Campbell v. Falcon

• Court: District Court, S.D. California
• Decided: August 29, 2022
• Docket: 3:22-cv-01204
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 SENARBLE CAMPBELL, Case No.: 3:22-cv1204-CAB-NLS CDCR #H-90841, 12 ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO Plaintiff, 13 PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS vs. 14 [Doc. No. 2]

15 R. FALCON; S. VALENZULA; AND 16 N. GARSILASO, 17 Defendants. DIRECTING U.S. MARSHAL TO EFFECT SERVICE OF COMPLAINT 18 AND SUMMONS PURSUANT TO 19 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) AND Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(3) 20 21 22 Plaintiff Senarble Campbell, an inmate currently incarcerated the California Health 23 Care Facility (“CHCF”), and proceeding pro se, has filed a civil rights complaint 24 pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Compl., Doc. No. 1. Plaintiff claims Correctional 25 Officers at RJD used excessive force against force against him in violation of the Eighth 26 Amendment. Id. at 7-8. Plaintiff also alleges that Defendants acted with deliberate 27 indifference to his serious medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Id at 9- 28 10. Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages. Id. at 15. 1 Plaintiff did not prepay the civil filing fee required by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) when 2 he filed his Complaint; instead, he filed a Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”) 3 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). See Doc. No. 2. 4 I. Motion to Proceed IFP 5 All parties instituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in a district court of the 6 United States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of 7 $402.1 See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). The action may proceed despite a plaintiff’s failure to 8 prepay the entire fee only if he is granted leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 9 § 1915(a). See Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1051 (9th Cir. 2007); Rodriguez v. 10 Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1177 (9th Cir. 1999). However, a prisoner who is granted leave to 11 proceed IFP remains obligated to pay the entire fee in “increments” or “installments,” 12 Bruce v. Samuels, 577 U.S. 82, 84 (2016); Williams v. Paramo, 775 F.3d 1182, 1185 (9th 13 Cir. 2015), and regardless of whether his action is ultimately dismissed. See 28 U.S.C. 14 § 1915(b)(1), (2); Taylor v. Delatoore, 281 F.3d 844, 847 (9th Cir. 2002). 15 Section 1915(a)(2) requires prisoners seeking leave to proceed IFP to submit a 16 “certified copy of the trust fund account statement (or institutional equivalent) for . . . the 17 6-month period immediately preceding the filing of the complaint.” 28 U.S.C. 18 § 1915(a)(2); Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113, 1119 (9th Cir. 2005). From the certified 19 trust account statement, the Court assesses an initial payment of 20% of (a) the average 20 monthly deposits in the account for the past six months, or (b) the average monthly 21 balance in the account for the past six months, whichever is greater, unless the prisoner 22 has no assets. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4). The institution having 23 custody of the prisoner then collects subsequent payments, assessed at 20% of the 24 preceding month’s income, in any month in which his account exceeds $10, and forwards 25

26 1 In addition to the $350 statutory fee, civil litigants must pay an additional administrative fee of $52. See 27 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) (Judicial Conference Schedule of Fees, District Court Misc. Fee Schedule, § 14 (eff. Dec. 1, 2020)). The additional $52 administrative fee does not apply to persons granted leave to proceed 28 1 those payments to the Court until the entire filing fee is paid. See 28 U.S.C. § 2 1915(b)(2); Bruce, 577 U.S. at 84. 3 In support of his IFP Motion, Plaintiff has submitted a copy of his CDCR Inmate 4 Statement Report. See Doc. No. 2 at 4-6; 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2); S.D. Cal. CivLR 3.2; 5 Andrews, 398 F.3d at 1119. This financial record shows Plaintiff had an available balance 6 of only $0.16 to his credit at the time of filing. See Doc. No. 2 at 5. 7 Therefore, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP (Doc. No. 2) and 8 declines to assess any initial partial filing fee pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1) and (b)(1). 9 See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) (providing that “[i]n no event shall a prisoner be prohibited 10 from bringing a civil action or appealing a civil action or criminal judgment for the reason 11 that the prisoner has no assets and no means by which to pay the initial partial filing fee.”); 12 Bruce, 577 U.S. at 86; Taylor, 281 F.3d at 850 (finding that 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) acts as 13 a “safety-valve” preventing dismissal of a prisoner’s IFP case based solely on a “failure to 14 pay . . . due to the lack of funds available to him when payment is ordered.”). Instead, the 15 Court DIRECTS the Secretary of the California Department of Corrections and 16 Rehabilitation (“CDCR”), or her designee, to collect the entire $350 balance of the filing 17 fee required by 28 U.S.C. § 1914 and to forward all payments to the Clerk of the Court 18 pursuant to the installment provisions set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). 19 II. Screening Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b) 20 A. Standard of Review 21 Because Plaintiff is a prisoner and is proceeding IFP, his Complaint also requires a 22 preliminary screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(b). Under these 23 statutes, the Court must sua sponte dismiss a prisoner’s IFP complaint, or any portion of 24 it, which is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim, or seeks damages from defendants 25 who are immune. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) 26 (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)); Rhodes v. Robinson, 621 F.3d 1002, 1004 (9th Cir. 27 2010) (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)). “The purpose of [screening] is ‘to ensure that 28 1 the targets of frivolous or malicious suits need not bear the expense of responding.’” 2 Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 903, 920 n.1 (9th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted). 3 “The standard for determining whether a plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon 4 which relief can be granted under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as the Federal Rule of 5 Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standard for failure to state a claim.” Watison v. Carter, 668 6 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012); see also Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th 7 Cir. 2012) (noting that screening pursuant to § 1915A “incorporates the familiar standard 8 applied in the context of failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9 12(b)(6)”). Rule 12(b)(6) requires a complaint “contain sufficient factual matter, 10 accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 11 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted); Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 1121. 12 Detailed factual allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the 13 elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” 14 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for 15 relief [is] ... a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its 16 judicial experience and common sense.” Id. The “mere possibility of misconduct” or 17 “unadorned, the defendant-unlawfully-harmed me accusation[s]” fall short of meeting 18 this plausibility standard. Id.; see also Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 19 (9th Cir. 2009). 20 B. Factual Allegations 21 Plaintiff is a “participant in the California Department of Corrections and 22 Rehabilitation (“CDCR”) Mental Health Services Delivery System (“MHSDS”) at the 23 Enhanced Outpatient (“EOP”) level of care.” Comp. at 3. Plaintiff has a “mobility 24 disability” and uses a cane, as well as a walker. Id. He also has a “waist-chain chrono” 25 which means Plaintiff cannot be handcuffed behind his back. Id. These accommodations 26 are due to an injury that occurred in 2005 which resulted in having a rod placed in his left 27 femur. See id. Plaintiff has also been diagnosed with exhibitionist disorder in 2005. See 28 id. 1 Plaintiff admits that he engaged in exhibitionist behavior on January 13, 2020. See 2 id. at 4. Approximately thirty (30) minutes later, Defendants Falcon, Valenzuela, and 3 Garsilaso came to Plaintiff’s cells and told him to “step outside.” Id. Plaintiff alleges 4 Falcon and Garsilaso entered his cell and he could “hear property being thrown around.” 5 Id. at 5. 6 Plaintiff felt “angry and panicked” and told Falcon that he was suicidal. Id. Falcon 7 responded by telling Plaintiff to “cuff up” in the back. Id. at 6. Plaintiff tried to tell 8 Falcon that he could not be handcuffed behind his back due to his disability but Falcon 9 “grabbed [Plaintiff’s] right hand” and forced him to the ground causing Plaintiff to lose 10 consciousness. Id. When Plaintiff regained consciousness, he was “being punched and 11 kneed” by Falcon, Valenzuela, and Garsilaso in the “head, face, ribs, and back.” Id. 12 Plaintiff claims he was not resisting. Id. Plaintiff was “forcefully pulled to [his] feet” 13 and “struggled to walk without [his] accommodating disability devices.” Id. Plaintiff 14 was “limping and struggling not to fall over while in pain” as he was escorted by 15 Defendants off the yard. Id. 16 C. Discussion 17 To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential 18 elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was 19 violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the 20 color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Naffe v. Frye, 789 F.3d 1030, 21 1035-36 (9th Cir. 2015). 22 As currently pleaded, the Court finds Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges a plausible 23 Eighth Amendment claims against Defendants sufficient to survive the “low threshold” 24 set for sua sponte screening as required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(b). See 25 Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 1123; Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 5 26 (1992) (unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain violates the Cruel and Unusual 27 Punishments Clause of the Eighth Amendment); Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34, 37 28 (2010) (per curiam) (for claims arising out of the use of excessive physical force, the 1 issue is “whether force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, 2 or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.”) (citing Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7); Estelle v. 3 Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976) (Deliberate indifference to an inmate’s serious medical 4 need violates the Eighth Amendment). 5 Therefore, the Court will order the U.S. Marshal to effect service upon Defendants 6 on Plaintiff’s behalf. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) (“The officers of the court shall issue and 7 serve all process, and perform all duties in [IFP] cases.”); Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(3) (“[T]he 8 court may order that service be made by a United States marshal or deputy marshal . . . if 9 the plaintiff is authorized to proceed in forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C. § 1915.”).2 10 III. Conclusion and Order 11 For the reasons explained, the Court: 12 (1) GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) 13 (Doc. No. 2); 14 (2) DIRECTS the Secretary of the CDCR, or her designee, to collect from 15 Plaintiff’s prison trust account the $350 filing fee owed in this case by garnishing 16 monthly payments from his account in an amount equal to twenty percent (20%) of the 17 preceding month’s income and forwarding those payments to the Clerk of the Court each 18 time the amount in the account exceeds $10 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). ALL 19 PAYMENTS MUST BE CLEARLY IDENTIFIED BY THE NAME AND NUMBER 20 ASSIGNED TO THIS ACTION; 21 (3) DIRECTS the Clerk of the Court to serve a copy of this Order by U.S. Mail 22 on Kathleen Alison, Secretary, CDCR, P.O. Box 942883, Sacramento, California, 94283- 23 0001, or by forwarding an electronic version to trusthelpdesk@cdcr.ca.gov; 24 25 26 27 2 Plaintiff is cautioned that “the sua sponte screening and dismissal procedure is cumulative of, and not a substitute for, any subsequent Rule 12(b)(6) motion that [a defendant] may choose to bring.” Teahan v. 28 1 (4) DIRECTS the Clerk to issue a summons as to Plaintiff’s Complaint (Doc. 2 No. 1) upon Defendants, and forward it to Plaintiff along with blank U.S. Marshal Form 3 285s for these Defendants. In addition, the Clerk will provide Plaintiff with a certified 4 copy of his Complaint and the summons so that he may serve Defendants. Upon receipt 5 of this “IFP Package,” Plaintiff must complete the USM Form 285s as completely and 6 accurately as possible, include addresses where Defendants may be found and/or subject 7 to service pursuant to S.D. Cal. CivLR 4.1c., and return them to the U.S. Marshal 8 according to the instructions the Clerk provides. 9 (5) ORDERS the U.S. Marshal to serve a copy of the Complaint and summons 10 upon Defendants as directed by Plaintiff on the USM Form 285s provided, and to file 11 executed waivers of personal service upon each of these Defendants with the Clerk of 12 Court as soon as possible after their return. Should any of these Defendants fail to return 13 the U.S. Marshal’s request for waiver of personal service within 90 days, the U.S. 14 Marshal shall instead file the completed Form USM 285 Process Receipt and Return with 15 the Clerk of Court, include the date the summons, Complaint, and request for waiver was 16 mailed to that Defendant, and indicate why service upon that party remains unexecuted. 17 All costs of U.S. Marshal service will be advanced by the United States; however, if a 18 Defendant located within the United States fails, without good cause, to sign and return 19 the waiver requested by the Marshal on Hearn’s behalf, the Court will impose upon that 20 Defendant any expenses later incurred in making personal service. See 28 U.S.C. § 21 1915(d); Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(3), (d)(2). 22 (6) ORDERS Defendants, once served, to reply to Plaintiff’s Complaint, and 23 any subsequent pleading he may file in this matter in which they are named as parties, 24 within the time provided by the applicable provisions of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25 12(a) and 15(a)(3). See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g)(2) (while Defendants may occasionally be 26 permitted to “waive the right to reply to any action brought by a prisoner confined in any 27 jail, prison, or other correctional facility under section 1983,” once the Court has 28 conducted its sua sponte screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(b), 1 || and thus, has made a preliminary determination based on the face of the pleading alone 2 || that Plaintiff has a “reasonable opportunity to prevail on the merits,” Defendants are 3 || required to respond). 4 (8) ORDERS Plaintiff, after service has been effected by the U.S. Marshal, to 5 serve upon Defendants, or if appearance has been entered by counsel, upon Defendants’ 6 ||counsel, a copy of every further pleading, motion, or other document submitted for the 7 || Court’s consideration pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(b). Plaintiff must include with every 8 || original document he seeks to file with the Clerk of the Court, a certificate stating the 9 ||manner in which a true and correct copy of that document was served on Defendants or 10 || their counsel, and the date of that service. See S.D. Cal.CivLR 5.2. 11 IT IS SO ORDERED. 12 ||Dated: August 29, 2022 € Z 13 Hon. Cathy Ann Bencivengo 14 United States District Judge 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 8 oe