PER CURIAM.
Appellant, Charles W. Stall, seeks to reverse an order of the district court granting defendants summary judgment on grounds of issue preclusion. Stall’s complaint in district court alleged that he had been discharged from employment due to his exercise of First Amendment rights. The district court concluded that Stall could not prevail on his constitutional claim because Stall had initiated a prior unemployment benefits action which was entitled to preclusive effect. That action had resulted in a determination that Stall’s discharge was for work-related misconduct, though not misconduct of sufficient severity to deprive Stall of unemployment benefits. The district court precluded Stall from relitigat-ing the reason for his discharge, and ruled that defendants were entitled to summary judgment on Stall’s constitutional claim.
We affirm the order of summary judgment because the district court properly determined the issue preclusive effect of Stall’s unemployment benefits action. Since our review of the district court’s order requires an understanding of the proceedings in Stall’s unemployment benefits action, we set out the history of that action in some detail.
Stall’s unemployment benefits action and his constitutional claim stemmed from his discharge from employment with the city of North Charleston, South Carolina. The Buildings and Grounds department of the City of North Charleston had employed Stall for some time. The employer asserted that sometime before March 1, 1982, Stall had indicated an intention to resign on or about March 1, 1982. The employer, acting on that information, asked Stall to state the date of his resignation, seeking such information for the department’s planning purposes. Stall’s memorandum response was that, because certain educational courses he sought were not then available, and for financial reasons, he was not then asking for a “leave of absence”. (Joint Appendix (App.) p. 84). The employer advised Stall by memorandum that the Stall response was “not satisfactory”. (App. p. 85). Several weeks later, Stall’s supervisor reviewed in a memorandum to Stall the employer’s contention; he concluded, “It is impossible to maintain a functional organization with a state of uncer-tainty____ I will not allow you to give and rescind notice of resignation. Therefore, I am advising you that your last day of employment with the City of North Charleston will be March 1, 1982.” (App. p. 86). Stall denied that he had ever stated an intention to resign.
During the period leading up to March 1, 1982, and apparently thereafter, Stall had been a member of the North Charleston School Board. In what appears to have been a spirited manner, an election contest for Chairman had developed on the School Board. Stall asserted that the Mayor of North Charleston had talked with him in early January, 1982, in the Mayor’s office and at lunch in an effort, among other things, to persuade Stall to vote for the [659]*659Mayor’s candidate for Chairman, one Altman. When Stall demurred, the Mayor made reference to his belief that Stall’s employment and School Board performance could reflect adversely on North Charleston. Stall asserted a feeling of intimidation, and a fear for his job, flowing from the Mayor’s comments and Stall’s reluctance to follow the Mayor’s wishes as to Mr. Altman.
Thus was the stage set for the various proceedings which followed. At about the time of the filing of his constitutional claim in district court, Stall also initiated an unemployment benefits action with the South Carolina Employment Security Commission [the Commission]. In the informal claim filed by Stall with the Commission, his claims for relief were twofold in nature; he asserted that he was discharged without any proper cause, and he further asserted that “I feel I was terminated for political reasons”. (App. p. 21). This material was contained in a “fact-finding report” of February 28, 1982, filed with the Commission. (App. p. 20, 21). In the complaint filed almost at the same time in the United States District Court for the State of South Carolina, Charleston Division, the claim for relief is predicated entirely on an assertion that Stall’s termination was in violation of Amendments One and Fourteen of the Constitution of the United States. In both proceedings, then, Stall advanced his constitutional claims; in the unemployment benefits proceeding he joined with that constitutional claim a denial of the employer’s stated reasons for his discharge.
Nonetheless, the central issue in the proceedings before the district court and before the Commission was, and had to be, the same: what was the reason for Stall’s discharge? If the reason for discharge was, for example, for a sufficiently severe failure to perform the duties of the employment, then obviously Stall could not prevail in either forum. On the other hand, if the Commission should have found that the discharge was not based on, for example, improper performance of duty, or other similar grounds, then Stall could prevail before that Commission, either because the asserted grounds for discharge were legally insufficient, or because his First Amendment rights had been violated by the discharge, or for both reasons. For emphasis, the issue before both the Commission and the District Court is restated: what was the reason for Stall’s discharge? Certain it is, however, that from the second paper shown (UCB Form 102) in the Joint Appendix Stall raised the issue of his First Amendment rights in the Commission proceedings in his statement there that “I feel I was terminated for political reasons”. (App. p. 21).
While the record does not reveal the nature or extent of the first level of proceedings on the unemployment benefits claim, before a “Claims Adjudicator”, that official filed a “Determination by Claims Adjudicator on Claim for Benefits” (App. p. 22), where she states her decision. The Claims Adjudicator determined that Stall had not been discharged, but in fact had voluntarily left his job with the city. It is clear from the report of the Claims Adjudicator that she did consider in her ruling on the claim for benefits of March 18, 1982, the arguments advanced by Stall concerning his First Amendment rights. The Claims Adjudicator writes, “He states he felt he was terminated for political reasons. After careful consideration ...”, the Adjudicator found that Stall had voluntarily quit his employment. (App. p. 22). Only by ignoring such language as that quoted can we conclude that the Claims Adjudicator did not consider the First Amendment rights advanced by Stall. Because of her conclusion as to voluntarily quitting, the Claims Adjudicator in the initial determination decided that Stall was not eligible for unemployment benefits.
Stall appealed the Adjudicator’s initial decision, which led to a full evidentiary hearing before the Commission’s Appeals Referee1. Both Stall and the employer [660]*660were represented by counsel in the hearing before the Commission’s Appeals Referee. Each presented extensive evidence concerning the reasons for Stall’s discharge. That evidence appears to have included a copy of Stall’s district court complaint,2 and substantial testimony by Stall to the effect that his discharge had resulted from his refusal to support the city mayor’s candidate for the North Charleston School Board position. Even a cursory reading of the transcript of the hearing before the Appeals Referee shows clearly that Stall chose to attack his discharge on two bases. First, he asserted vigorously that the assigned reason for his discharge was in fact not the true reason, in that he denied having ever indicated that he intended definitely to resign, and otherwise challenged the assertions of the employer on the charge of misconduct. Secondly, that same cursory reading shows very clearly that Stall advanced to the Appeals Referee in his testimony the conviction which Stall held that he had in fact been discharged for exercising his First Amendment rights. Stall recites the incident of lunch with the Mayor where Stall indicated that he disagreed with the Mayor’s request that he change his position on the North Charleston School Board matter and vote as the Mayor wanted him to vote. Stall states that he felt threatened “because I [Stall] interpreted the conversation as being very intimidating.” (App. p. 59). Stall goes on to say “Well, he [the Mayor] wanted me to pull for John Graham Altman for Chairman, and that I didn’t want to do that, and I felt like that, in itself, was going to, you know, cause ... one of the things to lose my job.” (App. p. 60). Further on, counsel for the employer asks Stall, “All right. Did the Mayor, in any way, threaten your job directly on the afternoon of January 8th, when he was talking to you about your School Board performance, as you described it?” Stall answered, “I felt like I was being intimidated by the things he was asking me.” (App. p. 68). Without belaboring the point, it is transparently obvious that Stall advanced as strongly as he could his arguments that his discharge came about because of his exercise of his First Amendment rights, and not because of any misconduct on his part as an employee. Given the facts of this case, it is difficult to see how Stall could have advanced more forcefully in the hearing before the Appeals Referee his contention that he was discharged for exercising his First Amendment rights.
The record of the proceedings before the Appeals Referee went forward to the Commission, in accordance with Commission procedure. On August 27, 1982, the Commission reached its decision, by which it “modified” the holding of the Claims Adjudicator that Stall had “quit his work without good cause” and found Stall “to have been discharged for misconduct connected to this work” and found Stall to be “disqualified from receiving benefits for eight weeks ...” (App. p. 88).
In that opinion, the Commission recites the contentions of the parties, dealing principally with the resignation-withdrawal of resignation question, and reciting, “He [Stall] maintains that he was discharged by [661]*661his employer for other reasons.” While the “other reasons” are not further explicated in the Commission’s opinion, the record of the evidentiary hearing was before the Commission, containing only one “other reason”, i.e., the assertion of violation of Stall's constitutional rights. (App. p. 88, 89).
Following the Commission decision, Stall perfected an appeal to the State’s Court of Common Pleas. There, Stall succeeded in reversing the portion of the Commission’s decision disqualifying him from receiving unemployment benefits for eight weeks. In the opinion filed in the Court of Common Pleas resolving the appeal to that court, the state court first indicated that
The Court is bound by the findings of the South Carolina Employment Security Commission by authority of § 41-35-750 which reads as follows: “In any judicial proceeding under this chapter, the findings of the Commission as to the facts, if supported by evidence and in the absence of fraud, shall be conclusive and the jurisdiction of the court shall be confined to questions of law.”
The facts, as indicated by the record are relatively simple.
(App. p. 90). The state court concluded that “[t]he sole reason for the termination was that the plaintiff had given and then rescinded his resignation,” (App. p. 91), accepting the finding of the Commission that Stall’s statement of intention to resign and subsequent rescission was misconduct, where the Commission found that “misconduct is a substantial disregard of the behavior which the employer has the right to expect of its employees, and the burden [is] upon the employer to show such. In this case, we believe the employer has done so____” (App. p. 92). The Court of Common Pleas then goes on to consider whether the misconduct of Stall in this case rises to meet the level of “misconduct” as defined under the South Carolina Employment Security Law, § 41-27-10 et seq., Code of Laws of the State of South Carolina 1976. Ultimately, its opinion concludes that Stall’s conduct did not rise to the degree of severity called for in the legal definition of “misconduct” under the South Carolina Employment Security Law and consequently held that Stall was entitled to unemployment benefits without any reduction in weeks of eligibility. (App. pp. 90-94). The Court of Common Pleas opinion indicates clearly that “the Court has carefully reviewed the documents, papers, and transcript of testimony in this case, together with the pleadings and has heard extensive argument of counsel and has carefully reviewed the various memoranda submitted by counsel.” (App. p. 90). If we accept this language as accurate, then it is patent that the question of the Constitutional issue was before the Court of Common Pleas of the State of South Carolina. It is this fact which seems to account for the language used by the Court of Common Pleas to the effect that “the sole reason for the termination” was misconduct. Stall v. North Charleston, No. 82-CP-10-3501, slip. op. at 2 (S.C.Cir.Ct. Dec. 21, 1982).
If the language used by the South Carolina Court, as quoted above, were ambiguous or susceptible of more than one meaning, an interpretation of the language would be appropriate. Here, however, “sole reason for termination” is, we conclude, susceptible of only one meaning, and that a most clear one.
We conclude that the reasons for Stall’s discharge were fully and fairly presented and litigated in an adjudicatory proceeding before the Commission and before the state court on the record made in the Commission proceedings in the context of Stall’s unemployment benefits claim. Stall had a full and fair opportunity fully to present his constitutional contentions in an adjudicatory hearing before a court of competent jurisdiction, vested with the duty to hear and resolve questions appearing in the case before it. Supporting this conclusion is the provision of the South Carolina Administrative Procedures Act, § l-23-380(g), where the South Carolina legislature has provided the appropriate standards which a court of record must employ in considering a decision rendered by an administrative agency. [662]*662In that section, the legislature has clearly-provided as follows:
The court may reverse or modify the decision [of the administrative agency] if substantial rights of the appellant have been prejudiced because the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions or decisions are: (1) in violation of constitutional or statutory provisions; ...
(Emphasis added). We should not conclude that the courts of South Carolina will not follow the requirements of their legislature.
Further, reading together the recitation in the opinion of the Court of Common Pleas that it had “carefully reviewed” all documents, pleadings, etc., in the case, (App. p. 90) and the language of the statute concerning violation of constitutional provisions leads inexorably to the conclusion that the constitutional contention raised by Stall was considered by the Court of Common Pleas. It is this conclusion which appears to have led that court to refer to misconduct as the “sole reason” for the discharge. The adjectival word, “sole”, does not appear elsewhere in the Appendix in any of the various findings and conclusions reached in the proceedings prior to the hearing and opinion in the Court of Common Pleas.
Following the Order and Opinion of December 21, 1983, of the Court of Common Pleas, that Court entered a further Order on March 1,1984, in which the Court granted the motion of plaintiff for an Order “construing and clarifying” the Order of December 21, 1982. In pertinent part, this latter Order reads, “in an effort to be fair to the litigants in this case, the Court now construes its Order of December 21, 1982. Before me was a legal issue — I decided a legal issue. The proceeding before me was legal not factual in nature.” (App. p. 97).
This statement comports with the provisions of Section 41-27-10 et seq. South Carolina Code of Laws 1976 as amended, to the effect that facts found by the administrative body, if supported by evidence and in the absence of fraud, shall be conclusive in the reviewing court, with that court confined to questions of law.
Of interest, however, footnote 2 of the opinion of the District Court states that “The defendants have appealed this Order.” (App. p. 103). The record before us discloses nothing further concerning this appeal, but certainly an appeal has been taken by defendants from the Court of Common Pleas, at least as to this “clarifying” order.
Following the decision of the Court of Common Pleas of December 21, 1982, Stall did not appeal further to the Supreme Court of South Carolina, but then attempted to proceed on his complaint in the United States District Court. The dissent argues that Stall could not appeal because he had won all that he could win in the proceedings in the Court of Common Pleas. Assuming, without agreeing, that this is so, the fact is that the issue had been decided. The reason for Stall’s discharge was found to be misconduct. Only by relit-igating this very issue could-Stall proceed in the district court, offering there the same evidence in his constitutional claim which had been fully considered in the proceedings leading up to and including those before the Court of Common Pleas.
It should be noted, however, that Stall could have made a respectable argument that he had been aggrieved by the Court of Common Pleas finding of misconduct, especially where he asserted he had committed no misconduct and that his discharge was in violation of his constitutional rights. No further monetary award was due to Stall on his unemployment benefits claim, but the consequences of a finding of misconduct on future employment, etc., gave Stall reason at least to attempt to appeal. Of course, the cryptic note as to the defendants’ appeal of the second, “clarifying” order of the Court of Common Pleas may have afforded a vehicle for cross-appeal, as well. So far as the record discloses, however, Stall made no effort to appeal.
Upon proceeding in the United States District Court, Stall was met, as might reasonably have been expected, with [663]*663a defense of issue preclusion on his assertion of a constitutional violation as the reason for his discharge. The basis for the defense was that the issue of the reason for his discharge had been heard and determined in the prior proceedings. The foregoing discussion of Stall’s unemployment benefits claim, and the procedures involved in that claim, demonstrates the reasons for the district court’s application of the principles of issue preclusion in granting defendants summary judgment on Stall’s constitutional claim. It is well settled that federal courts must give the same preclusive effect to a state court judgment as that judgment would be given by that state’s courts. Mi-gra v. Warren City School District Board of Education, 465 U.S. 75,104 S.Ct. 892, 79 L.Ed.2d 56 (1984); Kremer v. Chemical Construction Co., 456 U.S. 461, 102 S.Ct. 1883, 72 L.Ed.2d 262 (1982); Moore v. Bonner, 695 F.2d 799 (4th Cir.1982).
The “other tribunal” question troubling to the court in footnote 3 in Anderson v. Babb, 632 F.2d 300, 307 (4th Cir.1980) can arise in this case only by attenuated indirection. In Anderson, the District Court was construing a North Carolina statute which had been construed by that state’s State Board of Elections, a body made up of a “deliberately intended political composition” of three Democrats and two Republicans. The District Court construed the statute differently than had the State Board. Of far greater significance, however, no court of the State of North Carolina had passed on the State Board’s interpretation before the matter reached the District Court.
Further, as noted by the district court, Kremer and Moore stand for the proposition that the issue preclusive effect of a state court’s review of an administrative decision is not undermined merely because the state court did not conduct a de novo review. Thus, as the district court correctly recognized, the question of whether Stall was precluded in federal court from relit-igating the reason for his discharge turned on South Carolina’s law on issue preclusion.
Recent decisions from the South Carolina courts indicate that issue preclusion is proper if the issue in question was presented in a prior adjudicatory proceeding in which the party against whom preclusion is sought had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue. See, e.g., Beall v. Conerly, 281 S.C. 363, 315 S.E.2d 186 (S.C.App.1984), Graham v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Insurance Co., 277 S.C. 389, 287 S.E.2d 495 (1982). (In Graham, the court held that the issue as to which preclusion was sought had not been in fact before the court below, but the language of the opinion is instructive as to the status of South Carolina law on the point at issue in this case.) In addition, as the district court observed, the South Carolina Supreme Court has consistently ruled that an unappealed order is binding on all parties before the court, and is entitled to preclusive effect. Lowe v. Clayton, 264 S.C. 75, 212 S.E. 582 (1972); Earle v. Aycock, 276 S.C. 471, 279 S.E.2d 614 (1981). In Graham, Lowe, and Earle, the party against whom a previous adverse decision was asserted as issue preclusive had not appealed from that previous adverse decision. In Graham, the court cites prior cases, the earliest cited being 1910, which support the discussion in Graham, though the earlier cases speak in terms of estoppel and res adjudicata, rather than in terms of the more recent analyses using the phrases of claim preclusion and issue preclusion. In Earle, in a fact pattern somewhat similar to that of this case, Earle (the aggrieved party) had not appealed from an adverse decision of the state grievance committee, which committee found that Earle had been properly discharged. Though we note that Earle did not appeal from the committee to the courts, as happened in this case, certain of the language of the opinion of the Supreme Court of South Carolina is nonetheless pertinent in showing that court’s view of the law of that state. Quoting from Derrick v. Gaston School District of Lexington County, 172 S.C. 472, 478, 174 S.E. 431 (1934), the court noted the holding in Derrick as follows:
[664]*664He (the teacher) would have two tribunals, to both of which he might appeal, the county and state boards of education; or he may proceed in the Courts. But he may not try both the boards of education and the Courts and then select the decision of that one which best suits him.
No authority has been cited or found which would indicate that the rationale of Lowe and Earle is not the law of South Carolina. If such an unappealed order is entitled to preclusive effect under the law of South Carolina, then it must be given that effect in this case.
Based on South Carolina’s law on issue preclusion, we find that the district court correctly ruled that Stall was precluded from relitigating the reason for his discharge. We can find no basis for concluding that the adjudicatory proceedings before the Commission and the state court provided Stall with less than a full and fair opportunity to litigate the reason for his discharge. It is clear that Stall did exactly that, and that the reason for Stall’s discharge was actually and necessarily litigated before the Commission, resulting in the Commission’s determination that Stall was discharged for work-related misconduct.
Although the state court was authorized to reverse any finding by the Commission not supported by substantial evidence, etc., it chose, properly, to resolve the argument before it on the question of law as to whether the giving of a resignation and its rescission prior to the time of resignation constitutes “misconduct” under the South Carolina Employment Security Law, as discussed supra. As indicated, the court concluded that the legal definition of “misconduct” was not implicated by the giving and rescinding of the resignation under the facts of this case. Stall did not appeal from the state court’s ruling; thus, under South Carolina law noted supra, the South Carolina courts would preclude Stall from relitigating the reason for his discharge. Based on that conclusion, we find that the district court properly precluded Stall from relitigating that issue.
Where such disparate filings are made as in this case, which filings raise in each proceeding the same issue, i.e., here, what was the reason for Stall’s discharge, caution would dictate that the plaintiff should proceed in that forum which would afford the plaintiff the greatest relief, or more of the relief which is sought. In this case, resolution of the issue of the reason for discharge favorably to the plaintiff in the Commission proceedings could bring him only the statutory unemployment benefits; resolution of that same issue favorably to the plaintiff on his complaint in District Court would bring him the full panoply of relief sought in that suit, ranging from damages to reinstatement.
It is possible that the reason Stall elected to pursue the Commission remedy, and did not pursue further an appeal from the State court proceedings flowed from a mis-perception of the effect of the decision of the Court of Common Pleas in terms of issue preclusion. If that was Stall’s mis-perception, we should not as an appellate court disturb the state’s settled law governing issue preclusion to correct that mis-perception of the law.
For all the foregoing reasons, the order of the district court is
AFFIRMED.