Chad Creel v. Rob Bonta, et al.

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 CHAD CREEL, Case No. 2:26-cv-02111-DC-CSK (PS) 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. ORDER AND FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 14 ROB BONTA, et al., (ECF Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4) 15 Defendant. 16 17 Pending before the Court is Plaintiff Chad Creel’s motion to proceed in forma 18 pauperis (“IFP”), motion for a temporary restraining order (“TRO”), and request for 19 disability accommodations. (ECF Nos. 2, 3, 4).1 Pursuant to Local Rule 230(g), the Court 20 submits the motions upon the record and briefs on file. 21 For the reasons that follow, the Court recommends DENYING Plaintiff’s motion 22 for IFP, DISMISSING the Complaint without leave to amend, and DENYING Plaintiff’s 23 motion for a TRO. The Court DENIES Plaintiff’s request for disability accommodations as 24 moot. 25 I. MOTION TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS 26 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) provides that the court may authorize the commencement, 27 1 This matter proceeds before the undersigned pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636, Fed. R. 28 Civ. P. 72, and Local Rule 302(c). 1 prosecution or defense of any suit without prepayment of fees or security “by a person 2 who submits an affidavit stating the person is “unable to pay such fees or give security 3 therefor.” This affidavit is to include, among other things, a statement of all assets the 4 person possesses. Id. The IFP statute does not itself define what constitutes insufficient 5 assets. See Escobedo v. Applebees, 787 F.3d 1226, 1234 (9th Cir. 2015). In Escobedo, 6 the Ninth Circuit stated that an affidavit in support of an IFP application is sufficient 7 where it alleges that the affiant cannot pay court costs and still afford the necessities of 8 life. Id. “One need not be absolutely destitute to obtain benefits of the in forma pauperis 9 statute.” Id. Nonetheless, a party seeking IFP status must allege poverty “with some 10 particularity, definiteness and certainty.” Id. According to the United States Department 11 of Health and Human Services, the current poverty guideline for a household of one (not 12 residing in Alaska or Hawaii) is $15,650.00. See U.S. Dpt. Health & Human Service 13 (available at https://aspe.hhs.gov/poverty-guidelines). 14 Here, Plaintiff has made the required financial showing under 28 U.S.C. 15 § 1915(a). See ECF No. 2. However, the Court recommends Plaintiff’s IFP application 16 be denied because the action is facially frivolous or without merit. “‘A district court may 17 deny leave to proceed in forma pauperis at the outset if it appears from the face of the 18 proposed complaint that the action is frivolous or without merit.’” Minetti v. Port of 19 Seattle, 152 F.3d 1113, 1115 (9th Cir. 1998) (quoting Tripati v. First Nat. Bank & Tr., 821 20 F.2d 1368, 1370 (9th Cir. 1987)); see also McGee v. Dep’t of Child Support Servs., 584 21 Fed. App’x. 638 (9th Cir. 2014) (“the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying 22 McGee's request to proceed IFP because it appears from the face of the amended 23 complaint that McGee's action is frivolous or without merit”); Smart v. Heinze, 347 F.2d 24 114, 116 (9th Cir. 1965) (“It is the duty of the District Court to examine any application for 25 leave to proceed in forma pauperis to determine whether the proposed proceeding has 26 merit and if it appears that the proceeding is without merit, the court is bound to deny a 27 motion seeking leave to proceed in forma pauperis.”). Because it appears from the face 28 of Plaintiff’s Complaint that this action is frivolous or is without merit as discussed in 1 more detail below, the Court recommends Plaintiff’s IFP motion be denied. 2 II. SCREENING REQUIREMENT 3 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e), the court must screen every in forma pauperis 4 proceeding, and must order dismissal of the case if it is “frivolous or malicious,” “fails to 5 state a claim on which relief may be granted,” or “seeks monetary relief against a 6 defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); Lopez v. Smith, 7 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (2000) (en banc). A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an 8 arguable basis either in law or in fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). In 9 reviewing a complaint under this standard, the court accepts as true the factual 10 allegations contained in the complaint, unless they are clearly baseless or fanciful, and 11 construes those allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Neitzke, 490 12 U.S. at 327; Von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of Art at Pasadena, 592 F.3d 954, 960 13 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 564 U.S. 1037 (2011). 14 Pleadings by self-represented litigants are liberally construed. Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 15 F.3d 338, 342 & n.7 (9th Cir. 2010) (liberal construction appropriate even post–Iqbal). 16 However, the court need not accept as true conclusory allegations, unreasonable 17 inferences, or unwarranted deductions of fact. Western Mining Council v. Watt, 643 F.2d 18 618, 624 (9th Cir. 1981). A formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action does 19 not suffice to state a claim. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-57 (2007); 20 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). 21 To state a claim on which relief may be granted, the plaintiff must allege enough 22 facts “to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A 23 claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court 24 to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” 25 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. A pro se litigant is entitled to notice of the deficiencies in the 26 complaint and an opportunity to amend unless the complaint’s deficiencies could not be 27 cured by amendment. See Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1130-31; Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80 28 F.3d 336, 339 (9th Cir. 1996). 1 III. DISCUSSION 2 A. The Complaint 3 Plaintiff Chad Creel has filed a Complaint against Defendants Rob Bonta, in his 4 official capacity as the Attorney General of the State of California, California Department 5 of Justice; Shirley N. Weber, Safe at Home Program Administrator, California Secretary 6 of State/Safe at Home Program; California Assemblymembers Mia Bonta, Isaac Bryan, 7 and Carl DeMaio; California Legislative Latino Caucus; Coalition for Humane Immigrant 8 Rights (“CHIRLA”); and Jon/Jane Does 1-100. Compl. at 2-4, 68 (ECF No. 1.) 9 Plaintiff’s Complaint requests declaratory and injunctive relief against California 10 Assembly Bill 2624, which would create an address confidentiality program for 11 designated immigration support services providers, employees, or volunteers. A.B. 2624, 12 2026 State Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2026).2 Further, the bill would prohibit individuals 13 from “soliciting, selling, or trading on the internet the [protected individuals’] personal 14 information or image.” Id. 15 Plaintiff alleges the bill would limit him from activities such as “screenshotting, 16 filming, [and] preserving communications,” with which Plaintiff relies on during ongoing 17 legal disputes. Compl. at 78. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that AB 2624 would “threaten 18 to interfere” with Plaintiff’s ongoing litigation involving Meta, OpenAI, Amazon, and other 19 public officials. Id. Plaintiff further raises concerns that the bill could be used for selective 20 enforcement and that the bill “could be weaponized by private actors.” Id. at 80. 21 Plaintiff alleges AB 2624 violates the First and Fourteenth Amendments under 22 42 U.S.C. § 1983, such as by being a burden on protected speech, facially overbroad, a 23 violation of the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause, a prior restraint, a violation 24 of Plaintiff’s right to access the courts, and a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of 25 the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 84-90. Plaintiff further alleges AB 2624 violates Article

26 2 A court may judicially notice matters of public record, such as legislative enactments 27 and public records. Insight Psychology and Addiction, Inc. v. City of Costa Mesa, 801 F. Supp. 3d 942, 953 (C.D. Cal. 2025) (citations omitted). 28 1 1, §§ 2, 3, and 7 of the California Constitution. Id. at 90-91. Plaintiff requests declaratory 2 relief clarifying the parties’ rights and obligations before AB 2624 is “enforced, invoked, 3 cited, weaponized, or used to chill protected conduct.” Id. at 91. Plaintiff also seeks 4 preliminary and permanent injunctive relief, seeking a TRO, preliminary injunction, and 5 permanent injunction that prohibits Defendants from “enforcing, implementing, 6 interpreting, threatening, or using AB 2624 in any manner that burdens constitutionally 7 protected conduct.” Id. at 92-93. 8 1. Subject Matter Jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) 9 Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and may hear only those cases 10 authorized by federal law. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). 11 Jurisdiction is a threshold inquiry, and “[f]ederal courts are presumed to lack jurisdiction, 12 ‘unless the contrary appears affirmatively from the record.’” Casey v. Lewis, 4 F.3d 1516, 13 1519 (9th Cir. 1993) (quoting Bender v. Williamsport Area Sch. Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 546 14 (1986)); see Morongo Band of Mission Indians v. Cal. State Bd. of Equalization, 858 15 F.2d 1376, 1380 (9th Cir. 1988). Without jurisdiction, the district court cannot decide the 16 merits of a case or order any relief and must dismiss the case. See Morongo, 858 F.2d 17 at 1380. A federal court’s jurisdiction may be established in one of two ways: actions 18 arising under federal law or those between citizens of different states in which the 19 alleged damages exceed $75,000. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332. “Subject-matter jurisdiction 20 can never be waived or forfeited,” and “courts are obligated to consider sua sponte” 21 subject matter jurisdiction even when not raised by the parties. Gonzalez v. Thaler, 565 22 U.S. 134, 141 (2012). 23 2. Article III Standing 24 “Pursuant to Article III of the U.S. Constitution, federal courts have limited 25 jurisdiction to hear only live ‘cases’ and ‘controversies.’” Fruci & Associates, PS v. A10 26 Capital LLC, 510 F. Supp. 3d 962, 967 (W.D. Wash. 2020) (quoting Lujan v. Defenders 27 of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 559 (1992)). To have Article III standing, a plaintiff must show 28 (1) it has suffered an “injury in fact,” (2) its injury is “fairly traceable” to the defendant's 1 actions, and (3) its injury will likely be “redressed” by the action. Lujan, 504 U.S., at 560- 2 61. Courts have held threatened enforcement of a law may satisfy the “injury in fact” 3 requirement where plaintiff alleges “an intention to engage in a course of conduct 4 arguably affected with a constitutional interest, but proscribed by a statute, and there 5 exists a credible threat of prosecution thereunder.” Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 6 573 U.S. 149, 159 (2014) (quoting Babbitt v. Farm Workers, 442 U.S. 289, 298 (1979)) 7 (emphasis added). 8 Plaintiff alleges he is entitled to pre-enforcement review of AB 2624. Compl. at 73- 9 74. As of July 7, 2026, AB 2624 has not been passed into law and was re-referred to 10 Committee on July 2, 2026.3 “[P]ersons having no fears of state prosecution except 11 those that are imaginary or speculative, are not accepted to be appropriate plaintiffs.” 12 Babbitt, 442 U.S., at 298 (quoting Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 42 (1971)); see also 13 United States v. Juliano, 12 F. 4th 937, 941 (9th Cir. 2021) (“Only a fraction of proposed 14 legislation eventually becomes law.”). Because AB 2624 has not been passed into law, 15 any threatened prosecution under AB 2624 is speculative. Therefore, Plaintiff has failed 16 to state an “injury in fact” to sufficiently invoke Article III standing, and the Court lacks 17 subject matter jurisdiction to hear this action. See Perry v. Newsom, 18 F. 4th 622, 630 18 (9th Cir. 2021) (“Article III standing is an essential ingredient of subject matter 19 jurisdiction.”) (citation omitted). 20 3. Leave to Amend 21 In light of the Court’s lack of subject matter jurisdiction, it appears granting leave 22 to amend would be futile. The Court therefore recommends the Complaint be dismissed 23 without leave to amend. See Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1130-31; Cato v. United States, 70 F.3d 24 1103, 1105-06 (9th Cir. 1995). 25 B. Plaintiff’s Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order 26 Plaintiff has additionally filed an ex parte motion for a TRO seeking relief in the 27

28 3. Insight, 801 F. Supp. 3d, at 953 (C.D. Cal. 2025). 1 form of enjoining all Defendants, “their officers, agents, employees, successors, and all 2 persons acting in concert,” from “enforcing, implementing, administering, directing, 3 threatening, or relying on AB 2624.” TRO at 13 (ECF No. 3). Because the Court 4 recommends dismissing the Complaint without leave to amend, there is no operative 5 complaint to this action, and the Court recommends the TRO should be denied. See 6 Carnero v. Elk Grove Financial, 2017 WL 1315575, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 6, 2017) 7 (denying a TRO where there was no operative complaint). 8 C. Plaintiff’s Request for Disability Accommodations 9 Plaintiff also filed a request for disability accommodations, asking the Court to 10 grant Plaintiff: (1) permission to use AI tools for drafting and case-preparation; 11 (2) permission to use a computer, other digital devices, AI-assisted notes and other 12 electronic files during preparation and remote appearances; (3) permission to appear by 13 Zoom; (4) permission to mute audio and temporarily turn off video when experiencing 14 “disability-related overload”; (5) e-filing privileges or limited email submission access for 15 emergency filings; (6) authorization for U.S. Marshall service where permitted by Federal 16 Rule of Civil Procedure 4(c)(3) and 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d); (7) permission to coordinate 17 U.S. Marshall service by email; (8) permission to use the “Omni Trident Protocol” by 18 sending an organized email thread to the U.S. Marshall or service contact while 19 courtesy-copying opposing counsel; (9) permission to include the summons, relevant 20 filings, exhibits, Dropbox links, and service instructions in this thread; and 21 (10) “recognition that courtesy-copy email notice does not replace formal service unless 22 accepted, authorized, or ordered, but may be used to preserve notice and maintain a 23 clear record.” Pl. Req. Accommodation at 16-17 (ECF No. 4). Because the Court 24 recommends dismissing the Complaint without leave to amend, the Court denies 25 Plaintiff’s request for disability accommodations as moot. 26 IV. CONCLUSION 27 In conclusion, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff’s request for disability 28 accommodations (ECF No. 4) are DENIED as moot. 1 Further, based upon the findings above, it is RECOMMENDED: 2 1. Plaintiffs motion to proceed IFP (ECF No. 2) be DENIED; 3 2. Plaintiffs Complaint (ECF No. 1) be DISMISSED without leave to amend; 4 3. Plaintiff's motion for a TRO (ECF No. 3) be DISMISSED; 5 4. The Clerk of the Court be directed to CLOSE this case. 6 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District 7 || Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within 8 | 14 days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file 9 || written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. This document should 10 | be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any 11 | reply to the objections shall be served on all parties and filed with the Court within 14 12 || days after service of the objections. Failure to file objections within the specified time 13 || may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 14 | 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Yist, 951 F.2d 1153, 1156-57 (9th Cir. 1991). 15 16 | Dated: July 9, 2026 C i s 7 CHI SOO KIM 18 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 19 || 7, cree.2111.26.scrn tro 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28