Campion v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, Inc.

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Michigan
DecidedAugust 9, 2023
Docket2:22-cv-12075
StatusUnknown

This text of Campion v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, Inc. (Campion v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Michigan primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Campion v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, Inc., (E.D. Mich. 2023).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN SOUTHERN DIVISION

JOHN LEECH CAMPION, Case No. 2:22-cv-12075 Plaintiff, HONORABLE STEPHEN J. MURPHY, III v.

FARMERS INSURANCE EXCHANGE, INC.,

Defendant. /

OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO COMPEL DISCOVERY [17] Plaintiff John Leech Campion sued his former employer, Defendant Farmers Insurance Exchange, for violating Title VII of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Michigan Persons with Disabilities Civil Rights Act (PWDCRA). ECF 1. After Defendant answered, ECF 11, the Court held a scheduling conference under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16 and issued a scheduling order. ECF 12; 15. Four months later, Defendant moved for the Court “to compel Plaintiff to produce responsive records and information related to key substantive issues and his alleged economic and non-economic damages.” ECF 17, PgID 82. The parties briefed the motion. ECF 19; 20. For the reasons below, the Court will grant the motion to compel.1

1 Based on the briefing of the parties, the Court will resolve the motion on the briefs without a hearing. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 78(b); E.D. Mich. L.R. 7.1(f)(2). BACKGROUND “Plaintiff has suffered from a degenerative sight and hearing loss disorder since he was in high school.” ECF 1, PgID 2. He was employed by Defendant from

2006 to 2021, and Plaintiff claimed that “Defendant was fully aware of Plaintiff’s condition.” Id. at 2–3. Plaintiff alleged that he was “penalized [] for failing to complete work he was physically incapable of performing without an accommodation, but which he could perform with a simple fix.” Id. at 3. He also alleged that Defendant offered a severance package to him, which he declined. Id. Defendant then terminated Plaintiff’s employment. Id. Plaintiff sought damages for “mental [or] emotional pain and suffering, including but not limited to loss of enjoyment of a normal life due to

irritability, depression, anxiety, worry, humiliation, grief, sadness, anger, and panic attacks.” Id. at 6, 8, 11, 16; see id. at 12, 14. During discovery, Defendant served its first set of requests for production of documents and its first set of interrogatories. ECF 17, PgID 89; ECF 17-2. Plaintiff responded—after a three-week extension—to the discovery requests but included no supporting documentation. ECF 17-3; ECF 17-4. For some responses, Plaintiff

promised to “supplement [his] response.” ECF 17-3, PgID 123, 126; ECF 17-4, PgID 131. For others, Plaintiff objected based on relevance or scope. ECF 17-3, PgID 124, 126; ECF 17-4, PgID 130, 132–33. After receiving the discovery responses, Defendant’s counsel emailed Plaintiff’s counsel “to clarify some of Plaintiff’s objections to the [discovery requests].” ECF 17, PgID 91; ECF 17-8 (email chain between counsel). Defendant’s counsel even “made a proposal to Plaintiff to narrow the applicable [d]iscovery [r]equests.” ECF 17, PgID 92; ECF 17-8, PgID 146–47. Plaintiff’s counsel could not reach her client to review Defendant’s proposal. ECF 17-8, PgID 145–46.

Although Plaintiff’s counsel never responded to the proposal, Plaintiff disclosed to Defendant his supplemental responses to the production requests. ECF 17, PgID 93; ECF 17-10. Still, the supplemental responses did not include several items requested by Defendant. ECF 17, PgID 94; see ECF 17-10. And when Defendant’s counsel again tried to confer with Plaintiff’s counsel to cure the apparent production deficiencies, counsel for Plaintiff failed to agree to a deadline to produce or object to the remaining discovery requests. Id. at 94–95. “Defendant’s counsel then

informed Plaintiff[’s counsel] that Defendant would be filing a motion to compel” because Plaintiff had failed to remedy the deficiencies. Id. at 95. LEGAL STANDARD Discovery matters, including compelling the disclosure of documents and interrogatories are “committed to the sound discretion of the district court.” In re Air Crash Disaster, 86 F.3d 498, 516 (6th Cir. 1996) (quotation marks and quotation

omitted); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a). Discovery is limited only to relevant matters of the case. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). Relevant matters are construed broadly to include any information that “is reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” Lewis v. ACB Bus. Servs. Inc., 135 F.3d 389, 402 (6th Cir. 1998) (quotation marks and citations omitted). “A party seeking discovery may move for an order compelling an answer, designation, production, or inspection . . . if” the opposing party “fails to answer an interrogatory submitted under Rule 33” or if the party “fails to produce

documents . . . as requested under Rule 34.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(3)(B). And under Rule 37(a)(4), “an evasive or incomplete disclosure, answer, or response must be treated as a failure to disclose, answer, or respond.” “The burden . . . rests with the party objecting to the motion to compel to show [that] the discovery requests are improper.” Strategic Mktg. & Rsch. Team, Inc. v. Auto Data Sols., Inc., No. 2:15-cv-12695, 2017 WL 1196361, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 31, 2017) (Murphy, J.) (quotation marks and quotation omitted). “Once a party raises

an objection to discovery based on relevance, the burden shifts to the party seeking the information to demonstrate that the requests are relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action.” Id. at *2 (quotation marks and quotation omitted). DISCUSSION The Court will first grant the motion to compel. After, the Court will explain why Rule 37 sanctions are warranted.

I. Motion to Compel Plaintiff provided to Defendant “seven new medical record authorizations on the same day he filed his [r]esponse” to the motion to compel. ECF 20, PgID 184. Consequently, Defendant modified the relief it sought. Id. at 185–86. Defendant categorized the requested relief into four topics of discovery: medical records, emotional distress damages, tax filings, and social security records. See id. The Court will discuss each in turn. A. Medical Records

Defendant moved for the Court to compel Plaintiff, “within [ten] days of the Court’s Order, to confirm the [eight] medical record authorizations represent the extent of his medical care providers since April 2016 by supplementing his response to Interrogatory No. 1 . . . to reflect those [eight] providers and any other providers still yet to be disclosed.” ECF 20, PgID 185. Plaintiff confirmed that he had produced to Defendant “signed authorizations.” ECF 19, PgID 178. But Plaintiff did not explain in his response whether those authorizations reflect all the “health care

providers . . . consulted by Plaintiff since April 2016.” ECF 17-4, PgID 130; see ECF 19, PgID 176–79. And if he has consulted with other health care providers, Plaintiff did not argue why he should not have to disclose them in a supplemental response. See ECF 19, PgID 176–79. Accordingly, the Court will order Plaintiff to supplement his response to Interrogatory No. 1 to confirm that the eight medical record authorizations he sent to Defendant reflect the extent of his medical care providers

since April 2016.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
Campion v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, Inc., Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/campion-v-farmers-insurance-exchange-inc-mied-2023.