1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 KEFVON JEROME CAMP, Case No. 24-cv-04771-RMI
8 Plaintiff, ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITH LEAVE 9 v. TO AMEND
10 R. RODRIGUEZ, et al., Defendants. 11
12 13 Plaintiff, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, filed a civil rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. 14 § 1983. He has been granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis. 15 DISCUSSION 16 1. Standard of Review 17 Federal courts must engage in a preliminary screening of cases in which prisoners seek 18 redress from a governmental entity, or from an officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 19 U.S.C. 1915A(a). In its review, the court must identify any cognizable claims, and dismiss any 20 claims which are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or 21 seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. Id. at § 1915A(b)(1), (2). 22 Further, it should be noted that pleadings submitted by pro se parties must be liberally construed. 23 Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). 24 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only “a short and plain statement of the 25 claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” While specific facts are not necessary, the 26 statement needs to give the defendant fair notice of the nature of the claim and the grounds upon 27 which it rests. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007). Although a plaintiff need not include 1 cause of action and state conclusions; rather a plaintiff must state factual allegations sufficient to 2 raise the entitlement to relief “above the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 3 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). A complaint must proffer “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is 4 plausible on its face.” Id. at 570. The Supreme Court recently explained this standard: “[w]hile 5 legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual 6 allegations . . . [and] [w]hen there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their 7 veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Ashcroft 8 v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). 9 To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: 10 (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that 11 the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. 12 Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). 13 2. Legal Claims 14 Plaintiff alleges that he was improperly found guilty at a disciplinary hearing due to 15 falsified evidence. 16 Interests protected by the Due Process Clause may arise from two sources – the Due 17 Process Clause itself and laws of the states. See Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 223-27 (1976). 18 Changes in conditions so severe as to affect the sentence imposed in an unexpected manner 19 implicate the Due Process Clause itself, whether or not they are authorized by state law. See 20 Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995). Deprivations that are authorized by state law and are 21 less severe or more closely related to the expected terms of confinement may also amount to 22 deprivations of a procedurally protected liberty interest, provided that (1) state statutes or 23 regulations narrowly restrict the power of prison officials to impose the deprivation, i.e., give the 24 inmate a kind of right to avoid it, and (2) the liberty in question is one of “real substance.” See id. 25 at 477-87. Generally, “real substance” will be limited to freedom from (1) a restraint that imposes 26 “atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life,” 27 id. at 484, or (2) state action that “will inevitably affect the duration of [a] sentence,” id. at 487. 1 Prisoners are protected from being deprived of liberty without due process of law. Wolff v. 2 McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974). “Prison disciplinary proceedings are not part of a criminal 3 prosecution, and the full panoply of rights due a defendant in such proceedings does not apply.” 4 Wolff, 418 U.S. at 556. The minimum procedural requirements that must be met in such 5 proceedings are: (1) written notice of the charges; (2) at least 24 hours between the time the 6 prisoner receives written notice and the time of the hearing, so that the prisoner may prepare his 7 defense; (3) a written statement by the fact finders of the evidence they rely on and reasons for 8 taking disciplinary action; (4) the right of the prisoner to call witnesses in his defense, when 9 permitting him to do so would not be unduly hazardous to institutional safety or correctional 10 goals; and (5) legal assistance to the prisoner where the prisoner is illiterate or the issues presented 11 are legally complex. Id. at 563-71. 12 In order to recover damages for an allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, 13 or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence 14 invalid, a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed 15 on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to 16 make such determination, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas 17 corpus. Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-487 (1994). Heck bars a claim of unconstitutional 18 deprivation of time credits because such a claim necessarily calls into question the lawfulness of 19 the plaintiff's continuing confinement, i.e., it implicates the duration of the plaintiff's sentence. 20 See Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 645 (1997) (applying Heck bar to claim that officials used 21 unconstitutional procedures in a disciplinary hearing that resulted in the deprivation of time credits 22 if “the nature of the challenge to the procedures [is] such as necessarily to imply the invalidity of 23 the judgment”). 24 A prisoner has no constitutionally guaranteed immunity from being falsely or wrongly 25 accused of conduct which may result in the deprivation of a protected liberty interest. Sprouse v. 26 Babcock, 870 F.2d 450, 452 (8th Cir. 1989); Freeman v. Rideout, 808 F.2d 949, 951 (2d Cir. 27 1986). As long as a prisoner is afforded procedural due process in the disciplinary hearing, 1 F.2d 1137, 1140-41 (7th Cir. 1984).
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1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 KEFVON JEROME CAMP, Case No. 24-cv-04771-RMI
8 Plaintiff, ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITH LEAVE 9 v. TO AMEND
10 R. RODRIGUEZ, et al., Defendants. 11
12 13 Plaintiff, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, filed a civil rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. 14 § 1983. He has been granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis. 15 DISCUSSION 16 1. Standard of Review 17 Federal courts must engage in a preliminary screening of cases in which prisoners seek 18 redress from a governmental entity, or from an officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 19 U.S.C. 1915A(a). In its review, the court must identify any cognizable claims, and dismiss any 20 claims which are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or 21 seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. Id. at § 1915A(b)(1), (2). 22 Further, it should be noted that pleadings submitted by pro se parties must be liberally construed. 23 Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). 24 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only “a short and plain statement of the 25 claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” While specific facts are not necessary, the 26 statement needs to give the defendant fair notice of the nature of the claim and the grounds upon 27 which it rests. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007). Although a plaintiff need not include 1 cause of action and state conclusions; rather a plaintiff must state factual allegations sufficient to 2 raise the entitlement to relief “above the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 3 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). A complaint must proffer “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is 4 plausible on its face.” Id. at 570. The Supreme Court recently explained this standard: “[w]hile 5 legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual 6 allegations . . . [and] [w]hen there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their 7 veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Ashcroft 8 v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). 9 To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: 10 (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that 11 the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. 12 Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). 13 2. Legal Claims 14 Plaintiff alleges that he was improperly found guilty at a disciplinary hearing due to 15 falsified evidence. 16 Interests protected by the Due Process Clause may arise from two sources – the Due 17 Process Clause itself and laws of the states. See Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 223-27 (1976). 18 Changes in conditions so severe as to affect the sentence imposed in an unexpected manner 19 implicate the Due Process Clause itself, whether or not they are authorized by state law. See 20 Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995). Deprivations that are authorized by state law and are 21 less severe or more closely related to the expected terms of confinement may also amount to 22 deprivations of a procedurally protected liberty interest, provided that (1) state statutes or 23 regulations narrowly restrict the power of prison officials to impose the deprivation, i.e., give the 24 inmate a kind of right to avoid it, and (2) the liberty in question is one of “real substance.” See id. 25 at 477-87. Generally, “real substance” will be limited to freedom from (1) a restraint that imposes 26 “atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life,” 27 id. at 484, or (2) state action that “will inevitably affect the duration of [a] sentence,” id. at 487. 1 Prisoners are protected from being deprived of liberty without due process of law. Wolff v. 2 McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974). “Prison disciplinary proceedings are not part of a criminal 3 prosecution, and the full panoply of rights due a defendant in such proceedings does not apply.” 4 Wolff, 418 U.S. at 556. The minimum procedural requirements that must be met in such 5 proceedings are: (1) written notice of the charges; (2) at least 24 hours between the time the 6 prisoner receives written notice and the time of the hearing, so that the prisoner may prepare his 7 defense; (3) a written statement by the fact finders of the evidence they rely on and reasons for 8 taking disciplinary action; (4) the right of the prisoner to call witnesses in his defense, when 9 permitting him to do so would not be unduly hazardous to institutional safety or correctional 10 goals; and (5) legal assistance to the prisoner where the prisoner is illiterate or the issues presented 11 are legally complex. Id. at 563-71. 12 In order to recover damages for an allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, 13 or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence 14 invalid, a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed 15 on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to 16 make such determination, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas 17 corpus. Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-487 (1994). Heck bars a claim of unconstitutional 18 deprivation of time credits because such a claim necessarily calls into question the lawfulness of 19 the plaintiff's continuing confinement, i.e., it implicates the duration of the plaintiff's sentence. 20 See Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 645 (1997) (applying Heck bar to claim that officials used 21 unconstitutional procedures in a disciplinary hearing that resulted in the deprivation of time credits 22 if “the nature of the challenge to the procedures [is] such as necessarily to imply the invalidity of 23 the judgment”). 24 A prisoner has no constitutionally guaranteed immunity from being falsely or wrongly 25 accused of conduct which may result in the deprivation of a protected liberty interest. Sprouse v. 26 Babcock, 870 F.2d 450, 452 (8th Cir. 1989); Freeman v. Rideout, 808 F.2d 949, 951 (2d Cir. 27 1986). As long as a prisoner is afforded procedural due process in the disciplinary hearing, 1 F.2d 1137, 1140-41 (7th Cir. 1984). 2 A false charge that results in discipline that does not amount to a deprivation of a protected 3 liberty interest under Sandin, is not actionable under Section 1983 if it does not implicate another 4 constitutional right (e.g., the First Amendment right to be free of retaliation). See Smith v. 5 Mensinger, 293 F.3d 641, 653-54 (3d Cir. 2002); see, e.g., id. at 654 (even if the charges that led 6 to disciplinary confinement were false, no claim was stated because the disciplinary confinement 7 imposed was too short to amount to an atypical and significant hardship under Sandin). 8 Plaintiff’s brief complaint states that one Defendant falsified video footage to issue a 9 disciplinary charge and the second Defendant found Plaintiff guilty at a disciplinary hearing 10 despite evidence that the video footage was falsified. The complaint is dismissed with leave to 11 amend to provide more information. Plaintiff must describe the disciplinary incident and how the 12 video footage was falsified. He must also describe the punishment from the disciplinary hearing 13 and if he lost good time credits. Finally, he must discuss how the disciplinary hearing violated due 14 process pursuant to the legal standards above. Plaintiff must state the specific actions of the named 15 defendants and describe how they violated his constitutional rights. 16 CONCLUSION 17 1. The complaint is DISMISSED with leave to amend in accordance with the standards set 18 forth above. The amended complaint must be filed within twenty-eight (28) days of the date this 19 order is filed, and it must include the caption and civil case number used in this order and the 20 words “AMENDED COMPLAINT” on the first page. Because an amended complaint completely 21 replaces the original complaint, Plaintiff must include in it all the claims he wishes to present. See 22 Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1262 (9th Cir. 1992). Plaintiff may not incorporate material 23 from the original Complaint by reference. Failure to amend within the designated time will result 24 in dismissal of this case. 25 2. It is Plaintiff’s responsibility to prosecute this case. Plaintiff must keep the court 26 informed of any change of address by filing a separate paper with the clerk, headered “Notice of 27 Change of Address,” and must comply with the court’s orders in a timely fashion. Failure to do so 1 Procedure 41(b). 2 IT IS SO ORDERED. 3 Dated: September 9, 2024 4 5 ROBERT M. ILLMAN 6 United States Magistrate Judge 7 8 9 10 11 12
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