Casper Couch v. State

• Court: Court of Appeals of Georgia
• Decided: March 13, 2014
• Docket: A13A1927
• Status: Published

Opinion

FOURTH DIVISION DOYLE, P. J., MCFADDEN and BOGGS, JJ.

NOTICE: Motions for reconsideration must be physically received in our clerk’s office within ten days of the date of decision to be deemed timely filed. http://www.gaappeals.us/rules/

March 13, 2014

In the Court of Appeals of Georgia A13A1927. COUCH v. THE STATE.

MCFADDEN, Judge.

Casper Couch appeals from his convictions for rape, child molestation, false

imprisonment and burglary. He challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support

these convictions and argues that the trial court should have suppressed DNA

evidence. Because the evidence was sufficient and the DNA evidence was obtained

pursuant to a valid search warrant, we affirm.

1. Sufficiency of the evidence.

When a defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his

criminal convictions, “the relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in

the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found

the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307, 319 (III) (B) (99 Sct 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979) (citation omitted;

emphasis in original). So viewed, the evidence showed that the night of September

19, 2003, a man entered a residence where I. H., then 11 years old, was spending the

night with her aunt. I. H., who had been sleeping on a sofa, awoke to find herself on

a mattress on the floor with her panties down at her feet. She went back to sleep.

Later, she awoke to find that her panties had been removed and a man was on top of

her, holding her by her hands so she could not move. She tried to get up but the man

would not let her, and he told her that if she got up he would “knock [her] back

down.” She again tried to get up and the man broke her hand. I. H. tried to scream but

could not because the man was applying weight to her chest. The man then pushed

what I. H. believed to be his penis into her vagina, causing her pain; she testified that

it could not have been his hands or fingers because he was holding her down with his

hands at the time. The man then escaped through the back door of the residence. I. H.

immediately told her aunt what had happened.

I. H. initially identified someone other than Couch as her assailant. But

Couch’s DNA matched that of seminal fluid found on I. H.’s clothing. Couch also

was seen near the house shortly after the rape, and his shirt was found in the

residence.

2 From this evidence a reasonable trier of fact could find beyond a reasonable

doubt that Couch committed the offenses of rape, OCGA § 16-6-1 (a) (1) (person

commits offense of rape when he has carnal knowledge of a female forcibly and

against her will); child molestation, OCGA § 16-6-4 (a) (1) (person commits offense

of child molestation when he does any immoral or indecent act to or in presence of

child under age of 16 with intent to arouse or satisfy his sexual desires or those of

child); false imprisonment, OCGA § 16-5-41 (a) (person commits offense of false

imprisonment when, in violation of another’s personal liberty, he arrests, confines,

or detains such person without authority); and burglary, OCGA § 16-7-1 (b) (person

commits offense of burglary when, without authority and with intent to commit a

felony, he enters the dwelling house of another).

2. Motion to suppress DNA evidence.

Couch argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the

DNA evidence, which the state obtained pursuant to a search warrant. At the hearing

on Couch’s motion, a Georgia Bureau of Investigations agent testified that she

assumed responsibility for the investigation in this case after the death of the agent

who had initiated the investigation. She reviewed the files, which indicated that

Couch’s DNA (obtained from a blood sample that the first agent had taken from

3 Couch with Couch’s consent) matched the DNA found on I. H.’s clothing. Based on

this information, the second agent sought a warrant to obtain a saliva sample from

Couch for DNA testing. In a supporting affidavit, the second agent described the

information she had obtained from the first agent’s records.

Couch argues that the magistrate court lacked probable cause to issue a search

warrant. See OCGA § 17-5-30 (a) (2) (defendant may move to suppress items

obtained with search warrant on the ground that the warrant was illegal because there

was not probable cause for its issuance). In determining probable cause, the

magistrate’s task is “to make a practical, common-sense decision whether, given all

the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him, including the ‘veracity’ and

‘basis of knowledge’ of persons supplying hearsay information, there is a fair

probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.”

State v. Palmer, 285 Ga. 75, 77 (673 SE2d 237) (2009) (citations omitted). “[A]n

affidavit supporting a search warrant may be based on hearsay information as long

as there is a substantial basis for crediting the hearsay.” Deal v. State, 199 Ga. App.

184, 185 (1) (404 SE2d 343) (1991) (citation and punctuation omitted). The appellate

court’s duty

4 is to determine if there was a substantial basis for concluding that probable cause existed to issue the search warrant. Doubtful cases should be resolved in favor of upholding the determination that issuance of a warrant was proper, reflecting both a desire to encourage use of the warrant process by police officers and a recognition that once a warrant has been obtained, intrusion upon interests protected by the Fourth Amendment is less severe than otherwise may be the case.

Glenn v. State, 288 Ga. 462, 466 (3) (d) (704 SE2d 794) (2010) (citations and

punctuation omitted).

The second agent’s affidavit was based on information she retrieved from the

file assembled by the original investigating agent. That information included the

match of Couch’s DNA to that in seminal fluid found on I. H.’s clothing. It provided

a substantial basis for concluding that probable cause existed to issue the search

warrant to obtain further DNA from Couch. The trial court did not err in denying the

motion to suppress.

Judgment affirmed. Doyle, P. J., and Boggs, J., concur.