Chase-Riboud v. Dreamworks, Inc.

987 F. Supp. 1222, 45 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1259, 26 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1276, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22095, 1997 WL 785617
CourtDistrict Court, C.D. California
DecidedDecember 8, 1997
DocketCV 97-7619 ABC (Jgx)
StatusPublished
Cited by9 cases

This text of 987 F. Supp. 1222 (Chase-Riboud v. Dreamworks, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, C.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Chase-Riboud v. Dreamworks, Inc., 987 F. Supp. 1222, 45 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1259, 26 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1276, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22095, 1997 WL 785617 (C.D. Cal. 1997).

Opinion

ORDER RE: PLAINTIFF CHASE-RI-BOUD’S MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

COLLINS, District Judge.

Plaintiff BARABARA CHASE-RIBOUD’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction came on regularly for hearing before this Court on December 8, 1997. The Court has reviewed the materials submitted by the parties, argument of counsel, and the case file relating to *1224 Plaintiffs Motion for a Preliminary Injunction. Because Plaintiff has failed to meet her burden, the Court DENIES Plaintiffs motion.

I. Procedural Background 1

For three years Plaintiff researched the story of the Amistad. Chase-Riboud Decl. ¶¶ 9-13. In Plaintiffs rendition of the Amis-tad story, she selectively used the historical record. Chase-Riboud Decl. ¶¶ 15-16. Where gaps in the historical record appeared, she filled them with fictional scenes and characters. Chase-Riboud Decl. ¶¶ 17-22. Plaintiff published her historical novel Echo of Hons in 1989. Since then, Plaintiffs book has sold over 500,000 copies and has been translated into five languages. Chase-Riboud Decl. ¶ 28.

In February 1993, Plaintiff granted Punch Productions, Inc. a 12-month option for the right to license the theatrical motion picture rights of Echo of Lions. Punch renewed that option for two six-month periods and an additional one-month period. Chase-Riboud Decl. ¶¶ 30. David Franzoni, the credited screenwriter for “Amistad,” participated in pitching the “Echo of Lions Project” to major studios, including Warner Brothers. Pet-tis Decl. ¶¶ 9-10 and Exh. B. After Punch abandoned the project, Defendants retained Franzoni as a writer. Chase-Riboud Deck, Exh. V.

In 1996, Defendants announced that Steven Spielberg would direct “Amistad.” Chase-Riboud Decl. ¶ 31. Plaintiff then contacted the Defendants to remind them that she had previously submitted her book to Amblin Entertainment, Spielberg’s production company. Chase-Riboud Decl. ¶ 32.

On October 16, 1997, Chase-Riboud filed a Complaint naming, inter alia, DREAM-WORKS, INC., DREAMWORKS FILMS LLC, DREAMWORKS DISTRIBUTION LLC, AND DREAMWORKS LLC (collectively “Defendants”). Plaintiffs complaint alleges that the Defendants impermissibly infringed on her copyrighted historical novel Echo of Lions when they made the motion picture “Amistad.”

Plaintiff filed a Motion for a Preliminary Injunction on November 17, 1997. Defendants filed their Opposition on November 26, 1997. On December 3, 1997, Plaintiff filed her Reply.

II. Discussion

A. Preliminary Injunction Standard

Traditionally, a court may issue a preliminary injunction if it determines: (1) the moving party will suffer irreparable injury if the relief is denied; (2) the moving party will probably prevail on the merits; (3) the balance of potential harm favors the moving party; and, depending on the nature of the case, (4) the public interest favors granting relief. International Jensen v. Metrosound U.S.A., 4 F.3d 819, 822 (9th Cir.1993).

Under the “alternative standard,” a party may obtain a preliminary injunction, by demonstrating either: (1) a combination of probable success on the merits and the possibility of irreparable injury if relief is not granted; or (2) the existence of serious questions going to the merits and that the balance of hardships tips sharply in its favor. Id. “The alternative standards are not separate tests but the outer reaches of a single continuum.” Id. (quotation omitted). Essentially, the trial court must balance the competing claims of injury and must consider the effect on each party of the granting or withholding of the requested relief. Schwarzer & Tashima, Federal Civil Procedure Before Trial, at 13:39.

B. Copyright Infringement Standard

To establish copyright infringement, Plaintiff must prove (1) that Plaintiff owned the copyrights, and (2) that Defendants copied Plaintiffs copyrighted work. Smith v. Jackson, 84 F.3d 1213, 1218 (9th Cir.1996). “Copying” is composed of two parts: “(1) circumstantial evidence of the defendant’s access to the copyrighted work; and (2) substantial similarity between the copyrighted work and the defendant’s work.” Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Film Ventures Int’l, Inc., 543 F.Supp. 1134, 1140 (C.D.Cal.1982); see also Direct Marketing of Virginia v. E. Mishan & Sons, Inc., 753 F.Supp. 100, 104 (S.D.N.Y.1990) (“Where direct evidence of *1225 copying is unavailable, plaintiff in a copyright infringement action can prove copying indirectly by proving access and substantial similarity.”) (citing 3 M. Nimmer & D. Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright 13.01[B] (1990)). 2

In this case, the parties do not dispute that Plaintiff has ownership of a copyrighted work — the historical fiction Echo of Lions. See Chase-Riboud Decl. ¶ 3 and Exh. E. The parties also do not seriously dispute that Defendants had access to Plaintiffs work. See Defs.’ Opp. at 36 (“Clearly, defendants had the opportunity to view Echo of Lions .... It was submitted to Amblin and was optioned by Punch, who did discuss an Amistad project with Franzoni.”); see also Footnote 1, supra. “Access is proven when the plaintiff shows that the defendant had an opportunity to view or to copy plaintiffs work.” Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald’s Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1172 (9th Cir.1977). Defendants’ “admission that they had access to [Plaintiffs' work] is a factor to be considered in favor of [Plaintiff].” Shaw, 919 F.2d at 1362. Thus, the determinative factor in this case is whether there is “substantial similarity” between Echo of Lions and Defendants’ “Amistad” or, “more specifically, whether there is a likelihood that Plaintiff[ ] will succeed on the merits at trial on the issue of substantial similarity.” Universal City, 543 F.Supp. at 1140.

In Krofft, the Ninth Circuit established a two-part test to determine whether substantial similarity exists between the plaintiffs and defendants’ works. The first inquiry is the “extrinsic” test and asks if there is similarity of ideas. See Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald’s Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1164 (9th Cir.1977); see also Universal City, 543 F.Supp. at 1140 (“The first inquiry is whether there is substantial similarity between the general ideas of the two works.”). “Substantial similarity” refers to similarity of expression, not merely similarity of ideas or concepts. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b).

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987 F. Supp. 1222, 45 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1259, 26 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1276, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22095, 1997 WL 785617, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/chase-riboud-v-dreamworks-inc-cacd-1997.