Cheeks v. Powerball

• Court: District Court, District of Columbia
• Decided: June 6, 2025
• Docket: Civil Action No. 2024-2724
• Status: Published

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

JOHN CONRAD CHEEKS, : : Plaintiff, : Civil Action No.: 24-2724 (RC) : v. : Re Document Nos.: 11, 13, 14, 21 : POWERBALL LOTTERY, : : Defendant. :

MEMORANDUM OPINION

GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff John Conrad Cheeks filed this lawsuit pro se against Defendant, the Florida

Lottery, alleging that Defendant failed to pay Cheeks the Powerball Lottery grand prize of

$320,600,000 despite his lottery ticket matching the numbers displayed on the DC Lottery’s

website. The Florida Lottery moved to dismiss the Complaint under Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(b) for lack of personal jurisdiction, insufficient process, insufficient service of

process, and failure to state a claim. The Court determines that Mr. Cheeks has failed to

establish that this Court maintains personal jurisdiction over Defendant, and that the case must

therefore be dismissed. 1

1 The Florida Lottery’s response to the Complaint was initially due on November 1, 2024. That day, Cheeks filed a motion for default judgment, arguing that the Florida Lottery failed to respond to the Complaint. ECF No. 11. But that same day, the Florida Lottery moved for an extension of time to respond to the Complaint, ECF No. 10, which extension the Court granted on November 6, 2024. On November 12, 2024, Cheeks filed a motion for leave to file documents to support his claim and default judgment motion. ECF No. 13. Cheeks’s motion for leave, ECF No. 13, is GRANTED, and the Court will consider the exhibits Cheeks filed in addition to his pleadings in resolving the present motion to dismiss. But because the Court granted Defendant’s timely request for an extension, and Defendant timely filed this motion to II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On September 24, 2024, Cheeks filed his pro se 2 Complaint against the Florida Lottery. 3

See Compl., ECF No. 1. The Complaint names one defendant, “Powerball Lottery,” and

provided the address for the Florida Lottery in Tallahassee, Florida. Id. at 2, 4; Pl.’s Notice of

Errata, ECF No. 4. Cheeks appears to assert that this Court has diversity jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C.

§ 1332(a)(1), alleging that Cheeks is a citizen of Washington, D.C., that Defendant is

incorporated under the laws of the State of Florida and has its principal place of business in

Tallahassee, Florida, and that the amount in controversy—$320,600,000—exceeds $75,000.

Compl. at 3–4. Cheeks personally sent the Summons and Complaint to the Florida Lottery by

USPS Certified Mail. See Pl.’s Affidavit of Service, ECF No. 5.

In his Complaint, Cheeks alleges that he purchased a Powerball Lottery ticket from a

licensed retail vendor in Washington, D.C. on January 6, 2023. Compl. at 6; Pl.’s Resp. Def.’s

Mot. Dismiss (“Pl.’s Opp’n”) at 1, ECF No. 16. He further alleges that on January 7, 2023, the

Florida Lottery drew numbers that matched his ticket, thereby entitling him to the grand prize.

Compl. at 4. According to Cheeks, the Florida Lottery “issued Powerball Lottery numbers to the

D.C. Office of Lottery and Gaming as the winning numbers” to be posted on the DC Lottery’s

website, which Cheeks accessed to learn that he appeared to have won. Compl. at 6; Ex. 2 to

dismiss, Defendant has not “failed to plead or otherwise defend.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a). Cheeks’s premature motion for default judgment, ECF No. 11, is therefore DENIED. 2 After all relevant briefing, an attorney entered an appearance on Cheeks’s behalf. ECF No. 22. Because Cheeks filed his submissions pro se, the Court will still construe them liberally. See Frank v. Ridge, 310 F. Supp. 2d 4, 5 n.1 (D.D.C. 2004). 3 Cheeks’s Complaint originally named “Powerball et al.” as defendants, see ECF No. 1, but he later filed a Notice of Errata naming one defendant, “Powerball Lottery,” ECF No. 4. In his response to Defendant’s Motion to dismiss, Cheeks captioned his response to name “Florida Powerball Lottery” as the defendant. Pl.’s Resp. Def.’s Mot. Dismiss (“Pl.’s Opp’n”) at 1, ECF No. 16. For clarity, the Court refers to Defendant as “the Florida Lottery.”

2 Pl.’s Mot. File Supporting Docs., ECF No. 13-1. Rather than pay Cheeks, he alleges that the

Florida Lottery later used the prize money that was due to him to pay out a Powerball Jackpot

prize of $1,080,000,000 to a different winner on July 19, 2023. Compl. at 6. As a result, Cheeks

sued, seeking payment of the January 7, 2023 grand prize amount of $320,600,000, plus interest,

and $1,080,000,000 for damages from “using [his] grand prize amount to advance a larger grand

prize.” Id. at 4.

In response, the Florida Lottery moved to dismiss the Complaint for lack of personal

jurisdiction, insufficient process, insufficient service of process, and failure to state a claim.

Def.’s Mot. Dismiss (“Def.’s Mot.”), ECF No. 14. The Florida Lottery argues that the proper

defendant, if any, would be the Multi-State Lottery Association (“MUSL”), “an unincorporated

Iowa non-profit association, owned and managed by its state lottery members plus the lotteries of

the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico.” Def.’s Mot. at 5. Defendant explains that though

Powerball drawings occur at the Florida Lottery’s “draw studio in Tallahassee, Florida,”

Powerball is a game developed and overseen by MUSL. Id. While expressing some uncertainty

over whether Cheeks intended to serve the Florida Lottery, it responds and seeks dismissal of

this case, arguing that: (1) Cheeks failed to allege conduct by the Florida Lottery related to the

District of Columbia that would make the Florida Lottery subject to this Court’s jurisdiction, id.

at 7–10; (2) Cheeks failed to properly serve the Florida Lottery, a state agency, when he

personally mailed the Summons and Complaint, id. at 10–11; and (3) Cheeks failed to state a

claim to relief, as he failed to identify “any contractual or statutory obligations that the Lottery

allegedly breached,” id. at 12–14.

Cheeks’s two-page response does not address the Florida Lottery’s arguments directly,

but was filed with exhibits, including what appears to be a Declaration submitted by the D.C.

3 Office of Lottery and Gaming (“OLG”), a defendant in a separate case filed in the Superior

Court of the District of Columbia. See Ex. 1 to Pl.’s Opp’n, ECF No. 16-1. In that exhibit, the

declarant states that the numbers Cheeks saw displayed on the DC Lottery’s website were “test

numbers” that were inadvertently posted by one of the OLG’s contractors to the live, public

website, rather than the private, developmental website. Id. at 2. The Declaration also explains

that the numbers Cheeks saw were posted on January 6, 2023, and thus could not have been the

numbers drawn on January 7, 2023. Id.

III. LEGAL STANDARD

A. Pro Se Plaintiff

Courts construe a pro se complaint liberally and hold it “to less stringent standards than

formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam)

(quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)). A court may thus “examine other

pleadings to understand the nature and basis of . . . pro se claims” as alleged in a complaint.

Gray v. Poole, 275 F.3d 1113, 1115 (D.C. Cir. 2002). Nevertheless, a pro se plaintiff is not

excused from adhering to the applicable procedural rules and must “plead ‘factual matter’ that

permits the court to infer ‘more than the mere possibility of misconduct.’” Atherton v. D.C. Off.

of the Mayor, 567 F.3d 672, 681–82 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,

678–79 (2009)). Accordingly, a court “need not accept inferences unsupported by the facts

alleged in the complaint or ‘legal conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations.’”

Kaemmerling v. Lappin, 553 F.3d 669, 677 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (quoting Henthorn v. Dep’t of Navy,

29 F.3d 682, 684 (D.D.C. 1994)).

4 B. Rule 12(b)(2)

“[W]hen personal jurisdiction is in question, a court must first determine that it possesses

personal jurisdiction over the defendants before it can address the merits of a claim.” Kaplan v.

Central Bank of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 896 F.3d 501, 510 (D.C. Cir. 2018). On a

Rule 12(b)(2) motion to dismiss, the plaintiff bears the “burden of establishing a factual basis for

the exercise of personal jurisdiction over the defendant.” Crane v. N.Y. Zoological Soc’y, 894

F.2d 454, 456 (D.C. Cir. 1990). To meet his burden, a plaintiff “must make a prima facie

showing of the pertinent jurisdictional facts.” First Chicago Int’l v. United Exchange Co., 836

F.2d 1375, 1378 (D.C. Cir. 1988). A court will resolve factual disputes in the plaintiff’s favor

“[w]hen deciding personal jurisdiction without an evidentiary hearing,” but it “need not accept

inferences drawn by plaintiffs if such inferences are unsupported by the facts.” Livnat v.

Palestinian Auth., 851 F.3d 45, 57 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (quoting Helmer v. Doletskaya, 393 F.3d

201, 209 (D.C. Cir. 2004)). In addition to the pleadings, a court may consider evidence, such as

“affidavits and other written materials.” Mwani v. bin Laden, 417 F.3d 1, 7 (D.C. Cir. 2005).

“In a diversity case, the federal district court’s personal jurisdiction over the defendant is

coextensive with that of a District of Columbia court.” Helmer v. Doletskaya, 393 F.3d 201, 205

(D.C. Cir. 2004); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(1)(A) (providing that service of a summons

establishes personal jurisdiction over a defendant “who is subject to the jurisdiction of a court of

general jurisdiction in the state where the district court is located”). But a court’s exercise of

personal jurisdiction must still satisfy “the constitutional requirements of due process.” GTE

New Media Servs. Inc. v. BellSouth Corp., 199 F.3d 1343, 1347 (D.C. Cir. 2000). “The Supreme

Court has developed two distinct analyses of the circumstances in which a forum state may,

consistent with due process, authorize its courts to exercise contact-based personal jurisdiction

5 over a defendant”—general jurisdiction and specific jurisdiction. Erwin-Simpson v. AirAsia

Berhad, 985 F.3d 883, 888-89 (D.C. Cir. 2021). General jurisdiction “permits a court to assert

jurisdiction over a defendant based on a forum connection unrelated to the underlying suit.” Id.

at 889 (quoting Livnat, 851 F.3d at 56). In contrast, specific jurisdiction “depends on an

affiliatio[n] between the forum and the underlying controversy, principally, activity or an

occurrence that takes place in the forum State and is therefore subject to the State’s regulation.”

Id. at 888 (alteration in original) (quoting Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown,

564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011)).

IV. ANALYSIS

The Florida Lottery moves to dismiss the Complaint, arguing that Cheeks has failed to

establish this Court’s jurisdiction over it. Def.’s Mot. at 7–10. Cheeks does not respond to this

argument in his filings. To determine whether this Court has personal jurisdiction over the

Florida Lottery, the Court first reviews whether it has general jurisdiction and next, whether it

has specific jurisdiction. The Court agrees with the Florida Lottery that Cheeks has failed to

establish that this Court maintains personal jurisdiction on either basis. As a result, the suit must

be dismissed. Because the Court determines that it lacks personal jurisdiction, it does not

address the Florida Lottery’s arguments regarding insufficient process, insufficient service of

process, and failure to state a claim to relief.

A. General Jurisdiction

Cheeks has failed to establish that this Court maintains general jurisdiction over the

Florida Lottery because he alleges no facts supporting that the Florida Lottery is “at home” in the

District of Columbia. See Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 919. “A state court may exercise general

jurisdiction only when a defendant is ‘essentially at home’ in the State.” Ford Motor Co. v.

6 Montana Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 592 U.S. 351, 358 (2021) (quoting Goodyear, 564 U.S. at

919). “Absent exceptional circumstances, that standard is met only in the corporation’s ‘formal

place of incorporation or principal place of business.’” Shatsky v. Palestine Liberation Org., 955

F.3d 1016, 1024 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (quoting Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 139 n.19

(2014)). And courts have extended this reasoning to other entities. See, e.g., Livnat, 851 F.3d

at 56 (applying the “essentially at home” test to the Palestinian Authority); Waldman v. Palestine

Liberation Org., 835 F.3d 317, 332 (2d Cir. 2016) (“Daimler’s reasoning was based on an

analogy to general jurisdiction over individuals, and there is no reason to invent a different test

for general personal jurisdiction depending on whether the defendant is an individual, a

corporation, or another entity.”).

Here, Cheeks’s Complaint concedes that the Florida Lottery is organized under the laws

of the State of Florida, and that its principal place of business is located there. Compl. at 4. The

Florida Lottery argues that it “is an agency of the State of Florida; its operations, offices, and all

relevant activities are exclusively located within the State of Florida.” Def.’s Mot. at 8. Cheeks

alleges no facts to the contrary. Thus, Cheeks has not established that the Florida Lottery is “at

home” in the District of Columbia and subject to this Court’s general jurisdiction. See

Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 919.

B. Specific Jurisdiction

Cheeks has similarly failed to establish that this Court maintains specific jurisdiction over

the Florida Lottery because he alleges no relevant contacts between the Florida Lottery and the

District of Columbia that would support an exercise of jurisdiction. As relevant here, the District

of Columbia’s long-arm statute extends to “a claim for relief arising from the [defendant’s]

transacting any business in the District of Columbia;” or the defendant’s “causing tortious injury

7 in the District of Columbia by an act or omission outside the District of Columbia if he regularly

does or solicits business, engages in any other persistent course of conduct, or derives substantial

revenue from goods used or consumed, or services rendered, in the District of Columbia.” D.C.

Code § 13-423(a)(1), (4). Additionally, the Due Process Clause requires “‘minimum contacts’

between the defendant and the forum establishing that ‘the maintenance of the suit does not

offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice’” and that “the defendant’s conduct

and connection with the forum State are such that he should reasonably anticipate being haled

into court there.” Id. (first quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)); then

quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980)). “[W]here the

defendant deliberately has engaged in significant activities within a State, or has created

continuing obligations between himself and residents of the forum,” such that he has

purposefully “availed himself of the privilege of conducting business there, . . . it is

presumptively not unreasonable to require him to submit to the burdens of litigation in that

forum as well.” Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 675–76 (1985) (internal

quotation marks and citations omitted). But absent suit-related minimum contacts, a State may

not assert specific jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant. Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277,

283–84 (2014).

Here, the Florida Lottery argues that “the absence of forum-specific conduct precludes

the exercise of specific jurisdiction under both the D.C. statute and the Due Process Clause.”

Def.’s Mot. at 10. The Court agrees. Cheeks has failed to establish the Florida Lottery’s

minimum contacts with the District of Columbia.

The Complaint mentions the District of Columbia in two contexts, but neither is

sufficient. First, Cheeks alleges that he purchased his “Powerball lottery ticket . . . in

8 Washington D.C. for the drawing on Jan. 07, 2023.” Compl. at 4. The exhibit containing

Cheeks’s lottery ticket also supports that it was issued by the DC Lottery, not the Florida Lottery.

See Ex. 1 to Pl.’s Mot. File Supporting Docs., ECF No. 13-1. A plaintiff cannot establish

personal jurisdiction over a defendant unilaterally; the cause of action “must arise out of contacts

that the ‘defendant himself’ creates with the forum State.” Walden, 571 U.S. at 284 (quoting

Burger King, 471 U.S. at 475). Thus, Cheeks’s purchase of the ticket in the District of Columbia

does not constitute a contact between the Florida Lottery and the District. Second, Cheeks

alleges that the Florida Lottery “affirmed” and “issued Powerball lottery numbers to the D.C.

Office of Lottery and Gaming as the winning numbers.” Compl. at 4, 6. But as mentioned

above, Cheeks submitted what appears to be a Declaration in support of the District of

Columbia’s OLG, a defendant in a separate case filed in a different court, in which the declarant

states that the numbers Cheeks saw displayed on the DC Lottery’s website were “test numbers”

that were inadvertently posted by one of the OLG’s contractors. See Ex. 1 to Pl.’s Opp’n at 2–3.

Considering this additional evidence submitted by Cheeks, see Mwani, 417 F.3d at 7, the Court

concludes that the Declaration refutes Cheeks’s allegation of the Florida Lottery’s involvement

in the apparent mishap.

Given Cheeks’s status as a pro se litigant, the Court has also reviewed his other

submissions for factual assertions of the Florida Lottery’s forum-related conduct and found none.

See Gray, 275 F.3d at 1115. In his response to the Florida Lottery’s motion to dismiss, Cheeks

mentions that “Florida Powerball Lottery” is a “Licensed Affiliate of the Multi State Lottery

Association,” and asserts that “Defendants are interlocked in a Massive Lottery Cover Up

Scheme and are deceiving the Plaintiff with other known & unknown Actors who are building

wealth enormously.” Pl.’s Opp’n at 1. “‘Conclusory statements’ or a ‘bare allegation of

9 conspiracy or agency’ do not satisfy” Cheeks’s burden to establish personal jurisdiction. See

Livnat, 851 F.3d at 57 (quoting First Chicago Int’l, 836 F.2d at 1378–79). Even considering

Cheeks’s other filings, 4 the Court concludes he has failed to establish that this Court maintains

personal jurisdiction over the Florida Lottery.

V. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s motion to dismiss (ECF No. 14) is GRANTED;

Plaintiff’s motion for default judgment (ECF No. 11) is DENIED; Plaintiff’s motion for leave to

file supporting documents (ECF No. 13) is GRANTED; and Plaintiff’s motion for payment

demand (ECF No. 21) is DENIED.

Dated: June 6, 2025 RUDOLPH CONTRERAS United States District Judge

4 On January 22, 2025, Cheeks filed a motion titled, “Plaintiff’s Motion for Payment Demand of Lottery Jackpot on January 07,[ ]2023 and Payment for Unjust Enrichment by Defendant Powerball of Florida and Known Actors with Unknown Actors of July 19,[ ]2023 Prize.” ECF No. 21. This motion similarly lacks any allegations of the Florida Lottery’s contacts with the District of Columbia. Because this Court lacks personal jurisdiction over Defendant, this motion is also DENIED.