Carbajal v. Hayes Management Services, Inc.

CourtDistrict Court, D. Idaho
DecidedAugust 21, 2025
Docket4:19-cv-00287
StatusUnknown

This text of Carbajal v. Hayes Management Services, Inc. (Carbajal v. Hayes Management Services, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Idaho primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Carbajal v. Hayes Management Services, Inc., (D. Idaho 2025).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF IDAHO

MARIA ANGELICA “ANGIE” CARBAJAL, Case No. 4:19-cv-00287-BLW

MEMORANDUM DECISION Plaintiff, AND ORDER

v.

HAYES MANAGEMENT SERVICES, INC; HAYES TAX & ACCOUNTING SERVICES, INC.; and CHRIS HAYES,

Defendants.

HAYES MANAGEMENT SERVICE, INC,

Counter-claimant,

MARIA ANGELICA “ANGIE” CARBAJAL,

Counter-defendant.

INTRODUCTION Before the Court is Maria Angelica “Angie” Carbajal’s unopposed motion for attorneys’ fees and costs on appeal. Dkt. 337. For the reasons set forth below, the Court will grant the motion.

BACKGROUND In December 2023, a jury returned a verdict in favor of Ms. Carbajal on her claims under Title VII and the Idaho Human Rights Act. Judgment, Dkt. 291. After judgment was entered, the defendants appealed, claiming the Court erred on

several issues. Earlier this year, the Ninth Circuit issued its decision affirming the district court. Dkt. 334. Following this decision, Ms. Carbajal filed a motion in the Ninth Circuit

requesting to transfer consideration of her reasonable attorneys’ fees and non- statutory expenses on appeal to this Court. To comply with the requisite deadlines, Ms. Carbajal filed her motion for fees before the Ninth Circuit ruled on her motion to transfer consideration. Shortly thereafter, the Ninth Circuit granted Ms.

Carbajal’s motion to transfer consideration and denied her motion for fees as moot. She now moves this Court for $37,673.00 in fees on appeal. The defendants did not file any response to the motion, so the Court will treat the motion as unopposed.

LEGAL STANDARD When a prevailing party is entitled to the award of attorneys’ fees in the district court, it is also entitled to an award of attorneys’ fees on appeal. See Latta v. Otter, No. 1:13-cv-482-CWD, 2015 WL 4623817, at * 4–5 (D. Idaho Aug. 3, 2015). A plaintiff who prevails under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act may recover

a reasonable attorney fee award. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k); see also Christiansburg Garment Co. v. E.E.O.C., 434 U.S. 412 (1978). Under Title VII, to “prevail” means to succeed “on any significant issue in litigation which achieves some of the

benefit the parties sought in bringing suit.” Thorne v. City of El Segundo, 802 F.2d 1131, 1140 (9th Cir. 1986) (citing Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983)). The same is true under Idaho law. Idaho Transp. Dep’t v. Ascorp, Inc., 357 P.3d 863, 867 (Idaho 2015).

Once a court decides to award attorney fees, it must calculate a reasonable fee award. “The starting point for determining a reasonable fee is the ‘lodestar’ figure, which is the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by a

reasonable hourly rate.” Gates v. Deukmejian, 987 F.2d 1392, 1397 (9th Cir. 1992); see also Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433. In determining a reasonable hourly rate, the Court considers the “experience, skill and reputation of the attorney requesting fees,” Trevino v. Gates, 99 F.3d 911, 924 (9th Cir. 1996), as well as “the prevailing

market rates in the relevant community,” Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 895 (1984). And, in determining the number of hours billed, the Court must exclude hours that are duplicative or excessive. Once the lodestar figure is calculated, the Court must ask “whether it is necessary to adjust the presumptively reasonable lodestar figure on the basis of the

Kerr factors that are not already subsumed in the initial lodestar calculation.” Morales v. City of San Rafael, 96 F.3d 359, 363–64 (9th Cir. 1996) (footnote omitted).1 Ultimately, though, there is a “strong presumption that the lodestar

figure represents a reasonable fee,” and that figure should only be adjusted “in rare instances.” Id. at 363 n. 8. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). ANALYSIS A. Entitlement to Fees Ms. Carbajal is entitled to her fees on appeal. The Court previously

determined that Ms. Carbajal was “indisputably the prevailing party in this lawsuit.” Dkt. 322 at 11. The defendants appealed several issues and the Ninth Circuit affirmed this Court on each issue. Mandate, Dkt. 336. Accordingly, Ms.

Carbajal is the prevailing party on appeal. B. The Lodestar Method Having determined that Ms. Carbajal is entitled to a reasonable fee award, the Court must now calculate the award by multiplying the attorneys’ hourly rates

1 The “Kerr factors” are the factors identified by the Ninth Circuit in Kerr v. Screen Extras Guild, Inc., 526 F.2d 67, 70 (9th Cir. 1975). by the number of hours each attorney billed. The result—the “lodestar amount”— constitutes a presumptively reasonable fee award. Gonzalez v. City of Maywood,

729 F.3d 1196, 1202 (9th Cir. 2013). 1. Hourly Rates First, the Court must determine reasonable hourly rates for the attorneys whose fees are sought. Two attorneys from the firm of Casperson Ulrich Dustin

PLLC represented Carbajal on appeal, DeAnne Casperson and Amanda Ulrich. Their current hourly rates are $360 and $310, respectively. Both rates are reasonable for attorneys of their experience, skill, and reputation in the community.

See Dkts. 284, 332. (finding the same rates to be reasonable); see generally Ingram v. Oroudjian, 647 F.3d 925, 928 (9th Cir. 2011). 2. Number of Hours Expended Next, the Court must determine the number of hours reasonably expended

by Ms. Carbajal’s attorneys. As the party seeking a fee award, Ms. Carbajal bears the burden of showing that her attorneys billed a reasonable number of hours. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 431; Chalmers v. City of Los Angeles, 796 F.2d 1205, 1210 (9th Cir. 1986), as amended by 80 F.2d 1373 (9th Cir. 1987). “By and large,”

however, “the court should defer to the winning lawyer’s professional judgment as to how much time he was required to spend on the case; after all, he won and might not have, had he been more of a slacker.” Moreno v. City of Sacramento, 534 F.3d 1106, 1112 (9th Cir. 2008).

Ms. Carbajal seeks fees for a total of 114.3 hours expended between both the underlying action and the appeal from March 16, 2025 to March 31, 2025. This includes 13.6 hours obtaining and reviewing records, 73.1 hours working on

Ms. Carbajal’s response brief, 27.2 hours preparing for oral argument, and 0.4 hours on other tasks. Having reviewed the plaintiffs’ time entries, the Court finds the time expended reasonable. 3. The Lodestar Calculation

The lodestar amount is $37,673.00—$16,128.00 for Ms. Casperson’s 44.8 hours of work at $360 per hour and $21,545.00 for Ms. Ulrich’s 69.5 hours of work at $310 per hour.

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Related

Hensley v. Eckerhart
461 U.S. 424 (Supreme Court, 1983)
Blum v. Stenson
465 U.S. 886 (Supreme Court, 1984)
Ingram v. Oroudjian
647 F.3d 925 (Ninth Circuit, 2011)
Martin Gonzalez, Sr. v. City of Maywood
729 F.3d 1196 (Ninth Circuit, 2013)
Moreno v. City of Sacramento
534 F.3d 1106 (Ninth Circuit, 2008)
Idaho Transportation Department v. Ascorp, Inc.
357 P.3d 863 (Idaho Supreme Court, 2015)
Trevino v. Gates
99 F.3d 911 (Ninth Circuit, 1996)
Kerr v. Screen Extras Guild, Inc.
526 F.2d 67 (Ninth Circuit, 1975)
Thorne v. City of El Segundo
802 F.2d 1131 (Ninth Circuit, 1986)
Gates v. Deukmejian
987 F.2d 1392 (Ninth Circuit, 1992)

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