Cassino v. JP Morgan Chase Bank National Association

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
• Decided: July 29, 2022
• Docket: 22-1049
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

Appellate Case: 22-1049 Document: 010110717797 Date Filed: 07/29/2022 Page: 1 FILED United States Court of Appeals UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT July 29, 2022 _________________________________ Christopher M. Wolpert Clerk of Court LANCE CASSINO,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

v. No. 22-1049 (D.C. No. 1:20-CV-03228-RM-KLM) JP MORGAN CHASE BANK (D. Colo.) NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, U.S. BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, ASHLEY JORDAN, SERINA LEE, RAYMOND SKERLING, II, AND ROBERT HOFFMAN,

Defendants - Appellees. _________________________________

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* _________________________________

Before MORITZ, BRISCOE, and CARSON Circuit Judges. _________________________________

Plaintiff Lance Cassino, appearing pro se, appeals from the district court’s

denial of his Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(a) motion to correct a clerical mistake in the final

judgment. Exercising jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm.

* After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. Appellate Case: 22-1049 Document: 010110717797 Date Filed: 07/29/2022 Page: 2

I

On September 26, 2005, Cassino executed a $200,000 promissory note (Note)

in favor of Community Mortgage Group in connection with property that Cassino

owned in Jefferson County, Colorado (the Property). The Note was secured by a

deed of trust recorded in Jefferson County, Colorado, on October 6, 2005 (Deed of

Trust). Together, the Note and Deed of Trust comprised a mortgage loan (Mortgage

Loan) that was serviced by defendant JP Morgan Chase Bank National Association

(Chase).

On September 21, 2011, Chase recorded a document titled “Corporate

Assignment of Deed of Trust” (Assignment). The Assignment purported to transfer

the record interest in the Deed of Trust to Chase.

On November 16, 2011, Chase filed a civil complaint against Cassino in the

District Court for Jefferson County, Colorado, seeking to reform the legal description

in the Deed of Trust and to foreclose on the Property. On March 11, 2013, Chase and

Cassino entered into a settlement agreement resolving the claims and counterclaims

in the 2011 case. Under the terms of the settlement agreement, Chase paid Cassino

$10,000 for attorney’s fees and the dismissal of his counterclaims. Cassino was,

under the terms of the settlement agreement, to take steps to complete a desired

subdivision of the Property. That subdivision, however, was never completed.

On June 28, 2017, Cassino filed a civil action in the District Court for

Jefferson County, Colorado, against Chase. In that 2017 action, Cassino asserted a

variety of state tort claims, a quiet title claim, and a claim under the Fair Debt

2 Appellate Case: 22-1049 Document: 010110717797 Date Filed: 07/29/2022 Page: 3

Collection Practices Act (FDCPA). All of the claims related to the Property and

Chase’s purported interest in the Deed of Trust for the Property. Chase filed a

number of counterclaims against Cassino, including a counterclaim for breach of the

settlement agreement in the 2011 case and a counterclaim for judgment on the Note.

Chase ultimately prevailed on the claims and counterclaims. Specifically, the

claims and counterclaims were resolved as follows: (a) shortly before a combined

bench/jury trial, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of Chase on

Cassino’s claim for fraud/misrepresentation; (b) the district court entered a directed

verdict in favor of Chase on Cassino’s claims for interference with contractual

relations, spurious documents, violations of the FDCPA, and quiet title; (c) the jury

found in favor of Chase on its counterclaim for breach of the settlement agreement in

the 2011 case and awarded it $10,000 in damages; (d) the district court granted

Chase’s request for directed verdict on its counterclaims for judicial foreclosure,

instructed the jury to determine the amount owed to Chase on the judgment on the

note claim, and the jury awarded Chase $301,450.20; (e) the district court found in

favor of Chase on its counterclaim for spurious document, concluding that Cassino’s

Truth in Lending Act rescission notice was groundless and baseless; and (f) the

district court awarded Chase $144,004.75 in attorneys’ fees and $11,586.97 in costs.

On March 6, 2020, Cassino filed a notice of appeal with the Colorado Court of

Appeals.

3 Appellate Case: 22-1049 Document: 010110717797 Date Filed: 07/29/2022 Page: 4

II

On October 28, 2020, while his appeal was pending before the Colorado Court

of Appeals, Cassino filed this federal lawsuit against Chase, three of its officers who

executed documents relating to the underlying Mortgage (defendants Lee, Jordan,

and Skerling), and an attorney who represented Chase in the 2017 Colorado state

court action (defendant Hoffman). Cassino’s complaint alleged generally that he was

seeking “to redress the damage inflicted on [him] by Chase’s fraudulent actions and

activities in seeking to dispossess him of . . . his property.” ECF No. 1 at 3. The

complaint in turn detailed the history of Cassino’s relationship with Chase and the

Property. Ultimately, Cassino’s complaint reasserted the claims that Cassino had

asserted against Chase in the 2017 Colorado state court action, including claims for

relief against Chase for interference with contractual relations,

fraud/misrepresentation, spurious documents, violation of the FDCPA, and rescission

of the Note and Deed of Trust pursuant to the Truth in Lending Act.

Defendants moved to dismiss Cassino’s claims pursuant to Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and

failure to state a claim. Defendants argued in their motion to dismiss that the

Younger and Colorado River abstention doctrines precluded Cassino from pursuing

his claims in federal court. Defendants also argued that, because Chase had standing

to enforce the Note and Deed of Trust, Cassino’s claims failed to state a claim upon

which relief could be granted.

4 Appellate Case: 22-1049 Document: 010110717797 Date Filed: 07/29/2022 Page: 5

The district court referred defendants’ motion to the magistrate judge. On

August 17, 2021, the magistrate judge issued a written recommendation

recommending that defendants’ motion be granted. Specifically, the magistrate judge

concluded that the Colorado River abstention doctrine applied and that the relevant

factors “weigh[ed] heavily in favor of abstaining from the exercise of jurisdiction

under the specific circumstances of this case.” ECF No. 45 at 12. As for “whether

th[e] case should be dismissed or . . . stayed pending resolution of state court

proceedings,” the magistrate judge concluded that, “because of the federal claims”

alleged by Cassino, “that a stay and administrative closure pursuant to

D.COLO.L.CivR 41.2 [wa]s most appropriate.” Id.

On September 27, 2021, the district court issued an order overruling Cassino’s

written objections to the magistrate judge’s recommendation and accepting that

recommendation. The district court “considered the Colorado River factors

independently and as a whole,” and ultimately “agree[d] with the magistrate judge’s

conclusion that abstention [wa]s appropriate in this case.” ECF No. 50 at 8.

Consequently, the district court granted defendants’ motion to dismiss and directed

the clerk of the court “to ADMINISTRATIVELY CLOSE this case.” Id.

On October 26, 2021, the clerk of the district court entered final judgment in

the case. The final judgment stated, in pertinent part:

Pursuant to the Order (Doc. 50) entered by Judge Raymond P. Moore, it is ORDERED that judgment is hereby entered in favor of the defendants and against the plaintiff. It is FURTHER ORDERED that this case is closed.

5 Appellate Case: 22-1049 Document: 010110717797 Date Filed: 07/29/2022 Page: 6

ECF No. 51 at 1.

On January 25, 2022, Cassino filed a motion pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 60(a) to correct what he claimed was a clerical mistake in the final

judgment. Cassino argued in his motion that the clerk of the district court “erred

when attempting to carry out th[e] Court’s Order to administratively close this case”

because the final judgment stated only that “‘this case is closed.’” ECF No. 56 at 2

(emphasis in original). Cassino asked the district court to “direct the Clerk to correct

the Final Judgment to reflect the fact that this case has been ‘ADMINISTRATIVELY

CLOSED pursuant to D.C.COLO.LCivR 41.2, subject to reopening for good cause.’”

Id. at 3–4.

On January 27, 2022, the district court denied Cassino’s motion by way of a

text-only docket entry that stated, in pertinent part, “The Court has considered the

Motion, and it is hereby DENIED.” ECF No. 57.

On February 22, 2022, Cassino filed a notice of appeal from the district court’s

text-only docket entry denying his motion to correct a clerical mistake in the final

judgment.

III

Cassino asserts in his appeal that the district court erred in denying his motion

to correct a clerical mistake in the final judgment. “We review a district court’s

ruling on a Rule 60(a) motion for abuse of discretion.” Jones, Waldo, Holbrook &

McDonough v. Cade, 510 F.3d 1277, 1278 (10th Cir. 2007).

6 Appellate Case: 22-1049 Document: 010110717797 Date Filed: 07/29/2022 Page: 7

Cassino argues that the district court’s denial “is fraught with future

consequences” for him. Aplt. Br. at 13. Specifically, Cassino argues that a case that

is administratively closed “can be reopened [for good cause] pursuant to

D.C.COLO.LCivR 41.2,” but that a case that is simply closed “can never be reopened

for any cause.” Id. at 15. “By refusing to correct the error in the Final Judgment,”

Cassino argues, the district court “deprived” him of his right to seek reopening of the

case upon a showing of good cause. Id. at 16.

After reviewing the relevant district court pleadings, we are not persuaded that

the district court abused its discretion in denying Cassino’s Rule 60(a) motion. The

final judgment expressly noted, in pertinent part, that the clerk of the district court

was acting “[p]ursuant to the Order (Doc. 50) entered by” the district court and

“clos[ing]” the case. ECF No. 51 at 1. In our view, the final judgment is thus

entirely consistent with the expressly referenced order which, as noted, adopted the

magistrate judge’s recommendation, granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss, and

directed the clerk of the district court to “ADMINISTRATIVELY CLOSE this case.”

ECF No. 50 at 8. Had the district court determined the final judgment to be

inconsistent with its prior order, it surely would have said so rather than denying

Cassino’s Rule 60(a) motion.

Moreover, we are not persuaded, as Cassino now suggests in his appeal, that

the district court’s direction to “ADMINISTRATIVELY CLOSE this case” was

intended to authorize the case to be reopened for good cause in the future pursuant to

D.C.COLO.LCivR 41.2. The district court’s order did not cite to that local rule, nor

7 Appellate Case: 22-1049 Document: 010110717797 Date Filed: 07/29/2022 Page: 8

did it otherwise state that the case could be reopened for good cause. See Quinn v.

CGR, 828 F.2d 1463, 1465 (10th Cir. 1987) (construing district court’s order

directing the case “closed, to be reopened upon a showing of good cause,” to be the

equivalent of a stay rather than a dismissal). And with good reason. When, as here,

a district court invokes the Colorado River abstention doctrine, it has discretion to

either stay or dismiss the case. See Fox v. Maulding, 16 F.3d 1079, 1081–82 (10th

Cir. 1994). But, as the Supreme Court has noted, “the decision to invoke Colorado

River necessarily contemplates that the federal court will have nothing further to do

in resolving any substantive part of the case, whether it stays or dismisses.” Moses

H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 28 1983). And that, we

conclude, was the intent of the district court in this case, i.e., to dismiss the matter

and play no further role in resolving any substantive part of the case.

AFFIRMED.

Entered for the Court

Mary Beck Briscoe Circuit Judge