(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2024 1
Syllabus
NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
CC/DEVAS (MAURITIUS) LTD. ET AL. v. ANTRIX CORP. LTD. ET AL.
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
No. 23–1201. Argued March 3, 2025—Decided June 5, 2025* Devas Multimedia Private Ltd. signed a satellite-leasing agreement with Antrix Corporation Ltd., which is owned by the Republic of India for use by its Department of Space. But when the Indian Government later determined it needed more satellite capacity for itself, Antrix ter- minated the contract under its force majeure clause. The parties pro- ceeded to arbitration. After unanimously concluding that Antrix had breached the contract, the arbitral panel awarded Devas $562.5 mil- lion in damages plus interest. Devas then petitioned the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington to confirm the award. The District Court confirmed the award and entered a $1.29 billion judgment against Antrix. The Ninth Circuit reversed, finding that personal jurisdiction was lacking. Under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA), “[p]ersonal jurisdiction over a foreign state shall exist” whenever (1) an immunity exception applies, and (2) the foreign defendant has been properly served. §1330(b). The Ninth Circuit did not question that Antrix is a “foreign state” under the FSIA, that an immunity exception applies, and that Devas effectuated proper service. Yet bound by Cir- cuit precedent, the panel explained that the Act imposes an additional requirement: “personal jurisdiction under the FSIA [also] requires a traditional minimum contacts analysis” as set forth in International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U. S. 310, and its progeny. Applying that standard, the court concluded it could not exercise personal jurisdic- tion over Antrix because Antrix lacked sufficient suit-related contacts —————— *Together with No. 24–17, Devas Multimedia Private Ltd. v. Antrix Corp. Ltd. et al., also on certiorari to the same court. 2 CC/DEVAS (MAURITIUS) LTD. v. ANTRIX CORP.
with the United States. Held: Personal jurisdiction exists under the FSIA when an immunity ex- ception applies and service is proper. The FSIA does not require proof of “minimum contacts” over and above the contacts already required by the Act’s enumerated exceptions to foreign sovereign immunity. Pp. 7–13. (a) The FSIA’s personal-jurisdiction provision imposes two substan- tive requirements. First, the district court must have subject-matter jurisdiction, which the FSIA grants whenever an enumerated immun- ity exceptions applies. Second, service must be made under the FSIA’s specialized service-of-process rules. When both criteria are satisfied, the statute declares that personal jurisdiction “shall exist.” Accord- ingly, the most natural reading of the operative text is that personal jurisdiction over a foreign sovereign is automatic whenever an immun- ity exception applies and service of process has been accomplished. Notably absent from the provision is any reference to “minimum con- tacts.” And the Court declines to add what Congress left out, as the FSIA was supposed to “clarify the governing standards,” not hide the ball. Verlinden B. V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U. S. 480, 488. Of course, the FSIA’s immunity exceptions themselves require var- ying degrees of suit-related domestic contact before a case may pro- ceed. But to the extent these exceptions satisfy International Shoe, it is because the exceptions Congress wrote happen to meet that stand- ard, not because the Act’s personal-jurisdiction provision secretly in- corporated the Court’s due-process cases. The Act’s structure reinforces this reading. The FSIA “comprehen- sively regulat[es] the amenability of foreign nations to suit in the United States.” Republic of Argentina v. NML Capital, Ltd., 573 U. S. 134, 141. The immunity and jurisdictional provisions form the foun- dation of that comprehensive scheme, and Congress deliberately tied them together: whenever an exception applies, the FSIA strips immun- ity and grants jurisdiction. Reading an additional minimum-contacts requirement into only one of the FSIA’s tethered immunity and juris- dictional provisions would weaken the link Congress forged and create a gap in the Act’s otherwise “comprehensive framework.” Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U. S. 677, 699. Pp. 8–10. (b) The Ninth Circuit’s two contrary arguments cannot override the plain meaning of the FSIA’s personal-jurisdiction provision. First, the fact that one of the immunity exceptions contains language resembling the minimum-contacts test says little about whether a jurisdictional provision located elsewhere categorically imposes that test. Second, the legislative history cited by the Ninth Circuit shows only that Con- gress believed the contacts set forth in the Act’s then-existing immun- ity exceptions satisfy due process, not that the personal-jurisdiction Cite as: 605 U. S. ____ (2025) 3
provision silently includes an atextual minimum-contacts require- ment. Pp. 11–12. (c) Antrix’s alternative arguments—that the Fifth Amendment itself requires a showing of minimum contacts, that the claims at issue do not fall within the FSIA’s arbitration exception, and that the suit should be dismissed under forum non conveniens—were not addressed below by the Ninth Circuit. This Court declines to address them in the first instance. Pp. 12–13. Reversed and remanded.
ALITO, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Cite as: 605 U. S. ____ (2025) 1
Opinion of the Court
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the United States Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543, pio@supremecourt.gov, of any typographical or other formal errors.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES _________________
Nos. 23–1201 and 24–17 _________________
CC/DEVAS (MAURITIUS) LIMITED, ET AL., PETITIONERS 23–1201 v. ANTRIX CORP. LTD., ET AL.
DEVAS MULTIMEDIA PRIVATE LIMITED, PETITIONER 24–17 v. ANTRIX CORP. LTD., ET AL. ON WRITS OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT [June 5, 2025]
JUSTICE ALITO delivered the opinion of the Court. Under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA), 28 U. S. C. §§1330, 1602 et seq., foreign states are generally immune from suit in United States courts, but the Act creates several exceptions. See §§1604, 1605–1607. And when an exception applies, §1330(a) of the FSIA vests federal courts with “original jurisdiction” over such claims. This suit concerns the FSIA’s neighboring personal- jurisdiction provision. It provides that “[p]ersonal jurisdiction over a foreign state shall exist” whenever (1) an exception to foreign sovereign immunity applies, and (2) the foreign defendant has been properly served. §1330(b). In the deci- sion below, however, the Ninth Circuit imposed a third re- quirement: a plaintiff must also prove that the foreign state 2 CC/DEVAS (MAURITIUS) LTD. v. ANTRIX CORP.
has made “minimum contacts” with the United States suf- ficient to satisfy the jurisdictional test set forth in Interna- tional Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U. S. 310, 316 (1945), and its progeny. Because the Ninth Circuit’s additional re- quirement goes beyond the text of the FSIA, we reverse. I A Like so many disputes, this one began with two compa- nies and a contract. Antrix Corporation Ltd. (Antrix) is or- ganized under Indian law and is owned by the Republic of India for use by its Department of Space. In Antrix’s words, it serves as “the commercial arm of Indian Space Research Organisation”—a division within the Department of Space—and is tasked with “promot[ing] and commercially market[ing] the products and services emanating from the Indian Space Programme.” No. 2:18–cv–01360 (WD Wash., Dec. 21, 2018), ECF Doc. 24–1, p. 43. The Indian Govern- ment finances most of Antrix’s operations and appoints much of its leadership. In January 2005, Antrix signed a satellite-leasing agree- ment with Devas Multimedia Private Ltd. (Devas), a pri- vately owned Indian company incorporated to develop satellite-based telecommunications technology. Under the agreement, Antrix would build and launch a new satellite network into geostationary orbit*—specifically, at the 83°E orbital slot—and lease some of that network’s capacity back to Devas. Devas, in turn, would use its leased satellite ca- pacity to provide multimedia broadcasting services across India. —————— *“Satellites in geostationary orbit (GEO) fly above Earth’s equator, moving from west to east, exactly matching Earth’s rotation . . . . GEO is ideal for satellites that need to stay fixed above a specific location, such as telecommunication satellites, allowing antennas on Earth to stay in a constant position, always pointing at the satellite.” European Space Agency, Types of Orbits (Mar. 30, 2020), https://www.esa.int/Enabling_ Support/Space_Transportation/Types_of_orbits. Cite as: 605 U. S. ____ (2025) 3
The agreement proceeded as expected for several years. Antrix obtained project approval from the Indian Govern- ment and clearance from the International Telecommuni- cations Union, the arm of the United Nations responsible for allocating orbital satellite space among member states. For its part, Devas secured the requisite internet- and television-provider licenses, brought on investors, and paid Antrix the contractually required fees. And as satellite con- struction neared completion, the parties performed several successful trials of Devas’s newly developed software and infrastructure. In February 2011, however, Antrix and Devas hit a snag. Just before the satellites were scheduled for launch, the In- dian Government determined it needed greater satellite ca- pacity for itself and could no longer lease its limited S-band spectrum (the type Antrix and Devas planned to use) for commercial use. So, at the behest of government officials, Antrix terminated the agreement with Devas. Citing the contract’s force majeure clause, Antrix explained that In- dia’s new satellite-allocation policy prevented it from con- tinuing performance on the contract. But Devas thought Antrix was liable for the financial fall- out. So Devas invoked the contract’s arbitration provision, commenced proceedings, and argued the purported force majeure was self-induced. The three-member arbitral panel ruled unanimously for Devas on September 14, 2015. Applying Indian law, the panel concluded Antrix had wrongfully terminated the contract and awarded Devas $562.5 million in damages plus interest. After successfully confirming the arbitration award in France and the United Kingdom, Devas sought to do the same in the United States. See 2 J. Grenig, Domke on Com- mercial Arbitration §41:1, p. 467 (3d ed. 2025) (“[C]onfirma- tion of an arbitration award finalizes the award and makes the award a judgment of the court”). In September 2018, Devas petitioned the United States District Court for the 4 CC/DEVAS (MAURITIUS) LTD. v. ANTRIX CORP.
Western District of Washington to confirm the award, cit- ing the FSIA’s so-called arbitration exception as the basis for federal jurisdiction. See 28 U. S. C. §1605(a)(6). Antrix moved to dismiss, arguing, inter alia, that the District Court lacked jurisdiction. B For much of American history, foreign states and their instrumentalities enjoyed near total immunity from suit in our courts. See Hungary v. Simon, 604 U. S. ___, ___ (2025) (slip op., at 2). This posture reflected the venerable inter- national law principle that states are independent sover- eign entities, and it encouraged others to respect the sover- eignty of the United States in their courts. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela v. Helmerich & Payne Int’l Drilling Co., 581 U. S. 170, 179 (2017). Notably, this immunity was not statutorily or constitutionally required. Instead, we have long understood foreign sovereign immunity as “a matter of grace and comity,” so judges historically “ ‘de- ferred to the decisions of the political branches—in particu- lar, those of the Executive Branch—on whether to take ju- risdiction’ over particular actions against sovereigns and their instrumentalities.” Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U. S. 677, 689 (2004) (quoting Verlinden B. V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U. S. 480, 486 (1983)). In practice, that usually entailed the State Department filing a case- specific “ ‘suggestion of immunity’ ” whenever a foreign sov- ereign was sued, and when that occurred, the court would abide by the suggestion. Samantar v. Yousuf, 560 U. S. 305, 311 (2010) (quoting Ex parte Peru, 318 U. S. 578, 581 (1943)). Beginning in the mid-20th century, the Executive Branch adopted a more nuanced stance toward sovereign immun- ity, but its new approach “proved troublesome.” Verlinden, 461 U. S., at 487. Specifically, the State Department de- clared in 1952 it would no longer suggest immunity in Cite as: 605 U. S. ____ (2025) 5
“cases arising out of a foreign state’s strictly commercial acts.” Ibid. While this shift brought the United States into parity with the emerging international consensus, it also provoked tension and confusion. “[F]oreign nations often placed diplomatic pressure on the State Department,” and, “[o]n occasion, political considerations led to suggestions of immunity in cases where immunity would not have been available.” Ibid. Furthermore, in instances where the State Department simply failed to file any suggestion, courts were forced to determine immunity based on stand- ards that were “neither clear nor uniformly applied.” Id., at 488. Congress addressed the problem in 1976 by enacting the FSIA, now “the sole basis for obtaining jurisdiction over a foreign state in our courts.” Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U. S. 428, 434 (1989). Instead of case-by-case determinations that were governed by fuzzy legal standards and prone to manipulation, the FSIA im- poses a bright-line rule: foreign states and their instrumen- talities are immune from suit unless one of the Act’s enu- merated exceptions applies. 28 U. S. C. §1604; see §§1605– 1607. Exceptions include claims based on commercial ac- tivities with a specified nexus to the United States, §1605(a)(2), claims based on torts that have caused domes- tic personal injury or property damage, §1605(a)(5), claims based on certain expropriations, §1605(a)(3), and several others. The Act also waives immunity for suits to confirm arbi- tration awards. §1605(a)(6). The arbitration exception ap- plies in four statutorily defined contexts, including where the “agreement or award” is “governed by a treaty or other international agreement in force for the United States call- ing for the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards.” §1605(a)(6)(B). The United States, for instance, has ac- ceded to the New York Convention, which requires it to en- force certain awards issued abroad. See Convention on the 6 CC/DEVAS (MAURITIUS) LTD. v. ANTRIX CORP.
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10, 1958, 21 U. S. T. 2517, T. I. A. S. No. 6997; 9 U. S. C. §§201–208. In such instances, and when the FSIA is otherwise satisfied, the arbitration exception would also apply. Whenever an FSIA immunity exception applies, jurisdic- tion usually follows. That is because the Act’s jurisdictional provision, 28 U. S. C. §1330, pegs both subject-matter and personal jurisdiction to the exceptions. Subsection (a) of that provision grants district courts “original jurisdiction” over “any claim for relief in personam with respect to which the foreign state is not entitled to immunity . . . under sec- tions 1605–1607,” which are the FSIA’s immunity excep- tions. And subsection (b) provides for personal jurisdiction “as to every claim for relief over which the district courts have jurisdiction under subsection (a)”—i.e., for every claim subject to an immunity exception—and “where service has been made under section 1608.” See Republic of Sudan v. Harrison, 587 U. S. 1, 4–5, 8–13 (2019) (discussing §1608’s specialized service-of-process rules). C Once this dispute arrived in federal court in this country, a dramatic series of events unfolded. Upon satisfying itself that jurisdiction was proper under the FSIA’s arbitration exception, the District Court confirmed the award and en- tered a $1.29 billion judgment against Antrix. Yet before Devas could collect, an Indian corporate-law tribunal found that Devas—an Indian company—had procured the Devas– Antrix agreement by fraud; so the tribunal appointed an In- dian Government official to seize control of Devas and wind down its affairs. Quickly thereafter, several Devas share- holders and an American subsidiary attempted to intervene in the federal proceedings below and to enforce the judg- ment themselves. Successfully so: over Devas’s and An- trix’s objections, they intervened, secured post-judgment Cite as: 605 U. S. ____ (2025) 7
discovery to locate Antrix’s domestic assets, and registered the judgment in the Eastern District of Virginia, where An- trix held executable assets. Then, adding one last wrinkle to an already complex dispute, the High Court of New Delhi set aside the arbitration award based largely on the Indian corporate-law tribunal’s earlier fraud determination. Several appeals followed, and a Ninth Circuit panel found that personal jurisdiction was lacking and therefore reversed the District Court’s orders confirming and regis- tering the award. See No. 20–36024 etc. (Aug. 1, 2023), App. to Pet. for Cert. 3a–8a. The court did not question “that for purposes of the FSIA, Antrix is a ‘foreign state,’ service has been made, and an enumerated exception ap- plies.” Id., at 4a. Yet bound by Circuit precedent, the panel explained that the Act imposes an additional requirement: “personal jurisdiction under the FSIA [also] requires a tra- ditional minimum contacts analysis,” ibid., which is a ref- erence to our jurisdictional due-process test first developed in International Shoe, 326 U. S., at 316. See Walden v. Fiore, 571 U. S. 277, 283–286 (2014). Applying that stand- ard, the court concluded that Antrix lacked sufficient suit- related contacts with the United States and that the law- suit must therefore be dismissed. We granted certiorari to decide whether the FSIA requires proof of “minimum contacts” before a court can exercise per- sonal jurisdiction over a foreign state. See 603 U. S. ___ (2024). We hold it does not. II The facts of this suit are complex, but the legal question we address today is straightforward. The text and struc- ture of the FSIA demonstrate that Congress did not require “minimum contacts” over and above the contacts already required by the Act’s enumerated exceptions to foreign sov- ereign immunity. 8 CC/DEVAS (MAURITIUS) LTD. v. ANTRIX CORP.
A We start, as always, with the relevant statutory text. Here, that is the FSIA’s personal-jurisdiction provision, 28 U. S. C. §1330(b). It provides: “Personal jurisdiction over a foreign state shall exist as to every claim for relief over which the district courts have [subject-matter] jurisdiction under subsection (a) where service has been made under section 1608 of this title.” As noted earlier, this provision imposes two substantive re- quirements—one related to subject-matter jurisdiction, the other related to service of process. See supra, at 6. First, “district courts have [subject-matter] jurisdiction under subsection (a)” when any of the FSIA’s immunity exceptions applies. See Amerada Hess, 488 U. S., at 434–435. Second, “service has been made under section 1608” when a plaintiff complies with the FSIA’s specialized service-of-process rules. See Harrison, 587 U. S., at 4–5, 8–13. When both criteria are satisfied, the statute declares that personal ju- risdiction “shall exist,” and, “as in other contexts, the use of the word ‘shall’ creates an obligation impervious to judicial discretion.” Smith v. Spizzirri, 601 U. S. 472, 476 (2024) (some internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, the most natural reading of §1330(b) is that per- sonal jurisdiction over a foreign sovereign is “automatic” whenever (1) “an exception to immunity applies” and (2) “service of process has been accomplished.” Samantar, 560 U. S., at 324, n. 20; accord, Verlinden, 461 U. S., at 485, n. 5; Restatement (Fourth) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States §451, Comment b (2017). Or phrased in even simpler terms, “subject matter jurisdiction plus service of process equals personal jurisdiction.” GSS Group Ltd. v. National Port Auth., 680 F. 3d 805, 811 (CADC 2012) (in- ternal quotation marks omitted). Cite as: 605 U. S. ____ (2025) 9
Notably absent from §1330(b) is any reference to “mini- mum contacts.” And we decline to add in what Congress left out: the FSIA was supposed to “clarify the governing standards,” not hide the ball. Verlinden, 461 U. S., at 488; cf. Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U. S. 607, 618 (1992) (refusing to read an “unexpressed requirement” into the FSIA). Although nothing in the text of §1330(b) requires a minimum-contacts analysis, that does not mean Congress dispensed altogether with proof of contact between the for- eign state and the United States. In order for subject- matter jurisdiction to exist under the FSIA, an exception to immunity must apply. See §1330(a). And the FSIA’s im- munity exceptions themselves require varying degrees of suit-related domestic contact before a case may proceed. See §§1605–1607. Some exceptions call for considerable do- mestic nexus, such as “rights in immovable property situ- ated in the United States,” “commercial activity carried on in the United States by the foreign state,” or “commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere” that “causes a direct effect in the United States.” §§1605(a)(2)–(4); see Verlin- den, 461 U. S., at 490–491. Others, like §1605A’s terrorism exception, are satisfied by less direct or pervasive contact with the territory of the United States, as the parties acknowledge. See Brief for Petitioner Devas Multimedia Private Limited 26, 31–32; Brief for Petitioner CC/Devas (Mauritius) Limited et al. 48–49; Brief in Opposition 7. To the extent that some or all FSIA exceptions satisfy Interna- tional Shoe, it is only because the exceptions Congress wrote happen to meet that standard, not because §1330(b) secretly incorporated our jurisdictional due-process cases. The Act’s structure reinforces this straightforward read- ing of §1330(b)’s text. As we have recognized on many oc- casions, the FSIA “ ‘comprehensively regulat[es] the amena- bility of foreign nations to suit in the United States.’ ” Republic of Argentina v. NML Capital, Ltd., 573 U. S. 134, 10 CC/DEVAS (MAURITIUS) LTD. v. ANTRIX CORP.
141 (2014) (quoting Verlinden, 461 U. S., at 493). The Act’s immunity and jurisdictional provisions are the foundation of this comprehensive scheme, and Congress deliberately tied them together. Namely, whenever a §§1605–1607 ex- ception applies, §1604’s immunity falls away, and §1330 grants jurisdiction. See supra, at 5–6; Amerada Hess, 488 U. S., at 434–435, and n. 3 (detailing how immunity and ju- risdiction “work in tandem”); Verlinden, 461 U. S., at 485, n. 5, 489, and n. 14 (same); Price v. Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 294 F. 3d 82, 89 (CADC 2002) (observing that “the FSIA collapses subject matter jurisdiction, in per- sonam jurisdiction, and sovereign immunity into a single inquiry”). And, in the narrow instances where Congress did not want for immunity and jurisdiction to be coextensive with the enumerated exceptions, it said so. See §§1330(a)– (b) (limiting jurisdiction to “nonjury civil action[s],” “for re- lief in personam,” where “service has been made under sec- tion 1608”). Instead of enforcing these provisions as written, the Ninth Circuit read an additional requirement into one— and only one—of the FSIA’s tethered immunity and juris- dictional provisions. As a practical matter, that would weaken the link Congress forged among foreign sovereign immunity, subject-matter jurisdiction, personal jurisdic- tion, and the enumerated exceptions; it would also create a gap in the Act’s otherwise “comprehensive framework.” Alt- mann, 541 U. S., at 699. “We do not lightly assume that Congress has omitted from its adopted text requirements that it nonetheless intends to apply.” Jama v. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 543 U. S. 335, 341 (2005). And we are all the more reluctant to do so where, as here, read- ing such a requirement into the statute would upset the “carefully calibrated” system Congress chose. Turkiye Halk Bankasi A.S. v. United States, 598 U. S. 264, 273 (2023). Cite as: 605 U. S. ____ (2025) 11
B The Ninth Circuit based its contrary interpretation on a strange statutory argument and on the FSIA’s legislative history. Neither overrides §1330(b)’s plain meaning. As noted by the court below, the Ninth Circuit first read §1330(b) to “requir[e] satisfaction of the traditional mini- mum contacts standard” in an earlier precedent, Thos. P. Gonzalez Corp. v. Consejo Nacional de Produccion de Costa Rica, 614 F. 2d 1247, 1255 (1980). Gonzalez offered two pieces of support for that conclusion. First, one of the enu- merated immunity exceptions requires proof of a “direct ef- fect” in the United States, §1605(a)(2), which Gonzalez “in- terpreted as embodying the minimum contacts standard of International Shoe,” id., at 1255. But see Rote v. Zel Cus- tom Mfg. LLC, 816 F. 3d 383, 394 (CA6 2016) (“[T]he ‘direct effect’ requirement does not incorporate the ‘minimum con- tacts’ test”). Second, Gonzalez then read “[t]he legislative history of the Act”—particularly the House Judiciary Com- mittee Report’s discussion of personal jurisdiction—to “con- fir[m] that the reach of §1330(b) does not extend beyond the limits set by the International Shoe line of cases.” 614 F. 2d, at 1255, and n. 5. But see Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis, 584 U. S. 497, 523 (2018) (“[L]egislative history is not the law”). Even accepting Gonzalez’s cited authority on its own terms, we do not find either step of the Ninth Circuit’s anal- ysis compelling. The fact that one of the immunity excep- tions contains language resembling the minimum-contacts test says little about whether a jurisdictional provision lo- cated elsewhere categorically imposes that test. Each im- munity exception should be interpreted according to the text Congress enacted, see, e.g., Simon, 604 U. S., at ___– ___ (slip op., at 9–12), and so should §1330(b). To the extent it is relevant, the legislative history Gonza- lez cites is not to the contrary. True, the House Report says, “[t]he requirements of minimum jurisdictional contacts and 12 CC/DEVAS (MAURITIUS) LTD. v. ANTRIX CORP.
adequate notice are embodied in the [personal-jurisdiction] provision.” H. R. Rep. No. 94–1487, p. 13 (1976). But then the Report explains that this “embodiment” of due process comes from the Act’s immunity exceptions and service-of- process rules, not a minimum-contacts requirement silently emanating from §1330(b). “[E]ach of the immunity provi- sions in the bill, sections 1605–1607, requires some connec- tion between the lawsuit and the United States,” and, the Report notes, §1330(b)’s plain text “incorporat[es] these ju- risdictional contacts by reference.” Ibid. The Report then makes the critical point: “These immunity provisions, there- fore, prescribe the necessary contacts which must exist be- fore our courts can exercise personal jurisdiction. . . . [S]ec- tion 1330(b) also satisfies the due process requirement of adequate notice by prescribing that proper service be made under section 1608 of the bill.” Id., at 13–14 (emphasis added); see also Rote, 816 F. 3d, at 398 (White, J., concur- ring) (“[The House Report] shows only that Congress be- lieved that the contacts set forth in the immunity provisions satisfy due-process requirements. . . . It is a separate ques- tion whether Congress was correct in its assumption”). Thus, the FSIA’s legislative history leads to the same result as §1330(a)’s text: personal jurisdiction rises and falls based on whether an immunity exception applies and the plaintiff has effectuated proper service. III Antrix does not defend the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning. See Brief for Respondent 1; Tr. of Oral Arg. 36–37. Instead, it raises various alternative reasons why we should affirm the decision below notwithstanding its misreading of the FSIA. Namely, Antrix contends that the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause itself requires a showing of minimum con- tacts before a federal court can exercise personal jurisdic- tion over a company owned by a foreign sovereign. Antrix also argues that the claims at issue in this dispute do not Cite as: 605 U. S. ____ (2025) 13
fall within the FSIA’s arbitration exception, properly con- ceived, and that the suit should be dismissed under forum non conveniens. We decline to answer those questions today. The Ninth Circuit relied exclusively on its interpretation of the FSIA’s personal-jurisdiction provision, so that court has not yet ad- dressed Antrix’s alternative arguments. “[A]nd, for that reason, neither shall we.” F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd v. Empagran S. A., 542 U. S. 155, 175 (2004); accord, United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers’ Cooperative, 532 U. S. 483, 494 (2001). Of course, Antrix is welcome to litigate these contentions on remand consistent with principles of forfeiture and waiver. * * * Personal jurisdiction exists under §1330(b) of the FSIA when an immunity exception applies and service is proper. Because the Ninth Circuit required more, we reverse the judgment below and remand the suit for further proceed- ings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.