Canosa v. Weinstein

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedFebruary 12, 2021
Docket1:18-cv-04115
StatusUnknown

This text of Canosa v. Weinstein (Canosa v. Weinstein) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Canosa v. Weinstein, (S.D.N.Y. 2021).

Opinion

551 FIFTH AVENUE, 29TH FLOOR NEW YORK, NEW YORK 10176 Tel: (212) 684-1880 Fax: (212) 689-8156 www.rheingoldlaw.com

DAVID B. RHEINGOLD◊ Of Counsel THOMAS P. GIUFFRA♦ PAUL D. RHEINGOLD‡● EDWARD A. RUFFO♦ SHERRI L. PLOTKIN♦ Also Admitted In: JEREMY A. HELLMAN♦ D.C. ‡ February 9, 2021 NewV i Jr eg ri sn ei ya ♦◊ Massachusetts ● Hon. Paul A. Engelmayer, United States District Judge United States District Court Southern District of New York 40 Foley Square, Room 1305 New York, New York 10007

Re: Alexandra Canosa v. Harvey Weinstein, et al. No. 18 Civ. 4115 (PAE)

Dear Judge Engelmayer:

We represent plaintiff, Alexandra Canosa in this matter. I write in response to the letter filed by non-party Robert Weinstein on February 5, 2021 (ECF 288).

Robert Weinstein seeks to cancel his deposition because he claims in his counsel’s letter that Ms. Canosa cannot show relevance of his deposition. This entire argument is misplaced as "the party seeking to quash a subpoena bears a heavy burden of proof" Irons v. Karceski, 74 F.3d 1262, 1264 (D.C. Cir. 1995). Nonetheless, as will be discussed, Robert Weinstein possesses extensive relevant information regarding the conduct of his brother which is critical to establishing Plaintiff’s claims.

Plaintiff seeks the deposition of Robert Weinstein for matters that are highly relevant to the culpability of Harvey Weinstein personally. Following dismissal of various of Plaintiff’s claims, the following remain against Harvey Weinstein personally (ECF 152):

1. Battery (claim 1); 2. Assault (claim 2); 3. Intentional infliction of emotional distress regarding a course of intimidating and abusive conduct by Weinstein spanning August 2010 to August 2017 (claim 3); 4. Sexual assault (claim 6); 5. False imprisonment (claim 18); 6. New York State Human Rights Law (claim 8) and New York City Human Rights Law (claim 9) (Sex discrimination includes sexual harassment through quid pro quo, disparate impact and hostile work environment theories); 7. Trafficking Victims Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1591 (claim 13); 8. California law (claims 16 and 17).

These are wide ranging claims, as they include broad human rights claims that refer to Harvey Weinstein’s conduct at work and around the world. Robert Weinstein, who was deeply involved in the Weinstein Company, and has a plethora of personal knowledge regarding Harvey Weinstein’s behavior at work and in many contexts, is a prime source of probative evidence.

Based on prior proceedings in this matter and elsewhere, Harvey Weinstein will claim he had a consensual relationship with Ms. Canosa. Evidence of other instances of abuse and sexual harassment would demonstrate that Harvey Weinstein has a pattern of conduct, and intent, and Ms. Canosa was a victim. Even if Robert Weinstein does not know Ms. Canosa personally, he has not ruled out that he has information that would be useful (or harmful) to Ms. Canosa’s case. It cannot be seriously disputed that Robert Weinstein was involved and had knowledge of the allegations and settlement of multiple sexual harassment and similar matters involving his brother for many years, or had knowledge of improper conduct by his brother. This is certainly relevant in a claim involving a serial sexual predator who is taking the position that his conduct was consensual.

Federal Rules of Evidence §404(b)(2) states:

Other Crimes, Wrongs, or Acts. (2) Permitted Uses. This evidence may be admissible for another purpose, such as proving motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident.

Such evidence may be used in a civil proceeding. Bonilla v. Yamaha Motors Corp., 955 F.2d 150, 154 (1st Cir. 1992) (recognizing applicability of FRE 404(b) in civil context); Roshan v. Fard, 705 F.2d 102, 104-106 (4th Cir. 1983) (civil action arising out of altercation in a bar; error to exclude defense evidence that plaintiff had been convicted of a crime where defendant had acted as an informant because such evidence tended to demonstrate plaintiff’s motive to initiate assault); Dosier v. Miami Valley Broadcasting Corp., 656 F.2d 1295, 1300-1301 (9th Cir. 1981) (instances of alleged racial discrimination may be used “to establish the existence of a pattern or scheme” under FRE 404(b)); Miller v. Poretsky, 595 F.2d 780, 784 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (prior acts of alleged racial discrimination relevant to prove “landlord’s motive”); Edgar v. Fred Jones Lincoln-Mercury, Inc., 524 F.2d 162, 164-167 (10th Cir. 1975) (in fraud action alleging an odometer rollback on car, error to exclude evidence of prior similar acts to show “knowledge or intent”); Demers v. Adams Homes of Nw. Florida, Inc., 321 F. App'x 847, 854 (11th Cir. 2009) (“Thus, discriminatory intent may be proven by direct or circumstantial evidence, such as that admitted under 404(b).”).

The case of Vale v. Great Neck Water Pollution Control Dist., No. 14CV4229ADSAYS, 2016 WL 1072639, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 8, 2016) is instructive. It held:

C. The Subpoena Seeks Relevant Evidence Plaintiff claims that she was retaliated against and fired by Murphy. She also alleges that Murphy has a propensity to retaliate against employees who exercise their employment rights. Evidence that Murphy has acted similarly toward Plaintiff and other District employees may be admissible on the issue of intent. In Terry v. Ashcroft, 336 F.3d 128, 141 (2d Cir.2003), the Second Circuit considered an “atmosphere of retaliation in the workplace,” including testimony from various employees from plaintiff's office as evidence of retaliation. Similarly, in Henry v. Wyeth Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 616 F.3d 134, 150–151 (2d Cir.2010), the Second Circuit noted that race related comments made by plaintiff's direct supervisor to two other employees were relevant to the plaintiff's claims of retaliation. In Ortega v. Fedcap Rehabilitation Svcs., Inc., 2003 WL 21383383, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. June 16, 2003), the court found that similar-act complaints against plaintiff's supervisor by other employees were discoverable because intent was at issue. See also Flanagan v. Travelers ins. Co., 111 F.R.D. 42, 48 (W.D.N.Y.1986) (“Evidence of general patterns of discrimination by an employer is clearly relevant in an individual disparate treatment case, and is therefore discoverable pursuant to Fed. R. Civ.P. 26(b)(1).”(citations omitted).

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Related

Henry v. Wyeth Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
616 F.3d 134 (Second Circuit, 2010)
Green Miller, Jr. v. Lester Poretsky
595 F.2d 780 (D.C. Circuit, 1978)
United States v. George H. Vest
842 F.2d 1319 (First Circuit, 1988)
Jorge L. Bonilla v. Yamaha Motors Corp.
955 F.2d 150 (First Circuit, 1992)
Demers v. Adams Homes of Northwest Florida, Inc.
321 F. App'x 847 (Eleventh Circuit, 2009)
Terry v. Ashcroft
336 F.3d 128 (Second Circuit, 2003)
Weber v. City of New York
973 F. Supp. 2d 227 (E.D. New York, 2013)
Dosier v. Miami Valley Broadcasting Corp.
656 F.2d 1295 (Ninth Circuit, 1981)
Flanagan v. Travelers Insurance
111 F.R.D. 42 (W.D. New York, 1986)

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Canosa v. Weinstein, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/canosa-v-weinstein-nysd-2021.