Chibuzor v. Corwin

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedNovember 23, 2020
Docket1:20-cv-09643
StatusUnknown

This text of Chibuzor v. Corwin (Chibuzor v. Corwin) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Chibuzor v. Corwin, (S.D.N.Y. 2020).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK ANTHONY O. CHIBUZOR, Plaintiff, -against- 20-CV-9643 (JMF) DR. STEVEN CORWIN; CURTIS KELLNER; ORDER OF DISMISSAL DR. DIANA HU, Defendants. JESSE M. FURMAN, United States District Judge: Plaintiff, proceeding without counsel, brings this action, for which the filing fee has been paid, alleging that Defendants discriminated against him on the basis of his sex in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”) and the New York State Human Rights Law (“NYSHRL”).1 For the reasons set forth below, the Court dismisses the amended complaint, but it grants Plaintiff leave to replead his claims within sixty days. STANDARD OF REVIEW The Court has the authority to dismiss a complaint, even when the plaintiff has paid the filing fee, if it determines that the action is frivolous, see Fitzgerald v. First E. Seventh Tenants

Corp., 221 F.3d 362, 363-64 (2d Cir. 2000) (per curiam) (citing Pillay v. INS, 45 F.3d 14, 16-17 (2d Cir. 1995) (per curiam) (holding that Court of Appeals has inherent authority to dismiss frivolous appeal)), or that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, see Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 583 (1999). The Court is obliged, however, to construe pro se

1 On November 16, 2020, Plaintiff filed the original complaint. On November 17, 2020, he filed an amended complaint, along with a letter explaining that he mistakenly dropped off the original documents at the wrong building. See ECF No. 2. Both the original complaint and the amended complaint were docketed, and they appear to be identical. pleadings liberally, see Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and to interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). BACKGROUND Plaintiff, a former pharmacy technician at New York Presbyterian Hospital, alleges that

he was fired after being “harassed by a female employee.” ECF No. 3, at 17. On August 17, 2019, as Plaintiff was compounding a medication in the “biological safety cabinet (the hood),” pharmacist Diana Hu “rushed into” Plaintiff and “punched/poked/hit” him in the left side of his stomach. Id. at 10. Plaintiff was “jolted” and “felt some shift of weight on the medication bin/tray which [he was] holding with [his] right hand; [Plaintiff] returned [his] left hand to the bin and there and behold, Diana was pulling the bin away from the hood.” Id. Hu told Plaintiff that she wanted someone else to compound the medication and left the room. Later that day, security officers told Plaintiff that he was to be sent home over the incident and escorted him out of the hospital. On August 22, 2019, Plaintiff was suspended and, on September 4, 2019, he was fired by pharmacy director Curtis Kellner. The amended

complaint is confusing, but Plaintiff appears to suggest that the initial incident arose from a disagreement over medication labels that he believes may have “ruffled the ego of the pharmacists,” including Hu. Id. at 11. Plaintiff maintains that Hu “rushed at” him and that any contact between them was caused by Hu “violating [his] space and her harassing behavior.” Id. at 12. Plaintiff filed a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”), and the EEOC issued a notice of right to sue on August 13, 2020. Plaintiff received the notice on August 20, 2020. DISCUSSION A. Proper Defendants Plaintiff’s complaint does not name the proper defendants for his Title VII claims. It is well established that individuals cannot be held liable under Title VII. See, e.g., Lore v. City of Syracuse, 670 F.3d 127, 169 (2d Cir. 2012).2 Instead, “the only proper defendant in a Title VII claim is the plaintiff’s employer.” Mira v. Kingston, 218 F. Supp. 3d 229, 235 (S.D.N.Y. 2016),

aff’d, 715 F. App’x 28 (2d Cir. 2017) (summary order), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 126 (2018). Because Plaintiff names only individuals as Defendants, the Court dismisses his Title VII claims for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted. If Plaintiff repleads his Title VII claims, he must name his former employer as a Defendant. B. Discrimination Claims Title VII provides that “[i]t shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer . . . to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). These antidiscrimination provisions prohibit employers from mistreating

an individual because of the individual’s protected characteristics, see Patane v. Clark, 508 F.3d 106, 112 (2d Cir. 2007), or retaliating against an employee who has opposed any practice made unlawful by those statutes, see Crawford v. Metro. Gov’t, 555 U.S. 271, 276 (2009) (holding that conduct is protected when it “confront[s],” “resist[s],” or “withstand[s]” unlawful actions). Mistreatment at work that occurs for a reason other than an employee’s protected characteristic

2 Individuals who actually participate in discriminatory conduct may be held personally liable under the NYSHRL. See Feingold v. New York, 366 F.3d 138, 157-158 (2d Cir. 2004). or opposition to unlawful conduct is not actionable under these federal antidiscrimination statutes. See Chukwuka v. City of New York, 513 F. App’x 34, 36 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting Brown v. Henderson, 257 F.3d 246, 252 (2d Cir. 2001)). At the pleading stage in an employment discrimination action, “a plaintiff must plausibly allege that (1) the employer took adverse employment action against him, and (2) his race, color,

religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor in the employment decision.” Vega v. Hempstead Union Free Sch. Dist., 801 F.3d 72, 86 (2d Cir. 2015). The plaintiff “may do so by alleging facts that directly show discrimination or facts that indirectly show discrimination by giving rise to a plausible inference of discrimination.” Id. at 87. Here, Plaintiff fails to allege any facts suggesting that his sex was a motivating factor in the decision to terminate his employment. Plaintiff simply alleges that he was suspended and then fired after a female employee “punched/poked/hit” him in the side and then reported the incident to security. ECF No. 3, at 10. Other than stating that the other employee was female, Plaintiff alleges no facts suggesting his sex had any bearing whatsoever on the events alleged in

the complaint.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Coppedge v. United States
369 U.S. 438 (Supreme Court, 1962)
Carnegie-Mellon University v. Cohill
484 U.S. 343 (Supreme Court, 1988)
Ruhrgas Ag v. Marathon Oil Co.
526 U.S. 574 (Supreme Court, 1999)
Hill v. Curcione
657 F.3d 116 (Second Circuit, 2011)
Lore v. City of Syracuse
670 F.3d 127 (Second Circuit, 2012)
Chukwuka v. City of New York
513 F. App'x 34 (Second Circuit, 2013)
Patane v. Clark
508 F.3d 106 (Second Circuit, 2007)
Harris v. Mills
572 F.3d 66 (Second Circuit, 2009)
Cuoco v. Moritsugu
222 F.3d 99 (Second Circuit, 2000)
Mira v. Kingston
218 F. Supp. 3d 229 (S.D. New York, 2016)
Feingold v. New York
366 F.3d 138 (Second Circuit, 2004)
Vega v. Hempstead Union Free School District
801 F.3d 72 (Second Circuit, 2015)
Salahuddin v. Cuomo
861 F.2d 40 (Second Circuit, 1988)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
Chibuzor v. Corwin, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/chibuzor-v-corwin-nysd-2020.