KEFVON JEROME CAMP, Case No. 24-cv-04771-RMI
Plaintiff, ORDER OF SERVICE v.
R. RODRIGUEZ, et al., Defendants.
Plaintiff, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, filed a civil rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The original complaint was dismissed with leave to amend, and Plaintiff filed an amended complaint. (dkt. 8). Federal courts must engage in a preliminary screening of cases in which prisoners seek redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). In its review, the court must identify any cognizable claims, and dismiss any claims which are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. Id. at 1915A(b)(1),(2). Pro se pleadings must be liberally construed. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” “Specific facts are not necessary; the statement need only ‘give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (citations omitted). Although in order to state a the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do . . . [f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citations omitted). A complaint must proffer “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 570. The United States Supreme Court has recently explained the “plausible on its face” standard of Twombly as such: “[w]hile legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations . . . [and] [w]hen there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). Plaintiff alleges that he was improperly found guilty at a disciplinary hearing. Interests protected by the Due Process Clause may arise from two sources – the Due Process Clause itself and laws of the states. See Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 223-27 (1976). Changes in conditions so severe as to affect the sentence imposed in an unexpected manner implicate the Due Process Clause itself, whether or not they are authorized by state law. See Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995). Deprivations that are authorized by state law and are less severe or more closely related to the expected terms of confinement may also amount to deprivations of a procedurally protected liberty interest, provided that (1) state statutes or regulations narrowly restrict the power of prison officials to impose the deprivation, i.e., give the inmate a kind of right to avoid it, and (2) the liberty in question is one of “real substance.” See id. at 477-87. Generally, “real substance” will be limited to freedom from (1) a restraint that imposes “atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life,” Prisoners are protected from being deprived of liberty without due process of law. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974). “Prison disciplinary proceedings are not part of a criminal prosecution, and the full panoply of rights due a defendant in such proceedings does not apply.” Wolff, 418 U.S. at 556. The minimum procedural requirements that must be met in such proceedings are: (1) written notice of the charges; (2) at least 24 hours between the time the prisoner receives written notice and the time of the hearing, so that the prisoner may prepare his defense; (3) a written statement by the fact finders of the evidence they rely on and reasons for taking disciplinary action; (4) the right of the prisoner to call witnesses in his defense, when permitting him to do so would not be unduly hazardous to institutional safety or correctional goals; and (5) legal assistance to the prisoner where the prisoner is illiterate or the issues presented are legally complex. Id. at 563-71. Plaintiff’s original complaint contained very few allegations and was dismissed with leave to amend to provide more information. In the amended complaint, Plaintiff states that he and five other individuals were issued disciplinary notices by Defendant Rodriguez De La Paz for delaying a peace officer. A month later, Defendant Valdez called Plaintiff for a disciplinary hearing without any notice. Valdez was the hearing officer and Plaintiff pled guilty without hearing any details of the charges. He pled guilty so he could go back to the yard, though he did not know what he was pleading guilty to. When Plaintiff learned it was regarding the delaying of a peace officer incident, he was said he was not guilty, but Valdez said it was too late and ordered Plaintiff taken to the yard depriving him of his right to be heard. Plaintiff later learned that the disciplinary charges were dropped against the other individuals. Plaintiff also contends that the video footage from Rodriguez De La Paz’s body camera should have shown that he did not delay a peace officer, but Valdez ignored the evidence. As a result of his guilty plea, Plaintiff lost privileges for 60 days including talking to his family, going to the yard, and receiving food packages which resulted in him losing a significant amount of weight. Plaintiff states that he appealed the disciplinary finding, and it was later overturned. He seeks money damages. Liberally construed for purposes of screening, Plaintiff allegations against Rodriguez De La Paz in the amended complaint fail to state a claim for relief. The Court orders that Defendant Lieutenant M. Valdez be served electronically at Salinas Valley State Prison. Defendant Rodriguez De La Paz is dismissed from this case. Service on the listed Defendant will be effected via the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation’s (CDCR) e-service program for civil rights cases from prisoners in CDCR custody. In accordance with the program, the Clerk is directed to serve on CDCR via email the following documents: the operative complaint (dkt. 8), this order of service, the notice of assignment of prisoner case to a United States magistrate judge and accompanying magistrate judge jurisdiction consent or declination to
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KEFVON JEROME CAMP, Case No. 24-cv-04771-RMI
Plaintiff, ORDER OF SERVICE v.
R. RODRIGUEZ, et al., Defendants.
Plaintiff, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, filed a civil rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The original complaint was dismissed with leave to amend, and Plaintiff filed an amended complaint. (dkt. 8). Federal courts must engage in a preliminary screening of cases in which prisoners seek redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). In its review, the court must identify any cognizable claims, and dismiss any claims which are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. Id. at 1915A(b)(1),(2). Pro se pleadings must be liberally construed. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” “Specific facts are not necessary; the statement need only ‘give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (citations omitted). Although in order to state a the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do . . . [f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citations omitted). A complaint must proffer “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 570. The United States Supreme Court has recently explained the “plausible on its face” standard of Twombly as such: “[w]hile legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations . . . [and] [w]hen there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). Plaintiff alleges that he was improperly found guilty at a disciplinary hearing. Interests protected by the Due Process Clause may arise from two sources – the Due Process Clause itself and laws of the states. See Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 223-27 (1976). Changes in conditions so severe as to affect the sentence imposed in an unexpected manner implicate the Due Process Clause itself, whether or not they are authorized by state law. See Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995). Deprivations that are authorized by state law and are less severe or more closely related to the expected terms of confinement may also amount to deprivations of a procedurally protected liberty interest, provided that (1) state statutes or regulations narrowly restrict the power of prison officials to impose the deprivation, i.e., give the inmate a kind of right to avoid it, and (2) the liberty in question is one of “real substance.” See id. at 477-87. Generally, “real substance” will be limited to freedom from (1) a restraint that imposes “atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life,” Prisoners are protected from being deprived of liberty without due process of law. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974). “Prison disciplinary proceedings are not part of a criminal prosecution, and the full panoply of rights due a defendant in such proceedings does not apply.” Wolff, 418 U.S. at 556. The minimum procedural requirements that must be met in such proceedings are: (1) written notice of the charges; (2) at least 24 hours between the time the prisoner receives written notice and the time of the hearing, so that the prisoner may prepare his defense; (3) a written statement by the fact finders of the evidence they rely on and reasons for taking disciplinary action; (4) the right of the prisoner to call witnesses in his defense, when permitting him to do so would not be unduly hazardous to institutional safety or correctional goals; and (5) legal assistance to the prisoner where the prisoner is illiterate or the issues presented are legally complex. Id. at 563-71. Plaintiff’s original complaint contained very few allegations and was dismissed with leave to amend to provide more information. In the amended complaint, Plaintiff states that he and five other individuals were issued disciplinary notices by Defendant Rodriguez De La Paz for delaying a peace officer. A month later, Defendant Valdez called Plaintiff for a disciplinary hearing without any notice. Valdez was the hearing officer and Plaintiff pled guilty without hearing any details of the charges. He pled guilty so he could go back to the yard, though he did not know what he was pleading guilty to. When Plaintiff learned it was regarding the delaying of a peace officer incident, he was said he was not guilty, but Valdez said it was too late and ordered Plaintiff taken to the yard depriving him of his right to be heard. Plaintiff later learned that the disciplinary charges were dropped against the other individuals. Plaintiff also contends that the video footage from Rodriguez De La Paz’s body camera should have shown that he did not delay a peace officer, but Valdez ignored the evidence. As a result of his guilty plea, Plaintiff lost privileges for 60 days including talking to his family, going to the yard, and receiving food packages which resulted in him losing a significant amount of weight. Plaintiff states that he appealed the disciplinary finding, and it was later overturned. He seeks money damages. Liberally construed for purposes of screening, Plaintiff allegations against Rodriguez De La Paz in the amended complaint fail to state a claim for relief. The Court orders that Defendant Lieutenant M. Valdez be served electronically at Salinas Valley State Prison. Defendant Rodriguez De La Paz is dismissed from this case. Service on the listed Defendant will be effected via the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation’s (CDCR) e-service program for civil rights cases from prisoners in CDCR custody. In accordance with the program, the Clerk is directed to serve on CDCR via email the following documents: the operative complaint (dkt. 8), this order of service, the notice of assignment of prisoner case to a United States magistrate judge and accompanying magistrate judge jurisdiction consent or declination to consent form, a CDCR Report of E-Service Waiver form and a summons. The Clerk is also requested to serve a copy of this order on Plaintiff. No later than 40 days after service of this order via email on CDCR, CDCR shall provide the Court a completed CDCR Report of E-Service Waiver advising the Court which Defendants listed in this order will be waiving service of process without the need for service by the United States Marshal Service (USMS) and which Defendants decline to waive service or could not be reached. CDCR also shall provide a copy of the CDCR Report of E-Service Waiver and of the notice of assignment of prisoner case to a magistrate judge and accompanying magistrate judge jurisdiction consent or declination to consent form to the California Attorney General’s Office, which, within 21 days, shall file with the Court a waiver of service of process for the Defendants who are waiving service and, within 28 days thereafter, shall file a magistrate judge jurisdiction consent or declination to consent form as to the defendants who waived service. Upon receipt of the CDCR Report of E-Service Waiver, the Clerk is requested to prepare for each Defendant who has not waived service according to the CDCR Report of E-Service Waiver a USM-285 Form. The Clerk will provide to the USMS the completed USM-285 forms and copies of this order, the summons and the operative complaint for service upon each Defendant who has not waived service. The Clerk will also provide to the USMS a copy of the CDCR Report of E-Service Waiver. In order to expedite the resolution of this case, the Court orders as follows: No later than sixty days from the date of service, Defendant shall file their motion for summary judgment or other dispositive motion. The motion shall be supported by adequate factual documentation and shall conform in all respects to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 and shall include as exhibits all records and incident reports stemming from the events at issue. If Defendant is of the opinion that this case cannot be resolved by such a motion, they shall so inform the Court prior to the date that such motion is due. Moreover, all papers filed with the Court shall be promptly served on Plaintiff. At the time the dispositive motion is served, Defendant shall also serve, on a separate paper, the appropriate notice or notices required by Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 952, 953-954 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc), and Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108, 1120 n. 4 (9th Cir. 2003); see Woods v. Carey, 684 F.3d 934, 940-941 (9th Cir. 2012) (finding that Rand and Wyatt notices must be given at the time motions for summary judgment or motion to dismiss for non-exhaustion are filed, not earlier); Rand, 154 F.3d at 960 (establishing the separate paper requirement). Plaintiff’s opposition to the dispositive motion, if any, shall be filed with the Court and served upon Defendant no later than thirty days from the date the motion is served upon him. Additionally, Plaintiff must read the attached page headed “NOTICE – WARNING,” which is provided to him pursuant to Rand, 154 F.3d at 953-954, and Klingele v. Eikenberry, 849 F.2d 409, 411-12 (9th Cir. 1988). If Defendant files a motion for summary judgment claiming that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his available administrative remedies as required by 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a), Plaintiff should take note of the attached page headed “NOTICE – WARNING (EXHAUSTION),” which is provided to him as required by Wyatt, 315 F.3d at 1120 n. 4. If Defendant wishes to file a reply brief, they shall do so no later than fifteen days after the opposition is served. The motion shall be deemed submitted as of the date the reply brief is due. No hearing will be held on the motion unless the Court so orders at a later date. All communications by Plaintiff with the Court must be served on Defendants, or Defendant’s 1 counsel, if and when counsel has been designated, by mailing a true copy of the document to 2 Defendant or Defendant’s counsel. 3 Discovery may be taken in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. No 4 further Court order under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 30(a)(2) is required before the parties 5 may conduct discovery. 6 Finally, it is Plaintiff's responsibility to prosecute this case. Plaintiff must keep the Court 7 informed of any change of address by filing a separate paper with the clerk headed “Notice of 8 Change of Address.” He also must comply with the Court’s orders in a timely fashion. Failure to 9 do so may result in the dismissal of this action for failure to prosecute pursuant to Federal Rule of 10 Civil Procedure 41(b). a 12 Dated: November 18, 2024 R®@BERT M. ILLMAN IS United States Magistrate Judge 16
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NOTICE -- WARNING (SUMMARY JUDGMENT) If defendants move for summary judgment, they are seeking to have your case dismissed. A motion for summary judgment under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure will, if granted, end your case. Rule 56 tells you what you must do in order to oppose a motion for summary judgment. Generally, summary judgment must be granted when there is no genuine issue of material fact-- that is, if there is no real dispute about any fact that would affect the result of your case, the party who asked for summary judgment is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, which will end your case. When a party you are suing makes a motion for summary judgment that is properly supported by declarations (or other sworn testimony), you cannot simply rely on what your complaint says. Instead, you must set out specific facts in declarations, depositions, answers to interrogatories, or authenticated documents, as provided in Rule 56(e), that contradict the facts shown in the defendant’s declarations and documents and show that there is a genuine issue of material fact for trial. If you do not submit your own evidence in opposition, summary judgment, if appropriate, may be entered against you. If summary judgment is granted, your case will be dismissed and there will be no trial. NOTICE -- WARNING (EXHAUSTION) If defendants file a motion for summary judgment for failure to exhaust, they are seeking to have your case dismissed. If the motion is granted it will end your case. You have the right to present any evidence you may have which tends to show that you did exhaust your administrative remedies. Such evidence may be in the form of declarations (statements signed under penalty of perjury) or authenticated documents, that is, documents accompanied by a declaration showing where they came from and why they are authentic, or other sworn papers, such as answers to interrogatories or depositions. If defendants file a motion for summary judgment for failure to exhaust and it is granted, your case will be dismissed and there will be no trial.