NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-3925-23
CHAYANA DIAZ,
Appellant,
v.
NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,
Respondent. ___________________________
Submitted October 22, 2025 – Decided November 14, 2025
Before Judges Mayer and Paganelli.
On appeal from the New Jersey Department of Corrections.
Chayana Diaz, appellant pro se.
Matthew J. Platkin, Attorney General, attorney for respondent (Janet Greenberg Cohen, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Hilary Cohen, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief).
PER CURIAM Chayana Diaz appeals from a final agency decision by the New Jersey
Department of Corrections (DOC) finding her guilty of prohibited act .201
(possession of anything not authorized for retention or receipt or not issued
through regular correctional facility channels) and upholding the imposition of
disciplinary sanctions. Because Diaz fails to sustain her burden to establish the
DOC's action was arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable or that the charged
regulation was vague, we affirm.
We glean the facts and procedural history from the record. Diaz, Chelsea
Braunskill, and another individual incarcerated at the same correctional facility
were placed in temporary housing based on intelligence reporting "illegal
activity." During the search of Braunskill's cell, "numerous items were found
relating to . . . [her] operating a seamstress business in the unit." A search of
Diaz's cell revealed "a piece of card stock with the lists of alterations and prices
[(price sheet)] . . . and on the paperwork was the contact information for Shantal
Braunskill to pay for orders over $20." Diaz was charged with prohibited act
.210.
Diaz pled not guilty and was assigned counsel substitute. Before the
hearing officer, Diaz stated she "th[ought officers conducting the cell searches]
mixed the property up" because the price sheet did not belong to her. Counsel
A-3925-23 2 substitute argued "[t]he property got com[m]ingled somehow [and] what was
found was never in [Diaz's] possession."
The hearing officer stated:
During a search of [Diaz]'s property by custody staff, a card listing various types of clothing alterations with prices was found. Also found, was contact information for the relative of another [inmate] for Cash App/Zelle purposes. [Diaz] denied guilt [and] stated the information was not hers. Staff reports [were] relied upon to determine guilt.
The hearing officer denied Diaz's request to call Braunskill as a witness because
she was "not a credible witness as she has received several charges related to
this same incident." The officer considered DOC staff reports and the price
sheet in finding Diaz guilty. In its final agency decision, the DOC upheld the
hearing officer's guilty decision.
On appeal Diaz argues: (1) the DOC's decision was arbitrary, capricious,
or unreasonable because she was denied the opportunity to obtain a statement
from Braunskill, and the hearing officer failed to specify why Braunskill was
not a credible witness; and the disciplinary report was hearsay; and (2) she was
"not aware of any specific rule which prohibited her possession of the alleged
price/order sheet – a single piece of paper – that bore the name of another
inmate" and the charged regulation was vague.
A-3925-23 3 "The scope of [our] review is limited." In re Herrmann, 192 N.J. 19, 27
(2007). Therefore, "[a]n administrative agency's final quasi-judicial decision
will be sustained unless there is a clear showing that it is arbitrary, capricious,
or unreasonable, or that it lacks fair support in the record." Id. at 27-28. We
consider:
(1) whether the agency's action violates express or implied legislative policies, that is, did the agency follow the law; (2) whether the record contains substantial evidence to support the findings on which the agency based its action; and (3) whether in applying the legislative policies to the facts, the agency clearly erred in reaching a conclusion that could not reasonably have been made on a showing of the relevant factors.
[Id. at 28 (quoting Mazza v. Bd. of Trs., 143 N.J. 22, 25 (1995)).]
"When an agency's decision meets those criteria, then a court owes
substantial deference to the agency's expertise and superior knowledge of a
particular field." Ibid. The "deferential standard applies to the review of
disciplinary sanctions." Ibid. "The party challenging the administrative action
bears the burden of demonstrating the agency has not made that showing." In
re Young, 471 N.J. Super. 169, 177 (App. Div. 2022) (citing Lavezzi v. State,
219 N.J. 163, 171 (2014)).
A-3925-23 4 Appellate courts will decline to address issues that were not preserved
before an agency. See State v. Robinson, 200 N.J. 1, 20 (2009) (explaining that
"[i]t is a well-settled principle that our appellate courts will decline to consider
questions or issues not properly presented to the trial court . . . unless the
questions . . . go to the jurisdiction of the trial court or concern matters of great
public interest." (alteration in original) (quoting Nieder v. Royal Indem. Ins.
Co., 62 N.J. 229, 234 (1973))); see also ZRB, LLC v. N.J. Dep't of Env't Prot.,
403 N.J. Super. 531, 536 n.1 (App. Div. 2008) (applying the principle in
Robinson and Nieder to appeals from administrative agency orders).
Applying these standards, we reject Diaz's argument that the DOC's final
agency decision was arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable. "[I]nmates are
afforded due process rights in disciplinary proceedings." Malacow v. N.J. Dep't
of Corr., 457 N.J. Super. 87, 93 (2018) (citing Avant v. Clifford, 67 N.J. 496,
525-33 (1975)). An inmate has a right to call witnesses except under a number
of circumstances, including relevancy, as determined by the hearing officer. See
N.J.A.C. 10A:4-9.13(a).
Here, the hearing officer denied Diaz's request to call Braunskill to testify
because Braunskill was "not a credible witness as she received several charges
A-3925-23 5 related to this same incident." Given our deferential standard, we discern no
reason to disturb this decision.
Moreover, we decline to disturb the DOC's final agency decision finding
Diaz guilty of prohibited act .210. Diaz's argument that the agency's final
decision was erroneous because her version of events was not specifically
deemed incredible is misplaced. There was substantial credible evidence in the
record to support the finding that she committed the cited prohibited act.
Finally, there is no merit to Diaz's assertion that hearsay, in the form of
the DOC staff reports, was improperly admitted in the hearing. It is unclear if
Diaz raised this hearsay argument during the disciplinary hearing or if the
reports are in fact inadmissible hearsay. Nevertheless, DOC disciplinary
hearings are administrative hearings, and the Administrative Procedures Act
(APA) provides they are not "bound by rules of evidence." N.J.S.A. 52:14B-
10(a); see also Hampton v.
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NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-3925-23
CHAYANA DIAZ,
Appellant,
v.
NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,
Respondent. ___________________________
Submitted October 22, 2025 – Decided November 14, 2025
Before Judges Mayer and Paganelli.
On appeal from the New Jersey Department of Corrections.
Chayana Diaz, appellant pro se.
Matthew J. Platkin, Attorney General, attorney for respondent (Janet Greenberg Cohen, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Hilary Cohen, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief).
PER CURIAM Chayana Diaz appeals from a final agency decision by the New Jersey
Department of Corrections (DOC) finding her guilty of prohibited act .201
(possession of anything not authorized for retention or receipt or not issued
through regular correctional facility channels) and upholding the imposition of
disciplinary sanctions. Because Diaz fails to sustain her burden to establish the
DOC's action was arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable or that the charged
regulation was vague, we affirm.
We glean the facts and procedural history from the record. Diaz, Chelsea
Braunskill, and another individual incarcerated at the same correctional facility
were placed in temporary housing based on intelligence reporting "illegal
activity." During the search of Braunskill's cell, "numerous items were found
relating to . . . [her] operating a seamstress business in the unit." A search of
Diaz's cell revealed "a piece of card stock with the lists of alterations and prices
[(price sheet)] . . . and on the paperwork was the contact information for Shantal
Braunskill to pay for orders over $20." Diaz was charged with prohibited act
.210.
Diaz pled not guilty and was assigned counsel substitute. Before the
hearing officer, Diaz stated she "th[ought officers conducting the cell searches]
mixed the property up" because the price sheet did not belong to her. Counsel
A-3925-23 2 substitute argued "[t]he property got com[m]ingled somehow [and] what was
found was never in [Diaz's] possession."
The hearing officer stated:
During a search of [Diaz]'s property by custody staff, a card listing various types of clothing alterations with prices was found. Also found, was contact information for the relative of another [inmate] for Cash App/Zelle purposes. [Diaz] denied guilt [and] stated the information was not hers. Staff reports [were] relied upon to determine guilt.
The hearing officer denied Diaz's request to call Braunskill as a witness because
she was "not a credible witness as she has received several charges related to
this same incident." The officer considered DOC staff reports and the price
sheet in finding Diaz guilty. In its final agency decision, the DOC upheld the
hearing officer's guilty decision.
On appeal Diaz argues: (1) the DOC's decision was arbitrary, capricious,
or unreasonable because she was denied the opportunity to obtain a statement
from Braunskill, and the hearing officer failed to specify why Braunskill was
not a credible witness; and the disciplinary report was hearsay; and (2) she was
"not aware of any specific rule which prohibited her possession of the alleged
price/order sheet – a single piece of paper – that bore the name of another
inmate" and the charged regulation was vague.
A-3925-23 3 "The scope of [our] review is limited." In re Herrmann, 192 N.J. 19, 27
(2007). Therefore, "[a]n administrative agency's final quasi-judicial decision
will be sustained unless there is a clear showing that it is arbitrary, capricious,
or unreasonable, or that it lacks fair support in the record." Id. at 27-28. We
consider:
(1) whether the agency's action violates express or implied legislative policies, that is, did the agency follow the law; (2) whether the record contains substantial evidence to support the findings on which the agency based its action; and (3) whether in applying the legislative policies to the facts, the agency clearly erred in reaching a conclusion that could not reasonably have been made on a showing of the relevant factors.
[Id. at 28 (quoting Mazza v. Bd. of Trs., 143 N.J. 22, 25 (1995)).]
"When an agency's decision meets those criteria, then a court owes
substantial deference to the agency's expertise and superior knowledge of a
particular field." Ibid. The "deferential standard applies to the review of
disciplinary sanctions." Ibid. "The party challenging the administrative action
bears the burden of demonstrating the agency has not made that showing." In
re Young, 471 N.J. Super. 169, 177 (App. Div. 2022) (citing Lavezzi v. State,
219 N.J. 163, 171 (2014)).
A-3925-23 4 Appellate courts will decline to address issues that were not preserved
before an agency. See State v. Robinson, 200 N.J. 1, 20 (2009) (explaining that
"[i]t is a well-settled principle that our appellate courts will decline to consider
questions or issues not properly presented to the trial court . . . unless the
questions . . . go to the jurisdiction of the trial court or concern matters of great
public interest." (alteration in original) (quoting Nieder v. Royal Indem. Ins.
Co., 62 N.J. 229, 234 (1973))); see also ZRB, LLC v. N.J. Dep't of Env't Prot.,
403 N.J. Super. 531, 536 n.1 (App. Div. 2008) (applying the principle in
Robinson and Nieder to appeals from administrative agency orders).
Applying these standards, we reject Diaz's argument that the DOC's final
agency decision was arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable. "[I]nmates are
afforded due process rights in disciplinary proceedings." Malacow v. N.J. Dep't
of Corr., 457 N.J. Super. 87, 93 (2018) (citing Avant v. Clifford, 67 N.J. 496,
525-33 (1975)). An inmate has a right to call witnesses except under a number
of circumstances, including relevancy, as determined by the hearing officer. See
N.J.A.C. 10A:4-9.13(a).
Here, the hearing officer denied Diaz's request to call Braunskill to testify
because Braunskill was "not a credible witness as she received several charges
A-3925-23 5 related to this same incident." Given our deferential standard, we discern no
reason to disturb this decision.
Moreover, we decline to disturb the DOC's final agency decision finding
Diaz guilty of prohibited act .210. Diaz's argument that the agency's final
decision was erroneous because her version of events was not specifically
deemed incredible is misplaced. There was substantial credible evidence in the
record to support the finding that she committed the cited prohibited act.
Finally, there is no merit to Diaz's assertion that hearsay, in the form of
the DOC staff reports, was improperly admitted in the hearing. It is unclear if
Diaz raised this hearsay argument during the disciplinary hearing or if the
reports are in fact inadmissible hearsay. Nevertheless, DOC disciplinary
hearings are administrative hearings, and the Administrative Procedures Act
(APA) provides they are not "bound by rules of evidence." N.J.S.A. 52:14B-
10(a); see also Hampton v. Dep't of Corr., 336 N.J. Super. 520, 529 (App. Div.
2001) ("[T]he [DOC] is an agency to which the APA applies."). Hearsay
evidence is permitted in disciplinary hearings. See Weston v. State, 60 N.J. 36,
50-51 (1972). Therefore, we conclude there is no merit to Diaz's hearsay
argument.
A-3925-23 6 Next, we consider Diaz's argument that the regulation is
unconstitutionally vague and therefore she was unaware of the prohibition.
Again, it is unclear if this argument was presented to the hearing officer.
Nevertheless, "[a] statute is unconstitutionally vague as applied if it 'does not
with sufficient clarity prohibit the conduct against which it [is] sought to be
enforced.'" Jenkins v. N.J. Dep't of Corr., 412 N.J. Super. 243, 256 (App. Div.
2010) (second alteration in original) (quoting State v. Cameron, 100 N.J. 586,
593 (1985)). The doctrine's purpose is to give "'fair warning' of prohibited
conduct." Id. at 257 (quoting Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104, 110 (1972)).
"Because the party claiming that a law is vague as applied may only challenge
the law as applied to his or her own conduct . . . it is only necessary to give the
party 'fair warning' that his or her conduct is prohibited." Ibid. Such warning
is provided when "a person of ordinary intelligence may reasonably determine
what conduct is prohibited so that he or she may act in conformity with the law."
Ibid. (quoting State v. Saunders, 302 N.J. Super. 509, 520-21 (App. Div. 1997)).
Diaz's argument fails because the regulation provided her fair warning that
having the price sheet constituted prohibited conduct.
Affirmed.
A-3925-23 7