Caranci, E. v. Monsanto Company

2025 Pa. Super. 101

• Court: Superior Court of Pennsylvania
• Decided: May 8, 2025
• Docket: 993 EDA 2024
• Status: Published

Opinion

J-A06036-25 2025 PA Super 101

ERNEST CARANCI AND CARMELA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF CARANCI : PENNSYLVANIA : : v. : : : MONSANTO COMPANY, BAYER AG, : S&H HARDWARD AND SUPPLY : No. 993 EDA 2024 COMPANY, PENN HARDWARD, INC., : PENN HARDWARE TWO, INC. : : : APPEAL OF: MONSANTO COMPANY :

Appeal from the Judgment Entered March 11, 2024 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Civil Division at No(s): 210602213

BEFORE: LAZARUS, P.J., PANELLA, P.J.E., and DUBOW, J.

OPINION BY DUBOW, J.: FILED MAY 8, 2025

Appellant, Monsanto Company (“Monsanto”), appeals from the

$177,285,102.74 judgment entered in the Philadelphia County Court of

Common Pleas on March 11, 2024, following a jury verdict in favor of

Appellees, Ernest Caranci (“Mr. Caranci”) and Carmela Caranci (collectively,

“Appellees”), in this products liability action. Monsanto challenges the trial

court’s denial of its motions for a new trial or judgment notwithstanding the

verdict based on Monsanto’s allegations of improper communications between

court staff and jurors, erroneous evidentiary rulings, and federal preemption,

and claims that the jury’s damages award was excessive. After careful review,

we affirm. J-A06036-25

The relevant facts and procedural history are as follows. In June 2021,

Appellees sued Monsanto alleging that Mr. Caranci’s years’-long use of

Monsanto’s product Roundup and its ingredient glyphosate caused him to

develop non-Hodgkin’s lymphoma (“NHL”). Appellees’ complaint alleged

claims of, inter alia, Negligence, Strict Liability Defective Design and Strict

Liability Failure to Warn.

The parties filed certain pre-trial motions and made certain objections

at trial which dispositions are germane to this appeal, including the trial court’s

rejection of Monsanto’s assertion that Appellees’ Failure to Warn claim was

preempted by the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act

(“FIFRA”), 7 U.S.C. § 136, et seq, and denial of Monsanto’s request to exclude

evidence and argument relating to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals’ decision

in Natural Resources Defense Council v. U.S. Environmental Protection

Agency, 38 F.4th 34 (9th Cir. 2022) (“NRDC”).

The parties proceeded to a jury trial after which, on October 27, 2023,

the jury found in Appellees’ favor on their negligence claim. With respect to

Appellees’ Failure to Warn claim, the jury found that Roundup was defective

because it lacked proper warnings and instructions for safe use. 1 The jury

awarded Appellees $25 million in compensatory damages and $150 million in

punitive damages after finding that Monsanto’s conduct was malicious,

wanton, willful, or oppressive, or showed reckless indifference to others. ____________________________________________

1 The jury found in Monsanto’s favor on the “consumer expectations” aspect

of strict liability.

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After the jury had rendered its verdict and announced its damages

award, Monsanto contacted the individual members of the jury, one of whom

(“Juror 9”) agreed to have a recorded conversation with Monsanto’s counsel.

During the recorded conversation, Juror 9 alleged that, as the jury was

deliberating, the foreperson contacted a member of the court staff for

clarification as to whether “ten yes votes or ten no votes were required” to

end deliberations.” While the jury waited for the court staff member to consult

with the judge, it continued to deliberate. Juror 9 further alleged that,

eventually the court staff member told the jury it needed “to reach ten ‘no’

votes or ten ‘yes’ votes” and that “if [it] didn’t come to ten for one side today,

[it] would be called back on Monday and that if [it] didn’t reach ten votes

either way on Monday, [it] would have to return on Tuesday and if [it] still

had not reached ten votes on Tuesday that the judge would call a mistrial on

Wednesday.” Upon hearing this, Juror 9 alleged that one juror threatened not

to return. The votes then shifted, and the jury returned a verdict that

afternoon. Subsequent to his recorded conversation with Monsanto’s counsel,

Juror 9 prepared a notarized written statement recounting these alleged

communications and his perception of the jury deliberations after the

communications and provided the statement to the court.

Monsanto then filed a motion for recusal, a post-trial motion for JNOV

or a new trial, or an evidentiary hearing concerning the alleged conversation

between the jury and the court staff member, and other post-trial motions for

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JNOV or a new trial. The court denied each of these motions, the prothonotary

entered judgment against Monsanto, and this appeal followed.

Monsanto raises the following six issues on appeal:

1. Is a new trial or an evidentiary hearing required based on a juror’s sworn statement describing improper and prejudicial ex parte communications with the jury during its deliberations?

2. Is a new trial required because the trial court made erroneous and prejudicial evidentiary rulings based on double standards and other improper grounds, resulting in a one-sided trial?

3. Is JNOV required because [Mr. Caranci’s] claims are preempted?

4. Is JNOV required because [Appellees] failed to introduce sufficient evidence of specific causation?

5. Is JNOV, a new trial, or remittitur required because the punitive damages award was unwarranted, manifestly excessive, and improperly cumulative?

6. Is JNOV, a new trial, or remittitur required because the compensatory damages award was manifestly excessive and punitive?

Monsanto’s Brief at 6.

In each of Monsanto’s issues, it challenges the trial court’s denial of its

post-trial motions for JNOV or a new trial. We review the denial of a request

for JNOV for an error of law that controlled the outcome of the case or an

abuse of discretion. Hutchinson v. Penske Truck Leasing Co., 876 A.2d

978, 984 (Pa. Super. 2005). In this context, an “[a]buse of discretion occurs

if the trial court renders a judgment that is manifestly unreasonable, arbitrary

or capricious; that fails to apply the law; or that is motivated by partiality,

prejudice, bias or ill will.” Id.

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When reviewing the denial of a request for JNOV, the appellate court

examines the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict winner.

Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Wapner, 903 A.2d 565, 569 (Pa. Super. 2006)

(citation omitted). Thus, “the grant of [JNOV] should only be entered in a

clear case[.]” Id. (citation omitted).

There are two bases upon which a movant is entitled to JNOV: “one, the

movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and/or two, the evidence

was such that no two reasonable minds could disagree that the outcome

should have been rendered in favor of the movant.” Rohm and Haas Co. v.

Continental Cas. Co., 781 A.2d 1172, 1176 (Pa. 2001) (citation omitted).

When an appellant challenges a jury’s verdict on this latter basis, we will grant

relief only “when the jury’s verdict is so contrary to the evidence as to shock

one’s sense of justice.” Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. 69th St. Retail Mall, L.P.,

126 A.3d 959, 967 (Pa. Super. 2015) (citation omitted).

Similarly, “[o]ur standard of review when faced with an appeal from the

trial court’s denial of a motion for a new trial is whether the trial court clearly

and palpably committed an error of law that controlled the outcome of the

case or constituted an abuse of discretion.” Blumer v. Ford Motor Co., 20

A.3d 1222, 1226 (Pa. Super. 2011) (citation omitted). “In examining the

evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict winner, to reverse the trial

court, we must conclude that the verdict would change if another trial were

granted.” Id. (citation omitted).

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***

In its first issue, Monsanto contends that the trial court erred in failing

to hold an evidentiary hearing or grant its motion for a new trial because of

the alleged improper communication between the jury and a court staff

member during the jury’s deliberations.

When an ex parte communication between the court and the jury takes

place, a party is entitled to a new trial if the communication unduly influences

the jury’s deliberations. Commonwealth v. Bradley, 459 A.2d 733, 734

(Pa. 1983) (reviewing civil cases and providing a universal standard to address

ex parte communications between juries and courts). In Carter v. U.S. Steel

Corp., 604 A.2d 1010 (Pa. 1992), our Supreme Court provided the following

guidance to determine whether the external communication “unduly

influenced” the jury. The Court held:

In determining the reasonable likelihood of prejudice, the trial judge should consider 1) whether the extraneous influence relates to a central issue in the case or merely involves a collateral issue; 2) whether the extraneous influence provided the jury with information they did not have before them at trial; and 3) whether the extraneous influence was emotional or inflammatory in nature.

Id. at 1016-17.

The Court further explained that the standard for assessing prejudicial

effect is an objective one:

Once the existence of a potentially prejudicial extraneous influence has been established by competent testimony, the trial judge must assess the prejudicial effect of such influence. Because a trial judge is precluded from considering evidence concerning the subjective impact of an extraneous influence on

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any juror, it has been widely recognized that the test for determining the prejudicial effect of an extraneous influence is an objective one. In order to determine whether an extraneous influence is prejudicial, a trial judge must determine how an objective, typical juror would be affected by such an influence.

Id. at 1016 (emphasis added).

At the outset, we note that because the trial court did not hold a hearing

to determine whether the ex parte communication described by Juror 9

occurred, we assume for the sake of argument that the court staff member

told the jury that it needed ten votes for a verdict and would have to return

until it reached a verdict.

Relying on Briskin v. Lerro Elec. Corp., 590 A.2d 362 (Pa. Super.

1991)—a Superior Court decision issued before our Supreme Court decided

Carter, supra—Monsanto claims the trial court erred in not granting a new

trial because there is a reasonable likelihood, that under an objective

standard, the ex parte communication prejudiced Monsanto, Juror 9’s

testimony would be admissible to prove prejudice, and the trial court’s reasons

for disregarding prejudice were erroneous. Monsanto’s Brief at 26-37.

We start by rejecting Monsanto’s argument that we should consider

Juror 9’s perception of the jury deliberations. The Supreme Court in Carter

emphasized that “the rule in Pennsylvania, as well as in a majority of

jurisdictions, is that a juror is incompetent to testify as to what occurred during

deliberations.” Carter, 604 A.2d at 1013 (citing Pittsburgh National Bank

v. Mutual Life. Ins. Co., 425 A.2d 383, 385 (Pa. 1981)). This rule is often

referred to as the “no impeachment rule.” Id. However, in order to

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accommodate the competing policies in this area, courts have recognized a

narrow exception, which permits “post-trial testimony of extraneous

influences which might have [prejudiced] the jury during deliberations.”

Pittsburgh National Bank, 425 A.2d at 386 (citation omitted). Under this

exception, a juror may testify only as to the existence of the outside

influence, but not as to the effect this outside influence may have had

on deliberations. Id. Under no circumstances may jurors testify regarding

their subjective reasoning processes.2

Thus, our analysis of Monsanto’s claim is limited to an objective

consideration of whether the court staff member’s statement about the

number of jurors needed to reach a verdict and the length of time the court

would require the jurors to deliberate before declaring a mistrial unduly

influenced the jurors. Applying the test set forth in Carter to determine

whether the communication unduly influenced the jurors, we find that this

communication did not do so. The statement pertained to court procedure

and did not address any substantive issues. Furthermore, using an objective

standard, we find that the statement regarding the court procedure was not

emotional and could not inflame the jury. We, therefore, conclude that, even

____________________________________________

2 To permit a party unhappy with a verdict to hold a hearing about jury deliberations would require the return of every juror and subject the jurors to direct and cross-examination, a process that would unfairly burden jurors who have already given much time to participate in the trial. We trust that the courts can apply the relevant legal authority and determine objectively whether an outside communication unduly prejudiced the jurors.

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if the court staff member made the statement, it did not unduly influence the

jurors. Monsanto’s claim, thus, fails to garner relief.

In its second issue, Monsanto claims that certain of the trial court’s

evidentiary rulings resulted in a “one-sided” trial. Monsanto’s Brief at 37-53.

Questions of admissibility lie within the trial court’s sound discretion,

and we will not disturb the court’s decision absent a clear abuse of discretion.

Parr v. Ford Motor Co., 109 A.3d 682, 690 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citation

omitted). “[A]n abuse of discretion may not be found merely because an

appellate court might have reached a different conclusion, but requires a

manifest unreasonableness, or partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will, or such

lack of support so as to be clearly erroneous.” Keystone Dedicated

Logistics, LLC v. JGB Enters., Inc., 77 A.3d 1, 11 (Pa. Super. 2013)

(citation omitted).

Monsanto raises four distinct claims of error arising from the trial court’s

evidentiary rulings.3 We address those claims seriatim.

3 In addition to the arguments set forth by Monsanto and discussed infra, Monsanto also supports its various claims that the trial court erred in its evidentiary rulings by highlighting evidentiary rulings made in other Roundup cases by a different Philadelphia County judge subsequent to the trial in this case. That judge’s rulings do not persuade us that the instant trial court— making decisions in the context of this case, with the specific evidence and testimony before it—abused its discretion in its rulings.

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*

First, Monsanto contends that the trial court abused its discretion in

preventing it from relying on the result of studies completed by foreign

organizations that concluded that glyphosate was not carcinogenic while

permitting Appellees to build their case around a “hazard assessment” of

glyphosate prepared by the International Agency for Research on Cancer

(“IARC”), an organization under the umbrella of the World Health Organization

and based in France. Monsanto’s Brief at 38-43.

In support of this claim, Monsanto cites to places in the record where

the trial court precluded its fact witness, Dr. William Reeves, from testifying

about the limitations of the hazard assessment issued by IARC. Id. at 40-42.

Monsanto concludes that because Appellees relied on the IARC report to

support its claim for punitive damages, Monsanto was “entitled to respond by

showing [that] scientists worldwide dismissed IARC’s view.” Id. at 40.

Monsanto further complains that the trial court erred because it permitted

extensive testimony about the one foreign organization that agreed with

Appellees’ position that glyphosate causes cancer but precluded testimony

regarding the foreign organizations that found it to be non-carcinogenic, thus,

creating a “blatant double standard.” Id. at 41. Monsanto contends that the

trial court created an additional “double standard” when it prevented Dr.

Reeves from testifying about the manner in which the EPA reacted to IARC

because “EPA is not here,” yet the court “never applied the same principle to

IARC’s views, which was also ‘not here.’” Id. at 42 (citing N.T., 10/13/23 PM

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Session, at 80).4 Monsanto concludes that the court’s rulings precluded Dr.

Reeves from “challenging a core pillar of [Appellees’] theory” and

“substantially diminish[ed] its ability to present its case.” Id. at 43.

Following our review of the notes of testimony, in particular the

instances in which Monsanto alleges the court precluded Dr. Reeves from

testifying about the inaccuracies of the IARC hazard assessment, we find no

abuse of discretion in the court’s ruling. The notes of testimony reflect

vigorous discussion between the court and Monsanto’s counsel regarding the

nature of Dr. Reeves’s testimony—that is whether Dr. Reeves was appearing

as a fact or an expert witness—and Monsanto’s counsel agreeing that Dr.

Reeves was appearing as a fact witness. See, e.g. N.T. 10/13/23 AM Session,

at 88, 102, 114.

The rulings that Monsanto challenges are those in which Monsanto

attempted to elicit expert testimony from Dr. Reeves, including opinions

regarding the consequences or effects of research conducted by international

regulatory organizations. Because Dr. Reeves was not qualified as an expert

witness and did not prepare an expert report on the consequences or effects

of the international regulatory organizations, the trial court properly precluded

4 Even if the trial court erred in its evidentiary rulings regarding the EPA’s conclusions about glyphosate, the error was harmless because Dr. Reeves testified that the EPA viewed glyphosate as either non-carcinogenic or not likely to be carcinogenic. Monsanto’s Brief at 42 (citing N.T., 10/13/23 PM Session, at 91). This testimony implicitly conveyed EPA’s disagreement with and rejection of IARC’s finding that glyphosate is a carcinogen.

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him from testifying in the capacity of an expert. This claim, thus, warrants no

relief.

Next, Monsanto claims that the court erred in admitting prejudicial

testimony and improperly instructing the jury regarding the ruling of the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals in NRDC, supra.5 Monsanto’s Brief at 43-48.

NRDC was an administrative appeal in which the Natural Resources

Defense Counsel (“NRDC”) challenged the EPA’s 2020 Interim Registration

Review Decision that concluded that “for the most part,” glyphosate does not

cause cancer. NRDC, 38 F.4th at 39. Following its review of the EPA’s analysis

and conclusions, the Ninth Circuit found, inter alia, that, “EPA’s errors in

assessing human-health risk are serious.” Id. at 52. In particular, the Court

found that the EPA did not adequately consider whether glyphosate causes

cancer, and the “EPA’s choice of a hazard descriptor [i.e., that glyphosate “for

the most part” does not cause cancer] is not supported by substantial

evidence.” Id. at 51. The Ninth Circuit, thus, vacated the human-health

portion of the Interim Registration Review Decision and remanded the matter

to EPA for further consideration. Id. at 52.

Monsanto contends that the NRDC holding regarding the EPA Interim

Registration Review Decision pertaining to the link between glyphosate and

cancer is irrelevant to the instant case. In particular, Monsanto argues that ____________________________________________

5 Monsanto was an intervenor in the case filed by the NRDC.

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shortly after the Ninth Circuit decided the case, the EPA reaffirmed its views

that glyphosate does not cause cancer. Monsanto’s Br., at 43-44. Monsanto

further claims that, even if the Ninth Circuit decision were relevant, its

prejudicial impact outweighs its probative value because “[l]ay jurors cannot

be expected to understand nuanced issues of administrative law.” Id. at 44.

Monsanto asserts that the trial court, nevertheless, permitted Appellees to

selectively read parts of the decision to the jury and imply that Monsanto had

“executed a legally binding document admitting to [Appellees’]

characterization of” the decision.6 Id.at 45 (internal quotation marks

omitted).

Monsanto further asserts that the trial court inaccurately stated in open

court that “Monsanto is a defendant in a case and there was a ruling, as I

understand the testimony, that vacated the registration of the [Roundup],

right[?].” Monsanto’s Brief at 45 (citing N.T. 10/16/23 AM Session, at 88).

Monsanto concludes that the trial court compounded its error by not providing

a curative instruction about the inaccuracy until two weeks later when the

court charged the jury.

Our review of the record reveals that the trial court permitted Appellees

to read portions of the Ninth Circuit’s decision when conducting its recross- ____________________________________________

6 The “legally binding document” refers to a stipulation signed by Monsanto

lawyers acknowledging that the EPA’s 2020 Interim Registration Review Decision was vacated. See N.T., 10/13/23 PM Session, at 124, 126. During his recross-examination, Dr. Reeves denied having seen the stipulation. Id. at 126.

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examination of Dr. Reeves. See N.T., 10/16/23 AM Session, at 56-59. On

direct, Dr. Reeves had testified about the EPA’s Interim Registration Review

Decision. Dr. Reeves characterized the Interim Registration Review Decision

as a “well-written document” and testified that it gave Monsanto “more

confidence in the safety profile of glyphosate.” N.T. 10/13/23 PM Session, at

122, 123. Once Monsanto elicited testimony from Dr. Reeves establishing that

Monsanto relied on EPA’s determination that glyphosate “for the most part”

was non-carcinogenic, the court determined that it would not “ignore all of

[Dr. Reeves’s] previous testimony about his knowledge of the EPA and the

significance of the EPA” and, because the jury had “heard testimony on direct

and on cross about the wide range of knowledge and the reliance of Monsanto

on the regulatory process of the EPA,” it would permit Appellees to examine

Dr. Reeves regarding the subsequent history of that determination. N.T.,

10/16/23 AM Session, at 15.

The trial court further explained that Appellees were permitted to cross-

examine Dr. Reeves about the NRDC decision because “Monsanto has put all

this in play with respect to the efficacy, the procedural substance, all of that

Ninth Circuit decision.” Id. at 16.

We agree with the trial court. Since Dr. Reeves testified that Monsanto

relied on the EPA’s 2020 Interim Registration Review Decision’s determination

that glyphosate was “for the most part” non-carcinogenic, the trial court did

not abuse its discretion permitting Appellees to recross-examine him about

the NRDC decision.

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With respect to Monsanto’s claim that the trial court’s curative

instruction regarding the court’s interpretation of the NRDC holding was, in

essence, too little, too late, our review of the notes of testimony indicates that

Monsanto did not place a contemporaneous, specific objection to the court’s

inaccurate statement about the holding of the NRDC decision on the record.

In fact, Monsanto continued to question Dr. Reeves about the decision.

The following occurred during Monsanto’s re-direct examination of Dr.

Reeves:

Monsanto: Who actually withdrew the 2020 interim registration review?

Appellees: Objection.

Court: Are we disputing what the Ninth Circuit opinion said or directed? OR had a finding? Are you asking this witness to give a legal opinion?

Monsanto: No, I am not. I am not. I am asking with the - - I’m asking what his understanding as a Monsanto employee is of what the EPA did.

Court: Do you have a witness from the EPA or a witness who is going to testify on this subject?

Monsanto: Your honor, this goes directly to his work as a Monsanto employee working in regulatory science and what Monsanto did after that opinion came down.

Court: All right. Just so I understand. Monsanto is a defendant in a case and there was a ruling, as I understood the testimony, that vacated the registration of a product, right?

Monsanto: Absolutely not, Your Honor. Absolutely not. It was - - absolutely not. . . . It did not vacate the registration of the product.

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Court: All right. So you’re telling me what this - - you’re telling me what the Ninth Circuit opinion said then, right?

Monsanto: It says that. It actually does say that in black and white, Your Honor.

Court: That sounds like a yes to me.

Monsanto: Absolutely.

Court: This witness is not going to testify as to his understanding of the Ninth Circuit because he already testified that he didn’t read it and didn’t know about it.

NT., 10/16/23 AM Session, at 87-89. Monsanto’s attorney then proceeded to

question Dr. Reeves about his understanding of the NRDC decision.

It is axiomatic that to “preserve an issue for appellate review, a litigant

must place a timely, specific objection on the record. Issues that are not

preserved by specific objection in the lower court are waived.” Jones v. Ott,

191 A.3d 782, 787 (Pa. Super. 2018). In its Brief, Monsanto explained that,

“immediately following [the court’s] mistake, Monsanto tried to correct the

court’s mistaken view[.]” Monsanto’s Brief at 45 n.13 (emphasis added).

Monsanto’s attempt to “correct the court’s mistaken view,” did not, however,

operate as an objection to the court’s statement sufficient to preserve this

allegation of error for our review. Because Monsanto failed to place a timely,

specific objection to the trial court’s statement about the holding of the NRDC

decision on the record, Monsanto has waived any claim of error about the

timing of a curative instruction. Jones, 191 A.3d at 787.

Next, Monsanto claims that the trial court abused its discretion in

permitting Appellees to introduce inappropriate “propensity” evidence in

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violation of Pa.R.E. 404(b). Monsanto’s Brief at 48-50. Monsanto asserts that

the court should have precluded Appellees from introducing evidence that

Monsanto produced—and removed from the market around the same time it

introduced Roundup—the chemicals Agent Orange, PCBs, and DDT because it

was irrelevant and “suggest[s]a propensity to disregard safety.” Id. at 49.

Pa.R.E. 404(b)(1) prohibits admission of evidence of “other . . . wrong[s]

or act[s]” to show a propensity to act in accordance with a certain trait.

Pa.R.E. 404(b)(1). “This evidence may be admissible for another purpose,

such as proving motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge,

identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident.” Id. at 404(b)(2).

Our review of the record, including Monsanto’s motion in limine and the

notes of testimony reveals, that Monsanto did not object to the admission of

this evidence on Rule 404(b) grounds. Rather, Monsanto invoked Rules 401

and 403 as grounds for exclusions of this evidence. Monsanto’s failure to

preserve this specific objection results in its waiver. Jones, 191 A3d at 787.

Last, Monsanto contends that the trial court abused its discretion in

determining that Monsanto failed to establish a foundation for its alternative

theory of causation, i.e., that it was Mr. Caranci’s exposure to benzene 7 that

caused Mr. Caranci’s NHL. Monsanto concludes that this ruling precluded it

7 IARC has labelled benzene a known carcinogen.

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from developing its theory through Appellees’ causation expert witness.

Monsanto’s Brief at 50-52.

By way of background, Dr. Timur Durrani, Appellees’ expert medical

toxicologist, testified that, in calculating Mr. Caranci’s exposure to Roundup,

he used a methodology that involved multiplying the number of instances that

Mr. Caranci used Roundup per year by the hours per instance by the number

of years over which he used it. N.T., 10/18/23 AM Session, at 100. On cross-

examination, Monsanto asked Dr. Durrani to employ the same methodology

to calculate Mr. Caranci’s hypothetical exposure to benzene over his 10-year

career, assuming that he worked five to six days per year, as a painter.

Monsanto did not present its own expert to establish this theory; rather,

it attempted to use Appellees’ expert to establish that it was Mr. Caranci’s

exposure to benzene that caused Mr. Caranci’s cancer. In support, Monsanto

prepared a slide illustrating Mr. Caranci’s hypothetical exposures to benzene,

and using Dr. Durrani’s Roundup-exposure methodology, Monsanto’s

attorneys calculated Mr. Caranci’s total hypothetical benzene exposures.

Appellees objected on the grounds that neither party had presented

evidence of the number of hours, days, or weeks that Mr. Caranci spent

painting with paint containing benzene. Id. at 102-103. The trial court,

however, overruled the objection stating: “I understand. This is a hypothetical

that the jury may consider[,] but also may disregard. So just ask your

question, please. You’re making an assumption, please put it to the witness.”

Id. at 104. When Monsanto’s counsel asked Dr. Durrani to calculate, using

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his glyphosate exposure methodology, how many benzene exposure events

Mr. Caranci had had, Dr. Durrani refused to speculate, explaining, essentially,

that it is not appropriate to use the same methodology to gauge benzene

exposures and glyphosate exposures. Id. at 104-106. Because Dr. Durrani

would not speculate about Mr. Carangi’s hypothetical exposure to benzene,

the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ruling that Monsanto had failed

to lay a foundation that would permit an expert opinion that it was benzene

that caused Mr. Caranci’s NHL.

Additionally, Monsanto’s counsel admitted that he had no expert

testimony to support the theory that using the glyphosate exposure

methodology was the same methodology used to determine benzene

exposure. Rather, it was, simply, Monsanto’s attorneys’ argument that it was

appropriate to do so. Id. at 105. Ultimately, the trial court disallowed this

line of questioning because the benzene exposure calculation was “merely the

calculation from counsel,” and this was misleading or prejudicial and

Monsanto’s attorney had not established the proper foundation for it. Id. at

106-107.

Following our review, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its

discretion in its ruling. Monsanto failed to provide any evidence to support its

position that an expert toxicologist would use or had used the same

methodology to calculate the effect of benzene exposures as it would

glyphosate exposures or that benzene and glyphosate carry the same risk of

cancer. Furthermore, there was nothing in the record to support Monsanto’s

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attorneys’ speculation as to the number of instances of exposure in his time

as a painter. Without such a foundation, the trial court properly sustained

Monsanto’s questioning of Dr. Durrani. Monsanto is, thus, not entitled to relief

on this claim.

In Monsanto’s third issue, it contends that the doctrine of federal

preemption bars Appellees’ Failure to Warn claim. In support, Monsanto relies

on the recent decision of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals in Schaffner v.

Monsanto Corp., 113 F.4th 364 (3rd Cir. 2024), in which that Court,

interpreting Pennsylvania law, found that a Pennsylvania duty to warn claim

“imposes requirements that are different from those imposed under FIFRA,

and [the plaintiff’s claim] is therefore preempted by FIFRA.” Monsanto’s Brief

at 53-54 (quoting Schaffner, 113 F.4th at 371). Monsanto contends that,

based on the Schaffner decision alone, “JNOV is required on all of [Appellees’]

claims.” We reject this contention.

As a prefatory matter, we note that we are “not bound by decisions of

the federal Courts of Appeals [although] we may, and at times, do look to

them for guidance.” Miller v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transp. Auth.,

103 A.3d 1225, 1231 (Pa. 2014) (citation omitted).

Federal preemption is a question of law; our standard of review is, thus,

de novo, and our scope of review plenary. Dooner v. DiDonato, 971 A.2d

1187, 1193 (Pa. 2009). By way of background, this Court has explained the

doctrine of federal preemption as follows:

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The doctrine of federal preemption is founded on the Supremacy Clause. Federal laws are the supreme law of the land; thus, any “state law that conflicts with the federal law is without effect.”

A state law is preempted when: (1) Congress expresses a clear intent to preempt state law; (2) when there is outright or actual conflict between the federal and state law; (3) when compliance with the federal and state law is effectively impossible; (4) where there is an implicit federal barrier to state regulation; (5) where Congress has occupied the entire field of regulation; [or] (6) where state law “stands as an obstacle” to the objectives of Congress. The key question is whether Congress intended to preempt state law. Congressional intent may be express or implied:

Congress’ intent may be explicitly stated in the statute’s language or implicitly contained in its structure and purpose[.] In the absence of an express congressional command, state law is preempted if that law actually conflicts with federal law or if federal law so thoroughly occupies a legislative field as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it.

Absent express preemption, courts are not to infer preemption lightly, particularly in areas traditionally of core concern to the states such as tort law. This is because the preemption doctrine presumes that police powers historically left to the states are not supplanted by federal law.

Coffey v. Minwax Co. Inc., 764 A.2d 616, 619 (Pa. Super. 2000) (quoting

Romah v. Hygenic Sanitation Company, 705 A.2d 841 (Pa. Super. 1998)

(internal quotation marks and ellipses omitted)).

FIFRA contains an express preemption provision at Section 136v(b),

which provides that a “[s]tate shall not impose or continue in effect any

requirements for labeling or packaging in addition to or different from those

required under” FIFRA. 7 U.S.C. § 136v(b). In other words, FIFRA will

preempt a state law requirement—including a common-law cause of action—

that is not fully consistent with FIFRA’s requirements and imposes a duty

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greater than that imposed by FIFRA. Carson v. Monsanto Company, 92

F.4th 980, 990-91 (11th Cir. 2024) (citing Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC,

544 U.S. 431, 447 (2005)). A state law requirement is not fully consistent

with FIFRA’s requirements when the state law requirement is: (1) for labeling

or packaging; and (2) in addition to or different from what FIFRA requires. 7

U.S.C. § 136v(b); Carson, 92 F.4th at 989-91 (citing Bates, 544 U.S. at 444,

446-47).

We start with a discussion of the elements of a Pennsylvania failure to

warn claim. A claim for strict liability failure to warn under Pennsylvania law

requires a plaintiff to prove, inter alia, that a product “lacks adequate warnings

or instructions necessary for safe use of the product.” Zitney v. Wyeth LLC,

243 A.3d 241, 245 (Pa. Super. 2020) (citation omitted). In other words,

Pennsylvania imposes a requirement on manufacturers to provide adequate

warnings on its products that are necessary for the consumer’s safe use of the

product. The issue before us, therefore, is whether FIFRA imposes a similar

requirement, i.e., that manufacturers of pesticides provide adequate warnings

on their pesticide containers.

Turning to FIFRA’s labeling requirements, we start with Section

136a(c)(5)(B) that provides that the Administrator shall register a pesticide if

the Administrator determines that the pesticide’s “labeling . . . compl[ies]

with the requirements of this subchapter.” 7 U.S.C. § 136a(c)(5)(B)

(emphasis added). Among the requirements that FIFRA imposes on a

manufacturer of pesticides is that it not distribute or sell “any pesticide which

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is adulterated or misbranded.” Id. at § 136j(a)(1)(E). A pesticide is

“misbranded” if its label is inadequate, i.e., if it “does not contain a warning

or caution statement [that] may be necessary and if complied with . . . is

adequate to protect health and the environment.” Id. at § 136(q)(1)(G). In

other words, FIFRA imposes a requirement on manufacturers of pesticides that

they include adequate warnings on its containers of pesticides to protect

health and the environment. Otherwise, the product is “misbranded,” and the

manufacturer is prohibited from selling it.

Since a Pennsylvania failure to warn claim imposes a requirement on

manufacturers of pesticides to provide a label that warns of health risks and

FIFRA requires manufacturers of pesticides to include on their labels a

“warning or caution statement [that is] adequate to protect health and the

environment,” the requirements are similar and the Pennsylvania failure to

warn claim does not impose any requirement that is in addition to the

requirements imposed by FIFRA. Thus, FIFRA does not preempt a

Pennsylvania failure to warn claim.

This holding is consistent with numerous other courts throughout the

United States that have concluded that FIFRA does not preempt their states’

failure to warn claims. In Hardeman v. Monsanto Corporation, 997 F.3d

941, 995 (9th Cir. 2021), the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, determined that

California’s failure to warn cause of action did not impose any additional

requirements to FIFRA’s labeling provisions. That Court rejected Monsanto’s

argument that the EPA’s approval of a pesticide label demonstrated that the

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label is appropriate. The Court first noted that FIFRA only provides that

“registration of a pesticide shall be prima facie evidence that the pesticide, its

labeling and packaging comply with the registration provision of [FIFRA].” Id.

at 956 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 2 U.S.C. 136a(f)(2)).

Thus, approval of the label is not determinative that the label is per se

adequate.

The Court further noted that to hold otherwise would render the

provisions regarding misbranding and mandatory reporting of unreasonable

adverse effects superfluous:

And looking at FIFRA holistically, this makes sense—if mere EPA approval of a label were determinative of FIFRA compliance, then FIFRA’s misbranding provision and regulations imposing a duty to report additional factual information regarding unreasonable adverse effects would serve no purpose. So even though EPA approved Roundup’s label, a judge or jury could disagree and find that same label violates FIFRA. And because EPA’s labeling determinations are not dispositive of FIFRA compliance, they similarly are not conclusive as to which common law requirements are in addition to or different from the requirements imposed by FIFRA.

Id. (internal citations and quotation marks omitted; emphasis added).

Similarly, in Carson, 92 F.4th at 992, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that

FIFRA did not preempt Georgia’s failure to warn claim. The Court found that

“FIFRA’s labeling requirements that bear on our preemption analysis are its

(1) prohibition on misbranding; (2) required registration of pesticides and

their labels, and (3) ongoing reporting requirements.” Id.at 990-91. The

Court highlighted the provision of FIFRA that defines “misbranding” as a label

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that “does not contain a warning or caution statement which is necessary and

if complied with . . . is adequate to protect health and the environment.” Id.

at 991-92 (citation omitted).

The Court compared these provisions to a Georgia failure to warn claim.

The Court found that “under Georgia common law, a pesticide manufacturer

breaches its duty to warn if it fails to provide an adequate warning of the

product’s potential risks.” Id. at 992 (citation omitted). The Court then

concluded that “here, the practical effect is the same: both FIFRA and Georgia

common law require pesticide manufacturers to warn users of potential risks

to health and safety.” Id.

Most recently, a Missouri appellate court rejected Monsanto’s argument

that FIFRA preempted a Missouri failure to warn claim. That Court held that

“the practical effect of both FIFRA’s prohibition on misbranding under Section

136(q)(1)(G) and a strict liability failure to warn claim in Missouri are the

same: both require a pesticide manufacturer to adequately warn users of the

potential dangers of using its product, regardless of the manufacturer’s

knowledge or intent.” Durnell v. Monsanto, 707 S.W.3d 828, 833 (Mo. App.

E.D. 2025).

Monsanto, however, asks us to accept the reasoning of the Schaffner

Court and hold that FIFRA preempts a Pennsylvania failure to warn claim. The

Schaffner Court found that, because the EPA through its pre-approval

regulation process, approved Roundup’s label without a cancer warning,

Monsanto could not add a cancer warning without further EPA approval. 113

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F.4th at 399. The Court, therefore, concluded that since the Pennsylvania

failure to warn claim, which involves the failure to add a cancer warning,

imposes a requirement on Monsanto that FIFRA does not impose, FIFRA

preempts Pennsylvania law. Id.

We find the Schaffner Court’s reasoning and conclusion unpersuasive

because it relies on only one section of FIFRA and does not consider all the

requirements that FIFRA imposes on manufacturers of pesticides regarding

adequate labels. The Schaffner Court fails to consider the misbranding

provisions of FIFRA that prohibit a manufacturer or distributor of a pesticide

from distributing or selling “any pesticide [that] is . . . misbranded,” which

includes selling a pesticide that does not contain an adequate health warning.

7 U.S.C. § 136j(a)(1)(E).

The holding in Schaffner implies that EPA’s approval of a label is final

and determinative that the label adequately warns of risks. We reject this

implication. FIFRA provides that EPA approval merely creates a rebuttable

presumption of compliance with FIFRA. See Hardeman, 997 F.3d at 957

(observing that “FIFRA expressly states that EPA’s decision to approve a label

during the registration process raises only a rebuttable presumption that the

pesticide and its label comply with FIFRA.” (citation omitted)). It does not

provide that approval by the EPA is dispositive that the manufacturer has

complied with FIFRA and, in particular, with the provisions that prohibit selling

a pesticide with an inadequate health warning. Additionally, the approval of

the label is not a final blessing that the label adequately warns of risks; FIFRA

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still requires a manufacturer of a pesticide to provide to the EPA unreasonable

adverse effects of the pesticide. 7 U.S.C. § 136d(a)(2).

We might have found Schaffner persuasive if FIFRA did not impose any

additional obligations on a manufacturer of a pesticide beyond the EPA’s

approval of the label. However, FIFRA imposes additional requirements on

manufacturers; in particular, it requires them not to sell pesticides without

adequate health warnings. It is this requirement in FIFRA that is similar to

the requirement of Pennsylvania’s failure to warn law and, thus, precludes

FIFRA from preempting a Pennsylvania failure to warn claim. We, therefore,

conclude that FIFRA does not preempt a Pennsylvania failure to warn claim. 8 ____________________________________________

8 Monsanto also baldly asserts in its brief that “Schaffner confirms that Romah v. Hygienic Sanitation Co, 705 A.2d 841 (Pa. Super. 1997) aff’d [] 737 A.2d 249 (1999), was rightly decided and remains good law.” Monsanto’s Brief at 53 n.15. We disagree that Romah remains good law. In Romah, this Court found that FIFRA preempted plaintiffs’ state law claim that a pesticide manufacturer was negligent in distributing a toxic chemical, which is essentially a claim that the warnings on the pesticide were not sufficient to protect the public from injury. The Romah Court explained its reasoning as follows: if this “claim was permitted to go to the jury and the jury concluded that the warnings were inadequate, then such a verdict would have the effect of imposing a new labeling requirement . . . an outcome [] expressly preempted by [] FIFRA.” Romah, 705 A.2d at 852. Subsequently, however, in Bates, supra, the United States Supreme Court, in considering whether FIFRA permits failure to warn claims disagreed with this reasoning. The Bates Court explained that “a requirement is a rule of law that must be obeyed; an event, such as a jury verdict, that merely motivates an optional decision is not a requirement. The proper inquiry calls for an examination of the elements of the common-law duty at issue, not for speculation as to whether a jury verdict will prompt a manufacturer to change its label.” Bates, 544 U.S. at 432. The Court was clear that “[a] jury verdict that might induce pesticide manufacturers to change labels should not be viewed as a requirement.” Id. We, thus, decline to find either the Schaffner Court’s or Monsanto’s reliance on Romah persuasive.

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In its fourth issue, Monsanto challenges the sufficiency of Appellees’

evidence proving Roundup caused Mr. Caranci’s cancer. Monsanto’s Brief at

55-58. Monsanto claims that, rather than testify how much Roundup Mr.

Caranci actually inhaled or absorbed, Appellees’ causation expert, Dr. Durrani,

merely “extrapolated from the alleged ‘positive association’ between

glyphosate and cancer to conclude that, because [Mr. Caranci] used Roundup

for a number of years, it was the specific cause of his cancer.” Id. at 56-57.

Monsanto assails the expert’s “conclusory guesswork based on alleged ‘use’”

as “unrelated to any actual absorption or alleged effect of glyphosate.” Id. at

57. Monsanto also claims that Dr. Durrani’s testimony regarding Mr. Caranci’s

Roundup exposure was impermissible “any exposure” opinion. Id. at 55-56.

For these reasons, Monsanto contends Appellees’ evidence was “deficient” and

required entry of JNOV. Id. at 58. We disagree.

The notes of testimony indicate that Dr. Durrani did not conclude that

Mr. Caranci suffers from NHL based solely on the “alleged positive association

between glyphosate and cancer.” Rather, Dr. Durrani provided extensive

testimony explaining how he developed his conclusion regarding causation.

Dr. Durrani explained, generally, the process by which exposure to chemicals

can damage cellular DNA through oxidative stress, and damaged cells become

cancerous. He also discussed specific studies that concluded that glyphosate

caused oxidative stress. Then, Dr. Durrani testified that Roundup was a

substantial factor in causing Mr. Caranci’s cancer based on his calculation that

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Mr. Caranci had a history of “high exposure” to glyphosate. N.T., 10/17/23

PM Session, at 45.

Dr. Durrani also explained that he developed a differential diagnosis to

determine the cause of Mr. Caranci’s NHL. 9 Dr. Durrani concluded Roundup

caused Mr. Caranci’s NHL only after considering that cause as one of many

possible causes and, by process of elimination, ruling out the unlikely or

impossible causes. These other possible causes, or preexisting conditions

known for making people more susceptible to NHL, considered by Dr. Durrani

included: infections, viruses, autoimmune diseases, radiation exposure, family

history, personal medical history, occupational hazards, and exposures to

carcinogens. Following his review, Dr. Durrani determined to a reasonable

degree of medical and scientific certainty that Mr. Caranci’s exposure to

Roundup caused his NHL. Id. at 53. This evidence, which the jury was free

to credit, was sufficient to support the jury’s conclusion that Roundup caused

Mr. Caranci’s NHL.

Moreover, with respect to Monsanto’s allegation that Dr. Durrani’s

testimony constituted impermissible “any exposure” opinion testimony, we

are not persuaded by Monsanto’s misplaced reliance on Betz v. Pneumo

Abex, 44 A.3d 27 (Pa. 2012). Our Supreme Court in Betz considered the ____________________________________________

9 Dr. Durrani testified that a differential diagnosis is “something we use in medicine when we are trying to get an understanding, trying to provide a diagnosis or a cause of a disease.” N.T., 10/17/23 PM Session, at 47. Doctors use differential diagnoses to “understand all the possib[le] causes for someone’s symptoms] and then [] rank them” to determine which is the most likely cause. Id.

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trial court’s entry of summary judgment in favor of the defendants after the

trial court precluded on Frye grounds the plaintiff’s expert from testifying that

because “any” and “every” exposure to asbestos can cause cancer, the

defendant’s product necessarily caused the plaintiff’s cancer. Id. at 30, 39-

41. The Betz court affirmed the trial court’s decision, reasoning that the trial

court properly determined that the expert’s methodology for determining

causation was novel and not generally accepted. Id. at 58. Betz is not a

case addressing the sufficiency of the evidence and, thus, does not support

Monsanto’s assertion that Dr. Durrani’s opinion was insufficient to support the

verdict in Appellees’ favor. This claim, thus, fails.

In its fifth issue, Monsanto avers that it is entitled to JNOV or a new trial

because the punitive damages awarded to Appellees are unwarranted,

excessive, and cumulative. Monsanto’s Brief at 58-73.

Pennsylvania juries “enjoy[] discretion in the fixing of punitive

damages.” Bert Co. v. Turk, 298 A.3d 44, 61 (Pa. 2023). That discretion is,

however, subject to the limitations of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due

Process Clause, which imposes limits on punitive awards based on

“[e]lementary notions of fairness . . . dictate that a person receive fair notice

not only of the conduct that will subject him to punishment, but also to the

severity of the penalty that may be imposed.” Id. at 48 n.2 (internal quotation

marks and citation omitted).

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In Bert Co., our Supreme Court recently explained punitive damages

as follows:

Punitive damages have long been a part of traditional state tort law. The common-law method for assessing punitive damages has been recognized in every state and federal court for over two hundred years - since before enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868. They have been described as “quasi- criminal,” and could be described as “private fines” intended to punish the defendant and to deter future wrongdoing. A jury’s [or trial court’s (in the case of a non-jury trial)] assessment of the extent of a plaintiff’s injury is essentially a factual determination, whereas its imposition of punitive damages is an expression of its moral condemnation. Punitive damages are not compensation for injury. Instead, they are private fines levied by civil juries to punish reprehensible conduct and to deter its future occurrence.

Id. at 58-59 (citations, some quotation marks, original brackets, and

parentheses omitted).

We review an award of punitive damages for an abuse of discretion.

Grossi v. Travelers Personal Ins. Co., 79 A.3d 1141, 1157 (Pa. Super.

2013). “Under Pennsylvania law the size of a punitive damages award must

be reasonably related to the State’s interest in punishing and deterring the

particular behavior of the defendant and not the product of arbitrariness or

unfettered discretion.” Hollock v. Erie Ins. Exch., 842 A.2d 409, 419 (Pa.

Super. 2004) (citation and original quotation marks omitted); see also

Grossi, 79 A.3d at 1157.

Punitive damages may be awarded for conduct that is outrageous, because of the defendant’s evil motive or his[, or her,] reckless indifference to the rights of others. In assessing punitive damages, the trier[-]of[-]fact can properly consider the character of the defendant’s act, the nature and extent of the harm to the

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plaintiff that the defendant caused or intended to cause[,] and the wealth of the defendant.

Bert Co., 298 A.3d at 61-62, (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts §

908(2)). See also Hollock, 842 A.2d at 419 (citing cases addressing Section

908(2); Grossi, 79 A.3d at 1157 (same). “Punitive damages awards must be

tailored to each defendant.” Bert Co., 298 A.3d at 71.

Monsanto raises numerous sub-claims challenging the punitive damages

award. First, Monsanto claims punitive damages were improper because

Roundup is approved for use by the EPA and the evidence demonstrated that

Monsanto acted in accordance with scientific consensus and, therefore, lacked

the “evil motive or reckless indifference to the rights of others” necessary to

award punitive damages. Id. at 59-62 (quoting Feld v. Merriman, 485 A.2d

742, 747-48 (Pa. 1984)). Monsanto also contends that the punitive damages

award was the result of improper evidence that inflamed the jury. Monsanto’s

Brief at 63-65.

Monsanto has not cited to any controlling precedent to support its

argument that implies that a fact-finder as a matter of law may not impose

punitive damages when the defendant acted in accordance with scientific

consensus, and we have found none. In fact, this Court has held that

“compliance with industry and governmental safety standards does not,

standing alone, automatically insulate a defendant from punitive damages.

Daniel v. Wyeth Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 15 A.3d 909, 932 (Pa. Super.

2011) (emphasis added) (quoting Phillips v. Cricket Lighters, 883 A.2d

439, 447 (Pa. 2005)). Simply because Monsanto introduced evidence at trial

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that it complied with industry standards and scientific consensus does not

preclude the jury from awarding punitive damages and does not require the

trial court to enter JNOV.

Additionally, we note that Monsanto is, in essence, arguing that because

it introduced evidence of its compliance, the jury, when considering whether

to impose punitive damages, should have found its evidence of compliance

dispositive and disregarded any evidence Appellees presented. This argument

challenges the weight that the jury placed on the evidence of compliance. We

cannot and will not reweigh the evidence.

Next, in support of its claim that the amount of punitive damages

awarded was grossly and unconstitutionally excessive, Monsanto asserts that

its conduct was not reprehensible because no evidence suggested that

Monsanto demonstrated reckless disregard for the health or safety of others,

knew that Roundup, in fact, caused cancer, took advantage of Appellees, or

acted with malice. Id. at 67-68. Monsanto also notes that the 6:1 ratio of

punitive to compensatory damages is “beyond the outermost limit of the due

process guarantee.” Id. at 68. Monsanto next claims that, because Appellees

withdrew their request for economic damages, the $25 million compensatory

damages award for non-economic damages alone “undeniably contained a

punitive component.” Id. at 68-69. Characterizing the compensatory

damages award as “already excessive and substantial,” Monsanto argues that

any multiple of that amount violates due process.” Id. at 69 (emphasis in

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original). Monsanto also asserts that Appellees “improperly invited the jury

to award punitive damages based on Monsanto’s wealth” by stating that

“Monsanto is in the business of making money.” Id. at 69-70 (citing N.T.,

10/10/23 PM Session, at 23).

Monsanto’s claim that its conduct was not reprehensible for the reasons

it lists is, in essence, a challenge to the weight the jury gave to the evidence

presented at trial. The jury heard other evidence about Monsanto’s conduct

and placed more weight on that evidence. Thus, we decline to reweigh the

evidence and do not agree that the jury abused its discretion in awarding $125

million in punitive damages on that basis.

In addition, Monsanto’s suggestion—that the $25 million the jury

awarded for non-economic compensatory damages must necessarily include

a punitive component—is mere conjecture and not grounds for relief. We are

likewise unpersuaded by Monsanto’s claim that a punitive damages award in

an amount six times the compensatory damages award is inherently violative

of due process. In fact, the United States Supreme Court has “consistently

rejected the notion that the constitutional line is marked by a simple

mathematical formula.” State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538

U.S. 408, 425 (Pa. 2003) (citation omitted). The State Farm Court further

noted that “single-digit multipliers” like the one in the instant case, “are more

likely to comport with due process” than multiple-digit multipliers. Id. at 410.

Monsanto’s final argument within this sub-claim—that Appellees’

improperly invited the jury to award excessive punitive damages by stating

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that “Monsanto is in the business of making money”—also fails to provide

grounds for relief given that it is simply a statement of fact to which Monsanto

did not object when Dr. Reeves was asked to, and did, agree to it. See N.T.,

10/10/23 PM Session, at 23-24.

Monsanto next contends that the punitive damages award was

unconstitutionally cumulative based on Monsanto having already paid more

than $100 million in punitive damages to plaintiffs in other cases. Id. at 72.

Because the $150 million punitive damage award in this case more than

doubles the punitive damages paid as punishment for the same conduct, and

thousands of Roundup cases remain pending, Monsanto claims the award in

this case raises “serious due process” concerns. Id.

As with Monsanto’s prior claims, this claim likewise fails as Monsanto

has not cited to any authority requiring, as a matter of law, that the trial court

remit the punitive damages award simply because juries in other cases

awarded other plaintiffs punitive damages against Monsanto. The trial court

neither abused its discretion nor erred as a matter of law in declining to mold

the verdict here.

In sum, our review confirms that, in light of the totality of the record

developed at trial, the jury properly exercised its discretion in awarding

Appellees $125 million in punitive damages and the trial court did not abuse

it discretion or err as a matter of law in denying Monsanto’s motion for a new

trial or JNOV based on the amount of punitive damages awarded.

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In its final issue, Monsanto claims that the trial court abused its

discretion in denying its motion for a new trial, JNOV, or a substantial

remittitur because the non-economic compensatory damages awarded were

manifestly excessive and punitive. Monsanto’s Brief at 74-77. We are guided

by the following principles:

The grant or refusal of a new trial due to the excessiveness of the verdict is within the discretion of the trial court. This Court will not find a verdict excessive unless it is so grossly excessive as to shock our sense of justice. . . . Similarly, our standard of review from the denial of a remittitur is circumspect and judicial reduction of a jury award is appropriate only when the award is plainly excessive and exorbitant. The question is whether the award of damages falls within the uncertain limits of fair and reasonable compensation or whether the verdict so shocks the sense of justice as to suggest that the jury was influenced by partiality, prejudice, mistake, or corruption. Furthermore, the decision to grant or deny remittitur is within the sole discretion of the trial court, and proper appellate review dictates this Court reverse such an Order only if the trial court abused its discretion or committed an error of law in evaluating a party’s request for remittitur.

Tong-Summerford v. Abington Mem’l Hosp., 190 A.3d 631, 650-51 (Pa.

Super. 2018) (citation omitted).

We begin with the premise that large verdicts are not necessarily

excessive and that each case is unique and dependent on its own particular

circumstances. Gillingham v. Consol Energy, Inc., 51 A.3d 841, 857 (Pa.

Super. 2012). “In awarding damages for past or future non-economic loss, a

jury may consider, inter alia, the age of the plaintiff, the severity of his or her

injuries, whether the injuries are temporary or permanent, the duration and

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nature of medical treatment, the duration and extent of physical pain and

mental anguish on the part of the plaintiff, and the plaintiff’s physical condition

before the injuries.” Id. at 857-58 (citation omitted). “Thus, noneconomic

loss must be measured by experience rather than any mathematical formula.”

Brown v. End Zone, Inc., 259 A.3d 473, 486 (Pa. Super. 2021) (citation

omitted). “For this reason, the law entrusts jurors, as the impartial

acting voice of the community, to quantify noneconomic loss and

compensation.” Id. (citation omitted; emphasis added).

With respect to compensatory damages, “this Court will not find a

verdict excessive unless it is so grossly excessive as to shock our sense of

justice.” Id. (citation omitted). A court may consider: “(1) the severity of

the injury; (2) whether the Plaintiff’s injury is manifested by objective physical

evidence or whether it is only revealed by the subjective testimony of the

Plaintiff [;] (3) whether the injury will affect the Plaintiff permanently; (4)

whether the Plaintiff can continue with his or her employment; (5) the size of

the Plaintiff’s out-of-pocket expenses; and (6) the amount Plaintiff demanded

in the original complaint.” Id. at 486-87 (citation omitted).

With the above six-factor analysis in mind, Monsanto argues that the

non-economic damages awarded were excessive because Appellees

introduced no “objective physical evidence,” and Mr. Caranci achieved

remission and successfully treated recurrences of NHL, sold his business in

2010 at age 70 and introduced no evidence of lost earnings capacity, and

introduced no evidence of medical bills or out-of-pocket expenses. Monsanto’s

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Brief at 75. For these reasons, and because this compensatory damages

award was many times greater than “other” large products liability verdicts

involving serious illnesses in Pennsylvania and other compensatory damages

awards against Monsanto in other jurisdictions, Monsanto claims it is entitled

to relief. Id.at 76.

Following our review, we conclude that the trial court properly exercised

its discretion in denying Monsanto’s challenge to the amount of compensatory

damages awarded to Appellees. Here, Appellees provided a sufficient

evidentiary basis for the jury to conclude that Mr. Caranci suffered, and

continued to suffer, disfigurement, pain and suffering, embarrassment,

humiliation, and the loss of the ability to enjoy life’s pleasures—all non-

economic losses recognized under Pennsylvania law. See Gillingham, 51

A.3d at 866 (listing non-economic losses compensable under Pennsylvania

law).

Mr. Caranci testified extensively about the physical and emotional toll

NHL has had on him. In particular, Mr. Caranci testified that he first became

sick in 2005 and that his cancer subsequently returned four times, each time

with worse symptoms than the time before. N.T., 10/19/23 AM Session, at

76-77, 83, 85. He underwent chemotherapy that was very painful and caused

fatigue and nausea. Id. at 84. Mr. Caranci testified that his mouth is “dry all

the time” and his lips are swollen and dry. Id. at 85. To Mr. Caranci, food

has no taste and “everything smells like medicine.” Id. at 88. Mr. Caranci is

frail, has difficulty walking, and “can’t stand the pain” he experiences in his

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daily life. Id. at 85. The jury also saw that Mr. Caranci has disfiguring lumps

all over his body, including on his chin, arms, and groin. Id. at 82. He is

embarrassed because he “look[s] like a monster.” Id. He experiences “no

happiness, “no joy,” does not sleep, and feels defeated by the repeated return

of his cancer. Id. at 84. Mr. Caranci testified that selling the business that

he had run for 30 years in 2010 because he was not well enough to run it

“[broke] his heart.” Id. at 80.

In light of the record created by Appellees, we conclude that the jury—

acting as the impartial voice of the community—fairly and adequately valued

Mr. Caranci’s non-economic suffering. The award here is not “plainly and

excessively exorbitant” and it does not “so shock[] the sense of justice as to

suggest that the jury was influenced by partiality, prejudice, mistake, or

corruption.” Tong-Summerford, 190 A.3d at 650. Accordingly, we find that

the trial court did not err or abuse its discretion in denying Monsanto relief

from the compensatory damages award.

In conclusion, we find that none of the issues raised by Monsanto

entitles it to relief. We, therefore, affirm the entry of judgment in Appellees

favor.

Judgment affirmed.

- 39 - J-A06036-25

Date: 5/8/2025

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