FILE THIS OPINION WAS FILED FOR RECORD AT 8 A.M. ON JULY 11, 2024 IN CLERK’S OFFICE SUPREME COURT, STATE OF WASHINGTON JULY 11, 2024 ERIN L. LENNON SUPREME COURT CLERK
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
) DANIEL CAMPEAU, individually ) No. 102047-3 and on behalf of all persons similarly ) situated, ) ) Petitioner, ) En Banc ) v. ) ) YAKIMA HMA, LLC, ) Filed: July 11, 2024 ) Respondent. ) )
GONZÁLEZ, C.J.—General jurisdiction courts have the power, in limited
circumstances, to equitably toll a statute of limitations established by the
legislature. When the statute of limitations is tolled, a case that would otherwise
be untimely may proceed. In re Pers. Restraint of Fowler, 197 Wn.2d 46, 53, 479
P.3d 1164 (2021). Given our due regard for the legislature, equitable tolling must
be applied sparingly but is available when justice demands it. Millay v. Cam, 135
Wn.2d 193, 206, 955 P.2d 791 (1998).
In a suit that was timely filed by a nurses’ union, a trial court found that
Yakima HMA LLC wrongfully withheld wages from its nurses. Years later, and Campeau v. Yakima HMA, LLC, No. 102047-3
after the statute of limitations had passed, this court dismissed the union’s attempt
to recoup those wages, finding the union lacked associational standing. Before the
mandate on our opinion issued, some of those nurses filed this class action suit in
an attempt to recover wages due. This case asks us to determine whether equitable
tolling applies to allow this otherwise untimely class action to proceed. We
conclude that equitable tolling may be available, even in the absence of bad faith or
misconduct by the defendant, when a case based on associational standing fails, an
association member promptly files a follow-on class action, and the remaining
elements of equitable tolling have been met. We agree with the trial court that
equitable tolling is appropriate here. Accordingly, we reverse the Court of Appeals
and remand to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
FACTS
A trial court found that over five years, Yakima HMA LLC failed to pay
nearly $1.5 million in nurses’ wages. In 2015, the Washington State Nurses
Association (WSNA) 1 brought a claim against Yakima HMA for unpaid wages on
behalf of 28 home health and hospice nurses. Wash. State Nurses Ass’n v. Yakima
HMA, LLC, 196 Wn.2d 409, 412, 469 P.3d 300 (2020) (WSNA). Several nurses,
including the lead plaintiff here, Daniel Campeau, actively participated in the
1 WSNA is a labor union and is the bargaining representative for the nurses employed by Yakima HMA.
2 Campeau v. Yakima HMA, LLC, No. 102047-3
WSNA case. The trial court concluded that WSNA had associational standing to
bring the case and that Yakima HMA knowingly and willfully deprived the nurses
of their wages. Id. at 414.
Years later, and after the statute of limitations would have passed, we
reversed the trial court on the threshold issue of standing. This court concluded
that WSNA did not have associational standing to recover unpaid wages on behalf
of its nurses because the “damages established through representative testimony
were not certain, easily ascertainable, or within the knowledge of the defendant.”
Id. at 411. In deciding that case we noted that “[o]ther routes to collective action
against the egregious conduct of [Yakima HMA] were not foreclosed for the
nurses.” Id. at 425. We clarified that “[e]gregious employment practices, like the
practices that the nurses testified about . . . , should be confronted.” Id. We also
observed that “it [was] undisputed that the nurses could pursue a class action claim
against Yakima [HMA].” Id.
Before the WSNA case mandated, Campeau filed this class action alleging
materially identical wage and hour violation claims. Campeau is a union member,
a nurse, and a former employee of Yakima HMA. Campeau brought this action
“to vindicate the rights of the nurses who prevailed at trial in the WSNA [c]ase, but
who have still not been paid the wages they are due.” Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 2.
3 Campeau v. Yakima HMA, LLC, No. 102047-3
Yakima HMA moved for judgment on the pleadings arguing that the statute
of limitations barred Campeau’s claims. Campeau acknowledged that nothing
prevented the nurses from filing their own claims and did not dispute that his claim
exceeded the three-year time bar. Campeau argued that the statute of limitations
should be equitably tolled. The trial court agreed, reasoning, in part, that Campeau
(1) “diligently pursued his cla[i]ms through the WSNA action” and (2) “reasonably
relied on the union’s action to protect his statutory rights.” Id. at 111. Yakima
HMA successfully sought discretionary review at the Court of Appeals.
While review was pending, this court issued its opinion in Fowler v. Guerin,
200 Wn.2d 110, 515 P.3d 502 (2022). In Fowler, we set out the general standards
for equitable tolling in civil cases under Washington law. Id. at 112, 125. Fowler
requires, in part, a showing that “the defendant’s bad faith, false assurances, or
deception interfered with the plaintiff’s timely filing.” Id. at 125. Campeau
conceded that he could not satisfy Fowler and asked the Court of Appeals to apply
American Pipe2 tolling. Answer to Yakima HMA’s Opening Br. at 5-6 (Wash. Ct.
App. No. 38152-8-III (2022)). The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court,
concluding that American Pipe tolling is not available in Washington. Campeau v.
Yakima HMA, LLC, 26 Wn. App. 2d 481, 484, 528 P.3d 855 (2023). The Court of
2 Am. Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 94 S. Ct. 756, 38 L. Ed. 2d 713 (1974).
4 Campeau v. Yakima HMA, LLC, No. 102047-3
Appeals also held that even if American Pipe tolling was available, the doctrine
would not apply to Campeau’s case. Id. at 484, 490.
We granted review.
ANALYSIS
We must decide whether the statute of limitations may be equitably tolled,
even in the absence of a defendant’s bad faith, where associational standing has
failed and a member promptly brings a follow-on class action on the same grounds.
Our review is de novo. See Niemann v. Vaughn Cmty. Church, 154 Wn.2d 365,
374-75, 113 P.3d 463 (2005) (availability of equitable relief is a question of law).
1. Availability of American Pipe Tolling in Washington State
Campeau argues the statute of limitations should be tolled under American
Pipe. Yakima HMA responds that even if American Pipe tolling is available in
Washington, it does not apply because this case did not originate as a class action
and because Campeau was never a class member. We agree with Yakima HMA
that the question of whether American Pipe tolling is available in Washington does
not arise under these facts.
In American Pipe, the United States Supreme Court addressed the
relationship between statutes of limitations and class actions under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 23. 414 U.S. at 540. In that case, the state of Utah filed a timely
class action alleging violations of antitrust law by steel and concrete companies.
5 Campeau v. Yakima HMA, LLC, No. 102047-3
Id. at 540-41. The district court denied class certification because the class was too
small. Id. at 543. Subsequently, members of the original class filed motions to
intervene. Id. at 544. The district court denied the motions because the statute of
limitations had run. Id. The Supreme Court reversed.
The Supreme Court held that “the commencement of the original class suit
tolls the running of the statute for all purported members of the class who make
timely motions to intervene after the court has found the suit inappropriate for class
action status.” Id. at 553. The Court reasoned that a “contrary rule allowing
participation only by those potential members . . . who had earlier filed motions to
intervene . . . would deprive Rule 23 class actions of the efficiency and economy of
litigation which is a principal purpose of the procedure.” Id. In the absence of
tolling, “[p]otential class members would be induced to file protective motions to
intervene or to join in the event that a class was later found unsuitable.” Id. This
would result in “needless duplication of motions.” Id. at 554.
American Pipe is not applicable here. This case does not involve a failed
class action and a follow-on motion to intervene. This case involves a failed
representational action brought on a theory of associational standing and a follow-
on class action. American Pipe does not apply to these facts. Accordingly, we
decline to determine whether American Pipe tolling is available in Washington and
will await a case that more squarely confronts that question.
6 Campeau v. Yakima HMA, LLC, No. 102047-3
2. Equitable Tolling
The parties agree, as do we, that under Fowler, equitable tolling would not
apply because there has been no showing of bad faith or misconduct by Yakima
HMA. We conclude, nonetheless, that under these facts and the long-standing
principles underlying equitable tolling, equitable tolling is appropriate in this case.
Statutes of limitations are a “‘legislative declaration of public policy which
the courts can do no less than respect,’ with rare equitable exceptions.” Bilanko v.
Barclay Ct. Owners Ass’n, 185 Wn.2d 443, 451-52, 375 P.3d 591 (2016) (internal
quotation marks omitted) (quoting Cost Mgmt. Servs., Inc. v. City of Lakewood,
178 Wn.2d 635, 651, 310 P.3d 804 (2013)). Equitable doctrines are fashioned by
the courts and are intended to relieve individuals “under special circumstances
from the harshness of strict legal rules.” Ames v. Dep’t of Lab. & Indus., 176
Wash. 509, 513, 30 P.2d 239 (1934). Equitable tolling permits “a court to allow an
action to proceed when justice requires it, even though a statutory time period has”
passed. State v. Duvall, 86 Wn. App. 871, 874, 940 P.2d 671 (1997). Equitable
tolling is an extraordinary form of relief and must be carefully applied to avoid
“‘subtitut[ing] for a positive rule established by the legislature a variable rule of
decision based upon individual ideas of justice.’” Fowler, 200 Wn.2d at 119
(quoting Leschner v. Dep’t of Lab. & Indus., 27 Wn.2d 911, 926, 185 P.2d 113
(1947)).
7 Campeau v. Yakima HMA, LLC, No. 102047-3
Equitable tolling is appropriate when it is “consistent with both the purpose
of the statute providing the cause of action and the purpose of the statute of
limitations.” Millay, 135 Wn.2d at 206 (citing Douchette v. Bethel Sch. Dist. No.
403, 117 Wn.2d 805, 812, 818 P.2d 1362 (1991)). Campeau brought this class
action, in part, under, our state’s Minimum Wage Act, ch. 49.46 RCW, and
industrial welfare act, ch. 49.12 RCW. CP at 1. A purpose underlying these acts is
to ensure employees are paid the adequate wages they labored for. See RCW
49.46.005; RCW 49.12.010; Schilling v. Radio Holdings, Inc., 136 Wn.2d 152,
157, 961 P.2d 371 (1998). The purpose underlying statutes of limitations is to
protect against (1) litigating stale claims, (2) loss of evidence, and (3) fading
memories. Douchette, 117 Wn.2d at 813.
This court’s recent opinion in Fowler, set out the general standards for
equitable tolling in civil cases under Washington law. 200 Wn.2d at 125.
Affirming Millay, we held that
[a] plaintiff seeking equitable tolling of the statute of limitations in a civil suit must demonstrate that such extraordinary relief is warranted because (1) the plaintiff has exercised diligence, (2) the defendant’s bad faith, false assurances, or deception interfered with the plaintiff’s timely filing, (3) tolling is consistent with (a) the purpose of the underlying statute and (b) the purpose of the statute of limitations, and (4) justice requires tolling the statute of limitations.
Id. We explained that “Washington courts must evaluate each part of this standard
in light of the particular facts of each case and should equitably toll the applicable
8 Campeau v. Yakima HMA, LLC, No. 102047-3
statute of limitations only when all four parts of the Millay standard are satisfied.”
Id. at 124-25.
But Fowler is necessarily limited to the issues before it. Fowler did not
consider cases like American Pipe or the applicability of equitable tolling where
associational standing fails and an association’s member files a follow-on class
action. We do so now.
We conclude that applying equitable tolling is consistent with the legislative
purposes behind our state’s labor laws and the statute of limitations in this case.
First, there is no risk of surprise. Campeau raises nearly the same claims that
Yakima HMA litigated for several years in the WSNA case. Through that case
Yakima HMA received notice of Campeau’s claims and had an opportunity to
preserve evidence. Next, Campeau did not sleep on his claims or engage in
wrongful conduct. He actively participated in the WSNA case and reasonably
relied on his union to recover his wages. Prior to our holding in that case, WSNA
not only recovered the nurses’ wages but secured double damages, attorney fees,
and court costs for its members. WSNA, 196 Wn.2d at 414.
Furthermore, applying equitable tolling here advances the goals of
adjudicative efficiency and justice. Failing to extend equitable tolling in these
circumstances undermines the value of associational standing and disincentivizes
members from relying on their unions and employee associations. Without
9 Campeau v. Yakima HMA, LLC, No. 102047-3
equitable tolling, members would be forced to file individually to preserve their
claims in the event a court later found the association lacked standing. These
individual filings would burden our courts with a multiplicity of litigation and
would cut against the benefits of associational standing. In pursuing their
individual claims, members would face higher litigation costs. Where the financial
costs and the potential for retaliation are too high, some members may choose to
abandon their claims entirely. Tolling helps avoid these consequences.
In the absence of equitable tolling, these nurses would be unable to recover
the wages to which they are entitled and Yakima HMA would receive an
unjustified windfall in stolen wages. In the WSNA case, this court recognized that
“[e]gregious employment practices” need to be confronted. Id. at 425. We
specifically identified a class action as being an appropriate vehicle for relief. Id.
Given these circumstances, we find the applicable elements of equitable tolling
have been met and the trial court properly allowed Campeau to file a follow-on
class action.
CONCLUSION
We conclude that equitable tolling may be appropriate, even in the absence
of bad faith, where associational standing fails, an association’s member files a
follow-on class action, and all of the other elements of equitable tolling have been
met. Equitable tolling under these circumstances is consistent with the purposes
10 Campeau v. Yakima HMA, LLC, No. 102047-3
underlying statutes of limitations and furthers justice by providing these nurses a
means to recover their wages while preventing a windfall to Yakima HMA in the
form of wrongfully withheld wages.
Accordingly, we reverse the Court of Appeals and remand to the trial court
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
____________________________
WE CONCUR:
_____________________________ ____________________________
_____________________________ ____________________________ Rumbaugh, J.P.T.
11 Campeau v. Yakima HMA, LLC
No. 102047-3
MADSEN, J. (dissenting)—Less than two years ago, this court established that
equitable tolling in Washington requires a showing of “bad faith, false assurances, or
deception,” which interfered with a plaintiff’s timely filing. Fowler v. Guerin, 200
Wn.2d 110, 125, 515 P.3d 502 (2022). That showing has not been made here. Instead of
following this recent precedent, the majority redefines and grants equitable tolling
seemingly based on its “‘individual ideas of justice.’” Id. at 119 (quoting Leschner v.
Dep’t of Labor & Indus., 27 Wn.2d 911, 926, 185 P.2d 113 (1947)). But creating a rule
that depends on the decision-maker’s idea of justice is the very thing we are cautioned
against when determining whether to grant equitable tolling. Id.
Here, the nurses’ union made a strategic litigation choice in the original lawsuit
against Yakima HMA LLC that this court reversed for lack of associational standing.
The statute of limitations on individual suits expired during that time. The union’s
perhaps unwise litigation strategy is understandably disappointing to the nurse members No. 102047-3 Madsen, J., dissenting
and may result in action against the union, but it is not a justification for granting
equitable tolling. We should affirm the Court of Appeals. I respectfully dissent.
Discussion
Daniel Campeau is a member of the Washington State Nursing Association
(Association). The Association sued its members’ employer, Yakima HMA, for wage
and hour violations in 2015. Wash. State Nurses Ass’n v. Yakima HMA, LLC, 196 Wn.2d
409, 411-13, 469 P.3d 300 (2020) (WSNA). After a nine-day bench trial, the court ruled
in favor of the Association.
On appeal, this court reversed the trial court and dismissed the case based on a
lack of associational standing. Id. at 412-14. Specifically, the court held that the nurses’
damages were not easily ascertainable as representational standing requires. Id. at 426.
Within a few months of that decision, Campeau filed the current action, seeking
class certification and alleging the same claims as in the dismissed original union case.
Yakima HMA moved to dismiss the suit, arguing the claims were filed after the statute of
limitations had run. Campeau responded that equitable tolling should apply. The trial
court agreed. Applying this court’s recent precedent, the Court of Appeals reversed, and
“Equitable tolling” is “[a] court’s discretionary extension of a legal deadline as a
result of extraordinary circumstances that prevented one from complying despite
reasonable diligence throughout the period before the deadline passed.” BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY 680 (11th ed. 2019). Similar to other doctrines in equity, equitable tolling
2 No. 102047-3 Madsen, J., dissenting
grew from the desire to relieve parties in special circumstances from the “‘harshness of
strict legal rules.’” Fowler, 200 Wn.2d at 118 (quoting Ames v. Dep’t of Lab. & Indus.,
176 Wash. 509, 513, 30 P.2d 239 (1934)). This extraordinary form of relief is a
departure from the norm; generally, an untimely suit is barred by a statute of limitations.
Id.
Statutes of limitations reflect the importance of final, settled judgments. Id. A
statutory time limit is an express “‘legislative declaration of public policy which the
courts can do no less than respect.’” Id. (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting Bilanko v. Barclay Court Owners Ass’n, 185 Wn.2d 443, 451-52, 375
P.3d 591 (2016)). Requiring prospective plaintiffs to assert claims before evidence is lost
protects defendants and courts from litigating stale claims. Id. at 118-19 (citing
Douchette v. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403, 117 Wn.2d 805, 813, 818 P.2d 1362 (1991)).
Because equitable tolling, by its nature, frustrates the public policy goals of
statutes of limitations, courts do not grant equitable tolling broadly. Id. at 119. Courts
are cautioned against applying tolling in such a manner that it substitutes the positive rule
of a statute of limitations with “‘a variable rule’” based on “‘individual ideas of justice.’”
Id. (quoting Leschner, 27 Wn.2d at 926). These departures “must be rare in order for
th[e] general rules to have their intended effect.” Id. (emphasis added).
This court has determined the prerequisites for tolling of a statute of limitations in
all civil actions: bad faith, deception, or false assurances by the defendant, and exercise
3 No. 102047-3 Madsen, J., dissenting
of diligence by the plaintiff. Id. These conditions are “necessary to justify equitable
tolling of a statute of limitations in the civil context.” Id. at 113 (emphasis added).
There is no dispute that the prerequisites for equitable tolling are not met here.
Campeau has not shown that Yakima HMA acted in bad faith, deceived, or made false
assurances. The majority acknowledges as much, yet it still grants tolling. It does so by
limiting Fowler to its facts. Majority at 9. Because Fowler did not consider American
Pipe 1 or the procedural posture of the current case (where associational standing is
reversed and a member of that association files a follow-on class action), the majority
concludes that Fowler’s reach is limited and does not bind us. See id.
These distinctions are makeweight and carry no legal significance. The majority
devotes a section of its opinion to explaining why the analysis in American Pipe does not
apply to the facts of this case. Majority at 5-6. I agree. But if American Pipe plays no
role here, it is not relevant and the fact that Fowler did not discuss that case does not
matter.
The majority’s casual treatment of our precedent suggests that not much is needed
to disregard existing law and chart a new course, but the mere act of identifying a
difference does not render a case legally distinct such that we are not bound by precedent.
Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 584 U.S. 497, 510, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 200 L. Ed. 2d 889 (2018)
(“The law of precedent teaches that like cases should generally be treated alike.”).
1 Am. Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 94 S. Ct. 756, 38 L. Ed. 2d 713 (1974). 4 No. 102047-3 Madsen, J., dissenting
Differences must be meaningful. E.g., City of Auburn v. Brooke, 119 Wn.2d 623,
631, 836 P.2d 212 (1992) (noting a difference between two court rules but concluding it
did “not make a significant difference in the ultimate outcome of the cases because the
relevant rules are quite similar.”); Staples v. Allstate Ins. Co., 176 Wn.2d 404, 418, 295
P.3d 201 (2013) (seeing “no meaningful difference” between the examination under oath
requirement from the general duty to cooperate for insurers).
The procedural differences between this case and Fowler are not meaningful.
Fowler involved a dispute between a certified class of teachers against a state agency.
200 Wn.2d at 112. The present case concerns a follow-on putative class action of nurses
against their private employer after their associational suit was reversed. These are
distinctions, but why do they matter? The majority has no answer, but Fowler does.
Fowler did not mince words as to the legal issue presented: the case “asks us to clarify
the standards for equitable tolling in civil cases under Washington law.” Id. (emphasis
added). That is, in all civil cases. We clarified the standard, not by establishing a new
test but simply by “reiterating the four conditions this court has previously identified as
necessary to justify equitable tolling.” Id. at 113 (emphasis added). That Fowler did not
concern the exact procedural facts as this case does not justify ignoring the four
conditions required to obtain equitable tolling. By failing to show bad faith, deception, or
false assurances, Campeau does not satisfy those conditions. See id. at 119.
I agree with the majority that American Pipe does not apply. In American Pipe, a
state brought an antitrust action 11 days before the 1-year statute of limitations expired.
5 No. 102047-3 Madsen, J., dissenting
414 U.S. at 540-41. The trial court denied certification for lack of numerosity. Id. at
543. After that denial and the statute of limitations expired, parties in the putative class
moved to intervene. The court denied intervention as untimely. Id. at 541-44. On
appeal, the Supreme Court held that the interveners were not time barred. Id. at 554.
Based on the federal civil rules, the Court noted that class actions are “truly
representative suit[s]” where class member claims are advanced by class representatives.
Id. at 550. Thus, class members should be considered parties “until and unless they
receive notice” and decide not to continue. Id. at 551. Filing the class action satisfied the
statute of limitations for the class members as well as the intervenors. Id.
As previously discussed, the nurses’ union in the original wage and hour suit did
not bring a class action. Instead, the union asserted but ultimately did not prove
associational standing. See WSNA, 196 Wn.2d at 414-15. Associational standing and
class actions are distinct. Id. at 431-32 (Yu, J., dissenting) (quoting Int’l Union, United
Auto., Aerospace & Agric. Implement Workers of Am. v. Brock, 477 U.S. 274, 289, 106 S.
Ct. 2523, 91 L. Ed. 2d 228 (1986)); Retired Chi. Police Ass’n v. City of Chicago, 76 F.3d
856, 864 (7th Cir. 1996) (“‘the inquiry with respect to associational standing, while
similar, is not identical [to the class certification analysis]’” (alteration in original)
(quoting Retired Chi. Police Ass’n v. City of Chicago, 7 F.3d 584, 607 (7th Cir. 1993))).
Part of American Pipe’s rationale is that the putative class included all members who
later brought individual suits. See 414 U.S. at 554; In re WorldCom Sec. Litig., 496 F.3d
245, 255 (2d Cir. 2007). In effect, no new parties entered litigation. In associational
6 No. 102047-3 Madsen, J., dissenting
standing, however, an organization might bring suits without authorization from its
members and other members may later seek to file individual suits. See Int’l Union, 477
U.S. at 290 (noting the concern that associations will not always adequately represent the
interests of all injured members). Effectively, unlike putative class members, new parties
would enter litigation. That is the case here.
Equitable tolling is an extraordinary measure granted at the discretion of the
judiciary—but not without application of a consistent legal analysis. Fowler, 200 Wn.2d
at 118. To avoid the risk that individual judicial actors will grant relief based on their
individual notions of justice and fairness, we have set out four requirements necessary to
obtain equitable tolling. Id. at 119. Those requirements have not been met here, as the
majority recognizes. Therefore, tolling is not appropriate, even though this result is
disappointing to Association members who demonstrated their employer withheld wages.
See WSNA, 196 Wn.2d at 414-15. The Association employed a strategy of associational
standing that they ultimately could not prove, and it attempted to rectify that litigation
choice by filing a class action past the statutory deadline. Unfortunately, this is a case of
a union making an unsuccessful strategic choice on behalf of its members. It is not a case
justifying the extraordinary relief of equitable tolling, and we should not disregard our
long-standing precedent to save the day.
I agree with the majority that American Pipe is not applicable and this case does
not require us to decide whether American Pipe tolling generally applies in Washington.
7 No. 102047-3 Madsen, J., dissenting
However, I disagree with the majority’s expansion of our general equitable tolling
principles based on nothing more than setting aside Fowler. We should follow
established precedent that sets forth the test for equitable tolling in all civil cases and
conclude that Campeau has not satisfied the prerequisites for tolling: specifically
Campeau showed no bad action, deception, or false assurances on the part of Yakima
HMA. See Fowler, 200 Wn.2d at 119. Accordingly, tolling is not appropriate and we
should affirm the Court of Appeals, however reluctantly. With these considerations in
mind, I respectfully dissent.
___________________________________