Campos v. State

867 N.E.2d 676, 2007 Ind. App. LEXIS 1210, 2007 WL 1630418

• Court: Indiana Court of Appeals
• Decided: June 7, 2007
• Docket: 45A03-0605-CR-211
• Status: Published

Opinions

OPINION

BARNES, Judge.

Case Summary¹

Sergio Campos appeals the denial of his motion to suppress evidence obtained during a traffic stop of the car in which he was a passenger. We affirm.

Issues

Campos raises three issues. We address the two dispositive issues, which we restate as:

I. whether Campos had standing to challenge the search of the vehicle; and

II. whether Campos should have been Mirandized prior to entering the police car.

Facts

On July 28, 2005, Officer Alfred Villarreal of the Lake County Police Department stopped a car for speeding. Cesar Santiago-Armendariz was the driver, and Campos was the passenger. When Officer Villarreal approached the car, he observed that Santiago-Armendariz’s hand was shaking as he “fumbled through some of his paperwork.” Tr. p. 17. Officer Villarreal told Santiago-Armendariz that he was issuing a warning for speeding and asked Santiago-Armendariz to come with him to the police car while he wrote the warning.

Officer Villarreal determined the car was registered to Jose Gonzalez and asked Santiago-Armendariz who owned the car. Santiago-Armendariz said it belonged to Campos’s brother, Daniel. Officer Villarreal inquired as to the purpose of the trip, and Santiago-Armendariz told him that they had been to an airport. Santiago-Armendariz could not remember which airport and described it as the “small airport” in Chicago. Id. at 21. Santiago-Armen-dariz then gave Officer Villarreal directions to the airport and indicated that he had seen a sign for “Midway Airport.” Id.

As Officer Villarreal left the police car to obtain Campos’s identification, he again asked if the car belonged to Campos’s brother. Santiago-Armendariz replied that it did, and the officer asked “ ‘Is it Jose Gonzalez?’ ” Id. at 28. Santiago-Armendariz responded, “ Yes.’ ” Id.

When Officer Villarreal approached Campos, Campos told him that he and Santiago-Armendariz had been to O’Hare Airport for an international flight. Officer Villarreal returned to the police car and asked Santiago-Armendariz if he was sure they had been to Midway. Santiago-Ar-mendariz reiterated that they had been to the “small” airport. Id. at 27. Officer Villarreal then gave Santiago-Armendariz the warning ticket, returned his identification and paperwork, and told him “he was all set and to be careful in pulling out into traffic.” Id. The two shook hands and both walked back toward their vehicles.

Before Santiago-Armendariz left, Officer Villarreal asked him if he had any illegal weapons or narcotics in the car. Santiago-Armendariz said no. Officer Villarreal asked if he could search for those items. Santiago-Armendariz asked if it was necessary, and Officer Villarreal said it was. Santiago-Armendariz said “Okay,” and Officer Villarreal told him to have a seat in the police car for his own safety while he searched the car. Id.

Officer Villarreal also asked Campos if he could search the car. Campos told him to ask Santiago-Armendariz. The officer said that Santiago-Armendariz had consented, and Campos replied, “ ‘Okay.’ ” Id. Officer Villarreal asked Campos to have a seat in the back seat of the police car.

Unknown to Campos, a recording device was operating in the police car while he and Santiago-Armendariz were alone in the car, and the two apparently made “damaging admissions.” Id. at 50. Officer Villarreal’s search of the car uncovered 1,246 grams of cocaine in the trunk. The officer handcuffed Santiago-Armendariz and Campos and advised them of their Miranda rights.

On July 29, 2005, the State charged Campos with Class A felony dealing in cocaine. Campos moved to suppress the evidence obtained during the search of the car and the recording. After a hearing, the motion was denied. Campos now appeals.

Analysis

Our review of the denial of a motion to suppress is similar to other sufficiency matters. Richardson v. State, 848 N.E.2d 1097, 1100 (Ind.Ct.App.2006), trans. denied. We must determine whether substantial evidence of probative value exists to support the trial court’s ruling. Id. We do not reweigh the evidence, and we consider conflicting evidence most favorable to the trial court’s decision. Id. at 1100-01. “However, unlike the typical sufficiency of the evidence case where only the evidence favorable to the judgment is considered, we also consider the uncontested evidence favorable to the defendant.” Id. We will affirm the trial court’s ruling if it is sustainable on any legal grounds apparent in the record. Id.

I. Standing

Campos argues that, contrary to the trial court’s ruling, he had standing to challenge the search of the car under both the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution. In determining whether a person’s Fourth Amendment rights have been violated, the Supreme Court has determined that that decision is more properly placed within the purview of substantive Fourth Amendment law than within the purview of standing. Willis v. State, 780 N.E.2d 423, 427 (Ind.Ct.App.2002) (citing Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 140, 99 S.Ct. 421, 428, 58 L.Ed.2d 387 (1978)). The Supreme Court has rejected the rubric of the standing doctrine when analyzing Fourth Amendment claims and has determined that a defendant must demonstrate that he or she personally has an expectation of privacy in the place searched, and that the expectation is reasonable. Id. (citing Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 87-88, 119 S.Ct. 469, 472, 142 L.Ed.2d 373 (1998)). The burden is on the defendant challenging the constitutional validity of a search to demonstrate that he or she had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the premises searched. State v. Friedel, 714 N.E.2d 1231, 1236 (Ind.Ct.App.1999).

Campos, the passenger of the car, argues that he “had been given permission by his brother-in-law to drive/have the car and take it out of state.” Appellant’s Br. p. 11. This assertion, however, is not supported by his citations to the record, and we find no support for such in the record. In fact, there is very little evidence regarding the ownership of the car — just Santiago-Armendariz’s statements, which were conflicting, that the car belonged to Campos’s brother. These statements alone do not support Campos’s argument that his brother-in-law had given him permission to use the car. In the absence of such evidence, Campos was simply a passenger in a car driven by Santiago-Armendariz. Campos has not shown that he had an expectation of privacy in the trunk of that ear.

Campos also argues that he had standing to challenge the search under the Indiana Constitution, which has retained a separate standing requirement. Willis, 780 N.E.2d at 427. “While the Fourth Amendment inquiry focuses largely on the defendant’s privacy expectation in the premises searched, cases interpreting our state constitution focus both on the premises searched and the defendant’s interest in the property seized.” Mays v. State, 719 N.E.2d 1263, 1267 (Ind.App.Ct.1999), trans. denied. Specifically, “to challenge evidence as the result of an unreasonable search or seizure under Article I, Section 11, a defendant must establish ownership, control, possession, or interest in either the premises searched or the property seized.” Peterson v. State, 674 N.E.2d 528, 534 (Ind.1996). “If the facts fail to establish that the alleged illegal search and seizure actually concerned the person, house, papers or effects of the defendant, he will not have standing to challenge the illegality.” Id.

As we have discussed, there is no evidence that Campos had any ownership, control, possession, or interest in the car that was searched other than simply as a passenger. He argues, however, “the State cannot charge Campos with knowingly possessing drugs found in the trunk of the car of [sic] he had lawful possession and then claim, for purposes of standing, he had no possessory interest in the items seized.” Appellant’s Br. p. 11.

First, if we adopted Campos’s “automatic standing” argument, we would essentially be eliminating the standing doctrine as it relates to possessory offenses because a defendant charged with such crimes would always have standing to challenge the seizure under the Indiana Constitution based solely on the charges pending against him or her. The nature of the charges alone, not the facts of the case, would eliminate the defendant’s obligation to establish ownership, control, possession, or interest in either the premises searched or the property seized prior to challenging the illegality. See Peterson, 674 N.E.2d at 534.

Further, the doctrine of “automatic standing” has been rejected for purposes of the Fourth Amendment.² See Livingston v. State, 542 N.E.2d 192, 194 (Ind.1989); Robles v. State, 510 N.E.2d 660, 663 (Ind.1987) (“[M]ere possession of a searched item does not confer automatic standing to challenge the search on Fourth Amendment grounds, albeit that possession, as in this case, is sufficient to establish criminal culpability.”), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1218, 108 S.Ct. 2872, 101 L.Ed.2d 907. In Livingston, the defendant argued that to establish standing under the Fourth Amendment, “a person must thus risk admitting guilt to the crime to establish standing to challenge the search which produced the narcotics he is charged with possessing.” Livingston, 542 N.E.2d at 193. Citing Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 394, 88 S.Ct. 967, 976, 19 L.Ed.2d 1247 (1968), in which the Supreme Court held that a defendant’s testimony given at a hearing on a motion to suppress evidence on Fourth Amendment grounds was not admissible at trial as evidence of the defendant’s guilt, our supreme court concluded that Livingston’s dilemma was rendered nonexistent. Id. at 194. Based on this reasoning, Campos’s argument fails.³

Finally, even if Campos had argued that he had standing to challenge to the stop, the trial court properly denied the motion to suppress. Indeed, every person in a motor vehicle has the right to contest the stop of the vehicle in which he or she is traveling as either a driver or passenger. Osborne v. State, 805 N.E.2d 435, 439 (Ind.Ct.App.2004), trans. denied. However, police can briefly detain an individual for investigatory purposes without a warrant if, based on specific and articula-ble facts, the officer has reasonable suspicion that criminal activity may be afoot. Scott v. State, 855 N.E.2d 1068, 1072 (Ind.Ct.App.2006) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1880, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968)). “Reasonable suspicion entails some minimal level of objective justification for making a stop, something more than an unparticularized suspicion or hunch, but less than the level of suspicion required for probable cause.” Id. “Even if the stop is justified, a reasonable suspicion only allows the officer to temporarily freeze the situation for inquiry and does not give him all the rights attendant to an arrest.” Id. To determine the validity of a stop, we consider the totality of the circumstances. Id. at 1072-73.

Campos does not argue that Officer Villarreal did not have reasonable suspicion to stop the car for speeding. He argues, however, that it was only after Officer Villarreal completed the traffic stop that he asked for consent to search and that there was not reasonable suspicion “to detain the car and Campos as well as to seek consent to search.”⁴ Appellant’s Br. p. 16.

In support of his argument, Campos relies on Tumblin v. State, 736 N.E.2d 317, 319 (Ind.Ct.App.2000), trans. denied, which involved a patdown search of a passenger of a car after a traffic stop was completed. In Tumblin, the record established that “Officer Trimble fully concluded the routine traffic stop without any indication of illegal activity beyond traffic infractions. He admitted that the purpose of his initial stop had been completed and the vehicle occupants were ‘free to go’ before he inquired as to drugs or weapons.” Tumblin, 736 N.E.2d at 322. We concluded that the search and seizure were constitutionally infirm and reversed Tum-blin’s conviction. Id. at 323.

Unlike in Tumblin, here, Officer Villarreal testified that after he issued the warning, returned Santiago-Armendariz’s paperwork, and told him to be careful pulling out, Santiago-Armendariz and Campos were free to go only “[i]n their mind[s].” Tr. p. 29. Further, although Officer Villarreal testified that at that point he did not have any business left regarding the traffic infraction, he already had reasonable suspicion to further detain Santiago-Armendariz and Campos. The detailed and inconsistent stories from Santiago-Ar-mendariz and Campos regarding which airport they had been to, Santiago-Armen-dariz’s inconsistent statements regarding the name of the owner of the car, and Santiago-Armendariz’s demeanor justified the continuation of the stop.

Based on the totality of the circumstances, there was not a separate and distinct stop unsupported by reasonable suspicion. This was a single ongoing stop continuously supported by reasonable suspicion.⁵

II. Miranda

Campos also argues that he should have been Mirandized when he entered the police car with Santiago-Armendariz because he was in custody. Miranda warnings are only required when a suspect is subject to custodial interrogation. See King v. State, 844 N.E.2d 92, 96 (Ind.Ct.App.2005). Because Officer Villarreal was not in the police car or questioning Campos when he made incriminating statements, there was no interrogation. Campos has not established that the statements were recorded in violation of the Fifth Amendment rights.⁶

Conclusion

The trial court properly denied Campos’s motion to suppress because Campos did not have standing to challenge the search and he did not have to be informed of his Miranda rights prior to entering the police cruiser. We affirm.

Affirmed.

VAIDIK, J., concurs. MAY, J., dissents with separate opinion.

1 . We heard oral argument on March 29, 2007, at the University of Southern Indiana in Evansville. We thank the University for its hospitality and commend counsel for the quality of their oral advocacy.

2 . In U.S. v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 92-93, 100 S.Ct. 2547, 2553, 65 L.Ed.2d 619 (1980), the Supreme Court rejected “blind adherence” to the other underlying assumption that possession of the seized goods is an acceptable measure of Fourth Amendment interests and engaged in a conscientious effort to apply the Fourth Amendment by asking not merely whether the defendant had a possessory interest in the items seized, but whether he or she had an expectation of privacy in the area searched.

3 . Because Campos does not have standing to challenge the search, we need not address his argument that his consent to search was invalid.

4 . Campos concedes, and the State agrees, that he "did not raise this basis at the trial level.” Appellant’s Br. p. 13 n. 1. To the extent we address this issue, we do so because it was sufficiently raised in his motion to suppress, not because Indiana Appellate Rule 14(B) allowed him to raise it for the first time on appeal as Campos asserts.

5 . Campos argues, "Under the Indiana constitution, the officer's conduct in detaining the car and Campos, and seeking consent to search were not reasonable given the totality of the circumstances.” This statement alone is not sufficient to establish a separate claim feat fee stop was invalid based on the Indiana Constitution. See Richardson v. State, 800 N.E.2d 639, 647 (Ind.Ct.App.2003) ("Richardson's failure to cite any authority or to make any separate argument specific to the state constitutional provision waives the state constitutional argument on appeal.”), trans. denied.

6 . To the extent Campos argues that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated, we simply cannot agree with his assertion that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the backseat of a police car.