CHERENKO v. NEWMAR CORPORATION

CourtDistrict Court, W.D. Pennsylvania
DecidedDecember 10, 2021
Docket2:21-cv-00259
StatusUnknown

This text of CHERENKO v. NEWMAR CORPORATION (CHERENKO v. NEWMAR CORPORATION) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
CHERENKO v. NEWMAR CORPORATION, (W.D. Pa. 2021).

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA PITTSBURGH BERNADETTE M. CHERENKO, ) ) Plaintiff, ) 2:21-CV-00259-CRE ) vs. ) ) NEWMAR CORPORATION, ) ) Defendant, ) ) )

MEMORANDUM OPINION1

CYNTHIA REED EDDY, Chief United States Magistrate Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION

This civil action was removed to this court from the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County, Pennsylvania. Generally, Plaintiff Bernadette M. Cherenko alleges that she purchased a defective vehicle manufactured by Defendant Newmar, Corporation and brings breach of warranty under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act 15 U.S.C. § 2301, et seq., and Pennsylvania consumer protection law causes of action. This court has subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1367. Presently before the Court is Defendant’s motion to transfer venue to the United States District Court, Middle District of Florida Fort Myers Division pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). (ECF No. 4). For the reasons the follow, said motion is denied. II. BACKGROUND

1 All parties have consented to jurisdiction before a United States Magistrate Judge; therefore the Court has the authority to decide dispositive motions, and to eventually enter final judgment. See 28 U.S.C. § 636, et seq. Plaintiff alleges that she purchased a Newmar Bay Star Sport recreational vehicle (“RV”) in Florida and registered the RV in Pennsylvania. Plaintiff alleges that the RV included an extended warranty as well as other guarantees and warranties provided in the owner’s manual. Plaintiff claims that “as a result of the ineffective repair attempts made by Defendant through its authorized dealer(s), the vehicle is rendered substantially impaired and unable to be utilized for its

intended purposes and is worthless to Plaintiff.” Compl. (ECF No. 1-1 at ¶ 9). For example, Plaintiff complained about defects and or non-conformities to the following vehicle components: defective pump, wrong control board put on at service center, fittings were wrong, rear jack stays off the ground, passenger side window fogging up, hole in sofa cushion, oil stain on the pocket door, hood release needs adjusted, driver’s side 5th door back needs adjusted, the passenger side 4th door back not closing at all, hinge gets hung up on the driver’s side 2nd door, water leaking into two of the baggage doors, no water coming to any of the sinks, coach is uneven when leveled, driver’s seat valance rusting, water heater not working, indicator light stays on the water heater causing an overheating issue, jacks do not touch the ground, water all over the floor when sewage

rinse valve under sink is turned on, gate valve leaks, driver’s side seatbelt needs adjusted, screen door not closing tightly, and water leaking from kitchen sink. (Id. at ¶ 10). The Purchase Agreement for the RV entered into by Plaintiff and the Florida RV dealership, North Trail RV Center provides that “[a]ny actions of any kind relating to this sale and these goods . . . must be filed exclusiv[ely] in Fort Meyers(sic), Florida” and the sale of goods are governed by Florida Law. (ECF No. 1-1 at 13). Plaintiff does not name North Trail RV Center as a defendant nor asserts any claims against it. Plaintiff alleges that the vehicle is defective and exhibits nonconformities that substantially impairs its use, value and/or safety and asserts the following causes of action: (1) a Magnuson- Moss Warranty Improvement Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2301, et seq. claim (Count I); and (2) a Pennsylvania Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Act, 73 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 201-1, et seq. claim (Count II). Defendant seeks to transfer this case to the Middle District of Florida Fort Myers Division under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a).

III. DISCUSSION

A district court may transfer any civil action to another district or division that the case might have been brought if such a transfer is for the convenience of the parties and witnesses and is in the interest of justice. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has delineated several private and public factors that courts must balance when determining whether to transfer a case under the discretionary transfer statute. Jumara v. State Farm Ins. Co., 55 F.3d 873, 883 (3d Cir. 1995). The private Jumara factors include: (1) the plaintiff's forum preference as manifested in the original choice; (2) the defendant's preference; (3) whether the claim arose elsewhere; (4) the convenience of the parties as indicated by their relative physical and financial condition; (5) the convenience of the witnesses—but only to the extent that the witnesses may actually be unavailable for trial in one of the fora; and (6) the location of books and records (similarly limited to the extent that the files could not be produced in the alternative forum). Jumara, 55 F.3d at 879. Moreover, the Court must consider “all other practical problems that make trial of a case easy, expeditious and inexpensive” for the parties. Atl. Marine Const. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for W. Dist. of Texas, 571 U.S. 49 n.6, 134 S. Ct. 568, 581, 187 L. Ed. 2d 487 (2013). The public factors include “the enforceability of the judgment”; “the relative administrative difficulty in the two fora resulting from court congestion”; “the local interest in deciding local controversies at home”; “the public policies of the fora”; and “the familiarity of the trial judge with the applicable state law in diversity cases.” In re: Howmedica Osteonics Corp, 867 F.3d 390, 402 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting Jumara, 55 F.3d at 879–80). These factors change, however, where a forum-selection clause is present. In this instance, “district courts [must] adjust their usual § 1404(a) analysis in three ways[,]” by giving no weight

to the forum preferred by “the party defying the forum-selection clause[,]” considering the private interests to “weigh entirely in favor of the preselected forum[,]” and to only analyze the public interest factors. Atlantic Marine Const. Co., 134 S. Ct. at 581–82. See also In re: Howmedica Osteonics Corp, 867 F.3d at 407 (delineating discretionary transfer statute framework for applying forum selection clauses in multi-party cases that include non-contracting parties). In this case, while there is a forum selection clause in the sales agreement between Plaintiff and North Trail RV Center, North Trail RV Center is not a party to this action and there is no forum selection clause between Plaintiff and Defendant. Because “a forum-selection clause ‘can be enforced only by the signator[y] to [the] agreement[],’” In re: Howmedica Osteonics Corp, 867 F.3d at 407

(quoting Dayhoff Inc. v. H.J. Heinz Co., 86 F.3d 1287

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Bluebook (online)
CHERENKO v. NEWMAR CORPORATION, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/cherenko-v-newmar-corporation-pawd-2021.