Chase Manhattan Bank v. Gavin
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Opinions
Opinion
BORDEN, J.
The issues in this appeal are whether Connecticut’s tax on the undistributed taxable income of four testamentary trusts and one inter vivos trust: (1) violates the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United States constitution;1 and (2) unduly burdens interstate commerce in violation of the commerce clause of the United States constitution.2 The named plaintiff, Chase Manhattan Bank, and the plaintiff cotrustees (plaintiff),3 appeal from the summary judgment of the trial court in favor of the defendant, Gene Gavin, the commissioner of revenue [175]*175services.4 By that judgment, the trial court rejected the plaintiffs requests for refunds of the 1993 income taxes paid by the plaintiff as trustee of the trusts. The plaintiff claims that the relevant taxation scheme, as applied to it, violates the due process clause and commerce clause of the federal constitution. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
After paying the 1993 income taxes imposed on the trusts in question, the plaintiff requested refunds from the defendant, who denied the requests. The plaintiff appealed from the denials to the trial court pursuant to General Statutes § 12-730.5 In the trial court, the parties stipulated to the facts, submitted uncontroverted affidavits, and filed cross motions for summary judgment. The court granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, denied the plaintiffs motion, and rendered judgment for the defendant. This appeal followed.
The facts are undisputed. The plaintiff, a banking corporation incorporated under the laws of New York, is the trustee of the four testamentary trusts, namely, the Parry Trust, the Dallett Trust, the Stewart Trust and the Worcester Trust, and of the single inter vivos trust, namely, the Adolfsson Trust. All of the trusts are resident trusts as defined by General Statutes § 12-701 (a) [176]*176(4).6 Each testamentary trust is “a trust . . . consisting of property transferred by will of a decedent who at the time of his death was a resident of this state”;7 General Statutes § 12-701 (a) (4) (C); and the inter vivos trust is “a trust . . . consisting of the property of . . . [177]*177a person who was a resident of this state at the time the property was transferred to the trust if the trust was then irrevocable . . . .” General Statutes § 12-701 (a) (4) (D) (i); see footnote 6 of this opinion. More specifically, the Parry Trust was established in 1968 under the will of Sidney L. Parry, a Connecticut domiciliary, and was probated in the Probate Court for the district of Westport. The Dallett Trust was established in 1975 under the will of John Dallett, a Connecticut domiciliary, and was probated in the Probate Court for the district of Westport. The Stewart Trust was established in 1974 under the will of Elvira R. Evens, a Connecticut domiciliary, and was probated in the Probate Court for the district of New Canaan. The Worcester Trust was established in 1936 under the will of James N. Worcester, a Connecticut domiciliary, and was probated in the Probate Court for the district of New Canaan. The Adolfsson Trust is an irrevocable inter vivos trust established in 1955 by Charles Anderson Dana, a Connecticut domiciliary.
It is undisputed that the plaintiff, acting as trustee, did not maintain any presence and was not a domiciliary or a resident of Connecticut, and that no asset of any trust was located in Connecticut in 1993. No aspect of trust administration was conducted in Connecticut in 1993, and except for this proceeding and the probate proceedings delineated later in this opinion, the plaintiff, as trustee, has not been the subject of any judicial or administrative proceeding in any Connecticut forum. The assets of all of the trusts for 1993 consisted solely of cash and securities held in accounts of the plaintiff as trustee in New York. None of the trusts earned any income derived from or connected with the ownership [178]*178or disposition of any interest in real or tangible personal property, or from a business, trade, profession or occupation carried on by the trust in Connecticut or elsewhere. None of the four testamentary trusts paid any income taxes to any other state for 1993. The stipulation is silent on this point regarding the inter vivos trust.
None of the beneficiaries of the Parry Trust or the Dallett Trust was, or has been since its establishment, a resident or a domiciliary of Connecticut. The current income beneficiary of the Parry Trust is Elizabeth B. Parry. The trustee has the discretion to distribute principal to her, and up to 50 percent of the income to the testator’s grandchildren. Upon the death of Elizabeth B. Parry, Elizabeth Parry Miller will become the beneficiary and, upon her death, the trust will terminate and the trust assets will be distributed to the testator’s then living issue. The current income beneficiary of the Dallett Trust is John Dallett, Jr. The trustee has discretion to distribute the principal to him. Upon his death, the trust will terminate and the trust assets will be distributed to Cassandra Dallett. With respect to the Stewart Trust, since its establishment in 1974, Grace Evens Stewart, a Connecticut domiciliary, was the income and discretionary principal beneficiary until her death in 1995, when the trust was terminated and the trust property was distributed to her two children, one of whom was a Connecticut resident. With respect to the Worcester Trust, the current income beneficiary is, and was during 1993, James N. Worcester, Jr., a Connecticut domiciliary, and upon his death the trust property will be distributed either by virtue of his exercise of a general testamentary power of appointment or, in default of such an appointment, to his four children, one of whom is currently a Connecticut domiciliary. With respect to the Adolfsson Trust, the sole current income beneficiary is, and was in 1993, Sandra Leigh Dana, a [179]*179Connecticut domiciliary.8 In 1993, she was thirty-nine years old. The trust will terminate upon her death or when she reaches the age of forty-eight, when the trust property will be distributed to her outright if she is then living or, if not, pursuant either to her testamentary power of appointment or to her then living descendants, who are currently her children living with her in Connecticut.
Under the terms of the Parry Trust, the plaintiff is excused from rendering periodic accounts to the Probate Court pursuant to General Statutes § 45a-1779 and, [180]*180accordingly, the plaintiff has not rendered any such periodic accounts. Thus, the plaintiff has been involved in probate proceedings only with respect to the probating of the testator’s will. Under the terms of the Stewart Trust, the plaintiff is excused from rendering periodic accounts to the Probate Court pursuant to § 45a-177; see footnote 9 of this opinion; and, accordingly, the plaintiff has not filed any such periodic accounts. At the termination of the trust in 1995, however, the plaintiff filed a first and final account for the period 1975 through 1995, which the Probate Court approved in February, 1996. With respect to the Dallett Trust, the plaintiff has filed six periodic accounts in the Probate Court for the periods 1976-79,1979-82, 1982-85, 1985-88,1988-91 and 1991-93, all of which the Probate Court approved.
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Opinion
BORDEN, J.
The issues in this appeal are whether Connecticut’s tax on the undistributed taxable income of four testamentary trusts and one inter vivos trust: (1) violates the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United States constitution;1 and (2) unduly burdens interstate commerce in violation of the commerce clause of the United States constitution.2 The named plaintiff, Chase Manhattan Bank, and the plaintiff cotrustees (plaintiff),3 appeal from the summary judgment of the trial court in favor of the defendant, Gene Gavin, the commissioner of revenue [175]*175services.4 By that judgment, the trial court rejected the plaintiffs requests for refunds of the 1993 income taxes paid by the plaintiff as trustee of the trusts. The plaintiff claims that the relevant taxation scheme, as applied to it, violates the due process clause and commerce clause of the federal constitution. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
After paying the 1993 income taxes imposed on the trusts in question, the plaintiff requested refunds from the defendant, who denied the requests. The plaintiff appealed from the denials to the trial court pursuant to General Statutes § 12-730.5 In the trial court, the parties stipulated to the facts, submitted uncontroverted affidavits, and filed cross motions for summary judgment. The court granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, denied the plaintiffs motion, and rendered judgment for the defendant. This appeal followed.
The facts are undisputed. The plaintiff, a banking corporation incorporated under the laws of New York, is the trustee of the four testamentary trusts, namely, the Parry Trust, the Dallett Trust, the Stewart Trust and the Worcester Trust, and of the single inter vivos trust, namely, the Adolfsson Trust. All of the trusts are resident trusts as defined by General Statutes § 12-701 (a) [176]*176(4).6 Each testamentary trust is “a trust . . . consisting of property transferred by will of a decedent who at the time of his death was a resident of this state”;7 General Statutes § 12-701 (a) (4) (C); and the inter vivos trust is “a trust . . . consisting of the property of . . . [177]*177a person who was a resident of this state at the time the property was transferred to the trust if the trust was then irrevocable . . . .” General Statutes § 12-701 (a) (4) (D) (i); see footnote 6 of this opinion. More specifically, the Parry Trust was established in 1968 under the will of Sidney L. Parry, a Connecticut domiciliary, and was probated in the Probate Court for the district of Westport. The Dallett Trust was established in 1975 under the will of John Dallett, a Connecticut domiciliary, and was probated in the Probate Court for the district of Westport. The Stewart Trust was established in 1974 under the will of Elvira R. Evens, a Connecticut domiciliary, and was probated in the Probate Court for the district of New Canaan. The Worcester Trust was established in 1936 under the will of James N. Worcester, a Connecticut domiciliary, and was probated in the Probate Court for the district of New Canaan. The Adolfsson Trust is an irrevocable inter vivos trust established in 1955 by Charles Anderson Dana, a Connecticut domiciliary.
It is undisputed that the plaintiff, acting as trustee, did not maintain any presence and was not a domiciliary or a resident of Connecticut, and that no asset of any trust was located in Connecticut in 1993. No aspect of trust administration was conducted in Connecticut in 1993, and except for this proceeding and the probate proceedings delineated later in this opinion, the plaintiff, as trustee, has not been the subject of any judicial or administrative proceeding in any Connecticut forum. The assets of all of the trusts for 1993 consisted solely of cash and securities held in accounts of the plaintiff as trustee in New York. None of the trusts earned any income derived from or connected with the ownership [178]*178or disposition of any interest in real or tangible personal property, or from a business, trade, profession or occupation carried on by the trust in Connecticut or elsewhere. None of the four testamentary trusts paid any income taxes to any other state for 1993. The stipulation is silent on this point regarding the inter vivos trust.
None of the beneficiaries of the Parry Trust or the Dallett Trust was, or has been since its establishment, a resident or a domiciliary of Connecticut. The current income beneficiary of the Parry Trust is Elizabeth B. Parry. The trustee has the discretion to distribute principal to her, and up to 50 percent of the income to the testator’s grandchildren. Upon the death of Elizabeth B. Parry, Elizabeth Parry Miller will become the beneficiary and, upon her death, the trust will terminate and the trust assets will be distributed to the testator’s then living issue. The current income beneficiary of the Dallett Trust is John Dallett, Jr. The trustee has discretion to distribute the principal to him. Upon his death, the trust will terminate and the trust assets will be distributed to Cassandra Dallett. With respect to the Stewart Trust, since its establishment in 1974, Grace Evens Stewart, a Connecticut domiciliary, was the income and discretionary principal beneficiary until her death in 1995, when the trust was terminated and the trust property was distributed to her two children, one of whom was a Connecticut resident. With respect to the Worcester Trust, the current income beneficiary is, and was during 1993, James N. Worcester, Jr., a Connecticut domiciliary, and upon his death the trust property will be distributed either by virtue of his exercise of a general testamentary power of appointment or, in default of such an appointment, to his four children, one of whom is currently a Connecticut domiciliary. With respect to the Adolfsson Trust, the sole current income beneficiary is, and was in 1993, Sandra Leigh Dana, a [179]*179Connecticut domiciliary.8 In 1993, she was thirty-nine years old. The trust will terminate upon her death or when she reaches the age of forty-eight, when the trust property will be distributed to her outright if she is then living or, if not, pursuant either to her testamentary power of appointment or to her then living descendants, who are currently her children living with her in Connecticut.
Under the terms of the Parry Trust, the plaintiff is excused from rendering periodic accounts to the Probate Court pursuant to General Statutes § 45a-1779 and, [180]*180accordingly, the plaintiff has not rendered any such periodic accounts. Thus, the plaintiff has been involved in probate proceedings only with respect to the probating of the testator’s will. Under the terms of the Stewart Trust, the plaintiff is excused from rendering periodic accounts to the Probate Court pursuant to § 45a-177; see footnote 9 of this opinion; and, accordingly, the plaintiff has not filed any such periodic accounts. At the termination of the trust in 1995, however, the plaintiff filed a first and final account for the period 1975 through 1995, which the Probate Court approved in February, 1996. With respect to the Dallett Trust, the plaintiff has filed six periodic accounts in the Probate Court for the periods 1976-79,1979-82, 1982-85, 1985-88,1988-91 and 1991-93, all of which the Probate Court approved. With respect to the Worcester Trust, the plaintiff has filed forty-one periodic accounts in the Probate Court, from 1937 through 1995, all of which the Probate Court approved. With respect to the Adolfsson Trust, the plaintiff has appeared in a Connecticut court only in connection with this tax appeal.
Before considering the merits of the plaintiffs claims, it is useful to discuss the application of the relevant tax statutes to the resident testamentary trusts and the inter vivos trust in this case. For the 1993 tax year, General Statutes § 12-700 (a)10 imposed a tax on “the [181]*181Connecticut taxable income” of all residents of the state, including trusts and estates. Under General Statutes § 12-701 (a) (9),* 11 the “ ‘Connecticut taxable income of a resident trust or estate’ shall mean the taxable income of the fiduciary of such trust or estate as determined for purposes of the federal income tax,” subject to certain adjustments not relevant here. Under § 12-701 (a) (4) (C), a resident testamentary trust is “a trust, or a portion of a trust, consisting of property transferred by will of a decedent who at the time of his death was a resident of this state . . . .” Thus, all of the testamentary trusts in this case were resident trusts, and all of their 1993 undistributed taxable income statutorily was taxable in Connecticut.
The statutory taxation scheme of an inter vivos trust, however, is somewhat different and more complicated. Under § 12-701 (a) (4) (D), a resident inter vivos trust is “a trust, or a portion of a trust, consisting of the property of (i) a person who was a resident of this state at the time the property was transferred to the trust if the trust was then irrevocable . . . .’’An inter vivos trust’s taxable income for federal income taxes is considered — again, subject to certain adjustments not relevant here — to be its “Connecticut taxable income.” [182]*182General Statutes § 12-701 (a) (9). This taxable income is modifiable, however, according to a formula that takes into account whether there is any resident non-contingent beneficiary of the trust.12 Under the formula set forth in § 12-701 (a) (4),13 if there are no nonresident noncontingent beneficiaries, there is no modification. If, however, there are nonresident noncontingent beneficiaries then, as the defendant explains: “[T]he income simply would be prorated and assigned to this State based upon the ratio of Connecticut noncontingent beneficiaries to all noncontingent beneficiaries. Thus, unlike testamentary trusts, inter vivos trusts are taxed only on that portion of the undistributed income which corresponds to the number of in-state [noncontingent] beneficiaries.” In the present case, therefore, the Adolfsson Trust is a resident inter vivos trust and, [183]*183because its only noncontingent beneficiary is a Connecticut domiciliary, all of its 1993 undistributed income was taxable in Connecticut.
As is evident from this discussion, the taxability of the income of the resident testamentary trusts in this case is based on the fact that the testators were Connecticut domiciliaries at the time of their deaths. The taxability of the income of the inter vivos trust in this case is based on the fact that the settlor of the trust was a Connecticut domiciliary when the trust was established and the beneficiary is a Connecticut domiciliary. The plaintiff claims that this taxation scheme, as applied to it, violates the due process clause and the commerce clause of the federal constitution. We consider the plaintiffs contentions in turn. We conclude that none of them is persuasive.
I
DUE PROCESS OF LAW
A
The Testamentary Trusts
With respect to the testamentary trusts, the plaintiff argues that, “[f]or Connecticut’s power to tax these trusts to be upheld, Connecticut must provide the trusts with contemporaneous benefits, protections and opportunities. Those in turn must be ‘fiscally’ relevant to the rights of the trustees to receive and enjoy income, and sufficient in scope to justify categorizing the trusts as domiciliaries. However, Connecticut did not provide the trusts with such contemporaneous benefits and protections because, for each trust, the trustees, the trust assets and administration were located outside of Connecticut’s borders.” (Emphasis in original.) We are not persuaded by this contention.
[184]*184We begin with the observation that our task of evaluating the constitutionality of a legislative scheme of taxation is somewhat circumscribed. “A state is free to pursue its own fiscal policies, unembarrassed by the Constitution, if by the practical operation of a tax the state has exerted its power in relation to opportunities which it has given, to protection which it has afforded, to benefits which it has conferred by the fact of being an orderly, civilized society.” Wisconsin v. J. C. Penney Co., 311 U.S. 435, 444, 61 S. Ct. 246, 85 L. Ed. 267 (1940).
“As a general principle, a State may not tax value earned outside its borders. See, e.g., Connecticut General Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 303 U.S. 77, 80-81 [58 S. Ct. 436, 82 L. Ed. 673] (1938). The broad inquiry in a case such as this, therefore, is ‘whether the taxing power exerted by the state bears a fiscal relation to protection, opportunities and benefits given by the state. The simple but controlling question is whether the state has given anything for which it can ask return.’ Wisconsin v. J. C. Penney Co., [supra, 311 U.S. 444].” ASARCO, Inc. v. Idaho State Tax Commission, 458 U.S. 307, 315, 102 S. Ct. 3103, 73 L. Ed. 2d 787 (1982).
This “broad inquiry” has been refined further into a two part test. “For a State to tax income generated in interstate commerce, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment imposes two requirements: [1] a ‘minimal connection’ between the interstate activities and the taxing State, and [2] a rational relationship between the income attributed to the State and the intrastate values of the enterprise. Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267, [272-73, 98 S. Ct. 2340, 57 L. Ed. 2d 197] (1978); see National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753, 756 [87 S. Ct. 1389, 18 L. Ed. 2d 505] (1967), [rev’d on other grounds, Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 306, 112 S. Ct. 1904, 119 L. Ed. 2d 91 (1997)]; Norfolk & Western R. Co. v. Missouri Tax Comm’n, 390 U.S. 317, 325 [88 [185]*185S. Ct. 995, 19 L. Ed. 2d 1201] (1968).” Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes of Vermont, 445 U.S. 425, 436-37, 100 S. Ct. 1223, 63 L. Ed. 2d 510 (1980); see also Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, supra, 306 (“The Due Process Clause ‘requires some definite link, some minimum connection between a state and the person, property or transaction it seeks to tax,’ Miller Brothers Co. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340, 344-45 [74 S. Ct. 535, 98 L. Ed. 2d 744] (1954), and that the ‘income attributed to the State for tax purposes must be rationally related to “values connected with the taxing state.” ’ Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, [supra, 273].”).
Neither party has focused at all on the second part of this due process test, namely, that the income attributed to the state must be rationally related to values connected with the taxing state.14 Both parties have focused, instead, on the first part of the due process test, namely, that there be some definite link or minimum connection between the state and the person, property or transaction it seeks to tax. We confine our discussion, therefore, to that aspect of the test as it applies to the facts of the present case.
In Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, supra, 504 U.S. 301, the United States Supreme Court confronted a due process challenge to North Dakota’s imposition of a statutory duty on an out-of-state mail order house to collect [186]*186and pay a use tax on goods purchased for use within the state. The court began its analysis by repeating the familiar two part test: “The Due Process Clause requires some definite link, some minimum connection, between a state and the person, property or transaction it seeks to tax, Miller Brothers Co. v. Maryland, [supra, 347 U.S. 344-45], and that the income attributed to the State for tax purposes must be rationally related to values connected with the taxing State, Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, [supra, 437 U.S. 273].” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, supra, 306. The court noted, moreover, that “[h]ere, we are concerned primarily with the first of these requirements.” Id.
The court then employed what it termed the “[c]om-parable reasoning”; id., 308; of the due process cases in the field of “judicial jurisdiction.” Id., 307. In doing so, the court “abandoned more formalistic tests that focused on a defendant’s ‘presence’ within a State in favor of a more flexible inquiry into whether a defendant’s contacts with the forum made it reasonable, in the context of our federal system of Government, to require it to defend the suit in that State.” Id. Thus, the court in Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, supra, 504 U.S. 308, overruled, “as superseded by developments in the law of due process,” the prior holdings in the area of sales and use taxes; see, e.g., National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Dept. of Revenue, supra, 386 U.S. 753; that “some sort of physical presence” of the seller in the taxing state is required in order for the state to impose such a duty on the seller. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, supra, 306-307.
In place of a physical presence of the out-of-state mail order seller, the court borrowed, from the adjudicative jurisdictional cases, the concept that such jurisdiction was valid where a foreign corporation had “purposefully avail [ed] itself of an economic market in the forum . . . .” Id., 307. Applying that concept, the court noted [187]*187that the seller had “engaged in continuous and widespread solicitation of business within [the] State.” Id., 308. This activity gave the seller “ ‘fair warning that [its] activity [subjected it] to the [tax] jurisdiction of [the state].’ ” Id.; see also id., 312 (“[w]e have, therefore, often identified ‘notice’ or ‘fair warning’ as the analytic touchstone of due process nexus analysis”). In this regard, the record indicated that the seller solicited business in North Dakota through catalogs and flyers, advertisements in national periodicals, and telephone calls. It made approximately $1 million in sales to approximately 3000 North Dakota customers, making all deliveries by mail or common carrier from out-of-state. Id., 302. In addition, the court noted with approval the state’s assertion that it had provided the following benefits to the seller: it had created an economic climate that had fostered demand for the seller’s products; it maintained a legal infrastructure that protected that market; and it disposed of twenty-four tons of catalogs and flyers mailed into the state by the seller every year. Id., 304. On this record, the court concluded that “there is no question that [the seller] has purposefully directed its activities at North Dakota residents, that the magnitude of those contacts is more than sufficient for due process purposes, and that the use tax is related to the benefits [the seller] receives from access to the State. We therefore agree with the North Dakota Supreme Court’s conclusion that the Due Process Clause does not bar enforcement of that State’s use tax against [the seller].” Id., 308.15
In light of this development in the law of due process and taxation, the question in the present case becomes [188]*188whether the contacts between the testamentary trusts and Connecticut are sufficient constitutionally for Connecticut to treat the trusts as if they were domiciliaries of the state and, therefore, for Connecticut to tax the undistributed income of the trusts. We conclude that they are.
It is well established that a state may tax all of the income of one of its domiciliaries, irrespective of the source of that income, geographical or otherwise. Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. 450, 462-63, 115 S. Ct. 2214, 132 L. Ed. 2d 400 (1995) (applying “well-established principle of interstate and international taxation — namely, that a jurisdiction, such as Oklahoma, may tax all of the income of its residents, even income earned outside the taxing jurisdiction” [emphasis in original]). Indeed, the court noted that “[t]his general principle] . . . ha[s] international acceptance. American Law Institute, Federal Income Tax Project: International Aspects of United States Income Taxation 4, 6 (1987) . . . .” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Chickasaw Nation, supra, 463.16
Traditionally, the due process justification for permitting a domiciliary to be taxed on his or her income, irrespective of its source, is based upon the fact that [189]*189the domiciliary state, by virtue of its legal system, provides the social structure pursuant to which the domiciliary receives and enjoys that income. Taxation of a domiciliary “is founded upon the protection afforded by the state to the recipient of the income in his person, in his right to receive the income and in his enjoyment of it when received. These are rights and privileges which attach to domicil within the state. To them and to the equitable distribution of the tax burden, the economic advantage realized by the receipt of income and represented by the power to control it, bears a direct relationship.” New York ex rel. Cohn v. Graves, 300 U.S. 308, 313, 57 S. Ct. 466, 81 L. Ed. 666 (1937); id., 316 (state may tax domiciliary on rental income from real property located outside state, and on interest income from bonds located and secured by mortgages on property outside state); Lawrence v. State Tax Commission, 286 U.S. 276, 281, 52 S. Ct. 556, 76 L. Ed. 1102 (1932) (state may tax domiciliary on income received from work performed outside state); see also Cream of Wheat Co. v. Grand Forks, 253 U.S. 325, 328-29, 40 S. Ct. 558, 64 L. Ed. 931 (1920) (state may tax corporation incorporated in state on value of intangible personal property located outside state).
Furthermore, on much the same reasoning, as the plaintiff suggests, the “United States Supreme Court itself has validated the proposition that the State where the trustee is located provides constitutionally significant protections, opportunities and benefits to the trust for tax purposes.” See Greenough v. Tax Assessors, 331 U.S. 486, 488, 67 S. Ct. 1400, 91 L. Ed. 1621 (1947) (Rhode Island municipality permitted to impose proportional ad valorem tax on out-of-state trust based solely on fact that one of two trustees resided in Rhode Island, even though trust property maintained in New York, trust beneficiary domiciled in New York, and Rhode Island trustee did not exercise trust powers in Rhode [190]*190Island). The court’s reasoning was that the state was entitled to treat the resident trustee like one of its individual domiciliaries, in the sense of exacting from it a tax because of the benefits and protections that its legal system provided to it. Id., 496. “A resident trustee of a foreign trust would be entitled to the same advantages from Rhode Island laws as would any natural person there resident.” Id., 495. “Rhode Island has imposed this tax, it may be presumed, for the general advantages of living within the jurisdiction.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 499 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
Thus, in the present case, as the plaintiff does not dispute, if the trustee was located in Connecticut, this state could tax the trust’s undistributed income consistent with due process of law, even though, for example, the trustee in fact made all of its investment decisions, and kept the actual cash and securities of the trust in accounts in a New York office. The reason for this is that, by virtue of its legal system, Connecticut would be providing the legal benefits and protections that enabled the trustee to perform its functions.
Similarly, the plaintiff suggests that the state where the trust is administered constitutionally may tax the income of the trust “because the State provides the locale for the bookkeeping, accounts and other instruments of trust income and investment.” See, e.g., Pabst v. Wisconsin Dept. of Taxation, 19 Wis. 2d 313, 329, 120 N.W.2d 77 (1963) (sufficient nexus for taxation of income of trust where “the trust’s business was transacted [in the taxing state] during the [taxing] period in question”). Thus, in the present case, if the trustee, although located in New York, had a trust administration office in Connecticut where it kept the trusts’ accounts and made their investment decisions, Connecticut could tax the trusts’ undistributed income. Presumably the same rationale would justify the imposition of that tax in light of the legal benefits and protections [191]*191provided by the state to the process of trust administration.
Admittedly, neither the trustee, its function of administering the trusts, nor the tangible evidence of the trusts’ intangible assets — the “cash” and the actual security certificates17 — is located in Connecticut. This state, however, by virtue of its legislative scheme, in effect has taken the practical position of treating the seats of the trusts — where they were established, and where their principal legal protections and benefits have been and are provided — as domiciliaries of the state. In passing on the constitutionality of a tax, “we are concerned only with its practical operation, not its definition or the precise form of descriptive words which may be applied to it.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Wisconsin v. J. C. Penney Co., supra, 311 U.S. 444. The “practical operation of the statute . . . controls constitutionality, and not the form in which a State has cast a tax.” Greenough v. Tax Assessors, supra, 331 U.S. 499-500 (Frankfurt,er, J., concurring). For purposes of due process of law, we see nothing less compelling about the benefits and opportunities provided by Connecticut to these trusts by its legal and judicial systems than those benefits provided by states in which either the trustee or the administration of a trust might be located.
[192]*192Indeed, the United States Supreme Court has recognized the analogy between a domiciliary and the seat of a trust for purposes of taxation. “For the purpose of the taxation of those resident within her borders, Rhode Island has sovereign power unembarrassed by any restriction except those that emerge from the Constitution. Whether that power is exercised wisely or unwisely is the problem of each state. It may well be that sound fiscal policy would be promoted by a tax upon trust intangibles levied only by the state that is the seat of a testamentary trust.” Id., 490. “There may be matters of trust administration which can be litigated only in the courts of the state that is the seat of the trust. For example, in the case of a testamentary trust, the appointment of trustees, settlement, termination and distribution under the provisions of the trust are to be carried out, normally, in the courts of [the] decedent’s domicile.” Id., 495. The court also has recognized that a trust is “ ‘an abstraction,’ ” that for purposes of taxation it “is sometimes dealt with as though it had a separate existence,” and that it may, for such purposes, be dealt with as an “entity” consisting of “separate interests, the equitable interest in the res of the beneficiary and the legal interest of the trustee.” Id., 493-94.
Thus, just as a state may tax all of the income of a domiciliary, irrespective of its source, because of the legal benefits and opportunities it provides that permit the beneficiary to receive and enjoy the income, so may Connecticut tax the income of these testamentary trusts because of the benefits and opportunities that it provides to them. All of the testamentary trusts were established under their respective wills because the laws of this state provide for such establishment. Blodgett v. Bridgeport City Trust Co., 115 Conn. 127, 142, 161 A. 83 (1932). The validity of a testamentary trust is normally determined by the validity of the will, which in turn is ordinarily determined by the law of the testator’s [193]*193domicile. R. Hendrickson & N. Silverman, Changing the Situs of a Trust (1998) § 1A.02 [1], Thus, Connecticut’s laws assure the continued existence of the trusts as mechanisms for the disposition of the testators’ property according to the terms of the trusts as provided by the respective wills. In addition, the original trustees and their successors were approved by the respective Probate Courts in which the wills were probated.
With respect to the Dallett Trust and the Worcester Trust specifically, from the inception of the trusts the Connecticut Probate Courts have been charged with extensive responsibilities for legal and administrative oversight. This oversight includes the specific powers and responsibilities: (1) to call the trustee to account for the trust estate; General Statutes § 45a-98;18 (2) to [194]*194require a bond of the trustee under appropriate circumstances, even where the will excuses a bond; General Statutes § 45a-473;19 (3) to fill a vacancy in the office of trustee if a trustee were to resign or decline to serve; General Statutes § 45a-474;20 (4) to authorize the sale of real estate held by the trustee; General Statutes § 45a-164;21 (5) to require the trustee to render periodic [195]*195accounts, to hold hearings upon interim and final accounts, to pass on the propriety of such accounts, and to make such orders as are necessary to secure the due execution of the trustee’s duties; General Statutes §§ 45a-178 and 45a-179;22 (6) upon the allowance of interim and final accounts, to determine the rights of the trustee and the interested parties; General Statutes §§ 45a-175 through 45a-177;23 and (7) to make appro[196]*196priate orders regarding the distribution of the trust [197]*197assets upon its termination. General Statutes §§ 45a-[198]*198481 through 45a-483.24 Moreover, the exercise of these [199]*199powers and responsibilities benefits both beneficiaries and trustees alike. It benefits the beneficiaries because: the probate courts serve as the repository of the documents that define the beneficiaries’ rights and that detail how their financial interests are being managed; the probate courts give legal effect to those documents and oversee those rights and interests; and those courts remain open and available to ensure that the beneficiaries’ rights are being protected. It benefits the trustee because it provides the legal cloak of approval that helps to shield the trustee from later claims of mismanagement or other misconduct. Thus, submission of accounts and any other matters of trust administration to, and approval by, the probate court gives the trustee the assurance that its administration of the trust will not be successfully challenged at a later time.
With respect to the Parry Trust and the Stewart Trust, the wills establishing those trusts excused the trustee from rendering periodic accounts. This privilege, however, was afforded by § 45a-177. Furthermore, the final and only account of the Stewart Trust was approved by the Probate Court, thus affording the beneficiaries the legal assurance that their rights had been protected adequately throughout the administration of the trust and that the trust assets had been distributed properly, and affording the trustee the legal assurance that its administration would not be challenged later. Similarly, when the Parry Trust terminates, the trustee will be required to file a final account, which upon approval will afford the beneficiaries and the trustee the same assurances. In addition, with respect to both trusts, if at any time any beneficiary wishes or wished to question [200]*200the administration of the trust by the trustee, the Probate Court would be open and available for that purpose. See 4 G. Wilhelm & R. Folsom, Connecticut Estate Practice, Jurisdiction and Procedure (1983) § 54, p. 162 and § 59, p. 177.
We conclude that this panoply of legal benefits and opportunities is comparable to those general legal benefits and opportunities that justify the imposition of taxes on the income of individual domiciliaries of the state. Just as the vitality of the trust as an economic entity is inextricably intertwined with the administration of the trust assets by a trustee located in New York, the viability of the trust as a legal entity is inextricably intertwined with the benefits and opportunities provided by the legal and judicial systems of Connecticut, and its legal viability is inextricably intertwined with its economic vitality. Neither its economic vitality nor its legal viability trumps the other for purposes of due process and taxation. These contacts with Connecticut are sufficiently “fiscal” in nature to satisfy the due process clause, and gave the testamentary trusts fair warning that they were subject to its tax jurisdiction.
This conclusion is consistent with that of the only court that has considered this precise question since Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, supra, 504 U.S. 298, was decided. In District of Columbia v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 689 A.2d 539, 540 (D.C. App. 1997), the District of Columbia Court of Appeals held that “the District of Columbia, consistent with the Due Process Clause, [may] tax the annual net income of a testamentary trust created by the will of an individual who died while domiciled in the District, when the trustee, trust assets, and trust beneficiaries are all presently located outside the District.” We agree with that court’s reasoning that “the relationship between the [state] and the testamentary trust of one of its residents is sufficiently close to justify the [state’s] classification of the trust itself as a [201]*201resident for purposes of taxation. A testamentary trust of a [state] resident, which has been probated in the courts of the [state], has a relationship to the [state] distinct from the relationship, if any, between the [state] and the trustee or trust assets. The [state’s] unquestioned power to resolve disputes over the trust and to order accountings to protect the trust corpus and beneficiaries from potential malfeasance by the trustee reflects the [state’s] justifiable, though not necessarily exclusive, jurisdiction over the trust itself. One commentator has characterized this authority as follows: ‘Under the “trust entity” theory, a testamentary trust is established and remains at the testator’s domicile, thereby giving the domiciliary court in rem jurisdiction independent and apart from the presence of the trustee, the trust assets or the trust beneficiaries.’ [G. Bogert, Trusts (6th Ed. 1987) § 177, p. 686].” District of Columbia v. Chase Manhattan Bank, supra, 544; see also First National Bank of Boston v. Harney, 111 Vt. 281, 297, 16 A.2d 184 (1940) (due process of law does not preclude state from taxing income of testamentary trust of domiciliary of state). We disagree, moreover, with the cases decided prior to Quill Corp. that have reached a contrary conclusion. See Augusta v. Kimball, 91 Me. 605, 40 A. 666 (1898); In re Swift v. Director of Revenue, 727 S.W.2d 880 (Mo. 1987); Pennoyer v. Taxation Division Director, 5 N.J. Tax 386 (1983); Taylor v. State Tax Commission, 85 App. Div. 2d 821, 445 N.Y.S.2d 648 (1981).
We also disagree with the plaintiffs contention that, because Quill Corp. involved the collection and payment of a sales tax and the present case involves an income tax, Quill Corp. is irrelevant to this case. First, in restating the second part of the two part test for measuring the limitations on taxation imposed by the due process clause, the court in Quill Corp. itself referred to the requirement “that the income attributed [202]*202to the State for tax purposes must be rationally related to values connected with the taxing State . . . .” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, supra, 504 U.S. 306. Thus, the reference to “income” in the context of a sales tax case suggests that the court, in borrowing the adjudicative jurisdictional due process analytic rubric, did not intend to confine that analytic model to sales taxes. Second, the reasoning of Quill Corp. does not suggest that the comparable reasoning that it employed — between due process for adjudicative purposes and due process for tax purposes — was confined only to the sales tax context. Although the application of the test may yield different results depending on the type of tax to which it is applied, we can perceive no reason why the fundamental due process test itself should vary depending on the type of tax involved. Indeed, Justice Scalia in his concurrence in Quill Corp. stated that, although he did not understand the court to have held that “the due process standards for adjudicative jurisdiction and those for legislative (or prescriptive) jurisdiction are necessarily identical”; id., 319-20; “[i]t is difficult to discern any principled basis for distinguishing between jurisdiction to regulate and jurisdiction to tax.” Id., 319 (Scalia, J., concurring).
The plaintiff also argues that implicit in the due process test for taxation are the requirements “that the benefits provided by the State seeking to tax be contemporaneous with the imposition of the tax,” and that there be a nexus between the benefits provided by the state and “the earning of the income which is the subject of the taxation.” To the extent that the first of these implicit requirements, namely, contemporaneity, suggests that the benefits be more than historical, we agree. We think that it is implicit in the due process test that the benefits afforded by the state to a domiciliary, or its functional equivalent, justifying the taxation of its [203]*203income, must generally span the time period during which the income was earned, and not solely antedate that time period without any continuing effect. The panoply of benefits afforded in the present case, however, amply meets that test. To the extent, however, that the plaintiff suggests that the benefits afforded by the state be related directly to the earning of the income — in the sense of being specifically economic or fiscal benefits — we disagree with the plaintiff. The general legal and social benefits afforded to a domiciliary that justify a state’s taxation of a domiciliary’s income are no more specifically economic or fiscal than those afforded by the state to the testamentary trusts involved in the present case.
The same reasoning applies to the plaintiffs contention that a “State that seeks to treat a taxpayer as a domiciliary for tax puiposes, and to impose an unapportioned income tax upon all of the taxpayer’s income, as Connecticut does in this case, must show greater ‘fiscally’ relevant contacts than a State that seeks to tax only a discrete portion of the taxpayer’s income.” Having legitimately chosen to treat these testamentary trusts as if they were domiciliaries for tax purposes, and having established sufficient minimum contacts with them to do so consistent with due process of law, the state also was entitled to tax all of their income, wherever generated, like that of other domiciliaries. We see nothing either in precedent or policy that requires more contacts for a resident trust than for an individual domiciliary.
B
The Inter Vivos Trust
The plaintiff claims that the taxability of the undistributed income of the inter vivos trust violates the due process clause because: (1) the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. [204]*204Virginia, 280 U.S. 83, 50 S. Ct. 59, 74 L. Ed. 180 (1929), is still good law and controls this issue; and (2) the residence of the beneficiary does not satisfy the due process requirement that the taxpayer’s taxable activity purposefully be directed at the taxing state. Although this is a closer case than that with respect to the testamentary trusts, we conclude that the state’s taxation scheme of the undistributed income of the inter vivos trust satisfies the due process clause.
The same fundamental test applies to the inter vivos test that applied to the testamentary trusts: whether “the taxing power exerted by the state bears fiscal relation to protection, opportunities and benefits given by the state. The simple but controlling question is whether the state has given anything for which it can ask return.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) ASARCO, Inc. v. Idaho State Tax Commission, supra, 458 U.S. 315. There must be some “definite link, some minimum connection between” the state and the income that it seeks to tax. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, supra, 504 U.S. 306.
In the present case, the critical link to the undistributed income sought to be taxed is the fact that the non-contingent beneficiary of the inter vivos trust during the tax year in question was a Connecticut domiciliary. The accumulated income eventually will be paid either outright to her when she reaches the age of forty-eight or, if she does not five that long, according to the exercise of her testamentary power of appointment or, in default of such exercise, to her then living descendants. Thus, during the tax year of 1993, as a Connecticut domiciliary she enjoyed all of the protections and benefits afforded to other domiciliaries. Her right to the eventual receipt and enjoyment of the accumulated income was, and so long as she is such a domiciliary will continue to be, protected by the laws of the state. We conclude that, just as a state may tax all of the present income of a domiciliary, irrespective of its place [205]*205or origin or the nature of its source, a state may, on the basis of the same justification, tax the income of an inter vivos trust that is accumulated for the ultimate benefit of a noncontingent domiciliary and that is subject to her ultimate power of disposition. Although the connection is more attenuated than in the case of a testamentary trust, it is sufficient for purposes of due process of law. Furthermore, just as the state may tax the undistributed income of a trust based on the presence of the trustee in the state because it gives the trustee the protection and benefits of its laws; see Greenough v. Tax Assessors, supra, 331 U.S. 496; it may tax the same income based on the domicile of the sole noncontingent beneficiary because it gives her the same protections and benefits. In both instances, the state has given something for which it can ask return, and there is a definite and sufficient link between the contact with the state and the income sought to be taxed.
This conclusion is consistent with the decision of the California Supreme Court in a closely analogous case. In McCulloch v. Franchise Tax Board, 61 Cal. 2d 186, 189-90, 390 P.2d 412, 37 Cal. Rptr. 636, appeal dismissed, 379 U.S. 133, 85 S. Ct. 278, 13 L. Ed. 2d 333 (1964), the court upheld, against a due process challenge, California’s taxation of the undistributed income of an out-of-state testamentary trust based solely on the California residence of the beneficiary of the trust. We agree with the reasoning of the California Supreme Court that “[t]he laws of the state of residence afford benefit and protection to the resident beneficiary . . . .” Id., 195. “The tax imposed by California upon the beneficiary is constitutionally supported by a sufficient connection with, and protection afforded to, [the] plaintiff as such beneficiary. [The] [p]laintiff in the instant case has, in his role as beneficiary during the years of his residence in this state, enjoyed the protection accorded by California for his eventual receipt of these assets. California. [206]*206grants the beneficiary the interim protection of its laws so that he may ultimately obtain the benefit of the accumulated income. . . . [The] [plaintiff’s residence here confers the essential minimum connection . . . necessary for due process of law.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 196-97.25
We are not persuaded that, as the plaintiff asserts, the holding of Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Virginia, supra, 280 U.S. 83, is still good law. In that case, a Virginia domiciliary had created an inter vivos trust of intangible personalty — stocks and bonds — of which a Maryland bank was trustee, and the stock and bond certificates were located in Maryland. The beneficiaries, however, were Virginia domiciliaries. Id., 89-90. The court held that the due process clause prohibited Virginia from imposing an ad valorem tax on the value of the intangibles the evidence of which was located in Maryland. Id., 93. The court reasoned that “intangibles — stocks, [and] bonds — in the hands of the holder of the legal title with definite taxable situs at its residence, not subject to change by the equitable owner, may [not] be taxed at the latter’s domicile in another State.” Id.
Central to the court’s reasoning in Safe Deposit & Trust Co., however, was the notion that the “adoption of a contrary rule would involve possibilities of an extremely serious character by permitting double taxation, both unjust and oppressive.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. That notion is no longer viable. The risk of double taxation of intangibles has long been abandoned as a limitation on taxation under the due [207]*207process clause. Curry v. McCanless, 307 U.S. 357, 363, 59 S. Ct. 900, 83 L. Ed. 1339 (1939). Furthermore, the Supreme Court has affirmed that a domiciliary of a state who is a beneficiary of an out-of-state trust may be taxed on the trust income received by her, even though the other state also taxed the value of the trust property that generated the income, and in doing so the court specifically distinguished Safe Deposit & Trust Co. See Guaranty Trust Co. v. Virginia, 305 U.S. 19, 22 and n.1, 59 S. Ct. 1, 83 L. Ed. 16 (1938). Indeed, in their treatise on state taxation, Professors Jerome Hellerstein and Walter Hellerstein stated: “It is unlikely that the Supreme Court would now hold, on the weakened authority of the Safe Deposit & Trust [Co.] case and under the later Due Process Clause cases, that the Due Process Clause bars the State of a resident trust or estate from taxing a nonresident trustee on income accumulated by the trust from intangibles held by the trustee who resides outside the State and administers the trust there.” 2 J. Hellerstein & W. Hellerstein, State Taxation (1992) ¶20.09 [2], p. 20-68.
We also are not persuaded by the plaintiffs contention that the absence of conduct constituting “purposeful direction” at Connecticut is fatal to the state’s power to tax the undistributed income of the inter vivos trust in the present case. It is true that, in Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, supra, 504 U.S. 307, as the plaintiff argues, the Supreme Court held that the out-of-state mail order seller’s purposeful conduct toward the North Dakota market was a sufficient due process surrogate for a physical presence in North Dakota, for puiposes of requiring the seller to collect and pay a sales tax. That does not mean, however, as the plaintiffs argument suggests, that such conduct is a sine qua non of due process tax analysis in all contexts. Purposeful conduct may sexve to satisfy the minimum contacts requirement. [208]*208So may, however, the presence in the state of a noncontingent beneficiary who receives the benefits and protections of the state’s laws. McCulloch v. Franchise Tax Board, supra, 61 Cal. 2d 195.
II
THE COMMERCE CLAUSE
The plaintiff claims that the taxation scheme applied to the testamentary trusts and the inter vivos trust in the present case violates the commerce clause of the constitution because: (1) there is an undue risk of systematic, multiple taxation on the income of the trusts; and (2) Connecticut does not provide a tax credit for any taxes paid to any other state by the trusts. We disagree.
We first consider, and reject, the defendant’s argument that the commerce clause does not apply because the trusts are not engaged in interstate commerce. In this respect, the entities that are affected by the state taxing scheme are in-state banks and out-of-state banks that provide financial services to trusts as trustees. Although there is nothing in this record to indicate the degree of competition between the two groups, it is fair to assume, in this economy, that they may be actual or prospective competitors to provide such services to the Connecticut market for them. See General Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278, 300, 117 S. Ct. 811, 136 L. Ed. 2d 761 (1997) (presence of actual or prospective competition between supposedly favored and disfavored entities in single market determines applicability of commerce clause).
We next address whether, as the plaintiff contends, there is no credit available to resident trusts, like those in the present case, for income taxes paid to another taxing state, or whether, as the defendant suggests, a credit is available to these trusts. The question of the availability of a credit is significant because, to the [209]*209extent that such a credit is available, the risk of multiple taxation is eliminated. We conclude that such a credit generally is available under the tax statutes and regulations, but that it only extends to taxes paid on income derived from real or tangible personal property, or from a business, trade, occupation or profession, and does not extend to taxes paid on income derived from intangible personalty, such as dividends, interest and capital gains from the sale of securities.26 Therefore, because [210]*210the property of all of these trusts consisted only of cash and securities in the tax year in question, no credit would have been available to them under the current tax scheme.27
The so-called “dormant commerce clause” refers, not to the affirmative grant to Congress to “regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the Several States”; U.S. Const., art. I, § 8; but to the clause’s “negative sweep .... The Clause, in Justice Stone’s phrasing, ‘by its own force’ prohibits certain state actions that interfere with interstate commerce.” Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, supra, 504 U.S. 309. In Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279, 97 S. Ct. 1076, 51 L. Ed. 2d 326 (1977), the United States Supreme Court developed a four part test for measuring state taxes against a dormant commerce clause challenge. “[W]e will sustain a tax against a Commerce Clause challenge so long as the ‘tax [1] is applied to an activity with a substantial nexus with the taxing State, [2] is fairly apportioned, [3] does not discriminate against interstate commerce, and [4] is fairly related to the services provided by the State.’ [Id.].” Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, supra, 311. This test emphasizes “the importance of looking past the formal language of the tax statute [to] its practical effect . . . .” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 310.
The plaintiff does not focus on any one part of this test. Instead, it argues that “a critical principle that [211]*211animates [the Complete Auto Transit, Inc. test]” is that it “is intended to preserve the long-standing prohibition against any State tax that subjects interstate commerce to a risk of systematic, multiple taxation.” Specifically, with respect to the testamentary trusts, the plaintiff contends that testators will have an incentive to appoint only Connecticut trustees because appointing a trustee in another state “necessarily subjects the testamentary trust to the risk of a second income tax in that State.” Thus, the plaintiff argues, this incentive “unconstitutionally promotes in-state trustees by subjecting trusts administered by out-of-state trustees to a risk of multiple taxation.” With respect to the inter vivos trust, the plaintiff contends that this risk is compounded because, in addition to the risk of an additional income tax in the state of residence of the trustee, “the presence of [other] such out-of-state [noncontingent] beneficiaries increases the risk of multiple taxation even further.”28 Although we agree that there are such incentives and risks, we conclude that they are too remote and speculative to constitute a dormant commerce clause violation.
The plaintiff concedes that not all risks of multiple taxation run afoul of the dormant commerce clause, because it is not the purpose of the clause to relieve those engaged in interstate commerce from bearing their fair share of state tax burdens. Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, supra, 430 U.S. 279. The plaintiff contends, however, that the incentive for Connecticut testators and settlors to select Connecticut trustees over out-of-state trustees because of the risk of multiple [212]*212taxation in cases in which out-of-state trustees are selected, discriminates against interstate commerce by putting that commerce “into an inferior position to local commerce.” We are not persuaded.
In our view, this assertion rests on an assumption about how Connecticut testators of testamentary trusts and settlors of inter vivos trusts are likely to select their trustees that rests on little more than speculation. First, as we indicated previously, although any resident trust would not be entitled to a credit for income taxes paid to another state based on the trust’s income derived from intangibles, it would be entitled to such a credit for such taxes derived from real estate or tangible personal property. Thus, it is only the trust income derived from intangibles, not all potential trust income, that does not qualify for such a credit. Second, the purported testator or settlor also would have to be unwilling to admit of any significant degree of probability that the other taxing state would not provide, in its taxing scheme, a credit for taxes paid to Connecticut by the trust. Third, a testator or settlor sophisticated enough to envision the risk of future multiple taxation by a state of a nonresident trustee also would likely be sophisticated enough to realize that, even if a local bank originally was named as trustee, there would be no guarantee that the bank’s trust operation would remain local, given the history of mergers and acquisitions in the financial services industry.
Thus, the plaintiffs position rests on the assumption that, despite all of these uncertainties, a Connecticut testator or settlor would choose a Connecticut bank, over an out-of-state bank, as trustee solely because of the potential for future multiple taxation of some portion of the trust’s future income. The choice of bank as trustee is likely to be animated by many imponderables, among them: the prior experience of the testator or settlor; the financial performance of the various banks [213]*213in the pool of available choices; the current location of the likely beneficiaries; the current location of the various banks in the pool; and, of course, the tax implications, if any. We simply are not sufficiently persuaded of the underlying validity of the plaintiffs assumption about how such a multifaceted decision as the choice of a trustee is likely to be made.
The observations of the United States Supreme Court, in a recent case involving the application of the dormant commerce clause, are appropriate to the present case. In attempting to assess the likely effects of the regulatory scheme at issue there, the court stated: “The degree to which these very general suggestions might prove right or wrong, however, is not really significant; the point is simply that all of them are nothing more than suggestions, pointedly couched in terms of assumption or supposition. This is necessarily so, simply because the Court is institutionally unsuited to gather the facts upon which economic predictions can be made, and professionally untrained to make them. . . . [S]ee Smith, State Discriminations Against Interstate Commerce, 74 Calif. L. Rev. 1203, 1211 (1986) (noting that ‘[e]ven expert economists’ may have difficulty determining ‘whether the overall economic benefits and burdens of a regulation favor local inhabitants against outsiders’). We are consequently ill qualified to develop Commerce Clause doctrine dependent on any such predictive judgments, and it behooves us to be . . . reticent about projecting the effect of applying the Commerce Clause here . . . .” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) General Motors Corp. v. Tracy, supra, 519 U.S. 308-309. Similarly, in the present case, we should be reticent about making predictions about the economic effects of the marginal incentives afforded by the state’s taxing scheme of resident trusts. We conclude, therefore, that the incentives [214]*214and risks have not been sufficiently established so as to result in a dormant commerce clause violation.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion CALLAHAN, C. J., and NORCOTT, PALMER and PETERS, Js., concurred.
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