TIMBERS, District Judge:
Appellants, eight students at Central Connecticut State College (CCSC), New Britain, Connecticut, appeal from a judgment entered after hearings in the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut, T. Emmet Clarie, District Judge, dismissing their complaint which sought declaratory and injunctive relief against the President of the College, the Dean of Student Affairs of the [1123]*1123College, the Dean of Administrative Affairs of the College and the members of the Board of Trustees for the State Colleges of Connecticut. 319 F.Supp. 113 (D.Conn.1970); see also 311 F.Supp. 1275 (D.Conn.1970). We hold that the District Court correctly ruled that defendants, in denying official college recognition to a local chapter of Students for a Democratic Society (SDS), did not violate plaintiffs’ constitutional rights of freedom of speech, of freedom of assembly or to the equal protection of the laws; that they did not act arbitrarily or capriciously ; but that they did act well within “the comprehensive authority of the States and of school officials, consistent with fundamental constitutional safeguards, to prescribe and control conduct in the schools.” Tinker v. Des Moines School District, 393 U.S. 503, 507 (1969); and see Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968).
I.
In order more precisely to focus upon the narrow issue here involved, it may be helpful at the outset to make clear what is not involved. Plaintiffs as individuals have not been denied their rights, on or off campus, to speak, to assemble, to petition or to demonstrate. Nor have they been prevented from organizing off campus any group, club, chapter or other collective activity.
What this case does involve is the narrow question whether the President of the College,1 upon the specific record before him, properly acted within his broad discretion and comprehensive authority in denying the College’s stamp of approval for a local chapter of SDS as an officially recognized campus organization with its attendant privileges. We hold that he did.
II.
The controlling facts are not in dispute. In large measure they were stipulated.
In view of the District Court’s clear and comprehensive findings of fact,2 we shall summarize only so much of the chronology as is believed necessary to an understanding of our decision below.
(A) Events Leading Up to District Court’s Decision of April 24, 1970.
In common with most colleges and universities, the faculty of CCSC on May 19, 1969 adopted a “Statement on Rights, Freedoms and Responsibilities of Students.” 3
In September 1969, following publication in the student newspaper of a notice of a meeting to organize at CCSC a local chapter of SDS, plaintiffs met and voted to request the administration to grant official recognition to such a chapter on the campus. They sent to Dean Judd [1124]*1124an application containing a written statement of the purposes of the proposed “local chapter of Students for a Democratic Society”; this statement, among other things, disclaimed that the local SDS chapter would be “under the dictates of any National organization.”
Plaintiffs’ application on October 2, 1969 was referred to the Student Affairs Committee (also referred to as the Student Personnel Committee) which is an eight member group advisory to the President, consisting of the Dean of Student Affairs, three faculty members and four students. On October 13, 1969, the Student Affairs Committee, by a 6-2 vote, recommended to President James that the local SDS chapter be given official recognition.
On October 30, 1969, President James rejected the recommendation of the Student Affairs Committee and denied official recognition to the local chapter of SDS. His reasons for this action were set forth in a written memorandum,4 a copy of which was furnished to plaintiffs on October 30.
On November 6, 1969, after President James had denied official recognition to the local SDS chapter, plaintiffs and others met in the Devils’ Den of the Student Center, apparently a campus coffee shop under the administration of the College. Upon being informed that this was a meeting of the “CCSC-SDS” and that its purpose was to discuss President James’ action of October 30, Dean Judd and Dean Clow notified the group in writing that they could not meet in the Devils’ Den or in any other College property “since the CCSC-SDS is not a duly recognized college organization.”
Some three and a half months later, the instant lawsuit was commenced by [1125]*1125the filing of the complaint on February-24, 1970.5 Plaintiffs6 sought declaratory and injunctive relief, the primary thrust of which was to obtain official college recognition of “a chapter of Students for a Democratic Society . as a campus student organization.”
After the pleadings were closed and a stipulation of facts was filed, Judge Clarie on March 23, 1970 held a hearing on plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction. While the hearing was devoted mainly to marking of exhibits and to arguments of counsel, it was anything but perfunctory. Judge Clarie’s questions to counsel on both sides were perceptive and pervasive;7 they clearly indicated the lines of inquiry he thought should be pursued at the administrative hearing he subsequently ordered.
(B) District Court’s Decision of April H, 1970.
On April 24, 1970, Judge Clarie filed a comprehensive 14 page memorandum of decision. 311 F.Supp. 1275. He reviewed the events which led to the lawsuit. He summarized the claims of the parties, noting that plaintiffs did not challenge the constitutionality of the standards established by the College for determining whether campus organizations are to be recognized, but that they did claim as a denial of procedural due process the action of President James, without affording plaintiffs a hearing, in denying their application for official recognition of a local SDS chapter and particularly in going outside plaintiffs’ application and attributing to plaintiffs the aims and purposes of the national organization of SDS which he in turn found to be contrary to the policies of CCSC as set forth in its “Statement of Rights, Freedoms and Responsibilities of Students” (Appendix, pp. 1135, 1136, infra). In this connection, Judge Clarie pointed out an ambiguity on the face of plaintiffs’ application which he suggested should be clarified at an administrative hearing:
“The ambiguity in this application is patent in that it states that the petitioners wish to become a ‘local’ chapter of SDS. The term itself, ‘local chapter,’ strongly infers some kind of affiliation with a more extensive parent organization; yet the application specifically represents that the local group would not be under the dictates of the national organization. The college administration may wish to have this ambiguity clarified and the credibility of the representations ascertained and verified.” 311 F.Supp. at 1282.
■ Then, after a careful analysis of the pertinent authorities, the upshot of Judge Clarie’s April 24, 1970 decision was to order that an administrative hearing be held in accordance with the following blueprint (311 F.Supp. at 1282-83):
v<l) The hearing was to be held within 30 days.
■w<2) Reasonable notice was to be given to all parties.
v(3) The hearing was to be conducted by either President James “or a hearings officer duly designated by him and acting in his stead.”
t/fá) All plaintiffs were to be afforded an opportunity to be heard.
[1126]*1126(5) Cross-examination of witnesses was to be allowed.
(6) A record of the hearing was to be made.
(7) The hearing was to be conducted “in a climate of respectful civility.”
(8) Without attempting to restrict the scope of the hearing, the following lines of inquiry were suggested by Judge Clarie:
(a) “The initial question might be whether or not a local unaffiliated chapter of SDS can lawfully exist without being subject to the dictates of the national organization.”
(b) “A copy of the organization’s charter, by-laws or other similar type of document might be helpful on this point.”
(c) “In light of the recent fragmentation of the National SDS, it might also be relevant to know of which faction, if any, this group wishes to become a local chapter.”
(d) “Were it to be found to be impossible for a local chapter of SDS to exist without being affiliated with the national parent organization, could the aims and philosophy of the latter group become relevant and important ?”
(9) Minutes of the October 2 and October 13, 1969 meetings of the Student Affairs Committee were to be produced.
(10) Judge Clarie directed that President James, after the conclusion of the administrative hearing and upon the overall record, “make his findings as to whether or not the application met the existing policy standards of the college, which would qualify the applicant club for official campus recognition.”
(11) Jurisdiction was retained by the District Court for the entry of such further orders or judgments as might be necessary and appropriate.
(C) College Administrative Hearing of May 19 and May 25, 1970.
The administrative hearing ordered by Judge Clarie was held in the CCSC Administration Building in New Britain on May 19 and May 25, 1970. Notice of the hearing was given to and acknowledged by all interested parties, including each individual plaintiff and plaintiffs’ retained counsel who was present throughout.
While one of the primary purposes of the hearing was to afford plaintiffs the procedural due process Judge Clarie found had been denied them by President James’ action of October 30, 1969 without a hearing, it became quickly apparent at the first session of the hearing on May 19 that the notion of procedural due process entertained by plaintiffs’ counsel was quite different from that contemplated by Judge Clarie.
The following are examples, selected at random, of the disruptive tactics resorted to by plaintiffs’ counsel at the administrative hearing:
(1) Although Judge Clarie ordered that a record be made of the hearing, plaintiffs’ counsel spent two and a half pages of the transcript objecting to the presence of a tape recorder,8 concluding that “I’m objecting to the use of this device because this device cannot talk back and tell me when it doesn’t hear me. . . . ”9
(2) Despite Judge Clarie’s order that the hearing be conducted by either President James “or a hearings officer designated by him,” plaintiffs’ counsel took up another page of the transcript objecting to President James’ absence and his designation of Dean Judd as the hearing officer,10 stating that “I take the position that the hearing is not proper[1127]*1127ly conducted notwithstanding Judge Clarie’s statement.” 11 Upon being overruled, plaintiffs’ counsel then moved to postpone the hearing and again was overruled.12
(3) While Judge Clarie had ordered that “[a] 11 of the plaintiffs in this action shall be afforded an opportunity to be heard,” plaintiffs’ counsel made it clear at the outset that he was going to do the testifying, not the plaintiffs: “Well, as far as I’m concerned, I will make all the remarks that have to be made. I’m not foreclosing any one of my people from speaking, but as far as I’m concerned, I have no reasons for them to make any statements.” 13 Of the eight named plaintiffs, only two appeared at the May 19 hearing, one at the May 25 hearing. Plaintiffs’ counsel did all the talking. Plaintiffs themselves did not testify at all, with one minor exception.14
(4) Having effectively sealed off the individual plaintiffs from testifying, plaintiffs’ counsel thereupon called President James as a witness on behalf of plaintiffs at the May 25 hearing. Having in mind the purpose of the administrative hearing ordered by Judge Clarie and his directive that President James upon the overall record “make his findings as to whether or not the application met the existing policy standards of the college,” plaintiffs’ counsel proceeded to ask James questions such as the following:
“Dr. James, you — I withdraw that. Have you already decided this case?” 15
X- * -X- -X- *
“Dr. James, you addressed the Lions Club last week, did you not?” 16
* * -x- x-
“Dr. James, do you intend to offer any evidence in which the creditability of any of these students is under attack ?” 17
(5) After reading to Dr. James the only evidence offered by plaintiffs at the two day hearing — a statement of change of name of plaintiffs’ proposed organization from “local chapter of Students for a Democratic Society” to “Students for a Democratic Society of Central Connecticut State College” — plaintiffs’ counsel then asked President James:
“Now, does that statement help you in making a judgment?”18
(6) The attempt by plaintiffs’ counsel to talk to President James off the record is reflected in the following colloquy:19
“Attorney Silver: Yes, could we go off the record? I’d like to talk to Dr. James.
Dean Judd: No, sir.
Attorney Silver: Will the record show that I wanted to talk to Dr. James ‘off the record', and I was told that I couldn’t do so?
Dean Judd: That request is denied. Dr. James is here as your witness, counselor. We are conducting a hearing; we’re not going out of session.
Attorney Silver: I’m outraged!”
Plaintiffs’ counsel clearly understood the nature of the proceeding and President James’ role therein:
“Well, he’s my witness and he’s also the person who’s going to [1128]*1128make the decision in a quasi-judicial proceeding — an administrative proceeding.” 20
(7) Finally, the motivation for calling President James as a witness on behalf of plaintiffs is perhaps best reflected in the following exclamation by plaintiffs’ counsel:
“Attorney Silver: This is really terrific.” 21
The only substantive evidence produced by plaintiffs at the two day administrative hearing on May 19 and 25, 1970 was the statement,22 referred to above, changing the name of plaintiffs’ proposed organization to “Students for a Democratic Society of Central Connecticut State College” and reaffirming the disclaimer, set forth in their original statement of purposes, of any connection with the national SDS organization.
Defendants on the other hand, in compliance with the lines of inquiry suggested by Judge Clarie,23 produced a number of documentary exhibits, briefly summarized as follows:
(1) Notices of the administrative hearing and responses by plaintiffs and their counsel thereto.24
(2) Transcripts of Hearings before the Committee On Internal Security of the House of Representatives, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., on June 3-4, 5, 17, July 22, October 28-30, 1969, upon the subject of “Investigation of Students For A Democratic Society” (Georgetown University; Akron, Ohio; Detroit, Mich.; and Pittsburgh, Pa.).25
(3) Minutes of the CCSC Student Personnel Committee Meeting of October 2, 1969.26
(4) Minutes of the CCSC Student Affairs Committee Meeting of October 13, 1969.27
At the October 2, 1969 meeting of the CCSC Student Personnel Committee, referred to above, among the questions asked by the Committee, and the answers given by the SDS representative present, were the following:
“Q. How would you respond to issues of violence as other S.D.S. chapters have?
A. Our action would have to be dependent upon each issue.
Q. Would you use any means possible?
A. No I can’t say that; would not know until we know what the issues are.
* * Vf * *
Q. Could you envision the S.D.S. interrupting a class ?
A. Impossible for me to say.”
It should be borne in mind that the foregoing questions and answers were included in the very minutes that Judge Clarie suggested be produced at the administrative hearing. Although more than seven months had elapsed between the time this testimony was given by the SDS representative and the time the minutes were marked in evidence at the administrative hearing, significantly the same SDS representative who gave the testimony at the October 2, 1969 meeting was the one plaintiff present at the May 25, 1970 administrative hearing, viz. Miss Catherine Healy. Although accompanied by counsel, she sat silently by when her previous testimony was received in evidence.
Indeed, sitting silently by was just about all that any of the plaintiffs present at either the May 19 or the May 25 hearing did or were permitted to do by their counsel. And although plaintiffs’ counsel purported to be their spokesman, he repeatedly refused either to respond [1129]*1129himself to questions put by the hearing officer or to permit plaintiffs to respond. Such intransigence was demonstrated over and over again in response to questions by the hearing officer directed to the exhibits and to the precise lines of inquiry suggested by Judge Clarie.28 One example is the following response by plaintiffs’ counsel to a question by the hearing officer:
“Dean Judd: All right. A question — an additional question, then, Attorney Silver — is, we would like to know why the applying organization wishes to use a name of an existing national organization if it will have no attachment or affiliation with it?
Attorney Silver: Well, I didn’t participate in the selection of name, but the word ‘democracy’ sounds pretty good to me. It always has been a good word.” 29
(D) President James’ Decision of July 10, 1970.
On July 10, 1970, President James again denied plaintiffs’ application for official recognition as a campus organization. His decision was set forth in a letter to the Dean of Student Affairs, a copy of which was furnished to plaintiffs.
After summarizing the record of administrative proceedings before the hearing officer, including specific references to questions asked by the hearing officer and exhibits received in evidence, President James stated his reasons for denying the application:
(1) Failure of plaintiffs “to resolve a significant question which the College sought to clarify,” namely, “what is the nature of affiliation or association of the applying group?” and, specifically, “[i]f the group utilizes the name of an existing organization, how can it ‘not be under the dictates of any organization’ as the applying group stated?”
(2) Article III of the national constitution of SDS30 provides that independent groups which may affiliate as associates “are expected to operate within the broad terms of policies set by the national convention and the national council.”
(3) The documentary exhibits received in evidence, absent any disclaimer by plaintiffs of intent to resort to similar disruption or violence,31 indicated that plaintiffs’ prospective campus activities were likely to cause a disruptive influence at CCSC.
President James concluded as follows:
“Accordingly, in view of the documentary evidence filed by the Hearing Officer, and the intransigence of counsel for the applicants, I reaffirm my earlier decision to deny recognition to the applying group. Recognition of such group, in my judgment, would be contrary to the orderly process of change and would be contrary to the philosophy and lawful mission of this College.”
(E) District Court’s Decision of October 29, 1970.
Upon receipt of President James’ decision of July 10, plaintiffs filed in the District Court a motion to reject James’ findings and to grant the injunctive relief sought in the complaint. Judge Clarie held a further hearing on September 28, 1970, at which time he heard further arguments of counsel.
On October 29, 1970, Judge Clarie filed a further 10 page memorandum of decision. 319 F.Supp. 113. In view of the absence of any material issues of fact, he treated the record before him as though cross-motions for summary judgment had been filed and proceeded to determine the question of law thus presented. Rule 56, Fed.R.Civ.P.
He reviewed the prior proceedings, particularly the administrative hearing he had ordered. He analyzed the addi[1130]*1130tional evidence presented and President James’ decision of July 10.
The essence of Judge Clarie’s decision of October 29 was that plaintiffs had not met their burden of complying with the standard established by the College’s “Statement on Rights, Freedoms and Responsibilities of Students”; that until they did so, they had no constitutional or other right to have the College’s stamp of approval conferred upon their organization; and that President James’ discretionary action in denying the application, upon the specific record before him, could not properly be magnified into an interference with constitutionally protected rights.
Judge Clarie succinctly summarized his conclusion as follows:
“The opportunity of an open dialogue, with a free, uninhibited but respectful expression of ideas between teacher and student, scholar and scholar, with its attendant critical exchange exposed to full view, creates the epitome of the college students’ never ending search for truth. This autonomy of intellectual freedom of academic expression has not been materially deterred or lessened by the College President’s action. He is held responsible for the climate of campus discipline. To be effective in carrying out his responsibilities, he must be afforded broad discretionary authority with which to achieve it.” 319 F.Supp. at 116.
III.
We believe that the foregoing recital of events from the spring of 1969 through the fall of 1970 — including the words and actions of the parties themselves — compels but one decision in this case.
We start with the premise that “for good or ill, the Constitution has come to the campus.” Wright, The Constitution on the Campus, 22 Vand.L. Rev. 1027, 1033 (1969). And we yield to none in our profound belief that the full panoply of constitutional rights, duties, privileges and immunities should be fully implemented on every campus, whether of a public or private college, the campus being “undoubtedly a ‘marketplace of ideas.’ ” Eisner v. Stamford Board of Education, 440 F.2d 803, 807 and 808 n. 5 (2 Cir. 1971).
In order that there be full implementation of the Constitution on the campus, all constituencies must be active and willing participants; that includes administration, faculty, students and, occasionally, alumni as well. In short, to be effective, there must be a free flow of rights and responsibilities on the part of all concerned before life under the Constitution on the campus can have meaning.
Here, as the record makes painfully clear, the fountain was poisoned before it began to flow.
Despite the concededly valid college policy governing the constitutional rights, freedoms and responsibilities of students at CCSC,32 plaintiffs failed to avail themselves of the procedural due process accorded to them and thus prevented the President of the College and the administration from applying that policy to plaintiffs’ application so as to implement the undoubted authority of the college officials to control student conduct, consistent with fundamental constitutional safeguards.33
[1131]*1131Specifically, although Judge Clarie and the college administration made clear the information required of plaintiffs, they failed to comply in at least the following essential respects:
(1) They failed to submit a copy of their charter or by-laws.34
(2) They failed candidly to clarify the apparent conflict between the name of their proposed organization, “Students for a Democratic Society of Central Connecticut State College,” and their disclaimer of being under the dictates of the national SDS organization.35
(3) They failed candidly to respond to inquiries whether they would resort to violence and disruption on the CCSC campus, including interruption of classes.36
(4) They failed to testify at the administrative hearing and to subject themselves to cross-examination despite Judge Clarie’s explicit direction.37
(5) They failed to offer any evidence whatsoever at the administrative hearing designed to enable the college administration and Judge Clarie to resolve the issues for which the hearing was ordered; but, on the contrary, they sanctioned conduct at the hearing just the opposite of the “climate of respectful civility” ordered by Judge Clarie.38
Upon this record, Judge Clarie held that plaintiffs had not met their burden of complying with the standard established by the college for recognition of campus organizations; that until they did so, they had no constitutional or other right to claim the college’s stamp of approval upon their organization; and that the discretionary action of President James in denying their application could not be blown up into an interference with constitutionally protected rights. 319 F.Supp. at 116-17. We agree.
We wish to emphasize the narrow ground of our decision as stated. And we especially emphasize that we find it neither necessary nor appropriate, upon this record, to reach the substantive constitutional questions39 which might [1132]*1132have been presented if plaintiffs had availed themselves of the procedural due process to which Judge Clarie ordered they were entitled and which the college administration accorded them.40
We hold in short that, upon the specific record before him, President James properly acted within “the comprehensive authority of the States and of school officials, consistent with fundamental constitutional safeguards, to prescribe and control conduct in the schools.” Tinker v. Des Moines School District, supra note 33, at 507; Eisner v. Stamford Board of Education, supra note 32, at 807.
As applied to a college, this rule, which is the ground of our decision, has been well stated in Esteban v. Central Missouri State College, 415 F.2d 1077, 1089 (8 Cir. 1969) (Blackmun, J.):
“We . . . hold that a college has the inherent power to promulgate rules and regulations; that it has the inherent power properly to discipline; that it has power appropriately to protect itself and its property; that it may expect that its students adhere to generally accepted standards of conduct.”
Affirmed.