OPINION
REID, Chief Justice.
This negligence action results from the rape of the plaintiff-appellee by two men who are not parties to the suit. The trial court granted the defendants-appellants’ motion for summary judgment, and the Court of Appeals reversed and remanded for a jury trial.
The complaint charges that the defendants negligently allowed a key to the plaintiffs residence to be stolen by other parties who, thereby, gained access to her residence and raped her. The plaintiff, who is the purchaser of a residence in a “planned unit development,” sued Linder Construction Company, the seller-builder of her residence; Elwood Carpenter, the seller-builder’s construction supervisor; Linder Realty Company, the realtor; and Pattie Rollins, the realtor’s employee, who sold the residence to the plaintiff. The plaintiff also sued Idlewild Court Homeowners’ Association, a corporation, alleging it had breached its duty to “enforce the covenants” of the Association with regard to plaintiff’s safety. That defendant is not a party to this appeal.
The trial court found that the criminal assault was an independent intervening act and dismissed the complaint. The Court of Appeals held that the case presents issues of fact for the jury. This Court’s review of the evidence shows that the trial court properly granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants.
FACTS
Although the plaintiff-appellee insists that there is “significant disagreement as to the inferences to be drawn” from the facts, the essential facts are not disputed. Linder Construction Company contracted with Samuel Carpenter, the son of its construction supervisor, Elwood Carpenter, for the painting and wallpapering of houses as they were completed in the 35-lot development. At the time of the assault, Samuel Carpenter had been working for Linder Construction Company for approximately 14 months as an independent contractor and had been paid on the basis of work done. With the seller-builder’s knowledge and permission, he frequently worked at night and on weekends. Carpenter apparently had problems with alcohol and had three convictions of DUI. He admitted to the occasional use of drugs. The record discloses no other evidence of bad character or criminal conduct.
Several months before the assault, while Samuel Carpenter was painting the interior of a house that subsequently became a “model home” and the office of the realty company, the locks and keys for the outside doors of the house were delivered by the supplier. The supplier stored them in the fireplace of the house. Carpenter, [176]*176without anyone’s knowledge, took one of the several keys to the front door lock. His stated purpose for taking the key was to have access to the restroom and kitchen facilities while working at night and on weekends when the house was locked. During the extended time between Carpenter’s taking of the key and the assault, Samuel Carpenter did not use the key to the model house for any improper purpose. Since it was used as a sales office by the realty company, the model home was frequented during working hours by other workers on the project, realtors and prospective purchasers.
When a house in the development was sold, Rollins would offer to keep a key on behalf of the seller so that “punch list” items, agreed upon by the seller and the buyer at the time of sale, could be completed while the purchaser was at work or otherwise away from the residence. These “pass keys” were kept in the closet of Rollins’s office in the model home, and the key to each house was tagged with a number corresponding to the lot number on which the house was located. The procedure whereby the keys were used was clearly established and followed by Elwood Carpenter, who, inaccurately described in the dissent as “the on-site superintendent,” Dissent (Daughtrey, J.) at 187, a landlord-tenant term, was the construction supervisor of the project and, as such, was responsible for the “punch list” items agreed to at closing. Carpenter would take the keys needed that day from the office closet, put them onto his own key ring, and at the end of each day, return the keys to the box in the closet. The model home was locked at night and at all other times except when Pattie Rollins or another realtor was present. Although some buyers decided against allowing Rollins to keep a key to their house, that arrangement was made by the plaintiff and Rollins when her sale was closed. The arrangement, which is described in the plaintiff’s brief as “a normal business practice,” was for the mutual convenience of the defendants and the plaintiff.
About a week before the plaintiff was assaulted, Clinton Osborne came to Nashville from Ohio to visit his cousin Samuel Carpenter. Osborne worked some with Samuel Carpenter painting, but he mostly just “goofed off.” Osborne, described in the dissent as a “dangerous person,” Dissent at 189, which in hindsight is accurate, had served a penitentiary sentence in Ohio for assault and, unknown to Samuel Carpenter or the defendants, was a fugitive when he came to Tennessee. The extent of the defendants’ knowledge about Osborne was that Elwood Carpenter knew he had served time in prison in Ohio.
On the night of the assault, Samuel Carpenter used his key to enter the model home. After locating the box of pass keys, he identified the key tagged with the lot number of the plaintiff’s house and took it. He and Osborne then entered the plaintiff’s house with the pass key and raped her. Both men were convicted of the crime.
The trial court found that the criminal assault was not reasonably foreseeable under the circumstances and granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. The Court of Appeals found that these facts were sufficient to present jury questions with regard to the handling and storage of the key to the model home, the control of the “pass keys,” and the “employment” of Samuel Carpenter, a person “of known irresponsible character.”
STANDARD OF CARE
The plaintiff asserts this is a case of first impression in Tennessee. Apparently there is no reported decision from this or any other jurisdiction in which a plaintiff has undertaken to impose liability under circumstances similar to those presented in this case. Both the plaintiff and the dissent characterize the case as “unique.” Dissent at 194.
In attempting to establish the duty of care owed the plaintiff by the defendants, the plaintiff, and the dissent, acknowledge that the decisions of Tennessee courts provide no precedent and rely upon “recent developments in this area of the law.” The dissent advocates that Tennessee join the “ 'revolution' in this area of the law,” [177]*177which would require “a sudden judicial rejection of well established precedent.” Dissent at 192. The plaintiff undertakes to find support for her position in the law regarding the duty of shopping center operators to third parties for the criminal acts of strangers, Cornpropst v. Sloan, 528 S.W.2d 188 (Tenn.1975); the duty of landlords to tenants for the criminal acts of strangers, Tedder v. Raskin, 728 S.W.2d 343 (Tenn.App.1987); the duty of innkeepers (hotel or motel operators) to registered guests for the criminal acts of strangers, Zang v. Leonard, 643 S.W.2d 657 (Tenn.App.1982); and the duty of “condominium owners’ associations” to members for the criminal acts of strangers, Francis T. v. Village Green Owners Ass’n., 42 Cal.3d 490, 229 Cal-Rptr. 456, 723 P.2d 573 (1986). The Tennessee cases relied upon by the plaintiff set forth settled legal principles relating to the particular relationship presented in each case; however, those eases involve situations and relationships greatly different from the case at hand and constitute no authority for the legal principles advocated by the plaintiff. A significant difference between those cases and the present case is that in the present case, the criminal tortfeasor is not a “stranger” to the defendants but a person who was authorized by contract to be on the premises, and who gained access to the plaintiff’s residence by criminal or unauthorized acts committed against the defendant-seller as well as the plaintiff. Another significant difference is that the defendants were not the plaintiff’s landlord, lessor, or host, and consequently, did not owe the plaintiff the duty owed tenants, lessees, or guests. The defendants were not owners or occupiers of the plaintiff’s premises, they had only the right to enter the premises at the plaintiff’s convenience and for the purpose of completing the performance of the contractual obligation incident to the sale of the property. Aspects of those relationships which are not present between the defendants and the plaintiff include a contractual obligation regarding security or maintenance and a control over the plaintiff’s premises. The arguments advanced by the plaintiff and the cases relied upon, might be applicable to the plaintiff’s suit against the defendant Idlewild Homeowners Association, Inc., which, though a party to the suit, is not a party to this appeal. According to the allegations of the complaint, that defendant, incident to the covenants of the association, owed a duty to provide security to the association members. The liability of the association is not an issue before the Court.
The duty owed the plaintiff by the defendants was; as in all cases, that of reasonable care under all of the circumstances. The duty due the plaintiff arose from the contractual arrangement whereby a key to the plaintiff’s residence was retained by the seller for the mutual benefit of the plaintiff and the defendants. The duty, though much more limited, may be compared to that of a landlord, who, by agreement and for the parties’ mutual benefit, has access for a limited purpose to a tenant’s premises.
As stated previously, there appears to be no reported decision in which the purchaser of a residence sued the seller for the criminal assault committed by third parties. The Court of Appeals in Tedder v. Raskin, 728 S.W.2d at 349, in an excellent opinion written by Judge Cantrell, reviewed the development of the common law in this state regarding the duty of landlords to protect tenants against the criminal acts of third parties. In that case, tenants brought a negligence action against the landlord for injuries sustained when a bullet fired during a robbery in the adjoining apartment came through the wall and struck the plaintiff’s minor child. The plaintiffs claimed that the defendant breached a duty to provide them a reasonably safe place to live by failing to protect the plaintiffs and their child from dangers inherent in living next door to an alleged drug dealer. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court, which had granted a directed verdict for the defendants.
The court approved the succinct statement of the standard of care required of innkeepers in Zang, 643 S.W.2d at 657, as the standard applicable to landlords, as follows:
[178]*178The measure of the liability of the possessor of land to invitees is due care under all the circumstances including the nature and use of the land, the nature of the invitation, the nature of the relationship with the invitee, the opportunity of the possessor and the invitee to know and avoid existing or probable dangers, and any and all other factors which would challenge the attention of the possessor and/or invitee to the probability of danger to the invitee and produce the precautions which a reasonably prudent person would instigate under the same or similar circumstances. (Emphasis added).
Tedder, 728 S.W.2d at 348 (quoting Zang, 643 S.W.2d at 663). The Tedder court then stated that ordinary principles of negligence apply to landlord-tenant situations and, further, that the landlord is not an insurer but can be held liable when his or her failure to exercise reasonable care under the circumstances was the proximate cause of injury to the tenant.
If the defendants failed to exercise reasonable care under the circumstances then they breached their duty to the plaintiffs. The term reasonable care must be given meaning in relation to the circumstances. McCormick v. Waters, 594 S.W.2d 385, 387 (Tenn.1980). Ordinary, or reasonable, care is to be estimated by the risk entailed through probable dangers attending the particular situation and is to be commensurate with the risk of injury. Leach v. Asman, 130 Tenn. 510, 514, 172 S.W. 303 (1914). The risk involved is that which is foreseeable; a risk is foreseeable if a reasonable person could foresee the probability of its occurrence or if the person was on notice that the likelihood of danger to the party to whom is owed a duty is probable. Foreseeability is the test of negligence. If the injury which occurred could not have been reasonably foreseen, the duty of care does not arise, and even though the act of the defendant in fact caused the injury, there is no negligence and no liability. See Spivey v. St. Thomas Hospital, 31 Tenn.App. 12, 211 S.W.2d 450, 456 (1948). “[T]he plaintiff must show that the injury was a reasonably foreseeable probability, not just a remote possibility, and that some action within the [defendant’s] power more probably than not would have prevented the injury.” Tedder, 728 S.W.2d at 348. Foreseeability must be determined as of the time of the acts or omissions claimed to be negligent.
Negligence already has been defined as conduct which falls below a standard established by the law for the protection of others against unreasonable risk of harm. The idea of risk in this context necessarily involves a recognizable danger, based upon some knowledge of the existing facts, and some reasonable belief that harm may possibly follow. Risk, for this purpose, may then be defined as a danger which is apparent, or should be apparent, to one in the position of the actor. The actor’s conduct must be judged in the light of the possibilities apparent to him at the time, and not by looking backward “with the wisdom born of the event.” The standard is one of conduct, rather than of consequences. It is not enough that everyone can see now that the risk was great, if it was not apparent when the conduct occurred.
5 Prosser and Keeton, The Law of Torts § 31, p. 170 (1984) (footnotes omitted). With regard to the criminal acts of others, the Court in Tedder stated:
If the injury was not reasonably foreseeable, then the criminal act of the third party would be a superseding, intervening cause of the harm, relieving the landlord of liability.
Tedder, 728 S.W.2d at 349.
Based upon the principles stated in Ted-der, the duty owed the plaintiff by the defendants in this case is not that of an innkeeper to its guest or a landlord to a tenant, but only to exercise reasonable care in managing the key to the residence. The pertinent question is whether there was any showing from which it can be said that the defendants reasonably knew or should have known of the probability of an occurrence such as the one which caused the plaintiff’s injuries. Corbitt, 496 S.W.2d at 918. Analysis of “all the circumstances” of this case shows that there was no rea[179]*179sonable basis on which to foresee any danger to the plaintiff.
Samuel Carpenter used two keys to accomplish the criminal acts that caused injury to the plaintiff. It is important to separate the issues involved in the handling of each key to determine whether evidence of negligence by the defendants may be found anywhere in the sequence of events leading up to the rape of the plaintiff.
The plaintiff claims, somewhat tentatively, that the defendants’ first negligence, characterized as “potential negligence,” was in allowing Samuel Carpenter to obtain possession of the key to the model home. The Court of Appeals agreed. However, the only evidence cited by that court in support of its conclusion that the defendants “reasonably knew or should have known of the probability of an occurrence such as the one that caused the plaintiffs injuries,” was that Samuel Carpenter was of “known irresponsible character.” The record shows that this “irresponsible character” consisted of DUI convictions, alcohol dependency, and the occasional use of drugs, none of which are shown to be probative of a propensity to commit violent crimes against property or persons. During the 14 months that Carpenter worked at the job site, there were no complaints made against him, and there is no evidence that he used the key for any unlawful purpose during that time. Even though the Court of Appeals based its reversal in part upon the negligent hiring of Samuel Carpenter, that argument is not asserted on this appeal.
Although the plaintiff mentions the “first key,” claiming its handling was “potential negligence,” her main insistence is that the defendants’ proximate negligence was their control of the “second key,” the key to her residence. In her statement of “undisputed facts,” from which she claims a jury could draw inferences of negligence, the plaintiff refers only to the location of the “pass keys” and persons who had access to those keys while the model home was open. The facts claimed by the plaintiff to constitute negligence are as follows:
[T]he Defendants stored the pass keys in a common area which was frequented by prospective buyers, construction workers, and staff.
[T]he model home was left unattended by the Defendants and unauthorized persons were allowed to enter the model home when no one was present.
[T]he pass keys were clearly identified by lot number and were stored in an unlocked closet in an unlocked box.
[N]o security procedures were instituted to control access to the pass keys and such keys were never inventoried.
These facts, even if found by a jury to be true, are not sufficient to support a finding that the procedures followed and security measures taken in handling the pass keys were less than reasonably prudent. The facts relied upon by the plaintiff show that keys tagged with appropriate lot numbers were kept in a closet that opened into an office located in a building containing several rooms, which were accessible to persons doing business with the occupants, the development builders and realtors. The persons who had access to the model home-office building were prospective purchasers of residences, suppliers, craftsmen, and others who ordinarily would be present at such a business location. Though they were present in the sales office, there is no showing that any of these persons had an opportunity to steal a key, nor is there any showing that such persons were inclined to steal a key. More importantly, none of the people doing business at the model home actually stole a key or harmed the plaintiff or anyone else. The key was not taken by a “dangerous character” or one engaged in “criminal activity.” In fact it was taken before the sales office had been completed and by a contract painter-paper hanger who lawfully was working on the premises, and about whom the worst that could be said was that he smoked marijuana and drank too much beer. Under these circumstances, it was not reasonably foreseeable that the contractor would commit two secret, separate acts, one unauthorized and one criminal, in order to obtain possession of a key to commit another criminal act. A reasonably prudent person under these cir[180]*180cumstances would not feel compelled to guard against these unexpected criminal acts. It cannot be said, therefore, that the harm was foreseeable and therefore the defendants’ conduct regarding the pass keys fell below the standard of care required in this situation.
The plaintiff insists that evidence of “unauthorized entries” into other occupied houses in the development was sufficient to establish that the assault was foreseeable. That evidence consisted of the plaintiffs testimony that others had complained that “there were problems with their homes.” The plaintiff was able to provide only the vaguest information about two incidents, the disappearance of a can of tuna and an unflushed toilet. According to the plaintiff, the toilet incident involved a house owned by Meyers. However, according to the construction superintendent, Meyers complained to him of the toilet incident, which occurred after all keys to the Meyers’ house had been returned to him. The superintendent also said that another purchaser, Syke, complained of a “forced entry,” rather than an “unforced entry,” and that some items had been stolen, not as the result of the claimed entry but from his yard. Even though the complaint charges that the defendants were negligent in failing to warn the plaintiff of these “unforced entries,” she stated in discovery that she learned of these events in casual conversations with the neighbors prior to the assault when she was out walking in the neighborhood. The plaintiff could not remember the names of any other persons who had complained. None of the owners testified.
Neither the trial court nor the Court of Appeals found the evidence of complaints by other purchasers to be significant. In fact neither court even mentioned it. The dissent's characterization of this testimony as evidence of “unauthorized,” but unforced entries and “breaches of security” dignifies it far beyond its worth. Dissent at 190. Holding that such tenuous circumstances may constitute notice that produces foreseeability and therefore duty would truly “revolutionize” the law of negligence. Finding circumstances such as minor thefts, unexplained use of a bathroom, and unsubstantiated rumors to be sufficient notice on which to base liability for subsequent criminal assaults is not the law in Tennessee or any other jurisdiction.
The dissent, despite the disclaimer that this is not a case involving a landlord and tenant, undertakes to impose on the defendants the same duty that rests upon a landlord in cases like Lay v. Dworman, 732 P.2d 455 (Okla.1986), in which a tenant was assaulted by an intruder who gained entrance into her apartment through a door with a broken lock which the landlord had failed to repair after receiving notice, even though the landlord had knowledge that other assaults had occurred at the same apartment complex. Of course, all of the elements of a cause of action were present in that case. The duty arose from the landlord-tenant relationship, the acknowledged duty to repair, and the notice of danger. The proximate cause was the failure to repair.
In Kline v. 1500 Massachusetts Ave. Apartment Corp., 439 F.2d 477 (D.C.Cir.1970), said by the dissent to be the seminal case in the development of landlord liability, the court held:
However, there is no liability normally imposed upon the one having the power to act if the violence is sudden and unexpected provided that the source of the violence is not an employee or the one in control.
439 F.2d at 483, Dissent at 191-92. The decision of the Court in McClenahan v. Cooley, 806 S.W.2d 767 (Tenn.1991) is no authority for the plaintiff’s position in this case. The legal principle affirmed in McClenahan is the same principle that controls the instant case, the foreseeability of injury caused directly by a criminal act. The foreseeability of probable injury resulting from the act of leaving the ignition key in an automobile stopped in a heavily traveled location was recognized in McClena-han. The Court then held that the fact that the automobile was parked on private property, and therefore not in violation of T.C.A. § 55-8-162, did not vitiate the general principles of foreseeability and conse[181]*181quent liability. The difference in McClena-han and this case is that in McClenahan the proof would support a finding of foreseeability and in this case it would not.
Contrary to the plaintiffs contention, the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 323(a) (1965) does not support her position:
One who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to render services to another which he should recognize as necessary for the protection of the other’s person or things, is subject to liability to the other for physical harm resulting from his failure to exercise reasonable care to perform his undertaking, if
(a) his failure to exercise such care increases the risk of such harm....
The principle stated is not applicable to this case. The defendants did not offer to render any service to the plaintiff, they only agreed to complete the “punch list” items. The obligation assumed by the defendants did not extend to that of protecting the plaintiff from physical harm, and the defendants did not fail to perform any obligation assumed. This rule might find applicability to obligations assumed, according to the complaint, by the homeowners’ association, but not the builder-seller and its agents.
Simply put, there is no authority for holding that in the circumstances presented by this record the defendants were required to foresee that the painter-wallpaper hanger would steal a key to a building which later would become the sales office, that he would use that key in order to steal a key to one of the completed residences, and that he would use the second key to commit a criminal assault upon the occupant. There is no precedent or responsible authority which requires the builder-seller, under the circumstances of this case, to foresee a crime upon a crime upon a crime.
PROXIMATE CAUSE
In addition to the finding that the defendants’ conduct did not fall below the standard of care, another fatal flaw in the plaintiff’s case is the lack of proximate causation, an essential element in proving a case of negligence. As stated in Tedder, “[t]he plaintiff must further prove that the [defendant’s] failure to act was the proximate cause of the injury.” 728 S.W.2d at 348. This Court has held:
“An injury that is the natural and probable consequence of an act of negligence is actionable, and such an act is the proximate cause of the injury. But an injury which could not have been foreseen or reasonably anticipated as the probable result of an act of negligence is not actionable and such an act is either the remote cause, or no cause whatever, of the injury.”
Ward v. University of the South, 209 Tenn. 412, 354 S.W.2d 246, 250 (1962) (quoting Moody v. Gulf Refining Co., 142 Tenn. 280, 218 S.W. 817 (1919)). The facts upon which the plaintiff relies, even assuming they were acts of negligence, were not the proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injury. “Proof of negligence without proof of causation is nothing.” Drewry v. County of Obion, 619 S.W.2d 397, 398 (Tenn.App.1981). Proximate cause:
... is merely the limitation which the courts have placed upon the actor’s responsibility for the consequences of the actor’s conduct.... [T]he consequences of an act go forward to eternity, and the causes of an event go back to the dawn of human events, and beyond. But any attempt to impose responsibility upon such a basis would result in infinite liability....
Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts, § 41, p. 264 (5th ed. 1984). “As a practical matter, legal responsibility must be limited to those causes which are so closely connected with the result and of such significance that the law is justified in imposing liability. Some boundary must be set_” Id.
As previously discussed, the acts of rape were criminal acts of which the defendants had no warning and which they had no reason to believe would occur. As the court in Tedder held, “[i]f the injury was not reasonably foreseeable, then the criminal act of the third party would be a superseding, intervening cause of the harm, relieving the [defendants] from liability.” [182]*182728 S.W.2d at 348. The Court of Appeals was confronted with a similar situation in Corbitt v. Ringley-Crockett, Inc., 496 S.W.2d 914 (Tenn.App.1973), and found, as follows:
So, the question that will determine [whether the proof is insufficient to warrant a jury finding favorable to the plaintiff] is whether or not there is any proof in the record from which it can be said from the facts that the owner or lessee of the Coliseum in Knoxville reasonably knew or should have known of the probability of an occurrence such as the one which caused plaintiffs injuries. We are of the opinion there is not.
In order for plaintiff to recover in this ease, the proof must be such so that it can be said that it was reasonably foreseeable by the defendants that the plaintiff would be waylaid and robbed in the restroom. Reviewing the proof in the light most favorable to plaintiff as we must, (citation omitted), we are unable to find proof that would warrant such a conclusion. All of the proof shows that such an occurrence as complained of had never before happened in the Coliseum. Previous non-occurrence of an event, standing alone, does not necessarily mean that such event is not foreseeable. However, in the instant case, coupled with the previous non-occurrence there is the uncontradicted fact that the injury was caused by the sudden criminal attack of third persons, without any warning to the plaintiff or to anyone else. In Brodie v. Miller, [24 Tenn.App. 316, 143 S.W.2d 1042 (1940) ], it was held that the law does not place the onerous duty upon an owner of anticipating the criminal acts of another, unless the criminal act is the natural and spontaneous result of the act or failure to act of the owner. The criminal act complained of by the plaintiff in this case cannot be said to be the natural or normal result of any act of the defendants.
496 S.W.2d at 917-918 (emphasis added).
It is important to emphasize again that the tortfeasor in this case was not a stranger to the defendants. He was a contractor whose duties, pursuant to his contract with the seller-defendant, required his presence in the building that became the model home and office of the defendants, when the key to that building, which later gave him access to the building after working hours, was stolen. The key was not taken, as claimed by the plaintiff, as a result of “the [defendants’ storing of] the pass keys in a common area frequented by prospective buyers, construction workers and staff,” nor as a result of “the model home [having been] left unattended by the defendants and unauthorized persons [having been] allowed to enter the model home when no one was present,” nor as a result of “the pass keys [having been] clearly identified by a lot number and ... stored in an unlocked closet in an unlocked box,” nor as a result of “no security procedures [having been] instituted to control access to the pass keys and such keys [never having been] inventoried.”
Instead, access to the plaintiffs residence was accomplished by the unauthorized taking from the defendants’ possession the key to the model home, the locking of which was one of the protections against theft of the pass keys. The taking of the key to the model home was the efficient means whereby access to the plaintiff’s residence was accomplished. The key to the plaintiff’s residence was obtained by unauthorized acts (characterized as criminal by both the plaintiff and the defendants) committed against the Seller-defendant with which the tortfeasor had a contractual relationship. Therefore, the facts which must be considered in determining whether the evidence presents a jury question, are those relating to the taking of the key to the model home.
The criminal acts of Carpenter and Osborne were unforeseen, intervening causes of the plaintiff’s injuries. “If the defendant can foresee neither any danger of direct injury, nor any risk from an intervening cause, the defendant is simply not negligent.” Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts, § 44, p. 311 (5th ed. 1984). In Ward, the Court, in sustaining the dismissal of the complaint for failure to state a cause of action, stated:
[183]*183The test of liability under the law of intervening cause requires a person to anticipate or foresee what usually will happen. It does not require him to anticipate and provide against what is unusual or unlikely to happen, or that which is remotely possible, but whether it was probable according to the usual experience of persons.
354 S.W.2d at 250.
Ordinarily, the proximate cause of an injury is for the jury, but, where the facts are not controverted, the question of proximate or intervening cause is for the trial court. Brodie v. Miller, 24 Tenn.App. 316, 143 S.W.2d 1042, 1045 (1940) (citing Southeastern Greyhound Lines v. Groves, 175 Tenn. 584, 136 S.W.2d 512, 513 (1940)). The Brodie court stated:
Lastly, it is insisted that the question of proximate cause is a jury question and whenever the question is doubtful or debatable, that the court should submit it to the jury.... The remedy of leaving the doubtful questions to the jury does not seem to be adequate, for the court is better qualified to lay down the duties and responsibilities growing out of a conceded state of facts than the jury. We do not believe that it was intended by the discussion of the issue found in this case to change the practice in this state; here the trial judge is the witness of the law to the jury. And it is his duty to define the duties and responsibilities of the parties arising out of the theory of the plaintiff as well as of the defendant; the sole function of the jury is to decide the facts and to apply the principles as given them by the court.
143 S.W.2d at 1046. The relationship between the assault and the acts of the defendants claimed to constitute negligence is so problematic that there can be no liability as a matter of law.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
For a negligence case to go before a jury, the plaintiff has the burden to present facts sufficient to establish the necessary elements of negligence. The standard in a negligence case is that,
If, as a matter of law, the plaintiff has failed to allege or prove facts sufficient to establish notice, the existence of the duty to act, breach of the duty, or proximate cause, dismissal, summary judgment, or a directed verdict would be appropriate.
Tedder, 728 S.W.2d at 349 (Tenn.App.1987). More succinctly, “[t]he plaintiff in a negligence case must offer some material evidence showing the existence of a duty and an injury proximately caused by a breach of that duty.” Id. The standard of review in this case, then, is whether there is any disputed genuine issue of material fact concerning the elements of the alleged cause of action. If not, the dismissal of the complaint must be affirmed.
Many cases in which the plaintiff was injured by the criminal acts of persons other than the defendant have been decided by the Tennessee appellate courts against the plaintiff for failure to present facts sufficient to establish the elements of negligence. For instance, in Cornpropst v. Sloan, 528 S.W.2d 188 (Tenn.1975), a shopper who was assaulted in a shopping center parking lot brought an action in negligence against the owners of the shopping center and the businesses located in the center. In affirming the trial judge’s dismissal of the action upon finding no breach of duty and no proximate cause, the Court stated:
At common law, a private person or corporation, as distinguished from governmental units, had no duty whatsoever to protect others from the criminal acts of third parties. That general rule has remained steadfast in the tort law of this country, despite the exceptions that have appeared from time-to-time, where special relationships and special circumstances have combined to impose liability.
Cornpropst, 528 S.W.2d at 191. The Court then reviewed the law generally and the case of Railroad v. Hatch, 116 Tenn. 580, 94 S.W. 671 (Tenn.1906) (absent reasonable grounds for an apprehension of danger the railroad would not be liable for an attack on one passenger by another), and stated:
[184]*184The significance of Hatch to our inquiry is that where the highest degree of care characterized the relationship, the criminal acts of third parties imposes no liability unless there are present special circumstances that create in the minds of reasonable men an apprehension of danger.
Cornpropst, 528 S.W.2d at 192. Finally, the Court approved the following statement from Corbitt v. Ringley-Crockett, Inc., 496 S.W.2d 914 (Tenn.App.1978), in recognizing one special circumstance:
We hold that if the owner is to be held liable for the sudden criminal acts of third persons there must be a showing that the owner was on notice in some manner of the imminent probability of the act. Otherwise, there can be no issue for jury determination. There is no such showing in this record. The Trial Court should have directed a verdict for the defendants.
Corbitt, 496 S.W.2d at 919.
CONCLUSION
To hold as negligence the failure to prevent the theft or unauthorized taking of a key by workers or others lawfully on a construction site, under the circumstances of this case, would place an unrealistic burden on contractors and other employers. As stated in Prosser:
On its face, the problem is one of whether the defendant is to be held liable for an injury to which the defendant has in fact made a substantial contribution, when it is brought about by a later cause of independent origin, for which the defendant is not responsible. In its essence, however, it becomes again a question of the extent of the defendant's original obligation; and once more the problem is not primarily one of causation at all, since it does not arise until cause in fact is established. It is rather one of the policy as to imposing legal responsibility.
Prosser at 301. Even though the facts of this case are unique, the law of this state with regard to the legal issues presented is well settled.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the judgment of the trial court granting summary judgments is affirmed. Costs are taxed to the appellee.
DROWOTA, O’BRIEN and ANDERSON, JJ., concur.
DAUGHTREY, J., dissents.