OPINION
CHARLES KREGER, Justice.
Appealing from a summary judgment entered in favor of Anderson Martin Whitehead (“Whitehead”), Cedyco Corporation (“Cedyco”) raises two issues. First, Cedyco contends that the trial court “erred in entering summary judgment ... based on two broad requests for admissions, which were deemed admitted” and, second, Cedyco contends that the trial court “abused its discretion in refusing to grant the motion to undeem the requests for admissions.” From the substance of Cedyco’s first issue, we understand it as complaining of Whitehead’s failure to support his summary judgment motion with proper summary-judgment evidence. We agree and reverse the summary judgment.
The record indicates that in April of 2006, Whitehead petitioned the trial court for a judgment declaring certain assignments purportedly held by Cedyco to a $1.8 million judgment “null and void, without force or effect, and that any abstracts, writs, or other instruments issued pursuant to same are declared also to be null and void[.]” ’Whitehead alleges that the money-judgment at issue, entered in September of 1984, in a Jasper County district court, was assigned and transferred to him via a negotiated settlement agreement during the pendency of a separate and unrelated 1997 lawsuit, styled, Head Oil Prod. Co. v. Marvin Whitehead et al., Trial Cause Number 17,205. As part of his 2006 declaratory judgment action, Whitehead served requests for admissions on Cedyco. When Cedyco failed to timely respond to the requests for admissions, they were deemed admitted by Cedyco. See Tex.R. Civ. P. 198.2(a) (a party must respond to requests for admissions within thirty days); 198.2(c) (“If a response is not timely served, the request is considered admitted without the necessity of a court order.”).
Thereafter, Whitehead filed a motion for summary judgment supported primarily by the deemed admissions and Cedyco’s pleadings. On the day of the summary judgment hearing, Cedyco appeared and filed a motion for leave to make late responses to Whitehead’s request for admissions. The trial court denied Cedyco’s motion for leave and granted Whitehead’s summary judgment motion, declaring him “rightful owner and holder” of the $1.3 million judgment. The summary judgment also awarded Whitehead attorney’s fees in the amount of $25,000.
“The function of summary judgment is not to deprive a litigant of his right to trial by jury, but to eliminate patently unmeritorious claims and untenable defenses.” City of Houston v. Clear Creek Basin Auth., 589 S.W.2d 671, 678 n. 5 (Tex.1979) (citing Gulbenkian v. Penn, 151 Tex. 412, 252 S.W.2d 929, 931 (1952)). A plaintiff is entitled to summary judgment on a cause of action only if he conclusively proves all essential elements of his claim as a matter of law. See Tex.R. Civ. P. 166a(a), (c); Rhone-Poulenc, Inc. v. Steel, 997 S.W.2d 217, 223 (Tex.1999); MMP Ltd. v. Jones, 710 S.W.2d 59, 60 (Tex.1986). When reviewing a summary [880]*880judgment, we accept as true all evidence favorable to the nonmovant, and we indulge every reasonable inference and resolve any doubts in the nonmovant’s favor. See IHS Cedars Treatment Ctr. of DeSoto, Tex., Inc. v. Mason, 143 S.W.3d 794, 798 (Tex.2004). When the movant’s summary judgment proof fails to conclusively establish each element of his cause of action, the trial court may not render a summary judgment by default solely because the nonmovant did not file a summary judgment response. See Rhone-Poulenc, Inc., 997 S.W.2d at 223; Clear Creek Basin Auth, 589 S.W.2d at 678. The movant’s motion “for summary judgment must itself expressly present the grounds upon which it is made, and must stand or fall on these grounds alone.” Sci. Spectrum, Inc. v. Martinez, 941 S.W.2d 910, 912 (Tex.1997) (citing McConnell v. Southside Indep. Sch. Dist., 858 S.W.2d 337, 341 (Tex.1993)); see also Tex.R. Civ. P. 166a(c) (requiring motion to explicitly state the specific grounds for summary judgment).
The longstanding rule is that allegations in pleadings are not competent summary judgment evidence, even if sworn or verified. See Laidlaw Waste Sys. (Dallas), Inc. v. City of Wilmer, 904 S.W.2d 656, 660 (Tex.1995); Americana Motel, Inc. v. Johnson, 610 S.W.2d 143, 143 (Tex.1980); Clear Creek Basin Auth, 589 S.W.2d at 678; Hidalgo v. Surety Sav. & Loan Ass’n., 462 S.W.2d 540, 545 (Tex.1971). “Pleadings outline the issues, but they are not evidence.” Shawell v. Pend Oreille Oil & Gas Co., 823 S.W.2d 336, 338 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 1991, writ denied). Therefore, any averments contained in pleadings are not proper summary judgment evidence and will not sustain the trial court’s summary judgment in favor of Whitehead.
Regarding the deemed admissions, we noted above that when a party fails to timely respond to request for admissions, the matters therein are deemed admitted. Tex.R. Civ. P. 198.2(c). Admissions of fact on file at the time of a summary judgment hearing are proper summary judgment proof and will, therefore, support a motion for summary judgment. Tex.R. Civ. P. 166a(c); see e.g., Acevedo v. Comm’n for Lawyer Discipline, 131 S.W.3d 99, 105 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2004, pet. denied). However, a request for admission asking a party to admit or deny a purely legal issue is improper, and a deemed admission involving a purely legal issue is of no effect. See Boulet v. State, 189 S.W.3d 833, 838 (TexApp.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, no pet.); Fort Bend Cent. Appraisal Dist. v. Hines Wholesale Nurseries, 844 S.W.2d 857, 858-59 (TexApp.-Texarkana 1992, writ denied). This is so because the primary purpose of requests for admissions is to simplify trials by eliminating matters about which there is no real controversy. See Stelly v. Papania, 927 S.W.2d 620, 622 (Tex.1996). “It was never intended to be used as a demand upon a plaintiff or defendant to admit that he had no cause of action or ground of defense.” Id. (quoting Sanders v. Harder, 148 Tex. 593, 227 S.W.2d 206, 208 (1950)).
Whitehead’s motion for summary judgment contains, inter alia, the following assertion:
12. Three admissions by Defendant Cedyco Corporation are sufficient to support a judgment for Plaintiff Whitehead .... Those three admissions are quoted here in full:
NO. 8: The sole current legal owner of the Judgment is Anderson Martin Whitehead.
NO. 9: Defendant Cedyco Corporation is not the current legal owner of the Judgment.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
OPINION
CHARLES KREGER, Justice.
Appealing from a summary judgment entered in favor of Anderson Martin Whitehead (“Whitehead”), Cedyco Corporation (“Cedyco”) raises two issues. First, Cedyco contends that the trial court “erred in entering summary judgment ... based on two broad requests for admissions, which were deemed admitted” and, second, Cedyco contends that the trial court “abused its discretion in refusing to grant the motion to undeem the requests for admissions.” From the substance of Cedyco’s first issue, we understand it as complaining of Whitehead’s failure to support his summary judgment motion with proper summary-judgment evidence. We agree and reverse the summary judgment.
The record indicates that in April of 2006, Whitehead petitioned the trial court for a judgment declaring certain assignments purportedly held by Cedyco to a $1.8 million judgment “null and void, without force or effect, and that any abstracts, writs, or other instruments issued pursuant to same are declared also to be null and void[.]” ’Whitehead alleges that the money-judgment at issue, entered in September of 1984, in a Jasper County district court, was assigned and transferred to him via a negotiated settlement agreement during the pendency of a separate and unrelated 1997 lawsuit, styled, Head Oil Prod. Co. v. Marvin Whitehead et al., Trial Cause Number 17,205. As part of his 2006 declaratory judgment action, Whitehead served requests for admissions on Cedyco. When Cedyco failed to timely respond to the requests for admissions, they were deemed admitted by Cedyco. See Tex.R. Civ. P. 198.2(a) (a party must respond to requests for admissions within thirty days); 198.2(c) (“If a response is not timely served, the request is considered admitted without the necessity of a court order.”).
Thereafter, Whitehead filed a motion for summary judgment supported primarily by the deemed admissions and Cedyco’s pleadings. On the day of the summary judgment hearing, Cedyco appeared and filed a motion for leave to make late responses to Whitehead’s request for admissions. The trial court denied Cedyco’s motion for leave and granted Whitehead’s summary judgment motion, declaring him “rightful owner and holder” of the $1.3 million judgment. The summary judgment also awarded Whitehead attorney’s fees in the amount of $25,000.
“The function of summary judgment is not to deprive a litigant of his right to trial by jury, but to eliminate patently unmeritorious claims and untenable defenses.” City of Houston v. Clear Creek Basin Auth., 589 S.W.2d 671, 678 n. 5 (Tex.1979) (citing Gulbenkian v. Penn, 151 Tex. 412, 252 S.W.2d 929, 931 (1952)). A plaintiff is entitled to summary judgment on a cause of action only if he conclusively proves all essential elements of his claim as a matter of law. See Tex.R. Civ. P. 166a(a), (c); Rhone-Poulenc, Inc. v. Steel, 997 S.W.2d 217, 223 (Tex.1999); MMP Ltd. v. Jones, 710 S.W.2d 59, 60 (Tex.1986). When reviewing a summary [880]*880judgment, we accept as true all evidence favorable to the nonmovant, and we indulge every reasonable inference and resolve any doubts in the nonmovant’s favor. See IHS Cedars Treatment Ctr. of DeSoto, Tex., Inc. v. Mason, 143 S.W.3d 794, 798 (Tex.2004). When the movant’s summary judgment proof fails to conclusively establish each element of his cause of action, the trial court may not render a summary judgment by default solely because the nonmovant did not file a summary judgment response. See Rhone-Poulenc, Inc., 997 S.W.2d at 223; Clear Creek Basin Auth, 589 S.W.2d at 678. The movant’s motion “for summary judgment must itself expressly present the grounds upon which it is made, and must stand or fall on these grounds alone.” Sci. Spectrum, Inc. v. Martinez, 941 S.W.2d 910, 912 (Tex.1997) (citing McConnell v. Southside Indep. Sch. Dist., 858 S.W.2d 337, 341 (Tex.1993)); see also Tex.R. Civ. P. 166a(c) (requiring motion to explicitly state the specific grounds for summary judgment).
The longstanding rule is that allegations in pleadings are not competent summary judgment evidence, even if sworn or verified. See Laidlaw Waste Sys. (Dallas), Inc. v. City of Wilmer, 904 S.W.2d 656, 660 (Tex.1995); Americana Motel, Inc. v. Johnson, 610 S.W.2d 143, 143 (Tex.1980); Clear Creek Basin Auth, 589 S.W.2d at 678; Hidalgo v. Surety Sav. & Loan Ass’n., 462 S.W.2d 540, 545 (Tex.1971). “Pleadings outline the issues, but they are not evidence.” Shawell v. Pend Oreille Oil & Gas Co., 823 S.W.2d 336, 338 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 1991, writ denied). Therefore, any averments contained in pleadings are not proper summary judgment evidence and will not sustain the trial court’s summary judgment in favor of Whitehead.
Regarding the deemed admissions, we noted above that when a party fails to timely respond to request for admissions, the matters therein are deemed admitted. Tex.R. Civ. P. 198.2(c). Admissions of fact on file at the time of a summary judgment hearing are proper summary judgment proof and will, therefore, support a motion for summary judgment. Tex.R. Civ. P. 166a(c); see e.g., Acevedo v. Comm’n for Lawyer Discipline, 131 S.W.3d 99, 105 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2004, pet. denied). However, a request for admission asking a party to admit or deny a purely legal issue is improper, and a deemed admission involving a purely legal issue is of no effect. See Boulet v. State, 189 S.W.3d 833, 838 (TexApp.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, no pet.); Fort Bend Cent. Appraisal Dist. v. Hines Wholesale Nurseries, 844 S.W.2d 857, 858-59 (TexApp.-Texarkana 1992, writ denied). This is so because the primary purpose of requests for admissions is to simplify trials by eliminating matters about which there is no real controversy. See Stelly v. Papania, 927 S.W.2d 620, 622 (Tex.1996). “It was never intended to be used as a demand upon a plaintiff or defendant to admit that he had no cause of action or ground of defense.” Id. (quoting Sanders v. Harder, 148 Tex. 593, 227 S.W.2d 206, 208 (1950)).
Whitehead’s motion for summary judgment contains, inter alia, the following assertion:
12. Three admissions by Defendant Cedyco Corporation are sufficient to support a judgment for Plaintiff Whitehead .... Those three admissions are quoted here in full:
NO. 8: The sole current legal owner of the Judgment is Anderson Martin Whitehead.
NO. 9: Defendant Cedyco Corporation is not the current legal owner of the Judgment.
[881]*881No. [sic] 10: Reasonable and necessary-legal fees of the plaintiff in this suit are $25,000.00.
The deemed admissions Numbers 8 and 9, as quoted above, are purely questions of law and, therefore, are improper summary judgment evidence. See Wheeler v. Green, 157 S.W.3d 489, 443 (Tex.2005) (equating merits-preelusive discovery sanctions with merits-preclusive deemed admissions for due process purposes); Boulet, 189 S.W.3d at 838 (summary judgment may not be sustained by deemed admissions that “embrace the fundamental legal issues to be tried”); Gore v. Cunningham, 297 S.W.2d 287, 291 (Tex.Civ.App.-Beaumont 1956, writ ref d n.r.e.) (requests for admissions exists “to eliminate in advance of the trial fact issues which would not be in dispute, and ... the rule does not contemplate or authorize admissions to questions involving points of law”).
Accordingly, we hold the trial court erred in granting summary judgment as Whitehead’s summary judgment motion and proper summary judgment evidence failed to prove all the elements of Whitehead’s claims as a matter of law. We find Whitehead’s motion was entirely supported by improper summary judgment evidence in the form of pleadings and merits-preclusive deemed admissions solely embracing the fundamental legal issues of the case. We sustain Cedyco’s first appellate issue.
In light of our analysis and holding on issue one, and because we are remanding this cause to the trial court, we decline to address Cedyco’s second issue. The trial court may wish to revisit its ruling on Cedyco’s motion for leave to make late responses regarding the previously deemed admissions in an effort to avoid compromising the presentation of the merits of either party to the suit. See Wheeler, 157 S.W.3d at 443 (citing TransAmerican Nat. Gas Corp. v. Powell, 811 S.W.2d 913, 917-18 (Tex.1991)).
We reverse the summary judgment of the trial court and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.