Ceresa v. Rathjen

District Court, S.D. New York·Decided November 7, 2022·No. 1:22-cv-07070·Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK ROBERT L. CERESA, Plaintiff, 22-CV-7070 (LTS) -against- ORDER TO AMEND BRIAN RATHJEN; JAMES NEIMIE; SADIE MILLARD; KEN MERLO, Defendants. LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, Chief United States District Judge: Plaintiff brings this pro se action, for which the filing fees have been paid, alleging that Defendants discriminated against him based on his age by terminating his employment. For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint within 60 days of the date of this order. STANDARD OF REVIEW The Court has the authority to dismiss a complaint, even when the plaintiff has paid the filing fee, if it determines that the action is frivolous, Fitzgerald v. First E. Seventh Tenants Corp., 221 F.3d 362, 363-64 (2d Cir. 2000) (per curiam) (citing Pillay v. INS, 45 F.3d 14, 16-17 (2d Cir. 1995) (per curiam) (holding that Court of Appeals has inherent authority to dismiss frivolous appeal)), or that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 583 (1999). The Court also may dismiss an action for failure to state a claim, “so long as the plaintiff is given notice and an opportunity to be heard.” Wachtler v. County of Herkimer, 35 F.3d 77, 82 (2d Cir. 1994) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The Court is obliged, however, to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). But the “special solicitude” in pro se cases, id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits – to state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and

plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. Rule 8 requires a complaint to include enough facts to state a claim for relief “that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible if the plaintiff pleads enough factual detail to allow the Court to draw the inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. In reviewing the complaint, the Court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). But it does not have to accept as true “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,” which are essentially just legal conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the Court must determine whether those facts make it plausible – not merely possible – that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id.

BACKGROUND Plaintiff presents his claims using the court’s general complaint form, but the form is missing every other page (second, forth, and sixth pages). (See ECF 2.) He names as defendants Brian Rathjen, James Neimie, Sadie Millard, and Ken Merlo, but only identifies Merlo as the Legal Counsel of Roberts-Ryan Investments and Millard as its Operating Officer. Plaintiff seeks unspecified relief. The following assertions are taken from the complaint. Plaintiff was the Senior Director of the Municipal Securities Group at Roberts-Ryan. On January 21, 2021, while he was on a marketing call with his sales team, Defendants Merlo and Millard interrupted the call to inform him that his services were no longer needed as the firm was shutting down the Municipal Bond Department. Plaintiff claims, however, that the firm never closed the Municipal Bond Department and that personnel he had trained are still employed at the firm and working in the same department. Plaintiff believes that his employment was terminated because Roberts-Ryan did not want to pay the $39,348 in fees and commissions due to him, and thought that the “much

younger” personnel Plaintiff had trained could do the same job at lower pay. (ECF 2 at 3.) Plaintiff contends that Roberts-Ryan discriminated against him because of his age and “damaged” his career and reputation “by terminating [him] without just cause.” (Id.) Plaintiff attaches to the complaint a Notice of Right to Sue issued by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) on July 7, 2022, which states that the EEOC closed the charge because Plaintiff was “not in an employment relationship with the Respondent.” (Id. at 6.) DISCUSSION Plaintiff brings this action without specifying the statutory basis of his claims. Because Plaintiff alleges age discrimination and sought relief from the EEOC, the Court construes the complaint as being brought under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967

(“ADEA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634. The ADEA makes it unlawful for an employer to “discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s age.” 29 U.S.C. § 623(a). It also makes it unlawful to retaliate against employees who oppose discriminatory practices barred by the ADEA. Id. § 623(d). The statute protects workers who are at least forty years old from discrimination because of their age. See 29 U.S.C. § 631(a) (“The prohibitions in this chapter shall be limited to individuals who are at least 40 years of age.”); Feldman v. Nassau Cnty., 434 F.3d 177, 180 (2d Cir. 2006). Plaintiff cannot bring age discrimination claims under the ADEA against Defendants Rathjen, Neimie, Millard, and Merlo. The ADEA only provides for liability against an employer, not against supervisors or other individuals. See Guerra v. Jones, 421 F. App’x. 15, 17 (2d Cir. 2011) (holding that the ADEA does not subject individuals, “even those with supervisory liability

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Ceresa v. Rathjen, (S.D.N.Y. 2022).

Ceresa v. Rathjen (Ceresa v. Rathjen) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

Related

Coppedge v. United States
369 U.S. 438 (Supreme Court, 1962)
Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid
490 U.S. 730 (Supreme Court, 1989)
Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth
524 U.S. 742 (Supreme Court, 1998)
Ruhrgas Ag v. Marathon Oil Co.
526 U.S. 574 (Supreme Court, 1999)
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Hill v. Curcione
657 F.3d 116 (Second Circuit, 2011)
Harris v. Mills
572 F.3d 66 (Second Circuit, 2009)
Robinson v. Overseas Military Sales Corp.
21 F.3d 502 (Second Circuit, 1994)
Wachtler v. County of Herkimer
35 F.3d 77 (Second Circuit, 1994)
Cuoco v. Moritsugu
222 F.3d 99 (Second Circuit, 2000)
Wang v. Palmisano
51 F. Supp. 3d 521 (S.D. New York, 2014)
Feingold v. New York
366 F.3d 138 (Second Circuit, 2004)
Vega v. Hempstead Union Free School District
801 F.3d 72 (Second Circuit, 2015)
Darcy v. Lippman
356 F. App'x 434 (Second Circuit, 2009)