Casson Construction Co. v. Armco Steel Corp.

91 F.R.D. 376, 31 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 743, 1980 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16862
CourtUnited States District Court for the District of Arkansas
DecidedMay 7, 1980
DocketCiv. A. No. 77-2258
StatusPublished
Cited by27 cases

This text of 91 F.R.D. 376 (Casson Construction Co. v. Armco Steel Corp.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States District Court for the District of Arkansas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Casson Construction Co. v. Armco Steel Corp., 91 F.R.D. 376, 31 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 743, 1980 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16862 (ard 1980).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

O’CONNOR, Chief Judge.

This antitrust case was filed October 13, 1977. On October 19, 1977, each defendant was served with an identical set of ninety-two interrogatories. Local Rule 17(d) provides that no party shall serve more than thirty interrogatories without leave of court. No leave was sought. It is, however, common knowledge that more than thirty interrogatories ordinarily will be permitted in complicated cases such as this.

On November 4, 1977, at plaintiff’s request, defendants were enjoined from destroying documents relevant to the litigation. Defendants objected to the order as unnecessary and overly broad. At a hearing before the Magistrate on November 28, 1977, defendants proposed a different order and plaintiffs did not object. That order was entered by the Magistrate and restrained all parties from destroying documents. Defendants were given leave to file a motion requesting a stay of discovery because of a criminal action pending against them in the Western District of Missouri. No mention was made that more than thirty interrogatories had been served. All discovery was stayed pending resolution of the motion.

On January 25, 1978, a hearing was held before the Magistrate. A proposed pretrial order on discovery was to be submitted to the Magistrate in thirty days. Again no mention was made of the fact that more than thirty interrogatories had been served.

[378]*378On March 7, 1978, a conference was held with the Magistrate. While there was a good deal of discussion on discovery, again no complaint was made about the number of interrogatories. Thereupon the Magistrate entered Pretrial Order No. 1 on March 24, 1978. A discovery schedule had been agreed upon by all counsel. A target date for completion of class action discovery was set at June 1, 1978. A target date for completion of all discovery was set at October 1, 1978. Paragraph 4 of the Order stated in pertinent part:

Defendants need not respond to Plaintiff’s First Set of Interrogatories to Corporate Defendants at this time. Plaintiffs may designate . . . particular interrogatories, and defendants shall respond thereto within thirty days or April 14, 1978, whichever is later.

On March 10, 1978, pursuant to the agreement between counsel that had been discussed at the March 7 conference and embodied in the March 24 Order, plaintiff’s counsel notified counsel for defendants that certain interrogatories to the corporate defendants had been eliminated and that responses to the remaining interrogatories (the designated particular interrogatories) should be made.

On April 17, 1978, Ceco filed its response which consisted of an objection on the basis of Local Rule 17(d) — that more than thirty interrogatories had been served. The objection stated: “This defendant reserves any or all objections it may have under Rule 33(a), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.”

On April 19, 1978, Armco presented a similar response based on Local Rule 17(d), “fully reserving its rights to object or otherwise respond at a future date to these and any other interrogatories that may be properly served upon it.”

On May 26, 1978, plaintiff filed a Motion to Compel Answers to Interrogatories. Plaintiff argued that at the January 25, 1978 conference, and in the pretrial order entered on March 24, 1978, which was approved by all corporate defendants, defendants had waived any Local Rule 17(d) objection.

Defendants filed a joint memorandum in opposition arguing that they had not waived such objection.

In supplementary suggestions in support of the motion to compel, plaintiff argued that in addition to elimination of the local rule objection by waiver, plaintiff had effectively complied with Local Rule 17(d) in that the Pretrial Order No. 1 granted it permission to propound all interrogatories by designating particular interrogatories with no mention of paring the number down to thirty.

On September 26, 1978, the Magistrate entered a memorandum and order sustaining plaintiff’s motion to compel. The magistrate found that defendants, in agreeing to paragraph 4 of Pretrial Order No. 1, waived the thirty-interrogatory limitations of Local Rule 17(d):

“Under the Court’s Order (Pretrial Order No. 1) the defendants were given to April 14, 1978 to respond to plaintiffs’ interrogatories. Having responded with a single, blanket objection, found to have been waived by defendants, answers to the interrogatories are now in order. As a general rule, a party must answer or object to interrogatories within the time provided by the rule as fixed by the Court.”

Local Rule 17(d) is an attempt to avoid burdensome interrogatories. The proper response from a party faced with burdensome interrogatories is a motion for a protective order pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c). Defendants in this case made no request for a protective order. Rather they entered into negotiations with plaintiff, which resulted in Pretrial Order No. 1 and then, contrary to the spirit of the negotiations and the order itself, responded to the served interrogatories with a single objection based on the local rule. Under the circumstances, this approach to discovery could be construed as an indicator of defendants’ game plan for the discovery process that lay ahead.

Defendants’ attempt to preserve all other objections was of no effect. There is no [379]*379provision in the Federal Rules for preserving objections. “Rule 33 requires that the particular interrogatory be fully answered by the party or that objection to it and the grounds of objection be stated. A unilateral declaration that no objections are waived will not be allowed to displace the command of Rule 33 that the party either fully answer or object.” Dollar v. Long Mfg., N. C. Inc., 561 F.2d 613, 617 (5th Cir. 1977). Having failed to answer or make specific legitimate objections to particular interrogatories within the time allowed, defendants were held to have waived objections to all the interrogatories. The Magistrate compelled them to answer the interrogatories on or before November 1, 1978.

On October 6,1978, the corporate defendants filed a “Joint Memorandum in Support of Motion for Review of Order Compelling Answer to Interrogatories.” It does not appear that any motion for review was actually filed. Defendants’ memorandum challenged only that part of the Magistrate’s Order that held that there was a waiver of “substantive” objections. Attached to the memorandum were “Proposed Objections” by Ceco and “Preliminary Objections” by Armco to the first set of interrogatories. These had been received by plaintiff on October 4, 1978. These documents contained no answers to any interrogatories, but stated objections to most of the proposed interrogatories. Defendants did not seek an order staying the Magistrate’s order pending review.

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Bluebook (online)
91 F.R.D. 376, 31 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 743, 1980 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16862, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/casson-construction-co-v-armco-steel-corp-ard-1980.