NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FEB 3 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
VANESSA CHAVEZ, No. 25-8 D.C. No. Plaintiff - Appellant, 3:23-cv-08024-GMS v. MEMORANDUM* FORD MOTOR CREDIT COMPANY LLC; WIRB INCORPORATED, doing business as Western International Recovery Bureau,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Arizona G. Murray Snow, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted January 8, 2026 Phoenix, Arizona
Before: HAWKINS, RAWLINSON, and BRESS, Circuit Judges.
Plaintiff Vanessa Chavez (“Chavez”) appeals the district court’s grant of
summary judgment in favor of defendants Ford Motor Credit Company, LLC
(“Ford”) and WIRB, Inc. (“WIRB”). Chavez claims Ford illegally repossessed her
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. vehicle in breach of the peace, violating the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act
(“FDCPA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1692f, and an Arizona self-help statute, A.R.S. § 47-9609.
We review the summary judgment grant de novo, 2-Bar Ranch Ltd. P’ship v. U.S.
Forest Serv., 996 F.3d 984, 990 (9th Cir. 2021), and we affirm.
The FDCPA prohibits debt collectors from taking nonjudicial action to effect
dispossession or disablement of a debtor’s property if: “(A) there is no present right
to possession of the property claimed as collateral through an enforceable security
interest; . . . or (C) the property is exempt by law from such dispossession or
disablement.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692f(6). The FDCPA does not itself clarify when a
lender has a right of possession or when property is exempt by law from
repossession, so the parties agree we must look to the underlying state law to
determine whether a repossessor had a right to possess the property. See Aguayo v.
U.S. Bank, 653 F.3d 912, 923 (9th Cir. 2011) (“[D]ebt collection, and specifically
the right to repossess property that is the subject of a secured transaction, has deep
roots in common law and remains a fixture of state, not federal, law.”).
Borrowing from the Uniform Commercial Code, in Arizona a secured party
may utilize self-help repossession “if it proceeds without breach of the peace.”
A.R.S. § 47-9609(B)(2). “Breach of the peace” is not further defined, and the
Arizona Supreme Court has not yet interpreted the phrase in the repossession
context. Thus, we are called on to “predict how the highest state court would decide
2 25-8 the issue using intermediate appellate court decisions, decisions from other
jurisdictions, statutes, treatises, and restatements as guidance.” Vestar Dev. II, LLC
v. Gen Dynamics Corp., 249 F.3d 958, 960 (9th Cir. 2001) (quotation
omitted). Intermediate Arizona court decisions direct that the “facts of each
individual case must be evaluated to determine if a breach of the peace has
occurred.” Griffith v. Valley of Sun Recovery & Adjustment Bureau, Inc., 613 P.2d
1283, 1285 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1980) (quotation omitted).
As numerous courts have observed, there is a split in authority as to whether
continuing with repossession over the debtor’s oral protest, standing alone, can
constitute a breach of peace. See, e.g., Clarin v. Minn. Repossessors, Inc., 198 F.3d
661, 664 (8th Cir. 1999); Lavalley v. Skyline Recovery Serv., Inc., 788 F. Supp.3d
224, 228–33 (D. Mass. 2025); Wiley v. On Point Recovery Transport LLC, 757 F.
Supp. 3d 943, 947–49 (D. Ariz. 2024). Cases from several jurisdictions contain
language at least suggesting that an oral objection alone can be sufficient to require
the repossessor to cease efforts and try again at another time or resort to judicial
process. See, e.g., Gonzalez v. VJ Wood Recovery, LLC, 726 F. Supp. 3d 399, 404
(E.D. Pa. 2024) (“a verbal objection may constitute a breach of the peace”); Hopkins
v. First Union Bank, 387 S.E.2d 144, 146 (Ga. App. 1989) (“We further agree with
most courts which find a breach of peace by any creditor who repossesses over the
unequivocal oral protest of the defaulting debtor.” (quotation and alterations
3 25-8 omitted)); Hollibush v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 508 N.W.2d 449, 453 (Wis. Ct. App.
1993) (“Once a debtor unsuccessfully demands that a repossessing creditor desist,
the only way to enforce that demand is with a breach of the peace . . . .”).1 But there
are also a number of cases which have reached the opposite conclusion, i.e., that a
mere verbal objection to repossession, without more, does not amount to breach of
the peace. See, e.g., Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Koontz, 661 N.E.2d 1171, 1172–74
(Ill. App. 1996) (no breach of peace where debtor heard repossession occurring
during the night, rushed outside and yelled “don’t take it”); James v. Ford Motor
Credit Co., 842 F. Supp. 1202, 1208–09 (D. Minn. 1994) (“[D]efendants did not lose
the present right of possession merely because James said she did not want the car
taken away.”); Garcia v. Dezba Asset Recovery, Inc., 665 F. Supp. 3d 390, 407–08
(S.D.N.Y. 2023) (plaintiff did not plead sufficient facts to constitute breach of the
peace by alleging he confronted the repossessor and advised him not to repossess
the vehicle).
1 However, as the district court aptly noted, in many of these cases additional factors were present which increased the risk of violence or intimidation so that few of them actually relied solely on oral opposition to conclude there was a breach of peace. See, e.g., McLinn v. Thomas Cty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 535 F. Supp. 3d 1087, 1102–03 (D. Kan. 2021); Fulton v. Anchor Savs. Bank, FSB, 452 S.E.2d 208, 211– 12 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994); Morris v. First Nat’l Bank and Trust Co. of Ravenna, 254 N.E.2d 683, 686 (Ohio 1970).
4 25-8 We agree with the court in Wiley that “courts across all jurisdictions are
primarily concerned with a risk of violence in analyzing whether the specific facts
of each case demonstrate a breach of the peace.” 757 F. Supp. 3d at 949. As such,
courts have looked to a variety of factors to determine if there was a breach of peace
in self-help repossession, including “the use of law enforcement; violence or threats
of violence; trespass; verbal confrontation; and disturbance to third parties.” Rivera
v. Dealer Funding, LLC, 178 F. Supp. 3d 272, 279 (E.D. Pa.
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NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FEB 3 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
VANESSA CHAVEZ, No. 25-8 D.C. No. Plaintiff - Appellant, 3:23-cv-08024-GMS v. MEMORANDUM* FORD MOTOR CREDIT COMPANY LLC; WIRB INCORPORATED, doing business as Western International Recovery Bureau,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Arizona G. Murray Snow, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted January 8, 2026 Phoenix, Arizona
Before: HAWKINS, RAWLINSON, and BRESS, Circuit Judges.
Plaintiff Vanessa Chavez (“Chavez”) appeals the district court’s grant of
summary judgment in favor of defendants Ford Motor Credit Company, LLC
(“Ford”) and WIRB, Inc. (“WIRB”). Chavez claims Ford illegally repossessed her
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. vehicle in breach of the peace, violating the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act
(“FDCPA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1692f, and an Arizona self-help statute, A.R.S. § 47-9609.
We review the summary judgment grant de novo, 2-Bar Ranch Ltd. P’ship v. U.S.
Forest Serv., 996 F.3d 984, 990 (9th Cir. 2021), and we affirm.
The FDCPA prohibits debt collectors from taking nonjudicial action to effect
dispossession or disablement of a debtor’s property if: “(A) there is no present right
to possession of the property claimed as collateral through an enforceable security
interest; . . . or (C) the property is exempt by law from such dispossession or
disablement.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692f(6). The FDCPA does not itself clarify when a
lender has a right of possession or when property is exempt by law from
repossession, so the parties agree we must look to the underlying state law to
determine whether a repossessor had a right to possess the property. See Aguayo v.
U.S. Bank, 653 F.3d 912, 923 (9th Cir. 2011) (“[D]ebt collection, and specifically
the right to repossess property that is the subject of a secured transaction, has deep
roots in common law and remains a fixture of state, not federal, law.”).
Borrowing from the Uniform Commercial Code, in Arizona a secured party
may utilize self-help repossession “if it proceeds without breach of the peace.”
A.R.S. § 47-9609(B)(2). “Breach of the peace” is not further defined, and the
Arizona Supreme Court has not yet interpreted the phrase in the repossession
context. Thus, we are called on to “predict how the highest state court would decide
2 25-8 the issue using intermediate appellate court decisions, decisions from other
jurisdictions, statutes, treatises, and restatements as guidance.” Vestar Dev. II, LLC
v. Gen Dynamics Corp., 249 F.3d 958, 960 (9th Cir. 2001) (quotation
omitted). Intermediate Arizona court decisions direct that the “facts of each
individual case must be evaluated to determine if a breach of the peace has
occurred.” Griffith v. Valley of Sun Recovery & Adjustment Bureau, Inc., 613 P.2d
1283, 1285 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1980) (quotation omitted).
As numerous courts have observed, there is a split in authority as to whether
continuing with repossession over the debtor’s oral protest, standing alone, can
constitute a breach of peace. See, e.g., Clarin v. Minn. Repossessors, Inc., 198 F.3d
661, 664 (8th Cir. 1999); Lavalley v. Skyline Recovery Serv., Inc., 788 F. Supp.3d
224, 228–33 (D. Mass. 2025); Wiley v. On Point Recovery Transport LLC, 757 F.
Supp. 3d 943, 947–49 (D. Ariz. 2024). Cases from several jurisdictions contain
language at least suggesting that an oral objection alone can be sufficient to require
the repossessor to cease efforts and try again at another time or resort to judicial
process. See, e.g., Gonzalez v. VJ Wood Recovery, LLC, 726 F. Supp. 3d 399, 404
(E.D. Pa. 2024) (“a verbal objection may constitute a breach of the peace”); Hopkins
v. First Union Bank, 387 S.E.2d 144, 146 (Ga. App. 1989) (“We further agree with
most courts which find a breach of peace by any creditor who repossesses over the
unequivocal oral protest of the defaulting debtor.” (quotation and alterations
3 25-8 omitted)); Hollibush v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 508 N.W.2d 449, 453 (Wis. Ct. App.
1993) (“Once a debtor unsuccessfully demands that a repossessing creditor desist,
the only way to enforce that demand is with a breach of the peace . . . .”).1 But there
are also a number of cases which have reached the opposite conclusion, i.e., that a
mere verbal objection to repossession, without more, does not amount to breach of
the peace. See, e.g., Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Koontz, 661 N.E.2d 1171, 1172–74
(Ill. App. 1996) (no breach of peace where debtor heard repossession occurring
during the night, rushed outside and yelled “don’t take it”); James v. Ford Motor
Credit Co., 842 F. Supp. 1202, 1208–09 (D. Minn. 1994) (“[D]efendants did not lose
the present right of possession merely because James said she did not want the car
taken away.”); Garcia v. Dezba Asset Recovery, Inc., 665 F. Supp. 3d 390, 407–08
(S.D.N.Y. 2023) (plaintiff did not plead sufficient facts to constitute breach of the
peace by alleging he confronted the repossessor and advised him not to repossess
the vehicle).
1 However, as the district court aptly noted, in many of these cases additional factors were present which increased the risk of violence or intimidation so that few of them actually relied solely on oral opposition to conclude there was a breach of peace. See, e.g., McLinn v. Thomas Cty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 535 F. Supp. 3d 1087, 1102–03 (D. Kan. 2021); Fulton v. Anchor Savs. Bank, FSB, 452 S.E.2d 208, 211– 12 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994); Morris v. First Nat’l Bank and Trust Co. of Ravenna, 254 N.E.2d 683, 686 (Ohio 1970).
4 25-8 We agree with the court in Wiley that “courts across all jurisdictions are
primarily concerned with a risk of violence in analyzing whether the specific facts
of each case demonstrate a breach of the peace.” 757 F. Supp. 3d at 949. As such,
courts have looked to a variety of factors to determine if there was a breach of peace
in self-help repossession, including “the use of law enforcement; violence or threats
of violence; trespass; verbal confrontation; and disturbance to third parties.” Rivera
v. Dealer Funding, LLC, 178 F. Supp. 3d 272, 279 (E.D. Pa. 2016); see also Clarin,
198 F.3d at 664 (relevant factors include “(1) where the repossession took place, (2)
the debtor’s express or constructive consent, (3) the reactions of third parties, (4) the
type of premises entered, and (5) the creditor’s use of deception.” (quotation
omitted)). We conclude the Arizona Supreme Court would also look to similar
factors in analyzing breach of the peace, rather than adopting a bright-line rule. See
Griffith, 613 P.2d at 1285.
This leaves the question of whether, construing the facts in the light most
favorable to Chavez, there remains a genuine issue for trial as to whether WIRB’s
repossession breached the peace. The majority of factors identified above tip in
favor of the defendant. There was no use of law enforcement, no deception, no
violence or threat of violence, no physical obstruction, no significant reaction or
disturbance of third parties, and the repossession took place in a public parking lot.
Although there were verbal requests by Chavez for WIRB not to take the vehicle,
5 25-8 there is no allegation of screaming or profanity that exacerbated a risk of
violence. Significantly, Chavez was also given an opportunity to contact the lender
on the phone before WIRB proceeded with the repossession, and WIRB even agreed
to tow the car to Chavez’s home first to allow her to remove personal belongings
from the vehicle.
In light of the total circumstances present in this case, there was no breach of
peace during the repossession. The district court therefore properly granted
summary judgment to Ford and WIRB.
AFFIRMED.
6 25-8