Charles Grogan v. Daniel Uggla - Dissenting

CourtTennessee Supreme Court
DecidedNovember 21, 2017
DocketM2014-01961-SC-R11-CV
StatusPublished

This text of Charles Grogan v. Daniel Uggla - Dissenting (Charles Grogan v. Daniel Uggla - Dissenting) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Tennessee Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Charles Grogan v. Daniel Uggla - Dissenting, (Tenn. 2017).

Opinion

11/21/2017 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TENNESSEE AT NASHVILLE October 6, 2016 Session

CHARLES GROGAN v. DANIEL UGGLA, ET AL. Appeal by Permission from the Court of Appeals Circuit Court for Williamson County No. 2011443 James G. Martin, III, Judge ___________________________________

No. M2014-01961-SC-R11-CV ___________________________________

SHARON G. LEE, J., dissenting.

The primary issue is whether a home inspector owes a duty of reasonable care to a homeowner’s guest. Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the guest, as is required at the summary judgment stage, it was foreseeable that a negligent inspection of the home, and particularly the second-story deck railing, could result in a significant injury to a guest. The foreseeability and gravity of the harm outweighs the burden on the home inspector to protect against the harm. Due to the importance of home inspections, public policy favors the imposition of a duty of care on the home inspector. Therefore, a home inspector, as a matter of law, owes a duty of reasonable care to a guest of the homeowner. Here, a jury should have had the opportunity to decide whether the home inspector breached his duty of care. For these reasons, I dissent from the dismissal of the guest’s claim against the home inspector.

An essential element of a negligence claim is duty—the defendant’s legal obligation to “conform to a reasonable person’s standard of care to protect against unreasonable risks of harm.” Giggers v. Memphis Hous. Auth., 277 S.W.3d 359, 364 (Tenn. 2009) (citing Burroughs v. McGee, 118 S.W.3d 323, 328–29 (Tenn. 2003); McClung v. Delta Square Ltd. P’ship., 937 S.W.2d 891, 894 (Tenn. 1996)).

A risk of harm is unreasonable when the foreseeability and gravity of potential harm outweigh the burden imposed on the defendant to protect against the harm. See Satterfield v. Breeding Insulation Co., 266 S.W.3d 347, 365 (Tenn. 2008) (citing West v. E. Tenn. Pioneer Oil Co., 172 S.W.3d 545, 551 (Tenn. 2005); Burroughs, 118 S.W.3d at 329; McCall v. Wilder, 913 S.W.2d 150, 153 (Tenn. 1995)); see also Downs ex rel. Downs v. Bush, 263 S.W.3d 812, 820 (Tenn. 2008) (citing McCall, 913 S.W.2d at 153). A duty of care does not arise unless the plaintiff’s injury is reasonably foreseeable. Satterfield, 266 S.W.3d at 366 (citing Doe v. Linder Constr. Co., 845 S.W.2d 173, 178 (Tenn. 1992)). But foreseeability alone is not sufficient. Id. (citing McClung, 937 S.W.2d at 904). The probability or likelihood of harm must be significant enough to induce a reasonable person to avoid the conduct. Id. at 367 (citing Lopez v. Three Rivers Elec. Co-op., Inc., 26 S.W.3d 151, 156 (Mo. 2000); Knoll v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Neb., N.W.2d 757, 763 (1999)). Therefore, we focus on foreseeability and gravity of harm and whether these factors outweigh the burden on the defendant to protect against the harm. See Downs, 263 S.W.3d at 820 (citing McCall, 913 S.W.2d at 153). We then consider if imposing a duty accords with “society’s contemporary policies and social requirements concerning the right of individuals and the general public to be protected from another’s act or conduct.” Satterfield, 266 S.W.3d at 364 (quoting Bradshaw v. Daniel, 854 S.W.2d 865, 870 (Tenn. 1993)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

In reviewing the home inspector’s motion for summary judgment, we view the facts in the light most favorable to the guest. Parker v. Holiday Hospitality Franchising, Inc., 446 S.W.3d 341, 347 (Tenn. 2014) (citing Mills v. CSX Transp., Inc., 300 S.W.3d 627, 632 (Tenn. 2009)).

In 2010, Daniel Uggla authorized his brother to locate and purchase a home for him in Franklin, Tennessee. After finding a suitable home, Mr. Uggla’s brother signed a sales contract contingent on a home inspection. Mr. Uggla hired Jerry Black of Pillar to Post, Inc., to inspect the home. On September 8, 2010, Mr. Black inspected the home and issued a report, listing several areas requiring repairs, including the wooden flooring on the home’s second-story exterior deck. He did not report any defect in the deck railing. After the sellers repaired the flooring, Mr. Uggla purchased the home.

On October 8, 2010, Mr. Uggla hosted a housewarming party. During the party, Charles Grogan walked out onto the home’s second-story exterior deck and leaned on the deck’s wooden railing. The railing broke. Mr. Grogan fell to the ground level, sustaining serious injuries.

Mr. Grogan sued, alleging that Mr. Black breached his duty to use reasonable care in conducting the home inspection by failing to discover the defective deck railing. Mr. Grogan’s second amended complaint alleged that Mr. Black should have known that the deck railing was not properly constructed and that its construction was not in compliance with applicable building codes.1 The allegations of negligence, however, were not limited only to Mr. Black’s failure to discover building code violations. 1 Mr. Grogan alleged, in part, that:

[Mr. Black] knew or in the exercise of reasonable care as a professional inspector should have known that the second floor rear exterior deck railing was constructed with interior finishing nails in violation of local, state and national building codes, and constituted an 2 Mr. Black denied liability and asserted in a motion for summary judgment that he owed no duty to Mr. Grogan, who was not a party to the contract with Mr. Uggla and did not rely on the inspection report. Mr. Black admitted in deposition testimony that one of the goals of a home inspection is to make sure that the home is safe for future occupants of the home. He agreed that “someone might get hurt if you don’t know whether there’s a potential problem with that railing.” Mr. Black also agreed that railing attachments should be inspected, corroded railing attachments should be reported, and exterior railings should be attached with galvanized nails. The deck railing that broke did not have galvanized nails or any visible railing attachment beyond small, corroded finishing nails. Mr. Black did not note these deficiencies in his home inspection report.

It is undisputed that Mr. Grogan neither contracted with Mr. Black for the home inspection nor relied on the inspection report. Instead, Mr. Grogan visited the home as Mr. Uggla’s guest, leaned on the deck railing, fell to the concrete surface below when the railing broke, and sustained serious injuries. It is foreseeable that a homeowner will invite guests to his home. It is foreseeable that a home inspector’s failure to discover or report a dangerous defect in a second-story deck railing could lead to a serious injury to a guest of the homeowner.

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Related

Cheryl Brown Giggers v. Memphis Housing Authority
277 S.W.3d 359 (Tennessee Supreme Court, 2009)
Diane DOWNS Ex Rel. Ryan Cody DOWNS v. Mark BUSH Et Al.
263 S.W.3d 812 (Tennessee Supreme Court, 2008)
Doug Satterfield v. Breeding Insulation Company
266 S.W.3d 347 (Tennessee Supreme Court, 2008)
Russell v. Bray
116 S.W.3d 1 (Court of Appeals of Tennessee, 2003)
Lopez v. Three Rivers Electric Cooperative, Inc.
26 S.W.3d 151 (Supreme Court of Missouri, 2000)
Bradshaw v. Daniel
854 S.W.2d 865 (Tennessee Supreme Court, 1993)
McClung v. Delta Square Ltd. Partnership
937 S.W.2d 891 (Tennessee Supreme Court, 1996)
Mills v. CSX Transportation, Inc.
300 S.W.3d 627 (Tennessee Supreme Court, 2009)
West v. East Tennessee Pioneer Oil Co.
172 S.W.3d 545 (Tennessee Supreme Court, 2005)
Burroughs v. Magee
118 S.W.3d 323 (Tennessee Supreme Court, 2003)
McCall v. Wilder
913 S.W.2d 150 (Tennessee Supreme Court, 1995)
Doe v. Linder Const. Co., Inc.
845 S.W.2d 173 (Tennessee Supreme Court, 1992)
Greg Parker v. Holiday Hospitality Franchising, Incorporated
446 S.W.3d 341 (Tennessee Supreme Court, 2014)

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Charles Grogan v. Daniel Uggla - Dissenting, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/charles-grogan-v-daniel-uggla-dissenting-tenn-2017.