Carpenter v. Yonkers Middle High School

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedApril 15, 2024
Docket1:24-cv-00474
StatusUnknown

This text of Carpenter v. Yonkers Middle High School (Carpenter v. Yonkers Middle High School) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Carpenter v. Yonkers Middle High School, (S.D.N.Y. 2024).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK KENSEENER CARPENTER, Plaintiff, -against- 24-CV-0474 (LTS) YONKERS MIDDLE HIGH SCHOOL (DR. JENKINS); CPS DEPARTMENT OF CHILD ORDER TO AMEND PROTECTIVE SERVICES; YONKERS POLICE DEPARTMENT, Defendants. LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, Chief United States District Judge: Plaintiff, who is appearing pro se, brings this action alleging that Defendants have violated her rights. Named as Defendants are Yonkers Middle School, Assistant Principal Dr. Jenkins, the Westchester County Department of Child Protective Services (“CPS”), and the Yonkers Police Department. The Court construes the complaint as asserting federal constitutional claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. By order dated January 26, 2024, the Court granted Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), that is, without prepayment of fees. For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants Plaintiff 60 days’ leave to file an amended complaint. STANDARD OF REVIEW The Court must dismiss an IFP complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998). The Court must also dismiss a complaint when the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction of the claims raised. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). But the “special solicitude” in pro se cases, id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits –

to state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. Rule 8 requires a complaint to include enough facts to state a claim for relief “that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible if the plaintiff pleads enough factual detail to allow the Court to draw the inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. In reviewing the complaint, the Court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). But it does not have to accept as true “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of

action,” which are essentially just legal conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the Court must determine whether those facts make it plausible – not merely possible – that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id. BACKGROUND Plaintiff brings her claims using the court’s general complaint form. She does not specify a jurisdictional basis for her claims, but in response to the question asking which of her federal constitutional or federal statutory rights were violated, Plaintiff writes, “Illegal Profiling.” (ECF 1, at 2.) The following allegations are taken from the complaint. In November 2023, Plaintiff’s relative informed her that Plaintiff’s son’s school was trying to contact her and that the “next call unanswered by [Plaintiff]” would result in a call to CPS. (Id. at 5.) Plaintiff contacted Defendant Dr. Jenkins, who informed Plaintiff about “behavior [her] son had exhibited the week prior.” (Id.) Less than two hours after that conversation, “CPS was knocking at [Plaintiff’s] door.” (Id.) The CPS worker got Plaintiff to sign “preventive services documentation,” and Plaintiff was presented with a report “about [her] son’s behavior and nothing of any abuse or neglect.” (Id.) Ms. Daniels, a CPS worker, came to Plaintiff’s home later in December and told her that the case

would be closed as “unfounded.” (Id. at 5-6.) On January 5, 2024, Plaintiff’s son left home and did not return. On January 10, 2024, a missing persons report was filed with the Yonkers Police Department. Plaintiff went to her son’s school in order to get him “the proper treatment that he needed.” (Id. at 6.) Plaintiff called Gloria Daniels at CPS and learned that her “case was still open” even though CPS has “not established any wrongdoing on [her] behalf.” (Id.) She alleges that “[t]his alone has cost me los[s] of financial income because I have not been able to get any ABA cases an[d] I didn’t understand why until this time.” (Id.) Plaintiff states that her case has now been transferred to a new caseworker, who “is

stating that I now have a case against me when I called to the CPS hotline to report my son not going to school.” (Id.) Plaintiff asserts that the open CPS case “is illegal profiling with a lack of judgment for [her] wellbeing which has greatly affected [her] finan[ial] resources.” (Id.) Plaintiff asks for her CPS “[c]ase to be unfounded and sealed” and for $500,000 in damages. (Id.) DISCUSSION The Court construes the complaint as asserting claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of Plaintiff’s right to procedural due process. To state a claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff must allege both that: (1) a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) the right was violated by a person acting under the color of state law, or a “state actor.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48-49 (1988). A. Claims Against Municipal Agencies Plaintiff’s claims against the Yonkers Police Department, Yonkers Middle High School, and Westchester County Child Protective Services must be dismissed because municipal

agencies or departments do not have the capacity to be sued under New York law. See Omnipoint Commc’ns, Inc. v. Town of LaGrange, 658 F. Supp. 2d 539, 552 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (“In New York, agencies of a municipality are not suable entities.”); Hall v. City of White Plains, 185 F. Supp. 2d 293, 303 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (“Under New York law, departments which are merely administrative arms of a municipality do not have a legal identity separate and apart from the municipality and cannot sue or be sued.”); see also N.Y. Gen. Mun. Law § 2 (“The term ‘municipal corporation,’ as used in this chapter, includes only a county, town, city and village.”). In light of Plaintiff’s pro se status and likely intention to assert claims against the City of Yonkers and Westchester County, the Court construes the complaint as asserting claims against those municipalities. When a plaintiff sues a municipality under Section 1983, however, it is not

enough for the plaintiff to allege that one of the municipality’s employees or agents engaged in some wrongdoing. The plaintiff must show that the municipality itself caused the violation of the plaintiff’s rights. See Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S.

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Carpenter v. Yonkers Middle High School, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/carpenter-v-yonkers-middle-high-school-nysd-2024.