Casamayor v. Warden of U.S.P. McCreary

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Kentucky
DecidedJuly 24, 2023
Docket6:23-cv-00105
StatusUnknown

This text of Casamayor v. Warden of U.S.P. McCreary (Casamayor v. Warden of U.S.P. McCreary) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Kentucky primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Casamayor v. Warden of U.S.P. McCreary, (E.D. Ky. 2023).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY SOUTHERN DIVISION at LONDON

DANIEL CASAMAYOR, Petitioner, Civil Action No. 6: 23-105-KKC V. WARDEN OF U.S.P. McCREARY, MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER Respondent. *** *** *** *** Petitioner Daniel Casamayor is a federal prisoner currently confined at the United States Penitentiary (“USP”)-McCreary located in Pine Knot, Kentucky. Proceeding without counsel, Casamayor has filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 [R. 1] and has paid the $5.00 filing fee. [R. 4] Thus, this matter is before the Court to conduct the initial screening required by 28 U.S.C. § 2243. Alexander v. Northern Bureau of Prisons, 419 F. App’x 544, 545 (6th Cir. 2011).1 In his § 2241 petition, Casamayor challenges his conviction for using and carrying a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c)(l)(A) and 2. [R. 1-1 at p. 6] Specifically, Casamayor argues that the predicate offense that formed the basis of his § 924(c) conviction is unclear from the record, as there were two potential predicate offenses, one of which is no longer a valid predicate offense following the United States Supreme Court’s

1 A petition will be denied “if it plainly appears from the petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is not entitled to relief.” Rule 4 of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases in the United decision in United States v. Taylor, 142 S.Ct. 2015 (2022).2 Casamayor has previously filed a motion to vacate, set aside, or correct sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 in the court that sentenced him. [R. 1-1 at p. 8] Thus, he seeks to pursue this claim in a § 2241 petition via the “saving clause” § 2255(e) on the grounds that the remedy provided by § 2255 is “inadequate or ineffective” to test the legality of his conviction. [R. 1-1 at p. 8-10]

However, Casamayor’s § 2241 petition must be dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. While 28 U.S.C. § 2241 “grants federal courts the authority to issue writs of habeas corpus to prisoners whose custody violates federal law,” Section 2441’s applicability is severely restricted by 28 U.S.C. § 2255, which “serves as the primary means for a federal prisoner to challenge his conviction or sentence.” See Taylor v. Owens, 990 F.3d 493, 495 (6th Cir. 2021). Thus, a federal prisoner generally may not use a § 2241 petition to challenge the legality of his conviction or enhancement of his sentence, but must instead file a motion under § 2255 in the court that sentenced him. See United States v. Peterman, 249 F.3d 458, 461 (6th Cir. 2001) (explaining the distinction between a § 2255 motion and a § 2241 petition).

However, “[s]ince the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), second or successive § 2255 motions are barred unless they rely on either ‘newly discovered evidence,’ § 2255(h)(1), or ‘a new rule of constitutional law,’ § 2255(h)(2).” Jones v. Hendrix, 599 U.S. ---, 143 S.Ct. 1857, 1863 (2023). Accordingly, a federal prisoner may not “file a second or successive § 2255 motion based solely on a more favorable interpretation of statutory law adopted after his conviction became final and his initial § 2255 motion was resolved.” Id. Thus,

2 In Taylor, the Supreme Court held that “whatever one might say about completed Hobbs Act robbery, attempted Hobbs Act robbery does not satisfy the elements clause [of §924(c)].” Taylor, 142 S.Ct. at 2020. 2 Casamayor is unable to bring his claim based upon a favorable change of statutory interpretation in a second or successive § 2255 motion. Prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Jones, many federal Circuit Courts of Appeal (including the Sixth Circuit) allowed a federal prisoner to challenge his conviction or the enhancement of his sentence in a § 2241 petition filed pursuant to the “saving clause” of 28 U.S.C.

§ 2255(e), which authorizes a habeas petition if it appears that remedy afforded by 28 U.S.C. § 2255 is “inadequate or ineffective” to test the legality of the prisoner’s detention. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e). For example, in the Sixth Circuit, a petitioner could satisfy the saving clause (and, therefore, challenge his sentence in a § 2241 petition) by showing “‘that he had no prior reasonable opportunity to bring [his] argument’ in his earlier section 2255 proceedings…by identifying a Supreme Court decision that post-dates his original section 2255 proceedings, adopts a new interpretation of the statute of conviction, and supports his innocence claim.” Taylor v. Owens, 990 F.3d 493, 499 (6th Cir. 2021) (quoting Wright v. Spaulding, 939 F.3d 695, 705 (6th Cir. 2019)) (other citation omitted).

However, in Jones, the Supreme Court held that “the saving clause does not authorize such an end-run around the AEDPA.” Jones, 143 S.Ct. at 1868. Rather, the inability of a prisoner with a statutory claim to satisfy the two limited conditions specified by § 2255(h) “in which Congress has permitted federal prisoners to bring second or successive collateral attacks on their sentences…does not mean that he can bring his claim in a habeas petition under the saving clause. It means that he cannot bring it at all.” Id. at 1869. Thus, just as a federal prisoner may not rely in a favorable change of statutory law to file a second or successive § 2255 motion, nor may he raise such a claim in a § 2241 petition on the grounds that the remedy afforded by § 2255 is “inadequate or ineffective” to test the legality of his detention. Id. at 1868. 3 In light of Jones, a federal prisoner may no longer seek relief from his conviction or sentence based upon a favorable change in statutory interpretation in a § 2241 petition filed via the saving clause of § 2255(e), such as the § 2241 petition filed by Casamayor. The saving clause is a jurisdictional bar that a petitioner must clear prior to bringing a challenge to his conviction or sentence in a § 2241 proceeding. Taylor, 990 F.3d at 499-500. Because Jones makes clear that Casamayor is unable to clear this hurdle, his § 2241 petition must be dismissed for lack of subject- matter jurisdiction. /d. Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED as follows: 1. Casamayor’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 [R. 1] is DISMISSED for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction; 2. This action is DISMISSED and STRICKEN from the Court’s docket; and 3. A corresponding Judgment will be entered this date. This the 24th day of July, 2023.

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Related

Carlton Alexander v. Bureau of Prisons
419 F. App'x 544 (Sixth Circuit, 2011)
William Andrew Wright v. Stephen Spaulding
939 F.3d 695 (Sixth Circuit, 2019)
Derrick Taylor v. Angela Owens
990 F.3d 493 (Sixth Circuit, 2021)
United States v. Taylor
596 U.S. 845 (Supreme Court, 2022)
United States v. Peterman
249 F.3d 458 (Sixth Circuit, 2001)

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Bluebook (online)
Casamayor v. Warden of U.S.P. McCreary, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/casamayor-v-warden-of-usp-mccreary-kyed-2023.