Chichester v. Golden

204 F. Supp. 634, 1962 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4035
CourtDistrict Court, S.D. California
DecidedApril 18, 1962
Docket924-61
StatusPublished
Cited by9 cases

This text of 204 F. Supp. 634 (Chichester v. Golden) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Chichester v. Golden, 204 F. Supp. 634, 1962 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4035 (S.D. Cal. 1962).

Opinion

YANKWICH, District Judge.

The above entitled cause heretofore tried, argued and submitted is now decided as follows:

Upon the grounds stated in the Comment to follow judgment will be for the plaintiff as follows:

1. That plaintiff do have and recover of the defendants Howard Golden, Lucille Golden and Ruth S. Feldhorn only, the sum of $23,611.86 with interest from date of judgment.
2. That no exemplary damages in any amount be awarded against the above-named or any of the other defendants.
3. That plaintiff take nothing against the defendants Michael Golden, Stephen Golden, Judy Lynne Golden, a minor not represented by a guardian ad litem, Carl M. Feldhorn, Saul Goldstein and Lynne Furniture, Inc., or any of them, and that they and each of them have judgment against the plaintiff for their costs.
4. That plaintiff recover from Howard Golden, Lucille Golden and Ruth S. Feldhorn attorneys fees in the sum of $3,000.00 and their costs of suit.

Findings and judgment, limited strictly to the matters referred to in the Comment to follow, to be prepared by counsel for the plaintiff under Local Rule 7, West’s Ann.Code.

COMMENT

In this action a trustee in bankruptcy seeks to set aside a fraudulent conveyance under § 67, sub. d, (11 U.S.C.A. § 107, sub. d) and § 70, sub. c, (11 U.S. C.A. § 110, sub. c), of the Bankruptcy Act of 1938. The principles which govern such actions were established by the Supreme Court in the leading case of Shapiro v. Wilgus, 1932, 287 U.S. 348, 354, 53 S.Ct. 142, 77 L.Ed. 355. They have been followed ever since. (Sampsell v. Imperial Paper & Color Corp., 1941, 313 U.S. 215, 220, 61 S.Ct. 904, 85 L.Ed. 1293; In re Collins, 8 Cir., 1934, 75 F.2d 62; Fish v. East, 10 Cir., 1940, 114 F.2d 177, 182; General Kontrolar Co. v. Allen, 6 Cir., 1941, 124 F.2d 123, 125; Cook v. Ball, 7 Cir., 1944, 144 F.2d 423, 431; Heath v. Helmick, 9 Cir., 1949, 173 F.2d 157, 161; Hudson v. Wylie, 9 Cir., 1957, 242 F.2d 435, 436, 442.) Recovery is also sought under California Civil Code, § 3439.01 et seq. The conditions for recovery under these sections are set forth in Hickson v. Thielman, 1956, 147 Cal.App. 2d 11, 304 P.2d 122. See, Wood v. Kaplan, 1960, 178 Cal.App.2d 227, 230-231, 2 Cal.Rptr. 917.

Under the teaching of these cases acts, the object of which is to hinder and delay the creditors in enforcing their claims, are illegal and fraudulent against the creditors. The bankrupt and all persons participating therein with knowledge of the purpose may all be joined in an action by the trustee.

In the light of these principles a recovery in this case should be had against the bankrupt, his wife, Lucille Golden, and his sister, Ruth S. Feldhorn. The bankrupt established secret accounts. The wife knew of the establishment of the accounts and drew checks against one of them. The sister assisted *637 in the establishment of one account, lent $100.00, later repaid, towards its opening, executed the proper documents to enable the bankrupt to draw against it, and knew that the purpose was to “help him conduct his business operations despite harrassing creditors”. Carl Feldhorn, the sister’s husband, did not participate in any of these acts. So the judgment should not include him.

While including Mrs. Feldhorn it is stated for the record that the Court is satisfied that a $10,000.00 loan was actually made by the Feldhorns to the bankrupt which was never repaid. The Court is of the view, in the light of the eases cited, that there is no evidence in the record from which an inference can be made that the corporation Lynne Furniture, Inc. was organized with funds belonging to the bankrupt or that there can be traced to it any of the inventories of the merchandise which belonged to the bankrupt and which have not been accounted for. In view of these conclusions, the plaintiff is not entitled to judgment against the Corporation or the defendants Michael Golden, Stephen Golden, Judy Lynne Golden, and Saul Gold-stein who are alleged to have participated in its organization.

There is unrefuted evidence that the Corporation was established at the instigation of the bankrupt’s father, Michael Golden, with monies furnished by him or others whom he solicited, that the business, while somewhat the same as that conducted by the bankrupt, is managed entirely by the father and employees and salesmen whom he employs for the purpose, who receive either a salary or commission, which he pays. The fact that the bankrupt has, at times, done errands for the new business, for which he was paid, does not make him the owner or operator of it. Nor is the fact that when the bankrupt operated his own furniture business the father — who had been in the same business years before, occasionally assisted in answering telephones at the warehouse or in filling orders when the bankrupt was on the road — sufficient to indicate that the two businesses are the same and that, in reality, the Corporation is carrying on the former business of the bankrupt for his benefit or is his alter ego.

There is no law which prevents a person who has been adjudicated a bankrupt, but has been denied' a discharge, from later engaging in business or using his skill to earn a livelihood. The only effect of failure to receive a discharge is to subject his after-acquired property and future earnings to levy under attachment or execution in a proper proceeding. (Bankruptcy Act, §§ 14 to 17, 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 32-35.)

Were the failure to receive a discharge to stand in the way of earning a livelihood, a person denied discharge could, in effect be compelled to live on public charity or the charity of his family or friends. The Bankruptcy Act, while denying certain benefits to bankrupts who are not discharged, was not intended to punish them for the remainder of their lives by forcing them into a life of idleness or mendicity. The creditors are entitled to subject property in the name of others to the payment of their claims only if they can trace ownership to the bankrupt. They have attempted to do so in this case. The Court has limited recovery to certain individual defendants only and finds that the Corporation was organized with funds secured from others than the bankrupt, that none of its assets can be traced to funds or merchandise secreted or withheld by the bankrupt and that its business is not conducted for his benefit.

In order that the findings be limited strictly to the issues on which the court finds for the plaintiff, we state, that the placing of property, personal or real, in the name of others is not, of itself, either fraudulent or void. (See the writer’s opinion in In re Rogal, 1953, 112 F.Supp.

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204 F. Supp. 634, 1962 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4035, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/chichester-v-golden-casd-1962.