Campbell v. Citigroup

CourtDistrict Court, District of Columbia
DecidedApril 30, 2026
DocketCivil Action No. 2025-3101
StatusPublished

This text of Campbell v. Citigroup (Campbell v. Citigroup) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, District of Columbia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Campbell v. Citigroup, (D.D.C. 2026).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

GRETA L. CAMPBELL,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 25-cv-3101 (CRC)

CITIGROUP,

Defendant.

OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff Greta L. Campbell filed this pro se action against Citibank, N.A. (“Citibank”) in

the Superior Court of the District of Columbia.1 She alleges that Citibank engaged in “fraudulent

billing” practices that inflated her credit card account balance and damaged her credit score.

After removing the case to this Court, Citibank moved to compel arbitration of Campbell’s

claims. The Court twice directed Campbell to respond to Citibank’s motion, but she failed to file

an opposition. Based on the Court’s own review of Citibank’s motion and accompanying

documentation, the Court will grant the motion and stay the case pending the completion of

arbitration proceedings.

Campbell had a Staples credit card that was serviced by Citibank. See Compl.,

Continuation of Questions ¶ 1. Citibank closed her account in July 2023 when it discontinued

the Staples credit card program. Id. Campbell alleges that after her account was closed,

Citibank continued to “impose[] interest charges on purchases made” between October 2023 and

1 Citibank submits that Campbell erroneously sued “Citigroup” and/or “Citi Group.” See Notice of Removal at 1; id., Ex. 1 at 2. For the sake of clarity, the Court refers to Defendant as “Citibank.” May 2025.2 Id. ¶¶ 1–2. Because the charges “were imposed on an account that was no longer

active,” Campbell contends that she was “misle[d] . . . into making payments under false

pretenses.” Id. ¶ 2(1). She further submits that Citibank “reported [her] account to the credit

bureau despite the charges being fraudulent.” Id. ¶ 3(1). As a result, Campbell alleges that she

was “burdened with unnecessary payments,” her credit score was “negatively affected,” and she

suffered “significant emotional distress.” Id. ¶ 2(2)–(4). She seeks $250,000 in damages. Id.

¶ 2.3

After filing a notice of removal, Citibank moved to compel arbitration and stay

proceedings pending the completion of arbitration. Citibank submits that when Campbell

applied for her Staples credit card in 2018, she received a written agreement providing that any

“claims, dispute[s], or controvers[ies] . . . arising out of or related to” the account were subject to

2 Campbell attached several credit card billing statements to her complaint. See generally Notice of Removal, Ex. 1 at 19–43. The statements reflect that she was charged interest on her existing account balance, but they do not show any new charges after the account closed. Before closing Campbell’s account, Citibank informed her that she would “continue to receive a monthly billing statement until any remaining balance is paid in full” and the “terms and conditions as detailed in [her] cardholder agreement will remain in effect for any remaining balance on [her] account.” Id. at 16. 3 It is not entirely clear what cause(s) of action Campbell raises in her complaint. The “information sheet” accompanying her complaint indicates that she alleges a breach of contract. See Notice of Removal, Ex. 1 at 10. But she also attached to her complaint a “legal demand” letter that she sent to Citibank prior to filing this lawsuit; the letter asserts that Citibank’s actions “appear to constitute” a variety of unlawful acts, including “[h]arrassment in violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act[.]” Id. at 14–15. Regardless of whether Campbell brings a breach of contract claim or the claims enumerated in her demand letter, the Court is satisfied that (1) it has diversity jurisdiction over the matter, and (2) the claims would be covered by the arbitration agreement. See Notice of Removal ¶¶ 8, 21 (representing that Citibank’s main office is in South Dakota); id., Ex. 1 at 4 (Campbell’s complaint listing her address in the District of Columbia); Declaration of Kyle Mitchell ¶ 1 (stating that Citibank is “located” in South Dakota); 28 U.S.C. § 1348 (“All national banking associations shall . . . be deemed citizens of the States in which they are respectively located.”); Wachovia Bank v. Schmidt, 546 U.S. 303, 318 (2006) (holding that for purposes of establishing diversity jurisdiction, a national bank is located “in the State designated in its articles of association as its main office”).

2 mandatory arbitration. Mem. of Law in Supp. of Def.’s Mot. to Compel Arbitration and Stay

Proceedings (“Def.’s Mot.”) at 2; see Declaration of Kyle Mitchell (“Mitchell Decl.”) ¶¶ 6–8; id.,

Ex. 1 (“Card Agreement”) at 6–7. It further notes that Campbell accepted the terms of the

agreement by using the credit card. See Mitchell Decl. ¶ 9; id., Ex. 2 at 3 (credit card statement

showing purchase). Because Campbell’s claims “clearly fall within the scope” of the mandatory

arbitration agreement, Citibank says, the Court must stay all proceedings pending arbitration.

Def.’s Mot. at 8–12. As noted above, Campbell did not respond to Citibank’s motion.

The Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) provides that a provision in a contract requiring the

arbitration of disputes related to the contract “shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable.” 9

U.S.C. § 2. The Supreme Court has recognized that “any doubts concerning the scope of

arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration.” Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v.

Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24–25 (1983). If a party subject to an arbitration agreement

nevertheless tries to resolve a dispute in federal court, the opposing party may petition the court

“for an order directing that such arbitration proceed in the manner provided for in such

agreement.” 9 U.S.C. § 4.

When evaluating a motion to compel arbitration, the Court applies the familiar summary

judgment standard. Aliron Int’l, Inc. v. Cherokee Nation Indus., Inc., 531 F.3d 863, 865 (D.C.

Cir. 2008). Accordingly, the Court may look to evidence beyond the complaint and grant the

motion if “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and . . . the moving party is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law.” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,

Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247 (1986)); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). In making this determination, the

Court views the facts “in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Chambers v. U.S.

Dep’t of Interior, 568 F.3d 998, 1000 (D.C. Cir. 2009).

3 Citibank has adequately shown that Campbell is bound by the mandatory arbitration

agreement. The evidence before the Court indicates that Campbell received the agreement when

she applied for the Staples credit card. See Mitchell Decl. ¶ 6; Card Agreement at 2. It further

demonstrates that she accepted the agreement’s terms by using the credit card. See Card

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Related

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.
477 U.S. 242 (Supreme Court, 1986)
Wachovia Bank, National Ass'n v. Schmidt
546 U.S. 303 (Supreme Court, 2006)
Samenow v. Citicorp Credit Services, Inc.
253 F. Supp. 3d 197 (District of Columbia, 2017)
Smith v. Spizzirri
601 U.S. 472 (Supreme Court, 2024)

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