Carolyn Mullen v. United States

D.C. Circuit

Carolyn Mullen v. United States

263 F.2d 275

CourtCourt of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit

DecidedJanuary 29, 1959

Docket14663

StatusPublished

Cited by46 cases

This text of 263 F.2d 275 (Carolyn Mullen v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Carolyn Mullen v. United States, 263 F.2d 275 (D.C. Cir. 1959).

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EDGERTON, Circuit Judge.

This appeal is from a conviction under D.C.Code (1951) § 22-901, which makes it a crime to “torture, cruelly beat, abuse, or otherwise wilfully maltreat” a child. Appellant’s young Children were found chained in her house while she was absent. There was evidence, that she had chained them, and ajlso that she had done so for their “protection”. The District Court rightly charged the jury as a matter of law that appellant did not “torture” the children. But j with regard to the statutory words “hbuse” and “wilfully maltreat”, the court charged the jury to decide whether appelant “was acting reasonably under the circumstances or whether it was unreasonable and dangerous.” ¡

It was certainly unreasonable, and probably dangerous, to chain the children. But if appellant chained them for their own protection, she did not “abuse” or “wilfully maltreat” them within the meaning of the Code. That language calls for something worse than good intentions coupled with bad judgment. As we recently held in construing less explicit statutory language, “the common law concept of crime as a combination of an evil ] state of mind with the doing of an evil act applies to this felony.” Levine v. United States, 104 U.S.App.D.C. -, 261 F.2d 747; Morisette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 72 S.Ct. 240, 96 L.Ed. 288. The court’s charge omitted the] requirement of an evil state of mind and was therefore erroneous.

The jury mifeht well have acquitted appellant but i for the erroneous charge. We therefore reverse under F.R.Crim.P. Rule 52(b), 18 U.S.C. Cf. Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 107, 65 S. Ct. 1031, 89 L.Ed. 1495. We do not consider other alleged errors.

Appellant is a woman of limited understanding. She was.indicted more than two years ago and imprisoned more than one year. We commend these facts to the consideration of the United States Attorney.

Reversed.

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EDGERTON, Circuit Judge.

This appeal is from a conviction under D.C.Code (1951) § 22-901, which makes it a crime to “torture, cruelly beat, abuse, or otherwise wilfully maltreat” a child. Appellant’s young Children were found chained in her house while she was absent. There was evidence, that she had chained them, and ajlso that she had done so for their “protection”. The District Court rightly charged the jury as a matter of law that appellant did not “torture” the children. But j with regard to the statutory words “hbuse” and “wilfully maltreat”, the court charged the jury to decide whether appelant “was acting reasonably under the circumstances or whether it was unreasonable and dangerous.” ¡

It was certainly unreasonable, and probably dangerous, to chain the children. But if appellant chained them for their own protection, she did not “abuse” or “wilfully maltreat” them within the meaning of the Code. That language calls for something worse than good intentions coupled with bad judgment. As we recently held in construing less explicit statutory language, “the common law concept of crime as a combination of an evil ] state of mind with the doing of an evil act applies to this felony.” Levine v. United States, 104 U.S.App.D.C. -, 261 F.2d 747; Morisette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 72 S.Ct. 240, 96 L.Ed. 288. The court’s charge omitted the] requirement of an evil state of mind and was therefore erroneous.

The jury mifeht well have acquitted appellant but i for the erroneous charge. We therefore reverse under F.R.Crim.P. Rule 52(b), 18 U.S.C. Cf. Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 107, 65 S. Ct. 1031, 89 L.Ed. 1495. We do not consider other alleged errors.

Appellant is a woman of limited understanding. She was.indicted more than two years ago and imprisoned more than one year. We commend these facts to the consideration of the United States Attorney.

Reversed.

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