Camden Trust Company v. Ray M. Gidney, Comptroller of the Currency
This text of 301 F.2d 521 (Camden Trust Company v. Ray M. Gidney, Comptroller of the Currency) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
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Appellant, Camden Trust Company, is a banking corporation organized under the law of New Jersey with its principal office in Camden and, since 1953, with a branch at Erlton in Delaware Township, New Jersey. Seeking declara[522]*522tory and injunctive relief, appellant challenged the Comptroller’s authority under pertinent provisions of the National Bank Act,1 to issue a certificate of authority which would permit the intervenor, Delaware National Bank of Delaware Township, to commence the business of banking. The District Court granted summary judgment to the Comptroller and the intervenor and dismissed the complaint.2
On this appeal, appellant argues that under New Jersey’s Banking Act of 1948,3 no other state bank could establish a branch in Delaware Township. Accordingly, it is urged that no national bank can establish a branch4 at Ellis-burg Circle in Delaware Township, only one mile from appellant’s branch at Erlton. The Haddonfield National Bank, located in the adjacent Borough of Haddonfield, had sought in 1960 to locate its main office in Delaware Township while retaining as a branch its Haddonfield office, only two miles from Ellisburg Circle. The Comptroller denied that application, correctly we think,5 for clearly the application related to a branch, not a “new” bank.
Shortly thereafter, eight of Haddonfield National’s nine directors, later joined by the ninth, as individuals signed and filed an application for the incorporation of a new national bank at the Ellis-burg Circle location. Appellant filed objections to the application and by appearance before the Comptroller voiced its protest. The Comptroller nevertheless indicated his intention to approve, whereupon Camden filed this action. Its complaint in the District Court alleged that the application of the Haddonfield di[523]*523rectors was “on its face a manifest subterfuge to circumvent the provisions and purposes of the National Bank Act by attempting to introduce into Delaware Township a banking facility that will for all practical purposes constitute a branch facility of the Haddonfield National Bank. Issue of a Certificate of Authority in such a case is contrary to law, beyond the defendant’s authority, and a clear abuse of his discretion.”
Whatever weight is to be given to the appellant’s legal argument, it is difficult to think of the Haddonfield directors’ action as a “subterfuge,” 6 at least in an invidious sense. On the contrary, the preliminary proceedings seem to have been open and notorious. Perhaps on that account the “subterfuge” was alleged to be “manifest.” The president of the Haddonfield National Bank on its letterhead notified all of its shareholders of the plan and the objective which the directors sought.7 Appellant protested orally and in writing to the Comptroller. The latter and the New Jersey Bank Commissioner 8 corresponded concerning the project. It fairly may be said that we perceive nothing arcane or wrongfully covert in the effort. The respectively zealous competitors really are at issue, we feel sure, solely as to whether or not the Comptroller in the circumstances shown is to be precluded by law from issuing a certificate of authority to the intervenor.
Thus viewed in its fundamentals, the case would seem to turn, not on the Comptroller’s power but on its exercise. It is not claimed that the Comptroller [524]*524may not charter a “new” bank. Rather it is urged, he must permit the creation only of a “bona fide independent national bank doing business within its four walls.” For that narrow proposition appellant points to 12 U.S.C.A. § 36(c).9 We read the section as saying that the Comptroller affirmatively is empowered to authorize a national banking association to establish and operate new branches if, when and where state law permits state banks to do so.10 The amendment subsequent to First National Bank in St. Louis v. Missouri, is clear on its face and says, without ambiguity, exactly what it means. Beyond peradventure, Congress even defined the term “branch.” 11
Appellant next would say, the intervenor will be “an affiliate” of the Haddonfield National Bank, referring to its exhibit, set forth in full in note 7. We read that language as an assurance to shareholders of Haddonfield that the trusted management of Haddonfield and the policies pursued in the past may justify investment in the shares of the new bank. The directors of Haddonfield who as individuals were committing themselves and their capital sought information as to “whether or not” existing shareholders “are interested in purchasing shares in the new bank and to what extent.” They were to be required to raise $517,500 “which would result in a legal loan limit of $50,000 — the same as that of Camden Trust Company’s branch at Erlton,” the appellant tells us in its brief. We see nothing sinister in a banker’s prudent inquiry as to just where the promoters were to stand.
There is nothing in the record to show that the shareholders formed the association “for any other than the legitimate objects” contemplated by the Act. The Haddonfield National Bank has not been shown to own the intervenor even if some of the stockholders and directors of the former should own some of the shares of the latter. The intervenor clearly is not a branch of Haddonfield but is a completely separate entity with certain distinguishing characteristics sufficiently so set up in the Government’s brief as to justify our quoting verbatim:
“The capital structure of Delaware Valley is totally independent of that of Haddonfield National; the stock of Delaware Valley has been subscribed to and ‘paid in’ as required by 12 U.S.C. 53; Delaware Valley stockholders are subject to the individual liability described in 12 U.S.C. 63 [sic; repealed, 73 Stat. 457 (1959); see 12 U.S.C. § 64a], unrelated to their possible liability as shareholders in Haddonfield National ; the Comptroller has assigned a name to Delaware Valley that is not susceptible of confusion with Haddonfield National; Delaware Valley will be located approximately two miles from the main office of Haddonfield National * * * the general business of banking to be conducted by Delaware Valley will ‘be transacted in the place specified in its organization certificate’ (12 U.S.C. 81); deposits with Delaware Valley will be its liability not that of Haddonfield National; loan limitations on Delaware Valley will be those applicable to an independent bank, based on its own capital structure and totally independent of loan limitations applicable to Haddonfield National (12 U.S.C. 84); the limits of indebtedness which may be incurred by Delaware Valley will be as prescribed in 12 U.S.C. 82 and [525]
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301 F.2d 521, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/camden-trust-company-v-ray-m-gidney-comptroller-of-the-currency-cadc-1962.