Casey v. South Carolina State Housing Authority

215 S.E.2d 184, 264 S.C. 303, 1975 S.C. LEXIS 359
CourtSupreme Court of South Carolina
DecidedMay 2, 1975
Docket20004
StatusPublished
Cited by20 cases

This text of 215 S.E.2d 184 (Casey v. South Carolina State Housing Authority) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of South Carolina primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Casey v. South Carolina State Housing Authority, 215 S.E.2d 184, 264 S.C. 303, 1975 S.C. LEXIS 359 (S.C. 1975).

Opinions

Littlejohn, Justice:

This action was brought pursuant to the Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act, Section 10-2001 et seq., Code of Laws of South Carolina (1962), to contest the constitutionality of Act No. 1171 of 1974 (the Act).

The Act empowers the South Carolina State Housing Authority (created by Act No. 500 of the Acts of 1971) to issue its notes, or bonds, to promote housing accommodations for persons of moderate to low income.

The respondent, Casey, brings the action as a citizen, resident, and taxpayer of South Carolina, for himself and all others who would be adversely affected by the action which the defendants propose to take pursuant to the Act. Parties defendant (now appellants) are the South Carolina State Housing Authority and members of the State Budget and Control Board, who would implement and coordinate the provisions of the Act. The Attorney General (also an appellant) was joined as a defendant pursuant to § 10-2008, by reason of the fact that this action seeks to declare an Act of the General Assembly unconstitutional.

The complaint alleges that the Act is unconstitutional on several grounds. The lower court held that it was violative of Article 10, § 6 of the Constitution of South Carolina, in that the Act authorized the defendants to pledge and lend the credit of the State of South Carolina for the benefit of private corporations and individuals. The lower court found the other grounds, attacking the constitutionality of the Act, without merit.

The pertinent part of Article 10, § 6 of the Constitution provides, as follows:

“The credit of the State shall not be pledged or loaned for the benefit of any individual, company, association or corporation . . .”

[308]*308The Act is a complex one. After finding that there exists in South Carolina a serious shortage of sanitary and safe residential houses, it proceeds to declare that it is necessary in the public interest that the Authority be authorized to:

“(i) provide construction and mortage loans; (ii) purchase mortgage loans; (iii) provide for predevelopment costs, temporary financing and land development expenses; (iv) provide residential housing construction and rehabilitation by private enterprise and housing sponsors for sale or rental to persons and families of moderate to low income; (v) provide mortgage financing; (vi) make loans to mortgage lenders under terms and conditions requiring the proceeds thereof to be used by such mortgage lenders for new residential mortgage loans; (vii) provide technical, consultative and project assistance services to housing sponsors; (viii) assist in coordinating federal, State, regional and local public and private efforts and resources; (ix) promote wise usage of land and other resources; (x) make direct loans to qualified individuals through mortgage lenders; (xi) where necessary acquire title to real property and cause to be constructed by private enterprise or housing sponsors thereon residential housing for persons and families of moderate to low income; and (xii) sell and dispose of real property and residential housing on such terms and conditions as the authority shall determine, in order to preserve the quality of life in South Carolina.”

The Act then proceeds to endow the Authority with the power to do those things enumerated, declaring that all of these things are public purposes and in the public interest.

In order to accomplish the purposes of the Act, there are provided three methods of permanent mortgage financing.

LOAN TO LENDER PROGRAM

(Authorized by § 5(1) (a) )

Under this program the Authority may borrow money by issuing bonds, and lend the proceeds thereof to mortgage lending institutions which are actively engaged in the busi[309]*309ness of making mortgage loans on residential houses. The money borrowed from the Authority by the mortgage lender would be loaned by the mortgage lender to persons of moderate to low income to be chosen by the mortgage lender within specific guidelines to be established by the Authority. Bonds issued by the Authority under this first program would be secured by a pledge of the revenues received by the Authority in repayment of the loans made to the mortgage lenders, and by the collateral pledged by the mortgage lenders. Bonds issued by the Authority under this plan would not be secured by the “Guaranty Fund,” established by the Act, to which reference will be made hereafter.

DIRECT MORTGAGE LOAN PROGRAM

(Authorized by § 5(1) (b) )

Under this program the Authority would borrow money by issuing bonds, and use the proceeds to finance the construction of residential housing units by private builders. The Authority would then make such housing available to persons of moderate to low income. The Authority would appoint private mortgage lenders to service the loans made to members of the moderate to low income class. The bonds issued by this program would be secured by a pledge of the revenues received by the Authority on repayment of the mortgage loans made by the Authority. In addition, the bonds would be secured by the pledge of the “Guaranty Fund,” to which reference will be made hereafter.

MORTGAGE PURCHASE PROGRAM

(Authorized by § 5(1) (c) )

This program authorizes the Authority to borrow money by issuing notes with a maturity not exceeding two years, the proceeds of which would be used to purchase federally-insured mortgages from mortgage lenders upon the agreement of such mortgage lenders to use the proceeds of the purchase price in originating mortgage loans to persons or [310]*310families of moderate to low income. The notes of the Authority would be secured by a pledge of the federally-insured mortgages so purchased, and would be refunded by the proceeds of bonds directly secured by the “Guaranty Fund,” to which reference will be made hereafter.

There is also provided one temporary method of mortgage financing.

DIRECT CONSTRUCTION LOAN PROGRAM

This program permits the Authority to made direct, insured loans to housing sponsors from the proceeds of its bonds where there is a commitment for permanent financing through a federal, or federally-insured mortgage. This program does not pledge the “Guaranty Fund,” to which reference will be made hereafter.

TPIE GUARANTY FUND

The Guaranty Fund is created by, and may be utilized by and paid out in accordance with § 6 of the Act, which reads in pertinent part as follows:

“Any unexpended balance in the State General Fund at the end of fiscal year 1973-74 in excess of the amount required to cover appropriations in the State General Appropriations Act for 1974-75, as determined by the State Budget and Control Board in accordance with the provisions of Section 1-782 of the 1962 Code, but not in excess of ten million dollars, shall be set aside in a special account in the State Treasury to constitute a Guaranty Fund for any State bonds that may thereafter be issued by the South Carolina State Housing Authority. All monies in the Guaranty Fund shall be held by the State Treasurer, and shall be used only for the purpose of paying principal (whether at state maturity, or in accordance with any mandatory sinking fund) of and interest on notes and bonds issued pursuant to Section 5(1) [311]

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Casey v. South Carolina State Housing Authority
215 S.E.2d 184 (Supreme Court of South Carolina, 1975)

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Bluebook (online)
215 S.E.2d 184, 264 S.C. 303, 1975 S.C. LEXIS 359, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/casey-v-south-carolina-state-housing-authority-sc-1975.