Canada v. Jones

198 So. 2d 170, 1967 La. App. LEXIS 5413
CourtLouisiana Court of Appeal
DecidedApril 17, 1967
DocketNo. 6986
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 198 So. 2d 170 (Canada v. Jones) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Louisiana Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Canada v. Jones, 198 So. 2d 170, 1967 La. App. LEXIS 5413 (La. Ct. App. 1967).

Opinion

REID, Judge.

Plaintiff filed this suit in tort seeking to recover damages resulting from an automobile accident which occurred on March 14, 196.4, on U. S. Highway 61 (Scenic Highway) at about four o’clock P.M.

Plaintiff claims that he was riding as a guest passenger in an automobile owned by Irma I. Jones but operated by her husband Major C. Jones which was insured by Travelers Indemnity Company. This car was alleged to have collided with the rear of two vehicles traveling in the same direction as the Jones vehicle. The suit was filed against Major C. Jones, Irma I. Jones and their insurer, Travelers Indemnity Company, Chelsog N. Davis Sr., Thomas Quincy and Fireman’s Fund Insurance Company, Quincy’s insurer. Damages are sought in the total-amount of $21,700.00 with legal interest from judicial demand until paid and costs.

Defendants Thomas Quincy and his insurer Fireman’s Fund Insurance Company and Chelsog N. Davis Sr. filed peremptory exceptions on the grounds that there was no actionable negligence on the part of either of the drivers of the two forward cars. They additionally filed dilatory exceptions on the ground that Articles 3 and 4 of plaintiff’s petition do not describe the manner in which the accident took place, or the position of the respective automobiles prior to and at the time of the accident.

The defendants Major C. Jones, Irma I. Jones and Travelers Indemnity Company filed an answer admitting the accident and admitting the issuance of the policy on the car owned by Irma I. Jones but deny negligence on the part of Jones and in the alternative that if Major C. Jones was guilty of any negligence which was the proximate cause of the accident then the act of omission was that Major C. Jones was driving the automobile while in an intoxicated condition, that he was not in a mental or physical condition to properly operate a motor vehicle, that at the time because of his intoxicated condition he knew or should have known that he could not safely and properly operate a motor vehicle and that while driving the automobile in such an intoxicated condition he collided with the rear end of a vehicle proceeding south on U. S. Highway 61 which acts of negligence constituted the proximate cause of the accident sued on.

[172]*172In the further alternative the defendants Major C. Jones, Irma I. Jones, and Travelers Indemnity Company allege that if it be shown that Jones was guilty of such acts of negligence and that they were the proximate cause of the accident, all of which is denied, in that event they allege that plaintiff Canada was guilty of contributory negligence contributing to the accident which would bar his right to recover and which acts of contributory negligence consists of accepting a ride with an automobile driver who he knew, or should have known, was under the influence of intoxicating beverages; continuing to ride with an automobile driver when he knew, or should have known, was under the influence of intoxicating beverages and assumed the risk of an automobile accident contributable in whole or in part to the intoxicated condition of the said driver, and that Canada rode with this automobile driver when he knew, or should have known, that the driver was in no mental or physical condition to properly and safely operate a motor vehicle.

Plaintiff filed a supplemencal and amended petition in which he sets forth the position of the automobiles and alleging that the Quincy vehicle was in the left and partial right lane of traffic and had come to a stop but failed to give any signal and was obstructing traffic and that the Davis vehicle was in the right hand lane of traffic but made a sudden stop without giving proper signal and was obstructing traffic. He further alleged that the Jones vehicle was following the Davis vehicle in the right hand lane but was being driven at an excessive rate of speed and without i warning collided with the Davis vehicle which in turn collided with the Quincy vehicle, and alleged the damages.

Thomas Quincy and Fireman’s Fund Insurance Company then filed an exception of no cause of action on the grounds that the allegations show the proximate cause of the collision was the negligence of Major C. Jones. They subsequently filed an answer similar to the one filed by the Joneses and Travelers Indemnity Company.

The exceptions of vagueness filed by Quincy and Fireman’s Fund Insurance Company were sustained and plaintiff allowed fifteen days to amend Article 3.

Exception of no cause of action filed by Thomas Quincy and Fireman’s Fund Insurance Company were overruled.

The case was tried on the merits and the Court rendered judgment in favor of all the defendants and against the plaintiff rejecting and denying the demands of Canada and dismissing the suit at his costs. From this judgment plaintiff has appealed devolutively to this Court, only from the judgment insofar as it affects Major C. Jones, Irma I. Jones and Travelers Indemnity Company.

Defendant Major C. Jones, driver of the car, did not testify. Martin N. Fritcher, a Sergeant with the Louisiana State Police investigated the accident and he stated that the accident occurred at, or near, the intersection of U. S. Highway 61 (Scenic Highway) and Seventy-first Avenue. There were three cars involved in the accident, a 1962 Buick, owned and operated by Chel-sog Davis, a 1959 Pontiac owned and operated by Thomas Quincy, and a car owned by Irma I. Jones and operated by Major C. Jones. He further testified that the Jones vehicle collided with the rear of the Davis vehicle which caused it to strike, in a swinging around motion, the Quincy vehicle. He concluded that both the Davis and Quincy vehicles were completely stopped, the Scenic Highway being flooded and the traffic ahead was also stopped. He testified positively that Jones was drinking. The weather was clear and nothing to impair Jones’ vision. He further testified that all the occupants of Jones’ car had been drinking. The testimony, a portion of which we quote, is as follows:

“Q: You indicated that according to your investigation that Major [173]*173Jones had been drinking, is that right, sir?
A: My report shows that he had been drinking.
Q: And you have an independent recollection of that, too?
A: I have a recollection of it, also.
Q: Also you stated the plaintiff, Reed Canada, gave you some trouble. Had he also been drinking, was that apparent to you?
A: Yes, sir, definitely.
Q: Did it look like all the occupants of that car had been drinking?
A: Yes sir.
Q: It was apparent to you from their physical condition and actions at the scene of the accident?
A: That they had been drinking.”

Plaintiff called as a witness James R. Fields the third occupant of the Jones car. Fields testified that he, Jones and Canada met around nine or ten o’clock on Friday night at Canada’s home and started playing poker. They played all night long and continuously on Saturday until about eleven o’clock. At that time they left to go to Southern University to attempt to collect some money Canada claimed was owed to him by one of the professors. Fields stated that they were drinking a little Scotch and beer.

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Related

Marcotte v. Travelers Insurance Co.
236 So. 2d 587 (Louisiana Court of Appeal, 1970)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
198 So. 2d 170, 1967 La. App. LEXIS 5413, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/canada-v-jones-lactapp-1967.