SUMMARY ORDER
Plaintiff-Appellant Ajayveer Chapotkat appeals an April 7, 2014 judgment entered when the district court granted -a motion for summary judgment in favor of his employer, the County of Rockland (the “County”), on Chapotkat’s age discrimination claim brought under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”), 29 U.S.C. § 623. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, procedural history, and issues on appeal, which we reference only as necessary to explain our decision.
We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment
de novo. Holcomb v. Iona Coll,
521 F.3d 130, 137 (2d Cir.2008). Summary judgment is warranted if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). “An issue of fact is ‘genuine’ if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.”
Gorzynski v. JetBlue Airways Corp.,
596 F.3d 93, 101 (2d Cir.2010) (internal quotation omitted). We credit the nonmoving party’s evidence and draw all permissible factual inferences in the non-moving party’s favor.
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). Still, to survive summary judgment “a plaintiff must provide more than' conclusory allegations ... and show more than some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.”
Gorzynski,
596 F.3d at 101 (internal quotation and citation omitted).
Under the ADEA an employer may not “fail or refuse to hire or ... discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s age.” 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1). An ADEA plaintiffs ultimate burden is to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that “age was the ‘but-for’ cause of the challenged adverse employment action,” rather than merely a motivating factor in the decision.
Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs.,
557 U.S. 167, 180, 129 S.Ct. 2343, 174 L.Ed.2d 119 (2009).
Following the Supreme Court’s decision in Gross, we continue to address ADEA claims under the
McDonnell Douglas
burden-shifting framework.
Gorzynski,
596 F.3d at 106. Under
McDonnell Douglas,
the plaintiff bears the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination.
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,
411 U.S. 792, 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). If the plaintiff meets that initial burden, the burden shifts to the defendant to proffer “some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason” for the challenged action.
Id.
If the defendant does so, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to show that the defendant’s explanation is pretext for discrimination.
Id.
at 804, 93 S.Ct. 1817. At this third step in the analysis, following
Gross,
the ADEA plaintiff must show that age was a “but-for” cause of the employer’s action.
Gorzynski,
596 F.3d at 106. Thus, to resist summary judgment on an ADEA claim successfully, a plaintiff must demonstrate that a reasonable jury could conclude by a preponderance of the evidence that the employer’s explanations are pretextual and that, but for the plaintiffs age, the employer would not have taken the action it did.
Id.
at 107.
The district court concluded that Cha-potkat established a prima facie case of age discrimination and that the County satisfied its burden to proffer a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for deciding not to appoint Chapotkat provisionally to the Pollution Control Supervisor (“PCS”) position. We agree, and neither party challenges these determinations on appeal. Chapotkat takes issue with the district court’s conclusion as to the third step of the
McDonnell Douglas
framework: that the County was entitled to summary judgment because Chapotkat could not raise a .genuine issue of material fact as to whether the County’s non-discriminatory reasons were pretext for age discrimination and age was a “but-for” cause of the County’s decision not to promote him. Chapotkat contends that the factual context surrounding the promotion demonstrates pretext and points to age-related comments by Sewer District personnel during his interview for the PCS position, arguing that, in concert, these circumstances could lead a reasonable jury to find in his favor on his ADEA claim. We hold that the district court correctly granted summary judgment because no reasonable jury could conclude that age was a “but-for” reason that Chapotkat was not promoted to the PCS position.
The ADEA aims to prevent adverse employment decisions grounded in “inaccurate and stigmatizing stereotypes” about older workers’ “productivity and competence.”
Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins,
507 U.S. 604, 610, 113 S.Ct. 1701, 123 L.Ed.2d 338 (1993). “[Ejmployment decisions driven by factors that are empirically intertwined with age are not discriminatory so long as they are motivated by ‘some feature other than the employee’s age.’ ”
Cri-ley v. Delta Air Lines, Inc.,
119 F.3d 102, 105 (2d Cir.1997) (quoting
Hazen Paper,
507 U.S. at 609, 113 S.Ct. 1701). Thus, we have held that “decisions motivated by economic concerns do not violate the ADEA.”
Id.
Affirming summary judgment for the employer in
Criley,
we determined that “[njone of the statements cited by plaintiffs reflect any age-based stereotype or belief that older [employees] are less competent than younger ones.”
Id.
The same is true here. As direct evidence that age-related animus gave rise to the County’s decision, Chapotkat presents only Chief Operator Gonos’s comments made during his interview. According to Chapotkat, Gonos told Chapotkat that he did not “like when people in their late fifties and sixties
come and they don’t stay here,” that he did not “like the process of selection,” and that he “prefer[red] someone who could stay here for a long time.” Gonos then asked Chapotkat how old he was, to which Cha-potkat responded that he was 51 and that he intended to work 15 more years. Cha-potkat contends that this exchange demonstrates “an age-based stereotype — that older employees do not stick around.” We are not persuaded.
Even assuming — and we do not — that a jury could accept Chapotkat’s interpretation on appeal, the asserted “stereotype” would not show that the County used age as a proxy for productivity or competence.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
SUMMARY ORDER
Plaintiff-Appellant Ajayveer Chapotkat appeals an April 7, 2014 judgment entered when the district court granted -a motion for summary judgment in favor of his employer, the County of Rockland (the “County”), on Chapotkat’s age discrimination claim brought under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”), 29 U.S.C. § 623. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, procedural history, and issues on appeal, which we reference only as necessary to explain our decision.
We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment
de novo. Holcomb v. Iona Coll,
521 F.3d 130, 137 (2d Cir.2008). Summary judgment is warranted if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). “An issue of fact is ‘genuine’ if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.”
Gorzynski v. JetBlue Airways Corp.,
596 F.3d 93, 101 (2d Cir.2010) (internal quotation omitted). We credit the nonmoving party’s evidence and draw all permissible factual inferences in the non-moving party’s favor.
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). Still, to survive summary judgment “a plaintiff must provide more than' conclusory allegations ... and show more than some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.”
Gorzynski,
596 F.3d at 101 (internal quotation and citation omitted).
Under the ADEA an employer may not “fail or refuse to hire or ... discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s age.” 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1). An ADEA plaintiffs ultimate burden is to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that “age was the ‘but-for’ cause of the challenged adverse employment action,” rather than merely a motivating factor in the decision.
Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs.,
557 U.S. 167, 180, 129 S.Ct. 2343, 174 L.Ed.2d 119 (2009).
Following the Supreme Court’s decision in Gross, we continue to address ADEA claims under the
McDonnell Douglas
burden-shifting framework.
Gorzynski,
596 F.3d at 106. Under
McDonnell Douglas,
the plaintiff bears the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination.
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,
411 U.S. 792, 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). If the plaintiff meets that initial burden, the burden shifts to the defendant to proffer “some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason” for the challenged action.
Id.
If the defendant does so, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to show that the defendant’s explanation is pretext for discrimination.
Id.
at 804, 93 S.Ct. 1817. At this third step in the analysis, following
Gross,
the ADEA plaintiff must show that age was a “but-for” cause of the employer’s action.
Gorzynski,
596 F.3d at 106. Thus, to resist summary judgment on an ADEA claim successfully, a plaintiff must demonstrate that a reasonable jury could conclude by a preponderance of the evidence that the employer’s explanations are pretextual and that, but for the plaintiffs age, the employer would not have taken the action it did.
Id.
at 107.
The district court concluded that Cha-potkat established a prima facie case of age discrimination and that the County satisfied its burden to proffer a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for deciding not to appoint Chapotkat provisionally to the Pollution Control Supervisor (“PCS”) position. We agree, and neither party challenges these determinations on appeal. Chapotkat takes issue with the district court’s conclusion as to the third step of the
McDonnell Douglas
framework: that the County was entitled to summary judgment because Chapotkat could not raise a .genuine issue of material fact as to whether the County’s non-discriminatory reasons were pretext for age discrimination and age was a “but-for” cause of the County’s decision not to promote him. Chapotkat contends that the factual context surrounding the promotion demonstrates pretext and points to age-related comments by Sewer District personnel during his interview for the PCS position, arguing that, in concert, these circumstances could lead a reasonable jury to find in his favor on his ADEA claim. We hold that the district court correctly granted summary judgment because no reasonable jury could conclude that age was a “but-for” reason that Chapotkat was not promoted to the PCS position.
The ADEA aims to prevent adverse employment decisions grounded in “inaccurate and stigmatizing stereotypes” about older workers’ “productivity and competence.”
Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins,
507 U.S. 604, 610, 113 S.Ct. 1701, 123 L.Ed.2d 338 (1993). “[Ejmployment decisions driven by factors that are empirically intertwined with age are not discriminatory so long as they are motivated by ‘some feature other than the employee’s age.’ ”
Cri-ley v. Delta Air Lines, Inc.,
119 F.3d 102, 105 (2d Cir.1997) (quoting
Hazen Paper,
507 U.S. at 609, 113 S.Ct. 1701). Thus, we have held that “decisions motivated by economic concerns do not violate the ADEA.”
Id.
Affirming summary judgment for the employer in
Criley,
we determined that “[njone of the statements cited by plaintiffs reflect any age-based stereotype or belief that older [employees] are less competent than younger ones.”
Id.
The same is true here. As direct evidence that age-related animus gave rise to the County’s decision, Chapotkat presents only Chief Operator Gonos’s comments made during his interview. According to Chapotkat, Gonos told Chapotkat that he did not “like when people in their late fifties and sixties
come and they don’t stay here,” that he did not “like the process of selection,” and that he “prefer[red] someone who could stay here for a long time.” Gonos then asked Chapotkat how old he was, to which Cha-potkat responded that he was 51 and that he intended to work 15 more years. Cha-potkat contends that this exchange demonstrates “an age-based stereotype — that older employees do not stick around.” We are not persuaded.
Even assuming — and we do not — that a jury could accept Chapotkat’s interpretation on appeal, the asserted “stereotype” would not show that the County used age as a proxy for productivity or competence. Moreover, Chapotkat’s response to Gonos’s comments — that he planned to work 15 more years — reflects Chapotkat’s own understanding that Gonos was concerned with the length of the incoming PCS’s tenure, not with his age. Although Go-nos’s comments mention age, the concern expressed is with the inefficiency of a frequently-recurring hiring process.
We also consider Gonos’s comments alongside other undisputed facts that support the County’s nondiseriminatory explanation for its decision. When he was interviewed for the PCS position, Chapotkat was 52, not in his “late fifties” or “sixties.” Gonos had headed up the hiring process for the prior two PCSs when they were hired; both of them were older than Cha-potkat. Between applying for the position and his interview, Chapotkat joined two other employees in advocating for the elimination of the PCS position as a cost-saving measure. Only Linda Hoffman had applied for the position when the prior PCS officially retired and the County needed to make a “temporary” appointment. Hoffman served in this temporary role for a number of months before she was hired for the provisional role at issue in this appeal. Unlike Chapotkat’s application, Hoffman’s was typewritten and included a copy of the job description and her resume. With respect to “on paper” qualifications as represented in the PCS job description, neither Chapotkat nor Hoffman was objectively more qualified than the other for the position.
Considered as a whole, the evidence is insufficient to create a genuine issue as to whether age was a “but-for” cause of the County’s decision. Chapotkat argues that Hoffman was unfairly singled out for promotion instead of him. That may be the plain reality, but nothing suggests that age was a “but-for” cause of the County’s decision not to promote Chapotkat. The district court did not err in granting the County’s motion for summary judgment.
We have considered Chapotkat’s remaining arguments and find them to be without merit. The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.