Chan v. Ramdhaney

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedJune 21, 2022
Docket1:22-cv-03708
StatusUnknown

This text of Chan v. Ramdhaney (Chan v. Ramdhaney) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Chan v. Ramdhaney, (S.D.N.Y. 2022).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK LAP-SUN CHAN, Plaintiff, 22-CV-3708 (LTS) -against- SUSAN RAMDHANEY, MD; MANHATTAN ORDER OF DISMISSAL GASTROENTEROLOGY; LUIS CASTELO; WITH LEAVE TO REPLEAD MANHATTAN SPECIALTY CARE, Defendants. LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, Chief United States District Judge: Plaintiff brings this pro se action, for which the filing fee has been paid,1 alleging that Defendants violated his rights under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq. (“FDCPA”). Plaintiff also asserts state law claims of medical malpractice. For the reasons set forth below, the Court dismisses the complaint, but grants Plaintiff 30 days’ leave to replead his FDCPA claim. STANDARD OF REVIEW The Court has the authority to dismiss a complaint, even when the plaintiff has paid the filing fee, if it determines that the action is frivolous, Fitzgerald v. First E. Seventh Tenants Corp., 221 F.3d 362, 363-64 (2d Cir. 2000) (per curiam) (citing Pillay v. INS, 45 F.3d 14, 16-17 (2d Cir. 1995) (per curiam) (holding that Court of Appeals has inherent authority to dismiss frivolous appeal)), or that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 583 (1999). The Court also may dismiss an action for failure to state a

1 By order dated May 11, 2022, the Court denied Plaintiff’s application to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), concluding that Plaintiff had sufficient assets to pay the filing fees. (ECF 3.) Plaintiff paid the $402.00 in filing fees on May 23, 2022. claim, “so long as the plaintiff is given notice and an opportunity to be heard.” Wachtler v. County of Herkimer, 35 F.3d 77, 82 (2d Cir. 1994) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The Court is obliged, however, to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal

quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). BACKGROUND Plaintiff invokes the Court’s federal question jurisdiction, asserting claims under the FDCPA and state law claims of medical malpractice. (ECF 2, at 2.) Named as Defendants are Dr. Susan Ramdhaney, Manhattan Gastroenterology, Luis Castelo, and Manhattan Specialty Care. The following allegations are taken from the complaint. On May 7, 2021, Plaintiff went to see Dr. Ramdhaney to have blood drawn, but Ramdhaney “mistakenly ordered the wrong blood test.” (Id. at 5.) When Plaintiff called the office for clarification, Dr. Ramdhaney’s “staff repeatedly misinformed me, disrespected me, insulted me, and failed to return my phone calls. I yelled at them for this disrespect. They had the nerve to blame me for getting angry.” (Id.)

Plaintiff reported the behavior to Dr. Ramdhaney and several other doctors and demanded disciplinary action, but “[t]hey never followed up.” (Id.) Over the “next few months,” a woman from Dr. Ramdhaney’s office “has called [Plaintiff] up asking for payment of unpaid medical bills.” (Id.) Plaintiff states, Do they honestly think I would ever pay them a single cent after what they did? I received one such call from a woman who I believe was “Laura” (I don’t have records from that time). I informed her that if she wanted to get paid at all she’d “better do her fucking job and handle my complaint. YOU GOT IT, B**CH?!” She said, “Okey dokey. I’ll get on it.” (Id.) On May 4, 2022, Plaintiff received another call from a woman he “believe[s]” was Laura. (Id.) “She had the nerve to ask me again for my unpaid medical bill – after she completely ignored my demand to punish those employees. I cursed her out at the top of my lungs.” (Id.) Plaintiff adds, “I want to go on record that if I get one more call from Susan Ramdhaney and her mentally retarded staff (most of whom probably dropped out of elementary school), I

will call the police. I’m not paying the fucking bill.” (Id.) Plaintiff seeks $1 million in damages. DISCUSSION A. Fair Debt Collection Practices Act The FDCPA applies to consumer debt “arising out of . . . transaction[s] . . . primarily for personal, family, or household purposes.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(5); Polanco v. NCO Portfolio Mgmt., Inc., 930 F. Supp. 2d 547, 551 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (“[T]he FDCPA is triggered when the obligation is a debt arising out of a consumer transaction”). In cases where the FDCPA applies, it prohibits deceptive and misleading practices by “debt collectors.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692e. A debt collector is defined in Section 1692a(6) as: (1) a person whose principal purpose is to collect debts; (2) a person who regularly collects debts

owed to another; or (3) a person who collects its own debts, using a name other than its own as if it were a debt collector. See also Henson v. Santander Consumer USA, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1718 (2017) (holding that entities that regularly purchase debts originated by someone else and then seek to collect those debts for their own account are not necessarily debt collectors subject to the FDCPA). Section 1692d provides that “[a] debt collector may not engage in any conduct the natural consequence of which is to harass, oppress, or abuse any person in connection with the collection of a debt.” Conduct in violation of the statute includes, among other examples and without limitation, using violence or the threat of violence or other criminal means; using obscene or profane language “the natural consequence of which is to abuse the hearer or reader”; publishing a list of consumers who refuse to pay debts; or “[c]ausing a telephone to ring or engaging any person in telephone conversation repeatedly or continuously with the intent to annoy, abuse, or harass” the person called. 15 U.S.C. § 1692d.

Section 1692c provides that a debt collector may not, without prior consent, contact a consumer: (1) at an unusual time or place, 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(a)(1), (2) directly, if the debt collector knows an attorney is representing the consumer in connection with the debt, § 1692c(a)(2), or (3) at the consumer’s place of employment if the debt collector knows the employer prohibits such communication, § 1692c(a)(3). Section 1692c(c) provides that “[i]f a consumer notifies a debt collector in writing that the consumer refuses to pay a debt or that the consumer wishes the debt collector to cease further communication with the consumer, the debt collector shall not communicate further with the consumer with respect to such debt,” except to advise the consumer that further collection efforts

are being terminated, to notify the consumer that the debt collector may or will invoke specified remedies.

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Related

Coppedge v. United States
369 U.S. 438 (Supreme Court, 1962)
Carnegie-Mellon University v. Cohill
484 U.S. 343 (Supreme Court, 1988)
Ruhrgas Ag v. Marathon Oil Co.
526 U.S. 574 (Supreme Court, 1999)
Hill v. Curcione
657 F.3d 116 (Second Circuit, 2011)
Harris v. Mills
572 F.3d 66 (Second Circuit, 2009)
Henson v. Santander Consumer USA Inc.
582 U.S. 79 (Supreme Court, 2017)
Wachtler v. County of Herkimer
35 F.3d 77 (Second Circuit, 1994)
Cuoco v. Moritsugu
222 F.3d 99 (Second Circuit, 2000)
Polanco v. NCO Portfolio Management, Inc.
930 F. Supp. 2d 547 (S.D. New York, 2013)
Salahuddin v. Cuomo
861 F.2d 40 (Second Circuit, 1988)

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Bluebook (online)
Chan v. Ramdhaney, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/chan-v-ramdhaney-nysd-2022.