Central Valley Eden Environmental Defenders, LLC v. Airgas USA, LLC

• Court: District Court, E.D. California
• Decided: April 18, 2025
• Docket: 2:24-cv-03547
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 CENTRAL VALLEY EDEN No. 2:24-cv-03547-DJC-AC ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENDERS, LLC, 12 Plaintiff, 13 ORDER v. 14 AIRGAS USA, LLC, 15 Defendants. 16 17 This is an action under the Clean Water Act, in which Plaintiff Central Valley 18 Eden Environmental Defenders, LLC alleges Defendant Airgas USA, LLC has failed to 19 properly file certain permits and comply with regulations related to stormwater 20 discharge and other water pollutants. Airgas USA, LLC seeks dismissal of the 21 Complaint, arguing that Plaintiff lacks standing. For the reasons set forth below, the 22 Court finds that Plaintiff fails to plead independent factual allegations sufficient to 23 establish associational standing under Article III, and hereby GRANTS Defendant’s 24 Motion to Dismiss on standing grounds. Plaintiff may refile a First Amended 25 Complaint within fourteen days. 26 BACKGROUND 27 Airgas USA, LLC (“Airgas”) operates a facility in Sacramento, California, that 28 produces chemical gases. (ECF No. 1, hereinafter “Compl.” ¶¶ 8, 93.) According to 1 Central Valley Eden Environmental Defenders, LLC (“EDEN”), Airgas stores and 2 handles industrial chemicals and materials outdoors that are exposed to storm water, 3 eroded by wind, and otherwise contaminate the surrounding watershed. (Id. ¶ 96.) 4 During rain events, EDEN believes that storm water flows over the surface of Airgas’s 5 Sacramento facility and collects suspended sediment, dirt, metals, and other 6 chemicals and toxic pollutants, transporting those materials into the facility’s storm 7 water channels where they are ultimately discharged into the Sacramento River. (Id. 8 ¶¶ 97, 98, 100.) 9 Airgas’s Sacramento facility is subject to certain regulations under the Clean 10 Water Act (“CWA”), 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387, including regulations under the State of 11 California’s Industrial General Permit. (See id. ¶¶ 9, 10, 33.) The CWA makes it 12 unlawful to discharge “any pollutant by any person” except as authorized by and in 13 compliance with other sections of the CWA, including, as relevant here, 33 U.S.C. 14 § 1342. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a). The CWA authorizes the Administrator of the 15 Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”), as part of the National Pollutant Discharge 16 Elimination System (“NPDES”), to “issue a permit for the discharge of any pollutant, or 17 combination of pollutants . . ., upon condition that such discharge will meet either (A) 18 all applicable requirements under [the CWA], or (B) . . . such conditions as the 19 Administrator determines are necessary to carry out the provisions of this chapter.” Id. 20 § 1342(a)(1). Alternatively, the States, with EPA approval and continuing supervision, 21 may issue the permits themselves and take primary responsibility for the permitting 22 scheme. See id. § 1342(b); S. California All. of Publicly Owned Treatment Works v. U.S. 23 Env't Prot. Agency, 853 F.3d 1076, 1078 (9th Cir. 2017). California has authority to 24 issue its own NPDES permits. S. California All. of Publicly Owned Treatment Works, 25 853 F.3d at 1078. 26 //// 27 //// 28 1 The CWA also provides a regulatory scheme for municipal and industrial 2 stormwater discharges that are federally regulated as pollutants, 1 including, as 3 relevant here, any “discharge associated with industrial activity.” 33 U.S.C. 4 § 1342(p)(2)(B);2 see also Env’t Def. Ctr., Inc. v. U.S. E.P.A., 344 F.3d 832, 841–43 (9th 5 Cir. 2003). Under California’s NPDES program, rather than provide individual permits 6 authorizing a specific entity to discharge a pollutant in a particular place that is issued 7 after an informal agency adjudication process, see Alaska Cmty. Action on Toxics v. 8 Aurora Energy Servs., LLC, 765 F.3d 1169, 1171 (9th Cir. 2014), California has issued a 9 general permit that applies to entire classes of hypothetical dischargers following 10 notice-and-comment rulemaking. See id. (citing 40 C.F.R. § 122.28(b)). This general 11 permit requires an entity seeking coverage to submit a “notice of intent” to discharge 12 a pollutant under the general permit, see id. (citing 40 C.F.R. § 122.28(b)(2)). 13 First, permittees must implement best management practices (“BMPs”) to 14 reduce or prevent pollutants in storm water discharges. Second, the 15 Permit forbids discharges of storm water that cause or contribute to an exceedance of applicable Water Quality Standards in the applicable 16 water quality or basin plan. Third, permittees must develop a Storm Water Pollution Prevention Plan (“SWPPP”) in compliance with Section B 17 of the Permit, which includes filing annual reports with the Regional 18 Water Quality Control Board. 19 1 As rain falls, the water collects contaminants and impurities from the ground that then make their way 20 into drains and sewers, which eventually lead to federally protected bodies of water, and these sewers are sometimes used to directly discharge contaminants or waste. See Env’t Def. Ctr., Inc. v. U.S. E.P.A., 21 344 F.3d 832, 840 (9th Cir. 2003). The CWA defines “pollutants” as “dredged spoil, solid waste, incinerator residue, sewage, garbage, sewage sludge, munitions, chemical wastes, biological 22 materials, radioactive materials, heat, wrecked or discarded equipment, rock, sand, cellar dirt and industrial, municipal, and agricultural waste discharged into water . . . .” 33 U.S.C. § 1362(6). 23 2 Specifically, “[s]torm water means storm water runoff, snow melt runoff, and surface runoff and 24 drainage[,]” 40 C.F.R. § 122.26(b)(13), and “[s]torm water discharge associated with industrial activity means the discharge from any conveyance that is used for collecting and conveying storm water and 25 that is directly related to manufacturing, processing or raw materials storage areas at an industrial plant[,]” id. § 122.26(b)(14). The term “storm water discharge associated with industrial activity” is quite 26 broad; though it “does not include discharges from facilities or activities excluded from the NPDES program[,]” it does include, “storm water discharges from industrial plant yards; . . . manufacturing 27 buildings; storage areas (including tank farms) for raw materials, and intermediate and final products; and areas where industrial activity has taken place in the past and significant materials remain and are 28 exposed to storm water.” Id. 1 San Francisco Baykeeper v. Levin Enters., Inc. (“S.F. Baykeeper”), 12 F. Supp. 3d 1208, 2 1212 (N.D. Cal. 2013) (citation omitted). 3 EDEN alleges that Airgas has violated the CWA by failing to comply to comply 4 with California’s Industrial General Permit. More specifically, EDEN alleges that Airgas 5 has violated the Industrial General Permit by: (1) submitting a deficient SWPPP 6 (Compl. ¶¶ 163–67); (2) providing incomplete monitoring reports (id. ¶¶ 168–72); (3) 7 falsifying annual reports (id. ¶¶ 173–77); (4) failing to implement best conventional 8 treatments for conventional pollutions (“BCT”) and best available technology for toxic 9 and non-conventional pollutants (“BAT”) when implementing its best management 10 practices (“BMP”) at the Sacramento facility (id. ¶¶ 178–82); (5) discharging 11 contaminated stormwater (id. ¶¶ 183–92); and (6) failing to properly train employees 12 (id. ¶¶ 193–96). 13 EDEN seeks declaratory, injunctive, and civil relief from this Court. (Id. at 32– 14 33.) Specifically, EDEN requests the Court to: (1) declare that Airgas has violated the 15 CWA (id. at 32); (2) order Airgas to comply with the NPDES permitting requirements in 16 the Industrial General Permit and the CWA (id. at 33); (3) enjoin Airgas from 17 discharging pollutants until Airgas has developed and implemented an adequate 18 SWPPP or storm water pollution prevention plan that uses appropriate, including 19 BCTs for conventional pollutants and BATs for toxic and non-conventional pollutants 20 (id.); (4) order Airgas to pay $57,617 in civil penalties per day per each CWA violation 21 (id.); (5) require Airgas to take appropriate actions to restore the quality of the United 22 States waters impaired by activities at the Sacramento Facility (id.); (6) order Airgas to 23 pay EDEN’s reasonable attorney’s fees and costs (including expert witness fees); and 24 (7) award any other relief that may be just and proper. Finally, due to disagreements 25 about the veracity of statements submitted by Airgas’s counsel, EDEN seeks sanctions. 26 (ECF No. 26.) Both the issues of dismissal and of sanctions have been fully briefed, 27 and both motions were ordered submitted without oral argument. (ECF No. 35). 28 //// 1 LEGAL STANDARD 2 A party may move to dismiss a complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction 3 under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). See Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind of Cal. v. 4 Uber Techs., Inc., 103 F. Supp. 3d 1073, 1078 (N.D. Cal. 2015). A Rule 12(b)(1) 5 jurisdictional attack may be facial or factual. White v. Lee, 227 F.3d 1214, 1242 (9th 6 Cir. 2000) (citation omitted). “In a facial attack, the challenger asserts that the 7 allegations contained in a complaint are insufficient on their face to invoke federal 8 jurisdiction. By contrast, in a factual attack, the challenger disputes the truth of the 9 allegations that, by themselves, would otherwise invoke federal jurisdiction.” Safe Air 10 for Everyone v. Meyer (“Safe Air”), 373 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2004). “[The] party 11 invoking the federal court's jurisdiction has the burden of proving the actual existence 12 of subject matter jurisdiction.” Thompson v. McCombe, 99 F.3d 352, 353 (9th Cir. 13 1996). 14 DISCUSSION 15 A. Airgas Brings a Facial Challenge Under Rule 12(b)(1) 16 In its briefing, Airgas asserts that it brings both a factual and facial challenge to 17 EDEN’s allegations. (ECF No. 18, hereinafter “MTD,” at 3–4.) However, upon review, 18 the Court agrees with EDEN (ECF No. 22 at 2) that Airgas’s motion does not call into 19 question any of the underlying facts, as would be needed for a factual attack. For 20 example, Airgas contends that EDEN has not identified a local, affected member 21 affected by Airgas’ alleged actions (MTD at 10–11), has not described a concrete, 22 particularized, and imminent harm (id. at 12–13), nor established any causality 23 between an alleged act by Airgas and an alleged injury suffered by an organizational 24 member of EDEN (id. at 14–15.) These arguments go to the face of EDEN’s standing 25 argument and do not propose or identify any conflict in EDEN’s factual allegations. 26 See Safe Air, 373 F.3d at 1039. Accordingly, Airgas’s motion is properly understood 27 as a facial attack because it claims that the Complaint’s allegations, on their face, are 28 not sufficient to invoke this Court’s jurisdiction, which the Court can resolve based 1 solely on the assertions alleged in EDEN’s Complaint. See Salter v. Quality Carriers, 2 Inc., 974 F.3d 959, 964 (9th Cir. 2020). 3 B. EDEN Fails to Properly Plead Any Alleged Harms 4 The Supreme Court has “established that the irreducible constitutional 5 minimum of standing contains three elements.” Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 6 555, 560 (1992). To establish Article III standing,

7 a plaintiff must show (1) that it has suffered an “injury in fact” that is (a) 8 concrete and particularized and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action of 9 the defendant; and (3) it is likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision. 10

11 Ass’n of Irritated Residents v. U.S. Env’t Prot. Agency, 10 F.4th 937, 943 (9th Cir. 12 2021) (quoting Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Env’t Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 13 U.S. 167, 180–81 (2000)). An association has standing to bring suit on behalf of 14 its members when its members would otherwise have standing to sue in their 15 own right, the interests at stake are germane to the organization’s purpose, and 16 neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of 17 individual members in the lawsuit. Friends of the Earth, Inc., 528 U.S. at 181 18 (citing Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Advert. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977)). 19 “The party invoking federal jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing the[ ] 20 [three] elements [of standing].” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561 (citations omitted). But 21 standing is not dispensed in gross. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 358 n.6 (1996). 22 “Since they are not mere pleading requirements but rather an indispensable part of 23 the plaintiff’s case, each element must be supported in the same way as any other 24 matter on which the plaintiff bears the burden of proof, i.e., with the manner and 25 degree of evidence required at the successive stages of the litigation.” Lujan, 504 U.S. 26 at 561. In addition, “a plaintiff must demonstrate standing separately for each form of 27 relief sought.” Friends of the Earth, Inc., 528 U.S. at 185 (first citing, as an example, 28 City of Los Angeles v. Lyons (“Lyons”), 461 U.S. 95, 109 (1983); and then citing Lewis, 1 518 U.S. at 358 n.6)). Though a plaintiff may establish standing to sue for damages 2 based on past exposure to harm, where, as here, the plaintiff seeks prospective or 3 injunctive relief, the plaintiff must then establish that she suffers from the ”continuing, 4 present, adverse effects.” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 564 (quoting Lyons, 461 U.S. at 102 5 (quoting O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 495–96 (1974))). However, “private 6 plaintiffs, unlike the Federal Government, may not sue to assess penalties for wholly 7 past violations, but . . . [may sue] for violations that are ongoing at the time of the 8 complaint and that could continue into the future if undeterred.” Friends of the Earth, 9 Inc., 528 U.S. at 188 (citing Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 106–08 10 (1998)). 11 EDEN seeks to assert associational standing. (See Compl. ¶¶ 12–21.) 12 Ultimately, EDEN does not establish standing due to its failure to plead sufficient facts 13 to find that EDEN has suffered or will continue to suffer any alleged harm to its 14 aesthetic, informational, and recreational interests. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561; cf. Civil 15 Rts. Educ. & Enf't Ctr. v. Hosp. Prop. Tr., 867 F.3d 1093, 1098–1099 (9th Cir. 2017) 16 (finding pleadings adequate to survive a facial attack). That is, EDEN fails to 17 “demonstrate a concrete and particularized injury caused by the defendant and 18 redressable by the court [that] ensures that federal courts decide only ‘the rights of 19 individuals,’ and that federal courts exercise ‘their proper function in a limited and 20 separated government[.]’” TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 594 U.S. 413, 423 (2021) (first 21 quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 170 (1803); and then quoting John G. 22 Roberts, Jr., Article III Limits on Statutory Standing, 42 Duke L. J. 1219, 1224 (1993)). 23 Indeed, EDEN’s deficient Complaint is functionally identical to its First 24 Amended Complaint in Central Valley Eden Environmental Defenders, LLC v. 25 Champion Home Builders, Inc. (“Champion Home”), No. 2:23-CV-01273-DJC-DB, 26 2024 WL 115386 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 10, 2024), in which this very Court rejected the exact 27 Article III standing argument that EDEN presents in the instant case. In Champion 28 Home, this Court found that EDEN had failed to identify a member that would give it 1 organizational standing, although this Court gave the EDEN leave to amend its First 2 Amended Complaint to properly allege facts that would confer it standing. Id. EDEN 3 then submitted a Second Amended Complaint with new factual allegations to 4 strengthen its Article III standing argument. Champion Home, No. 2:23-CV-01273- 5 DJC-DB, 2024 WL 115386 (ECF No. 32) (E.D. Cal. Jan. 10, 2024). However, the 6 standing section of the Complaint filed in this case is identical to the deficient First 7 Amended Complaint in Champion Home and does not incorporate any of the 8 amendments made in EDEN’s Second Amended Complaint in that case. 9 For the first element of individual standing, EDEN pleads an injury to the 10 aesthetic, recreational, and scientific use and enjoyment of “the Sacramento River, a 11 tributary of the Sacramento-San Joaquin River Delta Waterways[,]” where Plaintiff's 12 members “use those waters and their watersheds for kayaking, canoeing, cycling, 13 recreation, duck hunting, sportfishing, swimming, hiking, bird watching, photography, 14 and nature walks.” (Compl. ¶ 15.) However, EDEN fails to include any independent 15 factual allegations to support this single conclusory statement that one or more of its 16 unidentified members ever again intends to “use those waters and their watersheds 17 for kayaking, canoeing, cycling, recreation, duck hunting, sportfishing, swimming, 18 hiking, bird watching, photography, and nature walks.” (Id.) EDEN’s Complaint thus 19 does not sufficiently establish that any of its members on their own would have 20 standing, and the Court concludes that EDEN’s proffered threadbare allegations are 21 the sort of “formulaic recitation” of the requirements for standing against which the 22 Supreme Court has cautioned. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly (“Twombly”), 550 U.S. 23 544, 555 (2007); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“Nor does a 24 complaint suffice if it tenders ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual 25 enhancement.’” (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557)). 26 EDEN also asserts it has suffered a concrete injury to its substantive right to the 27 information that Defendants must disclose and report regarding its monitoring and 28 compliance with the CWA and the Industrial General Permit (Compl. ¶ 159). See 1 Inland Empire Waterkeeper v. Corona Clay Co., 17 F. 4th 825, 832–33 (9th Cir. 2021) 2 (recognizing that the failure to follow the procedural elements of an NPDES permits 3 program requiring record retention of discharge sampling and filing reports can be 4 “the subject of a CWA citizen suit” and that disclosure, monitoring, and reporting 5 requirements “serve the public's substantive interest in clean water and the 6 environment[,] [which] [t]he CWA elevated [as a cognizable] interest by providing a 7 cause of action to affected citizens.” (citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at 578; 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a), 8 (g))). However, EDEN has failed to establish how any of its members have an intended 9 use for any information that was not disclosed, so EDEN cannot show how the alleged 10 injuries affect it or its members “in a personal and individual way.” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 11 560 n.1. Without such allegations, EDEN asserts nothing more than a generalized 12 grievance, which has never been enough. See, e.g., Carney v. Adams, 592 U.S. 53, 59 13 (2020); Lance v. Coffman, 549 U.S. 437, 439–41 (2007) (per curiam) (detailing the 14 Supreme Court's “lengthy pedigree” of rejecting standing based on generalized 15 grievances). 16 For instance, unlike the members of the environmental organization in Inland 17 Empire Waterkeeper, 17 F.4th 825, EDEN has not pled in its Complaint allegations 18 establishing that its members have a need for accurate information or for the 19 information to be disclosed, such as members not being able to swim in the water 20 because of fear that there has been increased pollution, which cannot be confirmed or 21 denied without the disclosed information, or by members not being able to provide 22 reliable information for use in educational or commercial settings without the 23 disclosed information. See 17 F.4th at 833–34. Nor, for that matter, has EDEN ever 24 identified when one of its members has used the Sacramento River in the past, or 25 when one of its members intends to use the Sacramento River in the future, or how 26 Plaintiff's members have had their activities along the Sacramento River impacted by 27 the CWA violations at the Sacramento facility. See, Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 28 U.S. 488, 495 (2009). Thus, EDEN has failed to allege specific facts showing not only 1 that the Sacramento River was in fact being threatened by pollution and discharge 2 stemming from the Sacramento Facility, but also that one or more of EDEN’s members 3 would thereby be directly affected apart from their special interest in the subject. See 4 Lujan, 504 U.S. at 563. 5 Because EDEN has not established it has Article III standing to bring the instant 6 claims, the Court cannot address the underlying merits of the Complaint. 7 C. Sanctions Are Not Appropriate at This Time 8 EDEN moves for sanctions against Airgas’s counsel, alleging that Airgas’s 9 pleadings contain numerous factual allegations and other assertions that are 10 unsupported by evidence in the record nor by supplemental evidentiary filings. (ECF 11 No. 26 at 1.) These include defense counsel’s statements that: (1) plaintiff’s counsel 12 misrepresented plaintiff’s counsel’s unavailability to meet and confer prior to the filing 13 of the Motion to Dismiss; (2) EDEN has only one member and no associational 14 members; (3) EDEN’s alleged sole member, Eric Lucas, is an Alabama, rather than 15 California, resident; (4) EDEN is currently affiliated with a New Mexico-based LLC; and 16 (5) various merits-related allegations raised in EDEN’s Complaint are unsupported or 17 improperly pled. (Id. at 6–13.) The Court finds that, at this juncture, there is no basis 18 for imposing sanctions against defense counsel. 19 The Court has wide latitude to impose sanctions against parties, including 20 levying sanctions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, 28 U.S.C. § 1927, and the 21 Court’s inherent authority. Rule 11 sanctions may be appropriate where an attorney 22 files a motion (1) to cause unnecessary delay or needlessly increase the cost of 23 litigation; (2) that is frivolous; (3) without evidentiary support for its factual contentions; 24 or (4) contains false or misleading statements of fact. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11. Under 28 25 U.S.C. §1927, sanctions may be appropriate when filings are “unreasonabl[e] and 26 vexatious[].” 28 U.S.C. § 1927. 27 Plaintiff’s counsel contends that defense counsel improperly implied that 28 Plaintiff’s counsel was unavailable to meet and confer prior to the filing of the Motion 1 to Dismiss filed on January 17, 2025. (ECF No. 26 at 6–7.) Defense counsel 2 recognizes that Plaintiff’s counsel indicated that he was unavailable to meet on 3 January 15 through 17, 2025, but identifies that due to the reassignment of this matter 4 from Magistrate Judge Allison Claire to the undersigned on January 15 (ECF No. 14), 5 January 15 through 17 were the only days available before the preexisting January 17 6 deadline for filing the Motion, and notes that only the undersigned, and not 7 Magistrate Judge Claire, requires parties to meet and confer prior to filing a Motion to 8 Dismiss. (ECF No. 30 at 4–6.) While it is generally a requirement that the parties meet 9 and confer for matters before the undersigned, the failure of counsel to meet and 10 confer prior to the filing of the Motion to Dismiss and defense counsel’s (technically 11 correct) representation that Plaintiff’s counsel was unavailable to do so, are not 12 egregious and certainly do not warrant sanctions. 13 On EDEN’s second and third allegation regarding organizational standing and 14 the disputed identity of Eric Lucas, the Court again finds sanctions are not warranted. 15 As discussed above, EDEN’s Complaint does not identify any member by name or 16 description that would confer it Article III standing. In light of this omission, defense 17 counsel investigated and, apparently erroneously, identified Eric Lucas as being the 18 sole member of EDEN. (See, e.g., MTD at 1–2.) Defense counsel further implied, but 19 did not definitively state, that Eric Lucas was a resident of Alabama and not California, 20 meaning he could not confer standing to sue on behalf of EDEN. (Id. (“Eric Lucas [] 21 appears to be an Alabama Resident.” (emphasis added).) Plaintiff’s counsel disputes 22 that Eric Lucas is an Alabama resident. (See, e.g., ECF No. 21 at 7.) Prior to the filing 23 of Plaintiff’s Motion for Sanctions, defense counsel filed a supplemental document 24 detailing its original identification of Eric Lucas and acknowledging that, in light of 25 Plaintiff’s counsel’s briefing, it had mistakenly identified a different Eric Lucas. (ECF 26 No. 24.) Due to Plaintiff’s deficient Complaint that failed to identify a member of its 27 organization therefore prompting defense counsel to investigate, and defense 28 counsel’s acknowledgment of its error prior to the filing of Plaintiff’s Motion for 1 | Sanctions, the Court finds that this incident does not rise to the level of sanctionable 2 | activity. 3 Relatedly, Plaintiff's counsel asserts that defense counsel unduly claimed that 4 | EDEN was “currently” affiliated with an unnamed New Mexico LLC. (ECF 21 at 8.) 5 | However, the language actually used by defense counsel was EDEN “appears 6 | affiliated with another LLC... in New Mexico.” (MTD at 2.) Again, defense counsel is 7 | implying, rather than definitely stating a fact. Plaintiff's assertion is incorrect, and 8 || defense counsel’s wording does not warrant sanctions. 9 The remaining assertions by Plaintiff pertain to disagreements regarding the 10 | merits of the underlying Complaint and Motion to Dismiss. Because the Court finds 11 | that Plaintiff does not having standing to bring the instant suit, the Court declines, at 12 | this juncture to adjudicate the merits of the case or any related claims. 13 CONCLUSION 14 For the reasons set forth above, the Court GRANTS Defendant's Motion to 15 | Dismiss (ECF No. 18) Plaintiff's Complaint (ECF No. 1) WITHOUT PREJUDICE. 16 | Additionally, the Court DENIES Plaintiff's Motion for Sanctions (ECF No. 26.) Plaintiff 17 | may refile a First Amended Complaint within 14 days, if it so chooses. 18 19 IT IS SO ORDERED. 20 | Dated: _April 18, 2025 Donel J CoD tto— Hon. Daniel alabretta 21 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 22 23 24 | DJC5- Eden24cv03547.mtd/ms 25 26 27 28 12