Carsten James Quinlan v. Fraser, Alissa Puls

• Court: Court of Appeals of Minnesota
• Decided: August 25, 2025
• Docket: a251084
• Status: Published

Opinion

STATE OF MINNESOTA IN COURT OF APPEALS A25-1084

Carsten James Quinlan, Appellant,

vs.

Fraser, et al., Respondents,

Alissa Puls, Respondent.

Filed August 25, 2025 Appeal dismissed Frisch, Chief Judge

Washington County District Court File No. 82-CV-24-5866

Carsten J. Quinlan, Woodbury, Minnesota (pro se appellant)

William L. Davidson, Ryan C. Ellis, Lind, Jensen, Sullivan & Peterson, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondents Fraser, Kallie Uner, Sara Haubrich)

Alan P. King, Natalie R. Cote, Goetz & Eckland PA, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent Alissa Puls)

Considered and decided by Frisch, Chief Judge; Larkin, Judge; and Bond, Judge.

SYLLABUS

A district court abuses its discretion in certifying entry of a final partial judgment

under Minn. R. Civ. P. 54.02 when the district court fails to provide reasons for the

certification and the basis for the certification is not otherwise apparent from the record. SPECIAL TERM OPINION

FRISCH, Chief Judge

In this interlocutory appeal, appellant Carsten James Quinlan seeks review of a May

6, 2025 partial judgment dismissing certain claims against respondents Fraser, Kallie Uner,

and Sara Haubrich (the Fraser parties). We questioned whether the district court acted

within its discretion in certifying the partial judgment for immediate appeal, and if not,

whether we must dismiss this appeal as taken from a nonappealable partial judgment.

Quinlan, the Fraser parties, and respondent Alissa Puls filed informal memoranda. On July

29, 2025, we filed a special term order dismissing the appeal, with an opinion to follow. 1

We now explain that we dismiss this appeal because the district court did not provide any

reasons for its certification decision, and it is not discernable from the record that

certification of a final partial judgment is appropriate.

DECISION

In 2024, Quinlan sued Puls and the Fraser parties. 2 In the complaint, which Quinlan

filed as a self-represented party, Quinlan asserted claims of civil conspiracy and intentional

infliction of emotional distress against both Puls and the Fraser parties. Quinlan also

asserted claims of defamation, negligence, failure to report child abuse, negligent infliction

1 In our July special term order, we also determined that the district court’s partial judgment was not appealable under Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 103.03(g), concluding that the Fraser parties’ motion to dismiss did not create a special proceeding separate and apart from the merits of the parties’ claims. 2 According to the complaint, Fraser is a mental-health organization in Minnesota, and Uner and Haubrich are employees of the organization.

2 of emotional distress, vicarious liability, and ratification against the Fraser parties. Quinlan

generally alleged that Fraser therapists harmed Quinlan and Quinlan’s minor children by

supporting a “false narrative of abuse” by Quinlan. Quinlan alleged that Fraser therapists

took these actions because of “manipulation and fraud” by Puls, the children’s mother.

The Fraser parties moved to dismiss six of Quinlan’s eight claims against them—

civil conspiracy, defamation, negligence, negligent infliction of emotional distress,

vicarious liability, and ratification. 3

The district court granted the Fraser parties’ motion to dismiss. The district court

dismissed Quinlan’s defamation claim against the Fraser parties in its entirety and

dismissed Quinlan’s claims of civil conspiracy, vicarious liability, and ratification “based

on” the defamation claim. The district court also dismissed Quinlan’s claims for

negligence and negligent infliction of emotional distress “to the extent those claims are

premised on communications” the Fraser parties had “in connection with any custody battle

or the Washington County termination of parental rights matter,” as well as Quinlan’s

claims of civil conspiracy, vicarious liability, and ratification “based on” those

communications.

Although no party asked the district court to certify entry of a final partial judgment

on the dismissal order to allow an immediate appeal under Minn. R. Civ. P. 54.02, the

3 The Fraser parties sought dismissal pursuant to the Minnesota Uniform Public Expression Protection Act (UPEPA), Minn. Stat. §§ 554.07-.20 (2024), which allows a party, within 60 days after being served with a complaint or other pleading that asserts a cause of action subject to UPEPA, to bring a special motion for expedited relief to dismiss that cause of action. Minn. Stat. § 554.09.

3 district court included language consistent with rule 54.02, that “there being no just reason

for delay, let judgment be entered accordingly.” On May 6, 2025, the district court entered

judgment on the partial dismissal order. In addition to the claims against the Fraser parties

that were not dismissed, both of Quinlan’s claims against Puls remain pending in the

district court. 4

The thrust of the rules governing the appellate process is that appeals should not be

brought or considered piecemeal. Emme v. C.O.M.B., Inc., 418 N.W.2d 176, 179 (Minn.

1988). Notwithstanding this general policy, under Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 103.03(a), an

appeal may be taken from a partial judgment entered pursuant to Minn. R. Civ. P. 54.02.

When multiple claims for relief or multiple parties are involved in an action, a district court

may direct the entry of a final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all the claims or

parties “only upon an express determination that there is no just reason for delay and upon

an express direction for the entry of judgment.” Minn. R. Civ. P. 54.02; see also Minn. R.

Civ. App. P. 104.01, subd. 1 (providing that an appeal may be taken from a partial judgment

entered pursuant to Minn. R. Civ. P. 54.02 within 60 days of its entry). 5

4 In their memorandum filed in this court, the Fraser parties assert that the district court’s dismissal order did not dismiss portions of Quinlan’s negligence and negligent-infliction- of-emotional-distress claims unrelated to the communications regarding the Washington County termination-of-parental-rights matter. They also assert that “any claims for civil conspiracy, vicarious liability, or ratification related to other remaining claims were not dismissed either.” Our resolution of this matter does not require us to determine whether these claims were dismissed in whole or in part, and we express no opinion on that question. 5 We note that an interlocutory appeal of a final partial judgment is mandatory. Javinsky v. Comm’r of Admin., 725 N.W.2d 393, 397 (Minn. App. 2007). We cannot review a final partial judgment or its inherent issues after the time to appeal that judgment has expired. Id.

4 Minn. R. Civ. P. 54.02 “is intended to reduce piecemeal appeals by limiting appeals

from judgments that resolve only part of the litigation” and “to liberalize the appellate

process for parties who might be prejudiced by waiting to appeal a decision where other

claims or liabilities are yet to be decided.” T.A. Schifsky & Sons, Inc. v. Bahr Constr., LLC,

773 N.W.2d 783, 787 (Minn. 2009).

Because the May 6, 2025 judgment did not resolve all claims against all parties, it

is a partial judgment. On its face, the partial judgment is immediately appealable under

Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 103.03(a) and Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 104.01, subd. 1, because it

includes the rule 54.02 certification language.

We review the district court’s decision to certify a partial judgment for immediate

appeal for an abuse of discretion. City of Elk River v. Bolton & Menk, Inc., 2 N.W.3d 173,

178 (Minn. 2024). “The discretionary judgment of the district court should be given

substantial deference because the district court is most likely to be familiar with the case

and is in the best position to identify any justifiable reasons for an immediate appeal.” Id.

When deciding whether to certify a final partial judgment under rule 54.02, district

courts should consider “the totality of the circumstances, including the possibility of

hardship that could result from a delayed appeal, administrative concerns, and other factors

such as ‘expense, delay, shortening the length of a trial, frivolity of competing claims, and

the possibility that another claim or counterclaim could offset the judgment.’” Id. at 177-

78 (quoting Contractors Edge, Inc. v. City of Mankato, 863 N.W.2d 765, 769 (Minn.

2015)). Other factors supporting certification of a final partial judgment include that the

certified claims were “dismissed solely on the pleadings rather than a developed factual

5 record” and that an immediate appeal of the dismissal of the certified claims “might

facilitate a settlement of the remainder of the claims.” Id. at 179. When the claims arise

out of one set of facts, the district court usually should not certify entry of a final partial

judgment. Contractors Edge, 863 N.W.2d at 770.

Quinlan contends that the district court acted within its discretion in certifying the

May 6, 2025 partial judgment for immediate appeal because the judgment resolved all

claims against the Fraser parties. The Fraser parties and Puls contend that the district court

did not act within its discretion in certifying entry of a final partial judgment. They

emphasize that none of the parties asked the district court to certify entry of a final partial

judgment and that the district court did not provide any reasons for its certification. The

Fraser parties correctly point out that the judgment did not resolve all of Quinlan’s claims

against them because claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress and failure to

report child abuse were not part of their motion to dismiss. And Puls argues that the

dismissed claims and the remaining claims against Puls arise out of one set of facts and are

closely related because Quinlan alleges that Puls conspired with the Fraser parties or

worked in tandem with them.

The district court did not explain its reasons for certifying entry of a final partial

judgment. Because none of the parties requested the entry of partial final judgment, it is

unclear from the record whether the district court intended to certify such a judgment. It

appears from the record that the rule 54.02 certification language may have been added

based on a mistaken belief that such language is required every time a partial judgment of

dismissal is entered. We note that the function of the “no just reason for delay” language

6 in Minn. R. Civ. P. 54.02 is to certify a dismissal order as a final partial judgment that is

immediately appealable. A district court entering a partial judgment should include the

“no just reason for delay” language only when the district court intends to certify a partial

judgment for immediate appeal. In all other circumstances, the district court may direct

entry of a partial judgment without the “no just reason for delay” language.

We also emphasize that the best practice in certifying entry of a final partial

judgment is for a district court to provide a written explanation for its decision. Contractors

Edge, 863 N.W.2d at 769; see also Bolton, 2 N.W.3d at 178 (noting that the district court

“documented its reasons for granting certification in a 6-page order”). A district court is

in the best position to decide whether to certify a judgment for an immediate appeal because

of its familiarity with the claims and parties. See Bolton, 2 N.W.3d at 178. A district

court’s certification decision is therefore entitled to substantial deference. Id. But when a

district court does not explain its reasoning for a certification decision, our evaluation of

that decision is limited to the district court record and informal memoranda from the

parties.

Here, it is not clear whether the district court intended to certify the partial dismissal

order as a final partial judgment by including the “no just reason for delay” language and

directing entry of judgment. And the district court did not explain its reasoning. We

nonetheless consider whether the record otherwise reveals a basis for certification. See

Contractor’s Edge, 863 N.W.2d at 769 (explaining that the district court’s failure to

provide reasons is not necessarily an abuse of discretion because “the record might

otherwise disclose why the certification was appropriate”).

7 The May 6, 2025 judgment did not resolve all the claims against the Fraser parties.

The Fraser parties also assert that the judgment did not fully resolve the claims mentioned

in their motion to dismiss. The remaining claims against the Fraser parties and Puls are

closely related to the claims that were dismissed and arise out of the same set of facts. The

claims all relate to allegations that Fraser therapists worked in tandem with Puls to harm

Quinlan and the minor children by supporting a “false narrative of abuse” by Quinlan.

Dispositive motions regarding the remaining claims are pending in district court. It is not

apparent from the record that certification of a final partial judgment is appropriate under

these circumstances. Without an explanation by the district court of its reasoning and given

the lack of any apparent basis in the record to certify the partial judgment, we conclude

that the district court abused its discretion in certifying the May 6, 2025 judgment as a final

partial judgment. The May 6, 2025 judgment is therefore a nonappealable partial

judgment. See id. at 775 (holding that when the district court abuses its discretion given in

Minn. R. Civ. P. 54.02 to certify a final partial judgment, the partial judgment is not final

and not immediately appealable).

Appeal dismissed.