UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 00-10002
RUSSELL B. CANFIELD; PEGGY A. CANFIELD,
Plaintiffs-Counter Defendants-Appellants,
VERSUS
AMERICAN EUROCOPTER CORPORATION; DAN HAGLER; CHRISTIAN GRAS; LINDA BURKETT,
Defendants-Counter Claimants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court For the Northern District of Texas, Fort Worth (4:99-CV-145-Y) August 16, 2000 Before KING, Chief Judge, REYNALDO G. GARZA and PARKER, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM:* Plaintiffs Russell B. Canfield and Peggy A. Canfield appeal the dismissal of their claims against defendants American Eurocopter Corporation, Dan Hagler, Christian Gras and Linda Burkett and the award of attorney fees to the defendants. We
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
1 affirm. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY On December 13, 1995, American Eurocopter terminated Peggy Canfield’s employment. On January 3, 1996, Peggy Canfield executed a release of claims against American Eurocopter and its employees related to her employment, including Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1994)(“Title VII”) and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 621 (1994)(“ADEA”) in exchange for an enhanced severance package. On August 29, 1997, Peggy Canfield filed a complaint in
federal court alleging that American Eurocopter, Hagler, Gras, and
Jerry Motsinger violated the ADEA and Title VII in decisions
related to her termination. The district court dismissed all of
her claims with prejudice and on July 28, 1998, the Fifth Circuit
affirmed the dismissal. See Canfield v. American Eurocopter Corp.,
No. 98-10072 (5th Cir. July 28, 1998)(unpublished)(“Canfield I”).
On January 19, 1999, Peggy Canfield, now joined by her husband
Russell Canfield, filed the present lawsuit in state court.
Defendants removed it to federal court. Plaintiffs filed an
amended complaint alleging violations of ADEA and the Older Workers
Benefit Protection Act, 29 U.S.C. § 626(f)(1)(1994)(“OWBPA”), state
statutory and common law fraud, civil conspiracy, and violation of
fiduciary duty. The district court granted summary judgment for
the defendants holding, “plaintiffs’ claims in this cause are
barred by the doctrine of res judicata or, alternatively,
collateral estoppel. Additionally, plaintiffs were not ‘consumers’
2 of goods and services, as required for claims under the Texas
Deceptive Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Act. Finally,
plaintiff Russell Canfield does not have standing to bring this
suit.” The final judgment, entered May 24, 1999, dismissed all of
plaintiffs’ claims with prejudice and ordered plaintiffs to bear
all costs. Approximately one month later, the court granted the
defendants’ motion to set aside the final judgment and reopened the
case to consider defendants’ counterclaim for attorney fees and
request for sanctions. On January 19, 2000, the court entered a
final judgment awarding defendants $30,000 in attorney fees. The
district court further enjoined plaintiffs from filing any lawsuits
against defendant based on Peggy Canfield’s employment with
American Eurocopter.
DISCUSSION
Plaintiffs appeared pro se in the district court and on
appeal. Therefore, we are required to construe their pleadings
liberally. See Pena v. United States, 122 F.3d 3, 4 (5th Cir.
1997).
Plaintiffs first challenge the district court’s denial of
their motion to remand. In reviewing a district court’s denial of
a plaintiff’s motion to remand a case from federal court to state
court, we apply a de novo standard of review. See Sherrod v.
American Airlines, 132 F.3d 1112, 1117 (5th Cir. 1998). Under 28
U.S.C. § 1441(a), except as otherwise expressly provided by an act
3 of Congress, any civil action filed in state court may be removed
to federal court when the district court would have original
jurisdiction. See id. at 1118. Because plaintiffs assert causes
of action under the ADEA and the OWBPA, the district court had
jurisdiction over their claims and did not err in denying their
motion for remand.
Plaintiffs also challenge the district court’s order denying
their motion to amend their pleadings and the order staying
discovery. We review these decisions for abuse of discretion. See
Ashe v. Corley, 992 F.2d 540, 542 (5th Cir. 1993)(denial of leave
to amend reviewed for abuse of discretion); Munoz v. Orr, 200 F.3d
291, 300 (5th Cir. 2000)(discovery rulings are reviewed for abuse
of discretion). Plaintiffs sought to amend their complaint to add
claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988. Because plaintiffs
asserted no state action and because defendants are not state
actors, the district court concluded that the additional claims
were futile and denied the motion to amend. The district court’s
denial of plaintiffs’ motion to amend was not an abuse of
discretion. The defendants moved to stay discovery pending
resolution of their motion for summary judgment. The district
court granted the motion in part, specifically permitting discovery
to go forward “as to issues related to Plaintiffs’ execution of the
Release and the enforceability of the Release.” The district court
did not abuse its discretion in so limiting discovery.
4 Plaintiffs next challenge the district court’s grant of
summary judgment for defendants, reurging their a claim for relief
pursuant to the OWBPA as interpreted by Oubre v. Entergy
Operations, Inc., 522 U.S. 422 (1998). We review the summary
judgment order de novo, employing the same standard for summary
judgment applied by the district court. Armstrong v. City of
Dallas, 997 F.2d 62, 65 (5th Cir. 1993). We specifically rejected
this claim in Canfield I, holding “[t]he release, and [Peggy
Canfield’s] acknowledgment of same, complied with the requirements
of a release set out in the Older Workers Benefit Protection Act
(“OWBPA”), 29 U.S.C. § 626(f)(1),” citing Oubre. Canfield I, at
*2. The district court did not err in rejecting plaintiffs’ claim
in the present suit that defendants violated Peggy Canfield’s
rights under the OWBPA.
Finally, plaintiffs challenge the district court’s grant of
defendants’ counterclaim for $30,000 in attorney fees as sanctions.
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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 00-10002
RUSSELL B. CANFIELD; PEGGY A. CANFIELD,
Plaintiffs-Counter Defendants-Appellants,
VERSUS
AMERICAN EUROCOPTER CORPORATION; DAN HAGLER; CHRISTIAN GRAS; LINDA BURKETT,
Defendants-Counter Claimants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court For the Northern District of Texas, Fort Worth (4:99-CV-145-Y) August 16, 2000 Before KING, Chief Judge, REYNALDO G. GARZA and PARKER, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM:* Plaintiffs Russell B. Canfield and Peggy A. Canfield appeal the dismissal of their claims against defendants American Eurocopter Corporation, Dan Hagler, Christian Gras and Linda Burkett and the award of attorney fees to the defendants. We
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
1 affirm. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY On December 13, 1995, American Eurocopter terminated Peggy Canfield’s employment. On January 3, 1996, Peggy Canfield executed a release of claims against American Eurocopter and its employees related to her employment, including Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1994)(“Title VII”) and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 621 (1994)(“ADEA”) in exchange for an enhanced severance package. On August 29, 1997, Peggy Canfield filed a complaint in
federal court alleging that American Eurocopter, Hagler, Gras, and
Jerry Motsinger violated the ADEA and Title VII in decisions
related to her termination. The district court dismissed all of
her claims with prejudice and on July 28, 1998, the Fifth Circuit
affirmed the dismissal. See Canfield v. American Eurocopter Corp.,
No. 98-10072 (5th Cir. July 28, 1998)(unpublished)(“Canfield I”).
On January 19, 1999, Peggy Canfield, now joined by her husband
Russell Canfield, filed the present lawsuit in state court.
Defendants removed it to federal court. Plaintiffs filed an
amended complaint alleging violations of ADEA and the Older Workers
Benefit Protection Act, 29 U.S.C. § 626(f)(1)(1994)(“OWBPA”), state
statutory and common law fraud, civil conspiracy, and violation of
fiduciary duty. The district court granted summary judgment for
the defendants holding, “plaintiffs’ claims in this cause are
barred by the doctrine of res judicata or, alternatively,
collateral estoppel. Additionally, plaintiffs were not ‘consumers’
2 of goods and services, as required for claims under the Texas
Deceptive Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Act. Finally,
plaintiff Russell Canfield does not have standing to bring this
suit.” The final judgment, entered May 24, 1999, dismissed all of
plaintiffs’ claims with prejudice and ordered plaintiffs to bear
all costs. Approximately one month later, the court granted the
defendants’ motion to set aside the final judgment and reopened the
case to consider defendants’ counterclaim for attorney fees and
request for sanctions. On January 19, 2000, the court entered a
final judgment awarding defendants $30,000 in attorney fees. The
district court further enjoined plaintiffs from filing any lawsuits
against defendant based on Peggy Canfield’s employment with
American Eurocopter.
DISCUSSION
Plaintiffs appeared pro se in the district court and on
appeal. Therefore, we are required to construe their pleadings
liberally. See Pena v. United States, 122 F.3d 3, 4 (5th Cir.
1997).
Plaintiffs first challenge the district court’s denial of
their motion to remand. In reviewing a district court’s denial of
a plaintiff’s motion to remand a case from federal court to state
court, we apply a de novo standard of review. See Sherrod v.
American Airlines, 132 F.3d 1112, 1117 (5th Cir. 1998). Under 28
U.S.C. § 1441(a), except as otherwise expressly provided by an act
3 of Congress, any civil action filed in state court may be removed
to federal court when the district court would have original
jurisdiction. See id. at 1118. Because plaintiffs assert causes
of action under the ADEA and the OWBPA, the district court had
jurisdiction over their claims and did not err in denying their
motion for remand.
Plaintiffs also challenge the district court’s order denying
their motion to amend their pleadings and the order staying
discovery. We review these decisions for abuse of discretion. See
Ashe v. Corley, 992 F.2d 540, 542 (5th Cir. 1993)(denial of leave
to amend reviewed for abuse of discretion); Munoz v. Orr, 200 F.3d
291, 300 (5th Cir. 2000)(discovery rulings are reviewed for abuse
of discretion). Plaintiffs sought to amend their complaint to add
claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988. Because plaintiffs
asserted no state action and because defendants are not state
actors, the district court concluded that the additional claims
were futile and denied the motion to amend. The district court’s
denial of plaintiffs’ motion to amend was not an abuse of
discretion. The defendants moved to stay discovery pending
resolution of their motion for summary judgment. The district
court granted the motion in part, specifically permitting discovery
to go forward “as to issues related to Plaintiffs’ execution of the
Release and the enforceability of the Release.” The district court
did not abuse its discretion in so limiting discovery.
4 Plaintiffs next challenge the district court’s grant of
summary judgment for defendants, reurging their a claim for relief
pursuant to the OWBPA as interpreted by Oubre v. Entergy
Operations, Inc., 522 U.S. 422 (1998). We review the summary
judgment order de novo, employing the same standard for summary
judgment applied by the district court. Armstrong v. City of
Dallas, 997 F.2d 62, 65 (5th Cir. 1993). We specifically rejected
this claim in Canfield I, holding “[t]he release, and [Peggy
Canfield’s] acknowledgment of same, complied with the requirements
of a release set out in the Older Workers Benefit Protection Act
(“OWBPA”), 29 U.S.C. § 626(f)(1),” citing Oubre. Canfield I, at
*2. The district court did not err in rejecting plaintiffs’ claim
in the present suit that defendants violated Peggy Canfield’s
rights under the OWBPA.
Finally, plaintiffs challenge the district court’s grant of
defendants’ counterclaim for $30,000 in attorney fees as sanctions.
Defendants moved for summary judgment on their counterclaim,
alleging that plaintiffs violated Chapter Ten of the Texas Civil
Practice and Remedies Code by signing a pleading that 1) was
brought for an improper purpose; 2) was not warranted by existing
law or by a nonfrivolous argument for the extension, modification,
or reversal of existing law or the establishment of new law; and 3)
contained allegations and factual contentions that plaintiffs knew
had no evidentiary support even after a reasonable opportunity for
5 investigation. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 10 (Vernon Supp.
1999). Defendants further alleged that plaintiffs violated Chapter
Nine of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code by signing a
pleading that was groundless and brought in bad faith, for the
purpose of harassment and for the improper purpose of imposing
additional litigation costs upon defendants. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM.
CODE ANN. § 9 (Vernon Supp. 1999). Defendants submitted extensive
documentary evidence to support their factual allegations.
Plaintiffs responded that the remedies requested by defendants were
unconstitutional, but did not refute defendants’ factual
allegations. We find no error in the district court’s grant of
summary judgment for defendants on the issue of attorney’s fees.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, we affirm the decisions of the
district court. Appellants’ motion to supplement the record with
Peggy Canfield’s medical records is denied.
Motion to supplement DENIED. AFFIRMED.