Cavallo v. HPD Section 8

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedOctober 17, 2024
Docket1:24-cv-04242
StatusUnknown

This text of Cavallo v. HPD Section 8 (Cavallo v. HPD Section 8) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Cavallo v. HPD Section 8, (S.D.N.Y. 2024).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK RONALD CAVALLO, Plaintiffs, 24-CV-4242 (LTS) -against- ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITH HPD SECTION 8; GODDARD RIVERSIDE, LEAVE TO REPLEAD Defendants. LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, Chief United States District Judge: Plaintiff Ronald Cavallo, who is proceeding pro se, brings this action against the New York City Department of Housing Preservation and Development (“HPD”) and Goddard Riverside Community Center (“Goddard”), both located in New York County. Plaintiff does not identify the basis for federal court jurisdiction; however, because Plaintiff asserts his “civil liberties” were violated, with respect to his housing, the Court construes the complaint as asserting claims under the Fair Housing Act of 1968 and 42 U.S.C. §1983. By order dated June 5, 2024, the Court granted Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), that is, without prepayment of fees. For the reasons set forth below, the Court dismisses the complaint for failure to state a claim, but grants Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint within 60 days of the date of this order. STANDARD OF REVIEW The Court must dismiss an IFP complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998). The Court must also dismiss a complaint when the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction of the claims raised. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470

F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). But the “special solicitude” in pro se cases, id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits – to state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires a complaint to include enough facts to state a claim for relief “that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible if the plaintiff pleads enough factual detail to allow the Court to draw the inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. In

reviewing the complaint, the Court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). But it does not have to accept as true “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,” which are essentially just legal conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the Court must determine whether those facts make it plausible – not merely possible – that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id. Moreover, a complaint is subject to dismissal if its “form or substance prevents the defendant from forming a ‘fair understanding’ of the plaintiff’s allegations or otherwise prejudices the defendant in responding to the complaint.” Ong v. Park Manor (Middletown Park) Rehab. & Healthcare Ctr., 51 F. Supp. 3d 319, 345 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). Ultimately, a complaint must give “fair notice” to the defendants. See Simmons v. Abruzzo, 49 F.3d 83, 86 (2d Cir. 1995) (“The function of pleadings under the Federal Rules is to give fair notice of the claims asserted.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). BACKGROUND The following facts are drawn from the complaint.1 During an unspecified period of time,

Plaintiff resided in a New York City shelter when housing authorities transferred him to a single room occupancy (“SRO”) unit.2 He states that his next door neighbor at the SRO was a “hoarder,” and his studio was “infested with roaches” because of it. (Id. at 5). He also states that he shared a bathroom and kitchen with the neighbor that also was infested. Additionally, he alleges that an exterminator treated his apartment and told him that the roaches were due to the hoarding of his neighbor. (Id.). Because of these conditions, Plaintiff applied for a transfer to a Goddard Riverside Community Center SRO. Plaintiff alleges, however, that he was “not aware of circumstances” at Goddard Riverside including: neighbors [being] allowed to have dogs . . . not supportive but for a pet . . . heavy drug trafficking cocaine, crack, possible heroin, going up + down stairwells especially during the night . . . 3-4 times attempted physical harm to me . . . [and] [management] cannot handle the situation, social work is not existent, setting off fire alarms, violence, slamming doors, yelling in corridors. (Id. at 6). Plaintiff alleges that he suffered between 14 and 15 years in inadequate housing, developed tremors and increased emotional stress as a result of his housing conditions. He notes

1 The Court quotes from the complaint verbatim. All spelling, grammar, and punctuation are as in the original unless noted otherwise. 2 It is unclear if these circumstances occurred at a different location before Plaintiff was transferred to Goddard Riverside Community Center or if these events occurred at Goddard. that he suffers from a heart disease and hypertension, and at some point, applied for social security disability benefits. As relief, Plaintiff seeks money damages. DISCUSSION A. Claims against the Department of Housing Preservation and Development Plaintiff’s claims against HPD must be dismissed because an agency of the City of New York, such as the HPD, is not an entity that can be sued. N.Y. City Charter ch. 17 § 396 (“[A]ll

actions and proceedings for the recovery of penalties for the violation of any law shall be brought in the name of the city of New York and not in that of any agency, except where otherwise provided by law”); Jenkins v. City of New York, 478 F.3d 76, 93 n.19 (2d Cir. 2007); see also Emerson v. City of New York, 740 F. Supp. 2d 385, 395 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (“[A] plaintiff generally prohibited from suing a municipal agency.”). The Court therefore dismisses Plaintiff’s claims against HPD for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted. See 28 U.S.C.

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Cavallo v. HPD Section 8, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/cavallo-v-hpd-section-8-nysd-2024.