Caraffa v. Tempe Police Department

CourtDistrict Court, D. Arizona
DecidedDecember 16, 2019
Docket2:19-cv-05492
StatusUnknown

This text of Caraffa v. Tempe Police Department (Caraffa v. Tempe Police Department) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Arizona primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Caraffa v. Tempe Police Department, (D. Ariz. 2019).

Opinion

1 WO MDR 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 8 9 Alfred E. Caraffa, No. CV 19-05492-PHX-MTL (ESW) 10 Plaintiff, 11 v. ORDER 12 Tempe (AZ) Police Department, et al., 13 Defendants.

14 15 On October 24, 2019, Plaintiff Alfred E. Caraffa filed a pro se civil rights Complaint 16 pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Doc. 1) and an Application to Proceed In District Court 17 Without Prepaying Fees or Costs (Doc. 2). The Court will grant the Application to Proceed 18 and will dismiss the Complaint with leave to amend. 19 I. Application to Proceed and Filing Fee 20 The Court, in its discretion, will grant the Application to Proceed. Plaintiff will be 21 allowed to proceed without paying the filing fee. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). 22 II. Statutory Screening of In Forma Pauperis Complaints 23 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), in a case in which a plaintiff has been granted 24 in forma pauperis status, the Court shall dismiss the case “if the court determines that . . . 25 (B) the action . . . (i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may 26 be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such 27 relief.” 28 . . . . 1 A pleading must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 2 pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) (emphasis added). While Rule 8 does 3 not demand detailed factual allegations, “it demands more than an unadorned, the- 4 defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 5 (2009). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 6 conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. 7 “[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a 8 claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 9 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content 10 that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the 11 misconduct alleged.” Id. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for 12 relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial 13 experience and common sense.” Id. at 679. Thus, although a plaintiff’s specific factual 14 allegations may be consistent with a constitutional claim, a court must assess whether there 15 are other “more likely explanations” for a defendant’s conduct. Id. at 681. 16 But as the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has instructed, courts 17 must “continue to construe pro se filings liberally.” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 18 (9th Cir. 2010). A “complaint [filed by a pro se individual] ‘must be held to less stringent 19 standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” Id. (quoting Erickson v. Pardus, 551 20 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam)). 21 If the Court determines that a pleading could be cured by the allegation of other 22 facts, a pro se litigant is entitled to an opportunity to amend a complaint before dismissal 23 of the action. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127-29 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). 24 Plaintiff’s Complaint will be dismissed for failure to state a claim, but because it may 25 possibly be amended to state a claim, the Court will dismiss it with leave to amend. 26 III. Complaint 27 In his Complaint, Plaintiff seeks monetary damages from Defendants Tempe Police 28 Department and Tempe Police Officer Guajardo. Plaintiff alleges a violation of “Due 1 Process, False Arrest, False I[m]prisonment, Unlawful Confinement, Cruel and Unusual 2 Punishment.” He claims that while he was looking in the window of a restaurant “and 3 playing with an I.D. in the refle[c]tion,” Defendant Guajardo came up behind Plaintiff, 4 grabbed his wrist, restrained his arm, and, without stating that he was a police officer, told 5 Plaintiff he was being detained for disorderly conduct. Plaintiff alleges he was arrested for 6 “disorderly conduct-fighting,” in violation of Arizona Revised Statutes section 13- 7 2904(A)(1), and was jailed for two-and-a-half days. He claims the charge of “disorderly 8 conduct-fighting” is a “total falsehood of the truth and a miscarriage of justice.” 9 IV. Failure to State a Claim 10 A. Defendant Tempe Police Department 11 Defendant Tempe Police Department is a subpart of the City of Tempe, not a 12 separate entity for purposes of suit. Gotbaum v. City of Phoenix, 617 F. Supp. 2d 878, 886 13 (D. Ariz. 2008); see Braillard, 232 P.3d at 1269 (county sheriff’s office is a nonjural 14 entity); see also Vincente v. City of Prescott, 2012 WL 1438695 (D. Ariz. 2012) (city fire 15 department is a nonjural entity); Wilson v. Yavapai Cnty., 2012 WL 1067959 (D. Ariz. 16 2012) (county sheriff’s office and county attorney’s office are nonjural entities). Because 17 Defendant Tempe Police Department is not a separate entity, it is not capable of being 18 separately sued. Thus, the Court will dismiss Defendant Tempe Police Department. 19 B. Defendant Guajardo 20 Although pro se pleadings are liberally construed, Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 21 520-21 (1972), conclusory and vague allegations will not support a cause of action. Ivey 22 v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). Further, a 23 liberal interpretation of a civil rights complaint may not supply essential elements of the 24 claim that were not initially pled. Id. 25 To state a valid claim under § 1983, plaintiffs must allege that they suffered a 26 specific injury as a result of specific conduct of a defendant and show an affirmative link 27 between the injury and the conduct of that defendant. See Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 28 371-72, 377 (1976). “[A] plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, 1 through the official’s own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.” Iqbal, 556 2 U.S. at 676. “A plaintiff must allege facts, not simply conclusions, that show that an 3 individual was personally involved in the deprivation of his civil rights.” Barren v. 4 Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998). 5 “False arrest, a species of false imprisonment, is the detention of a person without 6 his consent and without lawful authority.” Donahoe v. Arpaio, 869 F. Supp. 2d 1020, 1064 7 (D. Ariz. 2012) (quoting Reams v. City of Tucson, 701 P.2d 598, 601 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985)), 8 aff’d sub nom. Stapley v. Pestalozzi, 733 F.3d 804 (9th Cir. 2013). Under Arizona law, 9 false imprisonment and false arrest consist of non-consensual detention of a person 10 “without lawful authority.” Slade v. City of Phoenix,

Related

Wells v. Bonner
45 F.3d 90 (Fifth Circuit, 1995)
Price v. Roark
256 F.3d 364 (Fifth Circuit, 2001)
Haines v. Kerner
404 U.S. 519 (Supreme Court, 1972)
Rizzo v. Goode
423 U.S. 362 (Supreme Court, 1976)
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Wallace v. Kato
127 S. Ct. 1091 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Hebbe v. Pliler
627 F.3d 338 (Ninth Circuit, 2010)
Ivey v. Board of Regents of University of Alaska
673 F.2d 266 (Second Circuit, 1982)
Patricia J. Barry Charlene Karr v. Gary Fowler
902 F.2d 770 (Ninth Circuit, 1990)
Michael Henry Ferdik v. Joe Bonzelet, Sheriff
963 F.2d 1258 (Ninth Circuit, 1992)
Donald T. Stapley v. Peter R. Pestalozzi
733 F.3d 804 (Ninth Circuit, 2013)
Slade v. City of Phoenix
541 P.2d 550 (Arizona Supreme Court, 1975)
Gotbaum Ex Rel. Gotbaum v. City of Phoenix
617 F. Supp. 2d 878 (D. Arizona, 2008)
Reams v. City of Tucson
701 P.2d 598 (Court of Appeals of Arizona, 1985)
American Casualty Co. v. Baker
22 F.3d 880 (Ninth Circuit, 1994)
Lopez v. Smith
203 F.3d 1122 (Ninth Circuit, 2000)

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Caraffa v. Tempe Police Department, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/caraffa-v-tempe-police-department-azd-2019.