Cante Mijangos v. Bondi

• Court: Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
• Decided: February 18, 2026
• Docket: 25-1267
• Status: Published

Opinion

United States Court of Appeals For the First Circuit

No. 25-1267

ROSA LIDIA CANTE MIJANGOS,

Petitioner,

v.

PAMELA J. BONDI, Attorney General,

Respondent.

PETITION FOR REVIEW OF AN ORDER OF THE BOARD OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS

Before

Barron, Chief Judge, Kayatta and Rikelman, Circuit Judges.

Lidia M. Sanchez, for petitioner.

Marie V. Robinson, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Immigration Litigation, with whom Brett A. Shumate, Assistant Attorney General, Civil Division, and Cindy S. Ferrier, Assistant Director, Office of Immigration Litigation, were on brief, for respondent.

February 18, 2026 RIKELMAN, Circuit Judge. Petitioner Rosa Lidia Cante

Mijangos, a citizen of Guatemala, suffered sexual and physical

abuse at the hands of her former intimate partner for years.

Fearing for her safety, she fled to the United States in 2014 and

eventually applied for asylum and withholding of removal. See 8

U.S.C. §§ 1158(b)(1), 1231(b)(3). The Immigration Judge (IJ)

rejected her claims after concluding that Cante Mijangos had failed

to show the required connection or "nexus" between the harm she

experienced and her asserted protected status as a "Guatemalan

woman who was unable to effectively leave a domestic relationship."

Instead, the IJ found that her ex-partner abused her because of

his generally violent nature. The Board of Immigration Appeals

(BIA) affirmed, and Cante Mijangos petitioned our Court for review.

Although we do not minimize the harm that Cante Mijangos

experienced, we must deny the petition because she has failed to

develop any challenge to the legal and factual bases for the BIA's

ruling.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Relevant Facts1

Cante Mijangos began a relationship with her former

partner, Walter, in 2007. Three years later, in 2010, Walter began

1"We draw the facts from the administrative record, including [Cante Mijangos's] testimony before the IJ." Khalil v. Garland, 97 F.4th 54, 59 n.1 (1st Cir. 2024) (quoting Caz v. Garland, 84 F.4th 22, 25 n.2 (1st Cir. 2023)).

- 2 - abusing her emotionally, physically, and sexually. When he was

away, Walter prevented Cante Mijangos from leaving their home by

chaining and padlocking the front door and placing bars on the

windows. He also removed her phone so that she could not

communicate with anyone and left her with insufficient food.

Further, Walter repeatedly sexually abused Cante Mijangos, and she

eventually became pregnant as a result of that abuse. His abuse

continued during her pregnancy, including a beating when she was

seven months pregnant that left her unconscious for most of the

night and resulted in a ten-day hospital stay. During a follow-up

medical visit, Cante Mijangos informed a doctor about the abuse,

but he said that he could not help her.

Towards the end of Cante Mijangos's pregnancy, Walter

moved her to a different residence where she was constantly

monitored. When she was ready to give birth, Walter brought her

to a new hospital because he had discovered that she had alerted

a doctor at the previous hospital about his abusive conduct. After

Cante Mijangos gave birth, she remained at the residence where she

was closely watched, and Walter often left her without enough food

for herself and her daughter. Walter also continued to physically

abuse her. In one episode, after Cante Mijangos asked if she could

visit her parents, Walter attacked her with a knife, scarring her

leg. In another violent episode, Walter swung a machete at her

head. She blocked the machete with her hand, leaving her with

- 3 - more permanent scars. Walter also abused their daughter, including

by burning the child's feet with a cigarette to "shut her up."

Cante Mijangos testified before the IJ that she did not seek help

from the police because Walter threatened to harm her if she did.

Cante Mijangos eventually escaped from Walter with the

help of a neighbor, fleeing with her daughter to her parents' house

and then to her brother's home. Although Walter tracked Cante

Mijangos to her parents' house, her mother told him that she did

not know where Cante Mijangos had moved. Fearing that Walter would

soon find her and harm her, Cante Mijangos decided to leave

Guatemala. She entered the United States in March 2014. Her

daughter remains in Guatemala with Cante Mijangos's parents.

In 2017, Walter tried to remove his daughter from her

maternal grandparents' house by force. Although Cante Mijangos's

brother prevented him from abducting the child, Walter assaulted

and injured the brother with a machete. Police officers responded

to the family's report of the attack, but they did not conduct a

search for Walter and never arrested him. Cante Mijangos's parents

and brother have not seen Walter since this 2017 attack, and Cante

Mijangos confirmed to the IJ that she has no information about

Walter's whereabouts.

B. Procedural History

After the Department of Homeland Security initiated

removal proceedings against Cante Mijangos, she applied for

- 4 - asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the

Convention Against Torture.2 See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158(b)(1),

1231(b)(3); 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16. During her hearing before the IJ,

she asserted that she qualified for asylum and withholding of

removal based on her membership in the particular social group

(PSG) of "Guatemalan women unable to leave a domestic

relationship." She confirmed that she was relying on "just that

one group."

The IJ ultimately denied all relief. Although noting

that Cante Mijangos had "suffered unspeakable abuse in Guatemala,"

the IJ found parts of her testimony to be of "questionable

credibility."

Putting credibility aside, the IJ also determined that

Cante Mijangos had failed to show the required nexus between the

harm she experienced in Guatemala and any protected ground under

the immigration statutes. The IJ found that, even assuming the

PSG asserted by Cante Mijangos was legally cognizable, there was

no "nexus" between Walter's abuse and her PSG. According to the

IJ, although the record demonstrated that Walter was a "violent,

dangerous[,] and abusive man," there was no indication that he

abused Cante Mijangos to "punish [her] for holding a

2Cante Mijangos has waived any challenge to the agency's rejection of her claim for protection under the Convention Against Torture by failing to present any developed argument on that claim.

- 5 - characteristic" that he sought "to overcome." In support of that

finding, the IJ pointed out that Walter did not abuse Cante

Mijangos in the first years of their relationship and that he was

also violent towards his own daughter and Cante Mijangos's brother.

Thus, the IJ determined that Walter was an "uncontrolled abuser"

and was not motivated to harm Cante Mijangos because of her

asserted PSG.

Although the no-nexus finding was dispositive of Cante

Mijangos's asylum and withholding of removal claims, the IJ

rejected those claims on other grounds as well. For example, the

IJ concluded that Cante Mijangos had failed to establish that the

Guatemalan government was unable or unwilling to protect her from

Walter.

The BIA affirmed the IJ's decision in March 2025.

Assuming that Cante Mijangos had testified credibly, the BIA

nevertheless upheld the IJ's finding that Walter had not been

motivated to persecute Cante Mijangos because of her asserted PSG.

The BIA expressly concluded that there was no clear error in the

IJ's determination that Walter's actions were "due to his

uncontrolled abusive nature," not on account of any protected

ground, and thus Cante Mijangos could not satisfy the nexus

requirement. It also discerned no clear error in the IJ's other

findings, including that Cante Mijangos had failed to demonstrate

- 6 - that the Guatemalan government was unable or unwilling to protect

her from Walter.

Cante Mijangos timely filed a petition for review.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Although our review is focused on the final decision of

the BIA, "'to the extent that the BIA deferred to or adopted the

IJ's reasoning, we review those portions of the IJ's decision' as

well." Ferreira v. Garland, 97 F.4th 36, 45-46 (1st Cir. 2024)

(quoting Chavez v. Garland, 51 F.4th 424, 429 (1st Cir. 2022)).

"We uphold factual findings under the substantial evidence

standard unless the record compels a contrary conclusion." Id. at

46. We review legal conclusions de novo. See Alves v. Bondi, 128

F.4th 297, 298 (1st Cir. 2025). When discussing the decisions of

the BIA and the IJ "as a unit," we refer to them as "the agency."

Khalil v. Garland, 97 F.4th 54, 61 (1st Cir. 2024).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Legal Standard

An applicant for asylum must qualify as a "refugee" under

the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). See 8 U.S.C.

§ 1158(b)(1)(A). The INA defines a refugee as someone who is

"unable or unwilling to return [to] or to avail herself of the

protection of her own country 'because of persecution or a

well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion,

nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political

- 7 - opinion.'" De Pena-Paniagua v. Barr, 957 F.3d 88, 92 (1st Cir.

2020) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A)). Additionally, when an

individual is seeking asylum based on past or future harm by a

private actor, they must also show that the government was unable

or unwilling to protect them from that harm. See Medina-Suguilanda

v. Garland, 121 F.4th 316, 322 (1st Cir. 2024).

To establish that persecution is "on account of" a

protected ground -- the so-called nexus requirement -- an

individual must show that the protected ground is "at least one

central reason for [the] persecuti[on]." See Espinoza-Ochoa v.

Garland, 89 F.4th 222, 230 (1st Cir. 2023) (alterations in

original) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i)). "The 'one

central reason' test does 'not require an . . . applicant to

demonstrate that [she was] singled out only due to [her] protected

trait." Khalil, 97 F.4th at 62 (quoting Barnica-Lopez v. Garland,

59 F.4th 520, 531 (1st Cir. 2023)). "Instead, the test

'contemplates the possibility that multiple motivations can

exist.'" Id. (quoting Aldana-Ramos v. Holder, 757 F.3d 9, 18-19

(1st Cir. 2014)). To prevail on a mixed-motive theory, the

applicant must show that their protected trait "was not incidental,

tangential, superficial, or subordinate to another reason for

[the] harm." Id. at 63 (alteration in original) (internal

quotation marks omitted) (quoting Espinoza-Ochoa, 89 F.4th at

235).

- 8 - "A similar test applies to withholding of removal."

Espinoza-Ochoa, 89 F.4th at 230. To obtain this form of relief,

an applicant "must establish a clear probability that, if returned

to [their] homeland, [they] will be persecuted on account of a

statutorily protected ground." Id. (quoting Sanchez-Vasquez v.

Garland, 994 F.3d 40, 46 (1st Cir. 2021)); see 8 U.S.C.

§ 1231(b)(3)(A). Thus, like the asylum statute, the withholding

of removal statute requires a showing of nexus between any past or

future harm and a protected ground. See Espinoza-Ochoa, 89 F.4th

at 230. But the "clear probability" standard for withholding of

removal is even harder to meet than the "well-founded fear"

standard required for asylum. See id.

B. Analysis Our analysis begins and ends with waiver.

The BIA's decision focuses on the nexus requirement.

Specifically, the BIA concluded that the IJ did not clearly err in

finding that Cante Mijangos had failed to establish any nexus

between the persecution she experienced in Guatemala and her

asserted PSG. Thus, the BIA affirmed the IJ's determination that

"the abuse [Cante Mijangos] suffered" was "motivated by her former

partner's violent and abusive nature" rather than "any desire to

overcome a characteristic of" her asserted PSG.

Yet, in her petition, Cante Mijangos fails to grapple

with this critical ruling by the BIA. Although she asserts that

- 9 - "the record compels the conclusion that she suffered past

persecution . . . on account of being a Guatemalan woman," and

refers to her testimony regarding the abuse she experienced "at

the hands of her ex-partner," she fails to advance any record-based

argument connecting Walter's abuse to her asserted PSG. Nor does

she lodge a legal challenge to the IJ's application of our

mixed-motive precedent.

To be sure, Cante Mijangos contends in her petition that

the agency erred when it did "not explain why the harm and abuse"

she experienced "was not sufficiently related to her status as a

Guatemalan woman that was subjected to gender and sexual violence

due to her membership in this particular group." But the remainder

of her petition does not develop this contention with any legal or

factual support whatsoever. Our precedent makes clear that "issues

adverted to in a perfunctory manner, unaccompanied by some effort

at developed argumentation, are deemed waived." United States v.

Zannino, 895 F.2d 1, 17 (1st Cir. 1990) (holding an issue waived

when not fully raised in the opening brief).

Instead of addressing the basis for the agency's ruling,

Cante Mijangos focuses her petition on a separate issue: the legal

cognizability of her asserted PSG. The only substantial argument

Cante Mijangos makes in her petition is that the group "Guatemalan

women" is immutable, particular, and socially distinct, citing to

evidence of gender-based violence in Guatemala. But whether

- 10 - "Guatemalan women" is a legally valid PSG is not at issue in this

case.3

And, regardless of the asserted PSG, Cante Mijangos's

failure to make any developed argument as to why the agency's nexus

determination was incorrect is necessarily fatal to her claims.

"Without a sufficient showing as to nexus, the harm [Cante

Mijangos] suffered or fears suffering isn't a ground for asylum."

Pazine v. Garland, 115 F.4th 53, 58 (1st Cir. 2024); see Alves,

128 F.4th at 299. As such, her "asylum claim . . . fail[s] right

out of the gate." Pazine, 115 F.4th at 58. Her failure to

challenge the agency's nexus ruling also dooms her withholding of

removal claim. See Gonzalez-Arevalo v. Garland, 112 F.4th 1, 12

(1st Cir. 2024) (holding an applicant who cannot meet the asylum

standard will necessarily fail under the higher standard for

withholding of removal). Although the agency rejected Cante

Mijangos's claims on other grounds as well, we need go no further

in our review. See Alves, 128 F.4th at 299.

IV. CONCLUSION

For all these reasons, we deny the petition for review.

3 Before the agency, Cante Mijangos offered the PSG of "Guatemalan women [who are] unable to leave a domestic relationship." In her petition to us, however, Cante Mijangos asserts the PSG of "Guatemalan women." Because we deny her petition on other grounds, we do not address the implications of the different framing of her asserted PSG before our Court.

- 11 -