Carrasco v. T-Mobile USA, Inc.

• Court: District Court, S.D. California
• Decided: April 11, 2025
• Docket: 3:24-cv-02471
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 MARIO CARRASCO, Case No. 24-cv-2471-MMA-KSC

12 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S 13 v. MOTION TO REMAND

14 T-MOBILE USA, INC. et al., [Doc. No. 6] 15 Defendants. 16 17 18 19 Plaintiff Mario Carrasco initiated this employment action against T-Mobile USA, 20 Inc. (“T-Mobile”), Anna Argast, and Does 1 through 50, in the California State Court, 21 Cal. Sup. Ct. Case No. 24CU025147C, asserting various violations of the California 22 Labor Code, Doc. No. 1-4 (“Compl.”). On December 27, 2024, T-Mobile removed the 23 action to this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Doc. No. 1 (“Notice of Removal” or 24 “NOR”). Plaintiff now moves to remand the action back to state court. Doc. No. 6. T- 25 Mobile filed a response in opposition to the motion to remand, to which Plaintiff replied. 26 Doc. Nos. 9, 10. The Court found the matter suitable for determination on the papers and 27 without oral argument pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7.1.d.1. Doc. No. 12. For the 28 reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s motion. 1 I. BACKGROUND 2 Plaintiff was hired by T-Mobile on March 9, 2015, to work at a brick-and-mortar 3 store in Chula Vista. Compl. ¶ 13. During his nearly 10-year employment with T- 4 Mobile, Plaintiff worked at five different stores and in various roles, including as a 5 supervisor, associate manager, and high-volume manager. Id. ¶ 15. 6 On October 7, 2023, Defendant Argast started as Store Manager at Plaintiff’s store 7 location. Id. ¶ 17. In early November, Plaintiff and another associate raised concerns 8 about not being able to take rest breaks to Argast. Id. ¶¶ 18–21. Later in November, 9 Plaintiff informed T-Mobile’s Human Resources (“HR”) that there was an issue with the 10 timekeeping application such that Plaintiff could not record missed breaks. Id. ¶ 22. 11 On January 23, 2024, Argast communicated to Plaintiff that he was taking too long 12 of lunch breaks. Id. ¶ 24. Plaintiff reiterated to Argast that he was unable to take rest 13 breaks and could not record missed breaks in the mobile app. Id. ¶¶ 24–25. Argast 14 responded that Plaintiff was making excuses, and confronted Plaintiff about missing his 15 closing shift assignments from the night before, which was “going on his permanent 16 record.” Id. ¶ 27. 17 On February 2, 2024, Plaintiff reported to a District Manager that he felt he was 18 being targeted by Argast and also raised the issued with the missed breaks. Id. ¶¶ 32–34. 19 On March 1, 2024, Plaintiff received a disciplinary write-up with respect to a sales 20 incident that occurred a year prior, and because Plaintiff had allegedly been taking 21 extended lunches. Id. ¶ 35. Plaintiff alleges Argast only wrote Plaintiff up after he 22 complained. Id. 23 On May 6, 2024, Plaintiff was terminated for breaking company policy. Id. ¶ 37. 24 When Plaintiff inquired further, he was told of a situation that occurred months earlier 25 when he allegedly opened the tills before all customers had left the store. Id. ¶ 38. 26 According to Plaintiff, this is not prohibited in the employee handbook or Code of 27 Conduct, and he did not receive a warning. Id. ¶ 40. He was also accused of failing to 28 lock the door. Id. ¶ 41. 1 As a result, Plaintiff initiated this action in the San Diego County Superior Court 2 on November 26, 2024. See Compl. He asserts the following seven (7) claims: 3 (1) whistleblower retaliation, Cal. Labor Code § 1102.5, against T-Mobile; 4 (2) whistleblower wage & hour retaliation, Cal. Labor Code § 98.6, against T-Mobile; 5 (3) wrongful termination in violation of public policy against T-Mobile; (4) failure to 6 provide rest periods, Cal. Labor Code § 226.7, against both Defendants; (5) failure to 7 provide accurate wage statements, Cal. Labor Code § 226, against T-Mobile; (6) failure 8 to pay wages upon termination, Cal. Labor Code §§ 201–03; and (7) unfair business 9 practices, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200, against both Defendants. 10 T-Mobile was served with the Complaint on November 27, 2024. Doc. No. 1-5. 11 On December 24, T-Mobile filed its Answer, Doc. No. 1-8, and three days later, on 12 December 27, removed the action to federal court, Doc. No. 1. Plaintiff now moves to 13 remand the action to state court. Doc. No. 6. 14 II. LEGAL STANDARD 15 Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. 16 Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). Consequently, district courts are presumed to lack 17 jurisdiction unless the Constitution or a statute expressly provides otherwise. Stock West, 18 Inc. v. Confederated Tribes, 873 F.2d 1221, 1225 (9th Cir. 1989). The party seeking to 19 prove federal jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing it. See, e.g., McNutt v. Gen. 20 Motors Acceptance Corp. of Indiana, 298 U.S. 178, 189 (1936) (providing that “the party 21 who seeks the exercise of jurisdiction in his favor . . . must allege in his pleading the facts 22 essential to show jurisdiction”). Generally, federal subject matter jurisdiction exists due 23 to the presence of a federal question, see 28 U.S.C. § 1331, or complete diversity between 24 the parties, see 28 U.S.C. § 1332. 25 In cases arising out of diversity jurisdiction, such as the present case, district courts 26 have “original jurisdiction of all civil actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the 27 sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is between . . . citizens of 28 different States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1). The Supreme Court has interpreted § 1332 to 1 require “complete diversity of citizenship,” meaning each plaintiff must be diverse from 2 each defendant. Caterpillar Inc. v. Lewis, 519 U.S. 61, 68 (1996). 3 “Except as otherwise expressly provided by Act of Congress,” where a plaintiff 4 files a civil action in state court over which the federal district courts have original 5 jurisdiction, the defendant may remove that case “to the district court of the United States 6 for the district and division embracing the place where such action is pending.” 28 7 U.S.C. § 1441(a). In other words, a defendant may remove to federal court a claim filed 8 in state court that could have initially been brought in federal court. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). 9 However, a civil action otherwise removable solely on the basis of diversity jurisdiction 10 under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) “may not be removed if any of the parties in interest properly 11 joined and served as defendants is a citizen of the State in which such action is brought.” 12 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)(2); see also Martinez v. Omni Hotels Mgmt. Corp., 514 F. Supp. 3d 13 1227, 1232 (S.D. Cal. 2021). “In determining whether a civil action is removable on the 14 basis of the jurisdiction under section 1332(a) of this title, the citizenship of defendants 15 sued under fictitious names shall be disregarded.” 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)(1). 16 Courts strictly construe the removal statute against removal jurisdiction. See 17 GranCare, LLC v. Thrower, 889 F.3d 543, 550 (9th Cir. 2018) (citing Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 18 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992)). Further, “[t]he presumption against removal means 19 that ‘the defendant always has the burden of establishing that removal is proper.’” 20 Moore-Thomas v. Alaska Airlines, Inc., 553 F.3d 1241, 1244 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting 21 Gaus, 980 F.2d at 566). Courts resolve any doubt about the right of removal in favor of 22 remand. GranCare, 889 F.3d at 550. 23 III. DISCUSSION 24 Here, the parties’ dispute centers on whether Defendant Argast was fraudulently 25 joined. See Doc. No. 6-1 at 5–6; Doc. No. 9 at 2. According to the Notice of Removal, 26 Plaintiff served T-Mobile with the Complaint on November 27, 2024. NOR ¶ 3. 27 T-Mobile alleges that, to its knowledge, Defendant Argast was never personally served 28 with the Complaint and therefore, her consent to the removal was not required. Id. ¶ 5. 1 T-Mobile contends that this Court has diversity jurisdiction over this action 2 because the parties are diverse and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. Id. ¶ 7. 3 Namely, T-Mobile explains that it is a citizen of Delaware and Washington, id. ¶ 9, and 4 that Plaintiff is a citizen of California, id. ¶ 8. T-Mobile alleges that Defendant Argast 5 was fraudulently joined and therefore that her citizenship should be disregarded for the 6 purpose of determining diversity jurisdiction. Id. ¶ 13. Plaintiff disagrees and contends 7 that he has properly alleged that Defendant Argast is a managing agent and therefore can 8 be held liable under the California Labor Code. Doc. No. 6-1 at 10–11. Defendant 9 Argast is a citizen and resident of California. Id. ¶ 13; Compl. ¶ 4. It is therefore 10 seemingly undisputed that if her citizenship is considered, there is not complete diversity. 11 “In determining whether there is complete diversity, district courts may disregard 12 the citizenship of a non-diverse defendant who has been fraudulently joined.” GranCare, 13 889 F.3d at 548 (citing Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co. v. Cockrell, 232 U.S. 146, 152 14 (1914)). However, courts apply both a “strong presumption against removal 15 jurisdiction,” Gaus, 980 F.2d at 566, and a “general presumption against fraudulent 16 joinder,” Hamilton Materials, Inc. v. Dow Chem. Corp., 494 F.3d 1203, 1206 (9th Cir. 17 2007) (citation omitted). Accordingly, “[a] defendant invoking federal court diversity 18 jurisdiction on the basis of fraudulent joinder bears a ‘heavy burden’” of proving 19 fraudulent joinder by “clear and convincing evidence.” GranCare, 889 F.3d at 548; see 20 also Hamilton Materials, 494 F.3d at 1206 (citing Pampillonia v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 138 21 F.3d 459, 461 (2d Cir. 1998)). 22 A defendant may establish fraudulent joinder through: “(1) actual fraud in the 23 pleading of jurisdictional facts, or (2) inability of the plaintiff to establish a cause of 24 action against the non-diverse party in state court.” Hunter v. Philip Morris USA, 582 25 F.3d 1039, 1044 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Smallwood v. Ill. Cent. R. Co., 385 F.3d 568, 26 573 (5th Cir. 2004)). Under the second method, “if there is a possibility that a state court 27 would find that the complaint states a cause of action against any of the resident 28 defendants, the federal court must find that the joinder was proper and remand the case to 1 the state court.” Hunter, 582 F.3d at 1046 (quoting Tillman v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco, 2 340 F.3d 1277, 1279 (11th Cir. 2003)); see also GranCare, 889 F.3d at 549 (“A claim 3 against a defendant may fail under Rule 12(b)(6), but that defendant has not necessarily 4 been fraudulently joined.”). 5 The Court notes at the outset that T-Mobile has submitted no evidence in support 6 of its opposition to Plaintiff’s motion to remand. See Doc. No. 9. But considering the 7 entire record, including the allegations in the Complaint and Notice of Removal, as well 8 as the exhibits attached to T-Mobile’s Notice of Removal, the Court finds that T-Mobile 9 has not met its heavy burden of demonstrating that Argast was fraudulently joined. 10 Plaintiff asserts Claims 4 and 7 against Argast, for failure to provide rest periods in 11 violation of California Labor Code § 226.7 and violation of California’s Unfair 12 Competition Law, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200 et seq., respectively. See Compl. at 13 13, 17. The California Labor Code provides that “[a]ny employer or other person acting 14 on behalf of an employer” may be held liable for Labor Code violations. Cal. Labor 15 Code § 558.1(a). Section 558.1 further defines “other person acting on behalf of an 16 employer” as someone who “is an owner, director, officer, or managing agent of the 17 employer.” Cal. Labor Code § 558.1(b). The California Supreme Court has held that a 18 “managing agent” includes “supervisors who have broad discretionary powers and 19 exercise substantial discretionary authority in the corporation.” White v. Ultramar, Inc., 20 88 Cal. Rptr. 2d 19, 29 (Cal. 1999) (discussing “managing agent” as defined by 21 California Civil Code § 3294(b)); see also Cal. Labor Code § 558.1(b) (providing that 22 “‘managing agent’ has the same meaning as in” California Civil Code § 3294(b)). 23 However, it excludes “supervisors who have no discretionary authority over decisions 24 that ultimately determine corporate policy.” Id. 25 According to the Complaint, beginning October 7, 2023, Argast was a Store 26 Manager at the T-Mobile location where Plaintiff worked. Compl. ¶ 17. Plaintiff alleges 27 that Argast was responsible for assigning work schedules, including meal and rest 28 periods. Id. ¶ 21. When Plaintiff complained to HR about missing breaks and issues 1 with T-Mobile’s timekeeping application, HR told Plaintiff to work it out with Argast, id. 2 ¶ 22, who did not assist him with these issues and instead merely told him to manage his 3 time better, id. ¶ 26. And when Plaintiff began taking his rest breaks immediately after 4 his lunch breaks, Argast told Plaintiff that his breaks were too long. Id. ¶ 24. According 5 to Plaintiff, Argast then engaged in a pattern of fabricating issues so she could discipline 6 Plaintiff, such as for failure to complete his closing shift tasks, id. ¶¶ 26–27, taking short 7 lunch breaks, id. ¶ 29, and accepting trade-ins with cracked back glass, id. ¶ 31. Plaintiff 8 complained to his District Manager that he felt Argast was targeting him and being 9 dishonest, id. ¶ 32, and he was told again to work it out with Argast, id. ¶ 34. According 10 to Plaintiff, Argast is personally responsible for the rest period violations as she failed to 11 schedule sufficient personnel to afford Plaintiff with adequate opportunities to take rest 12 breaks and for reprimanding and disciplining Plaintiff for taking rest breaks when he did. 13 Id. ¶ 84. 14 T-Mobile contends that these allegations are insufficient to state a claim against 15 Argast as a managing agent. NOR ¶¶ 17, 21. Plaintiff argues that Argast qualifies as a 16 managing agent under the Labor Code based upon her broad discretionary authority and 17 substantial independent control over store operations, including hiring, scheduling, 18 training, marketing, team leadership, coaching, developing, and overseeing of employees, 19 and, at her discretion, discipline and terminations. Doc. No. 6-1 at 8. Argast herself 20 concedes that she maintains these responsibilities as Retail Store Manager. Doc. No. 1-2 21 (“Argast Decl.”) ¶ 3. However, Argast explains that her discretion regarding discipline 22 and termination is not unlimited, id. ¶ 4, and she explains that she has no authority or 23 discretion to determine corporate policy, including anti-retaliation and wage-and-hour 24 policies, id. ¶ 6. 25 Whether Argast has limited authority regarding discipline and termination is not 26 dispositive here because she currently faces two claims stemming from Plaintiff’s 27 allegations that she was personally involved in denying Plaintiff his rest periods in 28 violation of the Labor Code, and T-Mobile offers no evidence that her authority in this 1 respect (i.e., scheduling, managing employees’ breaks, day-to-day operations) was not 2 unfettered. Moreover, Argast’s belief that she has no authority over corporate policy is 3 conclusory and similarly not dispositive here. Abdelmalak v. ReOpen Diagnostics, LLC, 4 No. 8:24-cv-01365-FWS-JC, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 165396, at *13 (C.D. Cal. Sep. 13, 5 2024) (“Indeed, courts regularly reject [conclusory] declarations as insufficient to carry a 6 defendant’s burden to show fraudulent joinder in the Section 558.1 context.”). Accepting 7 that Argast does not determine T-Mobile’s written, corporate wage-and-hour policies 8 does not preclude a finding that she has sufficient “authority that results in the ad hoc 9 formulation of policy.” King v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 266 Cal. Rptr. 3d 520, 557 (Cal. 10 Ct. App. 2020). 11 Determining whether an individual is a managing agent “is a fact-intensive inquiry 12 that does not rely on corporate labels.” Gonzalez v. Sheraton Operating Corp., No. CV 13 20-8785 DSF (AGRx), 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 225384, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 1, 2020); 14 see, e.g., Garcia v. Keefe Commissary Network, LLC, No. EDCV 20-695 JGB (SHKx), 15 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 106030, at *7 (C.D. Cal. June 16, 2020); Abdelmalak, 2024 U.S. 16 Dist. LEXIS 165396, at *18. Here, Argast was Plaintiff’s supervisor, and she is alleged 17 to have directly participated in the events that Plaintiff contends violated the California 18 Labor Code’s meal and rest period requirements. A California court could find that 19 Argast had broad discretion over scheduling shifts as well as meal and rest breaks, and 20 that ensuring compliance with state law requirements for meal and rest periods at the 21 storefront level is a corporate policy over which she had sufficient discretion and 22 authority. T-Mobile’s legal arguments to the contrary ignore what appears to be an 23 emerging consensus among district courts in this Circuit finding that remand is 24 appropriate on sufficiently analogous facts and records. See Guzman v. Peri & Sons 25 Farms of Cal., LLC, No. 1:21-cv-00348-JLT-SKO, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 230515, at 26 *19 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 22, 2022) (rejecting fraudulent joinder argument and remanding case 27 where the defendant was packing shed manager and was alleged to have “personally 28 directed employees to record their hours ins ways that violated California’s labor laws”); 1 see also Kendrick v. Mindlance Inc., No. CV 23-9037-KK-ASx, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2 29711, at *12 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 21, 2024) (rejecting fraudulent joinder argument and 3 remanding case where the defendant was a Senior Director of Program Management and 4 the plaintiff’s supervisor and was alleged to have been directly involved in the 5 violations); Dole v. Verisk Analytics, Inc., No. 22-cv-06625-JD, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6 66890, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 17, 2023) (rejecting fraudulent joinder argument and 7 remanding case where the defendant was the plaintiff’s manager and allegedly directed 8 the plaintiff to falsify her time sheets and was otherwise alleged to have directly 9 participated in the violations); Dopp v. NOW Optics, Ltd. Liab. Co., No. 22-CV-964- 10 CAB-RBB, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 150698, at *10 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 22, 2022) (rejecting 11 fraudulent joinder argument and remanding case where the defendant was District 12 Manager and was alleged to have authority over eight stores, including the budgeting and 13 staffing); Abdelmalak, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 165396, at *18 (rejecting fraudulent 14 joinder argument and remanding case where the defendants were human resources 15 representatives for the plaintiff’s employer and were alleged to have directly participated 16 in the violations); Jones v. Wyndham Vacation Ownership, Inc., No. 21-cv-02061-DMR, 17 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 138919, at *11 (N.D. Cal. July 26, 2021) (rejecting fraudulent 18 joinder argument and remanding case where the defendant was Vice President of 19 corporation and the plaintiff’s supervisor and was alleged to have personal involvement 20 with determining the plaintiff’s schedule and wages); Gonzalez, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21 225384, at *5 (rejecting fraudulent joinder argument and remanding case where the 22 defendant was Executive Chef at the hotel where the plaintiff worked and the plaintiff’s 23 supervisor). 24 Therefore, because the Court cannot say on this record that Plaintiff could not 25 possibly state a claim against Argast, the Court finds that T-Mobile fails to demonstrate 26 by clear and convincing evidence that Argast was fraudulently joined such that her 27 citizenship should be disregarded for the purpose of determining diversity jurisdiction. 28 Considering Argast’s California citizenship, there is not complete diversity. 1 || Consequently, the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this case and it must be 2 || remanded. 3 IV. CONCLUSION 4 Based upon the foregoing, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff's motion to remand. The 5 || Court DIRECTS the Clerk’s of Court to return this action to the San Diego County 6 || Superior Court forthwith and close this case. 7 IT IS SO ORDERED. 8 ||Dated: April 11, 2025 9 Wthi / hphlr 10 HON. MICHAEL M. ANELLO 11 United States District Judge 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28