OPINION ON APPELLANTS’ PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW
CAMPBELL, Judge.
Appellants Josephine Castillo, Ysidro Castillo Sr., and Jose Morones were tried jointly and found guilty of the offense of engaging in organized criminal activity by conspiring with Gilberto Salinas and Flavio Quintanilla to deliver more than 200 pounds but less than 2000 pounds of marihuana. Tex.Penal Code § 71.02(a)(5). The jury assessed punishment for each of the Castillos at imprisonment for 75 years and a $100,-000 fine. Morones’ punishment was assessed by the jury at imprisonment for 15 years and a $100,000 fine. The Tenth Court of Appeals, sitting in Waco, affirmed all three convictions. 761 S.W.2d 495. We granted appellants’ joint petition for discretionary review, pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 200(c)(4), in order to determine whether the court of appeals correctly interpreted the wiretap authorization provision contained in Article 18.20, § 3 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. Concluding that the court of appeals erred in its interpretation but that the error was harmless, we will affirm the judgment of the court of appeals.
On March 23, 1987, the Ellis County district attorney and the Navarro County criminal district attorney made application to the Honorable Mace B. Thurman, 147th district court judge of Travis County, for orders authorizing wiretaps on the Ellis County telephones of Nickey Rutledge and Carolina Castillo. Judge Thurman, the judge lawfully empowered to order electronic “intercepts” in the Third Administrative Judicial District, issued the intercept orders as requested, although Ellis County is located in the adjacent First Administrative Judicial District. See Tex.Gov’t Code § 74.042(b). The listening post for the wiretaps, however, was located in Navarro County, which is in the Third Administrative Judicial District. See Tex.Gov’t Code § 74.042(d). On March 31, the Navarro County criminal district attorney requested and obtained from Judge Thurman an order authorizing a third wiretap, this time on the Navarro County telephone of appellant Josephine Castillo. The probable cause affidavit for the third wiretap relied in part on information derived from the first two wiretaps.
On April 13, 1987, officers of the Texas Department of Public Safety tape-recorded a conversation acquired through the third wiretap. See Appendix. The contents of that conversation were admitted in evidence at appellants’ trial over their objection. Appellants argued that the contents of the conversation should be suppressed under Article 18.20, § 2 (wiretap statute exclusionary rule) because the conversation was acquired through an unlawfully authorized wiretap. More specifically, appellants argued that under Article 18.20, § 3(b), Judge Thurman had no power to authorize the Ellis County wiretaps because that county is not in Judge Thurman’s administrative judicial district; that all information derived from the Ellis County was therefore tainted; and that all information from the Navarro County wiretap was also tainted because that wiretap was authorized in part based on information obtained from the Ellis County wiretaps. See United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505, 94 S.Ct. 1820, 40 L.Ed.2d 341 (1974) (under Title III, faulty authorization of ini[182]*182tial wiretap application invalidated extension order and tainted evidence derived from extension order); United States v. Spagnuolo, 549 F.2d 705, 711 (9th Cir.1977) (when evidence from wiretap # 1 is tainted and used as probable cause to obtain wiretap #2, evidence from wiretap #2 is also tainted); J. Carr, The Law of Electronic Surveillance § 6.4(b)(2) at 6-95 (1990) (“Where it is later determined that the original [wiretap] order was improperly requested, issued, or executed, and the evidence derived therefrom is suppressed, any subsequent eavesdropping orders based on information derived from the original surveillance may be tainted.”).
The Waco court of appeals, relying upon Evans v. State, 252 Ga. 312, 314 S.E.2d 421 (1984), held that under Article 18.20, § 3(b), a telecommunication is electronically “intercepted” wherever it is “heard and recorded” by law enforcement personnel, and that since the Ellis County conversations were heard and recorded at the Navarro County listening post, “Judge Thurman was a proper judge to issue the intercept order[s].” 761 S.W.2d at 505. The court of appeals held in the alternative that exigent circumstances existed to warrant Judge Thurman’s first two intercept orders under Article 18.20, § 3(c):
The [original] application stated the location of the telephones in Ellis County were small communities; that 30 officers would be required to maintain them; that there was danger of compromise of the investigation if monitoring occurred in Ellis County; and that there was close association between two of the parties to be monitored and an Ellis County police officer, and there was information concerning “pay off” of the Sheriff. Since the exigent circumstances existed, the prosecutors were authorized under Article 18.20(3)c to apply to the Third Judicial District for the order[s].
Id.
In their petition for discretionary review, appellants reiterate their argument that the contents of the April 13, 1987, telephone conversation should be suppressed.1 In its reply brief, the State argues that the court of appeals correctly interpreted Article 18.20, § 3.2
In 1968 Congress passed Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2521. Title III regulates the electronic and mechanical interception of wire, oral, and electronic communications by government officials and private citizens. Title III also authorizes state legislatures to enact electronic surveillance statutes as long as those statutes “afford subjects of investigations at least as much protection from improper interception of protected communications as is afforded by the federal [statute].” G. Dix, The 1981 Texas Electronic Surveillance Statute, 7 T.Mar.L.Rev. 59, 60 (1981).
In 1981, the Texas Legislature passed its own electronic surveillance statute, Article 18.20 of the Texas Code of. Criminal Procedure. On April 13, 1987, §§ 1(3) and 3(a)-(e) of Article 18.20 read in relevant part:
Sec. 1(3) “Intercept” means the aural acquisition of the contents of a wire or oral communication through the use of an electronic, mechanical, or other device.
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[183]*183Sec. 3(a) The presiding judge of the court of criminal appeals ... shall appoint one district judge from each of the administrative judicial districts3 of this state to serve ... as the judge of competent jurisdiction within that administrative judicial district....
(b) Except as provided by Subsection (c) of this section, only the judge of competent jurisdiction
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OPINION ON APPELLANTS’ PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW
CAMPBELL, Judge.
Appellants Josephine Castillo, Ysidro Castillo Sr., and Jose Morones were tried jointly and found guilty of the offense of engaging in organized criminal activity by conspiring with Gilberto Salinas and Flavio Quintanilla to deliver more than 200 pounds but less than 2000 pounds of marihuana. Tex.Penal Code § 71.02(a)(5). The jury assessed punishment for each of the Castillos at imprisonment for 75 years and a $100,-000 fine. Morones’ punishment was assessed by the jury at imprisonment for 15 years and a $100,000 fine. The Tenth Court of Appeals, sitting in Waco, affirmed all three convictions. 761 S.W.2d 495. We granted appellants’ joint petition for discretionary review, pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 200(c)(4), in order to determine whether the court of appeals correctly interpreted the wiretap authorization provision contained in Article 18.20, § 3 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. Concluding that the court of appeals erred in its interpretation but that the error was harmless, we will affirm the judgment of the court of appeals.
On March 23, 1987, the Ellis County district attorney and the Navarro County criminal district attorney made application to the Honorable Mace B. Thurman, 147th district court judge of Travis County, for orders authorizing wiretaps on the Ellis County telephones of Nickey Rutledge and Carolina Castillo. Judge Thurman, the judge lawfully empowered to order electronic “intercepts” in the Third Administrative Judicial District, issued the intercept orders as requested, although Ellis County is located in the adjacent First Administrative Judicial District. See Tex.Gov’t Code § 74.042(b). The listening post for the wiretaps, however, was located in Navarro County, which is in the Third Administrative Judicial District. See Tex.Gov’t Code § 74.042(d). On March 31, the Navarro County criminal district attorney requested and obtained from Judge Thurman an order authorizing a third wiretap, this time on the Navarro County telephone of appellant Josephine Castillo. The probable cause affidavit for the third wiretap relied in part on information derived from the first two wiretaps.
On April 13, 1987, officers of the Texas Department of Public Safety tape-recorded a conversation acquired through the third wiretap. See Appendix. The contents of that conversation were admitted in evidence at appellants’ trial over their objection. Appellants argued that the contents of the conversation should be suppressed under Article 18.20, § 2 (wiretap statute exclusionary rule) because the conversation was acquired through an unlawfully authorized wiretap. More specifically, appellants argued that under Article 18.20, § 3(b), Judge Thurman had no power to authorize the Ellis County wiretaps because that county is not in Judge Thurman’s administrative judicial district; that all information derived from the Ellis County was therefore tainted; and that all information from the Navarro County wiretap was also tainted because that wiretap was authorized in part based on information obtained from the Ellis County wiretaps. See United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505, 94 S.Ct. 1820, 40 L.Ed.2d 341 (1974) (under Title III, faulty authorization of ini[182]*182tial wiretap application invalidated extension order and tainted evidence derived from extension order); United States v. Spagnuolo, 549 F.2d 705, 711 (9th Cir.1977) (when evidence from wiretap # 1 is tainted and used as probable cause to obtain wiretap #2, evidence from wiretap #2 is also tainted); J. Carr, The Law of Electronic Surveillance § 6.4(b)(2) at 6-95 (1990) (“Where it is later determined that the original [wiretap] order was improperly requested, issued, or executed, and the evidence derived therefrom is suppressed, any subsequent eavesdropping orders based on information derived from the original surveillance may be tainted.”).
The Waco court of appeals, relying upon Evans v. State, 252 Ga. 312, 314 S.E.2d 421 (1984), held that under Article 18.20, § 3(b), a telecommunication is electronically “intercepted” wherever it is “heard and recorded” by law enforcement personnel, and that since the Ellis County conversations were heard and recorded at the Navarro County listening post, “Judge Thurman was a proper judge to issue the intercept order[s].” 761 S.W.2d at 505. The court of appeals held in the alternative that exigent circumstances existed to warrant Judge Thurman’s first two intercept orders under Article 18.20, § 3(c):
The [original] application stated the location of the telephones in Ellis County were small communities; that 30 officers would be required to maintain them; that there was danger of compromise of the investigation if monitoring occurred in Ellis County; and that there was close association between two of the parties to be monitored and an Ellis County police officer, and there was information concerning “pay off” of the Sheriff. Since the exigent circumstances existed, the prosecutors were authorized under Article 18.20(3)c to apply to the Third Judicial District for the order[s].
Id.
In their petition for discretionary review, appellants reiterate their argument that the contents of the April 13, 1987, telephone conversation should be suppressed.1 In its reply brief, the State argues that the court of appeals correctly interpreted Article 18.20, § 3.2
In 1968 Congress passed Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2521. Title III regulates the electronic and mechanical interception of wire, oral, and electronic communications by government officials and private citizens. Title III also authorizes state legislatures to enact electronic surveillance statutes as long as those statutes “afford subjects of investigations at least as much protection from improper interception of protected communications as is afforded by the federal [statute].” G. Dix, The 1981 Texas Electronic Surveillance Statute, 7 T.Mar.L.Rev. 59, 60 (1981).
In 1981, the Texas Legislature passed its own electronic surveillance statute, Article 18.20 of the Texas Code of. Criminal Procedure. On April 13, 1987, §§ 1(3) and 3(a)-(e) of Article 18.20 read in relevant part:
Sec. 1(3) “Intercept” means the aural acquisition of the contents of a wire or oral communication through the use of an electronic, mechanical, or other device.
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[183]*183Sec. 3(a) The presiding judge of the court of criminal appeals ... shall appoint one district judge from each of the administrative judicial districts3 of this state to serve ... as the judge of competent jurisdiction within that administrative judicial district....
(b) Except as provided by Subsection (c) of this section, only the judge of competent jurisdiction for the administrative judicial district in which the proposed interception will be made may act on an application for authorization to intercept wire or oral communications.
(c) If the judge of competent jurisdiction for an administrative judicial district is absent or unable to serve or if exigent circumstances exist, the application may be made to the judge of competent jurisdiction in an adjacent administrative judicial district_
Act of June 1, 1981, 67th Leg., R.S., ch. 275, 1981 Tex.Gen.Laws 729, amended by Act of June 16, 1989, 71st Leg., R.S., eh. 1166, §§ 2 & 3, 1989 Tex.Gen.Laws 4783 (emphasis added). The definition of “intercept” was taken essentially verbatim from 18 U.S.C. § 2510(4).4
Our initial task is to ascertain the meaning of the terms “aural acquisition” and “interception” as used in §§ 1(3) and 3(b). In the interpretation of these sections, we must, of course, attempt to effectuate the collective “intent” or “purpose” of the Legislature. Camacho v. State, 765 S.W.2d 431 (Tex.Cr.App.1989). We may consider the legislative history of the statute as well as the consequences of any particular construction. Tex.Gov’t Code §§ 311.023(3) & (5).5 We must presume that the Legislature intended a reasonable result. Tex.Gov’t Code § 311.021(3). Finally, because § 1(3) was borrowed from the federal wiretap statute, it is appropriate for us to consider the construction placed upon the federal statute by other courts. State v. Klein, 154 Tex.Crim. 31, 224 S.W.2d 250 (App.1949).
Our research reveals two cases in which appellate courts, facing similar factual patterns, have interpreted the identical “aural acquisition” language used in the federal statute. In the case relied upon by the court of appeals, Evans v. State, supra, a Georgia state superior court judge whose jurisdiction was the Atlanta Judicial Circuit authorized wiretaps on 41 telephones, 23 of which were not in the Atlanta Judicial District. The Georgia defendant argued that evidence obtained from the 23 taps outside the judge’s district should be suppressed because the judge had no power under the federal statute to authorize wiretaps outside his territorial jurisdiction. The Georgia Supreme Court held, though, that because the listening post, where all the tapped communications were recorded, was in the Atlanta Judicial District, the superior court judge had territorial jurisdiction under the federal statute to order all 41 wiretaps. The Court held, in effect, that under the federal statute, a communication is “aurally acquired” at the place where it is heard and recorded by law enforcement personnel.
In United States v. Nelson, 837 F.2d 1519 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 829, 109 S.Ct. 82, 102 L.Ed.2d 58 (1988), the Eleventh Circuit reached a different conclusion. There, a Florida state judge issued wiretap orders for several telephones within his district, although the listening post for the taps was outside his district. The defendant argued that all the wiretap evidence should be suppressed because it was recorded outside the authorizing judge’s district. The Eleventh Circuit held, however, that “the term ‘intercept’ [in the federal wiretap statute] as it relates to ‘aural acquisition’ refers to the place where a communication is initially obtained regardless of where the communication is ulti[184]*184mately heard [or recorded].” 837 F.2d at 1527.
Thus, the two courts that have considered the meaning of “aural acquisition” in similar situations have reached conflicting answers.
In our view, the language of § 3(b) plainly contemplates territorial restriction. Only certain judges may issue intercept orders and then only if the communications in question are to be “aurally acquired” within their respective jurisdictions. The court of appeals held that the Legislature’s use of the word “aural” means that a communication is “acquired” only at the place where it is actually heard or recorded by law enforcement personnel. Professor Dix has explained, however, that “[t]his language, identical to that in the federal statute, is apparently intended [only] to impose no limitation upon the use of devices such as pen registers that enable law enforcement officers to determine the numbers called from a telephone but not to orally [sic] acquire the ‘contents’ of conversations.” G. Dix, 7 T.Mar.L.Rev. at 63.
If the Waco court of appeals’ interpretation of §§ 1(3) and 3(b) is upheld, then a wiretap at any location in Texas could be authorized by any of the nine authorizing judges. This is so because, with modern communications technology, a listening post can be established hundreds of miles from the place under surveillance. Under the court of appeals’ holding, then, law enforcement officials would be free to “shop” for a sympathetic judge from which to obtain an intercept order. This would effectively destroy the territorial restrictiveness apparent on the face of the statute.
The relevant legislative history of Article 18.20, such as we have been able to find, as well as the forum shopping consequences of the court of appeals’ interpretation of §§ 1(3) and 3(b), lead us to conclude that that interpretation is unreasonable and probably does not reflect the intent of the Legislature. The bill analysis prepared for House Bill 360 (later Article 18.20) states in relevant part that § 3(b) “[pjrovides for the designation by the presiding judge of the Court of Criminal Appeals of one district judge from each administrative judicial district to hear applications for electronic surveillance within that district.’’ House Comm, on Crim.Juris., Bill Analysis, Tex. H.B. 360, 67th Leg., R.S. (1981) (emphasis added). A “common sense” reading of the bill analysis indicates that the relevant location for judicial authorization purposes is not that of the listening post but rather where the wiretap device is physically located.
For the reasons cited, we hold that, for the purposes of Article 18.20, § 3(b), a communication is “intercepted” where the wiretap device is physically placed. In this case the wiretap devices for the Ellis County telephones were physically placed in Ellis County.
We hold also that the State’s original wiretap applications failed to demonstrate exigent circumstances warranting Judge Thurman’s issuance of the original intercept orders under § 3(c). The circumstances cited by the prosecutors in their original wiretap applications were simply not exigent; i.e., they failed to show why it was not possible to ask the appropriate judge in the First Administrative Judicial District to authorize the Ellis County wiretaps. It follows that, on the facts presented, Judge Thurman had no authority to issue the intercept orders for the Ellis County telephones; that the information derived from those intercepts was tainted; and that the information derived from the third intercept, including the April 13,1987, conversation, was similarly tainted and should not have been admitted in evidence.
We must now determine whether the admission of the April 13, 1987, conversation constituted reversible error. Rule 81(b)(2) of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure provides that an appellate court in a criminal case need not “reverse the judgment under review [if] the appellate court determines beyond a reasonable doubt that the error made no contribution to the conviction or the punishment.” When the error relates to improperly admitted evidence, the test “is not whether [185]*185the conviction could have been had without the improperly admitted evidence, but, instead, is whether there is a reasonable possibility that the complained of evidence might have contributed to the conviction or the punishment assessed.” Green v. State, 727 S.W.2d 263, 267 (Tex.Cr.App.1987). Consideration of the probable impact of the improperly admitted evidence on the minds of average jurors is essential to such an inquiry. Gauldin v. State, 683 S.W.2d 411 (Tex.Cr.App.1984).
Eighteen witnesses testified for the prosecution at the guilt/innocence phase of the trial; none testified for the defense. The prosecution’s witnesses established the following: On January 22, 1987, Linda McAl-lister contacted an officer of the Department of Public Safety and notified him that she had transported a large amount of marihuana for an “organization” of individuals, one of whom was appellant Ysidro Castillo Sr. At 2:23 p.m., April 13, D.P.S. officers, acting pursuant to the intercept order discussed previously, intercepted a telephone call from Chris Castillo to the rural Navarro County residence of his parents, appellants Josephine and Ysidro Castillo Sr. That telephone conversation, which is the focus of this case, led the D.P.S. officers to believe that “there would be something happening the next day ... around noon.”
On April 14, D.P.S. officers surveilled the Castillo and Morones residences, located approximately two miles south of Blooming Grove, from the ground and from the air. The Morones residence was across the road from the Castillo residence. At 1:55 p.m. a U-Haul truck left the Morones residence and went to the Castillo residence, where an adult male unloaded three boxes from the truck. At 1:59 p.m. a Dodge van left the Castillo residence and headed south. At approximately 2:10 p.m., a D.P.S. highway patrolman searched the van, which had stopped at a cemetery in Navarro County. The driver of the van was Flavio Quintanilla. The van was found to contain three U-Haul boxes of marihuana, weighing approximately 125 pounds.
Shortly after the van was searched, D.P.S. officers asked for, and received, Jose Morones’ consent to search his residence and storage shed. In the storage shed the officers found 37 U-Haul boxes containing marihuana.
In the early evening of April 14, D.P.S. officers executed a search warrant at the Castillo residence. Josephine, Ysidro Sr., and Gilberto Salinas were present when the warrant was executed. Found in and around the residence were: $7,212 in cash in Josephine’s purse; $109,000 in cash in the trunk of a Cadillac automobile registered to Josephine; $70,000 in cash buried in a flower bed; $499,000 in cash buried under a doghouse; small amounts of marihuana in a van and workbench drawer in a barn next to the residence; and written notes “that appeared to be drug ledger notes”. Also found, in the residence’s master bedroom, were numerous notes of unspecified transactions involving many persons and amounts as high as $554,840. Finally, in one of Salinas’ pockets were found records of weights which corresponded to the weights of the boxes found in Morones’ storage shed.
We have no difficulty concluding that the erroneous admission in evidence of the April 13 conversation was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt as to appellants’ convictions. The conversation, when taken in isolation, was not in any way incriminating, and in the context of all the State’s evidence, it is quite difficult to see how average jurors could have thought the conversation significant. We also have no difficulty concluding beyond a reasonable doubt that the admission of the conversation did not contribute to the punishments assessed. The conversation did not in any way increase the gravity of appellants’ crimes or otherwise place them in a poorer light.
The judgment of the court of appeals is affirmed.
TEAGUE, J., concurs in the result.