FOX, District Judge.
These two cases were filed in February of 1961. Plaintiffs, in their complaints, pray for a declaration that the establishment and operation by the defendant Empire National Bank, of a banking office within or near Traverse City, Michigan, whether by change of location of its principal office, or otherwise, is unlawful. Plaintiffs also prayed for an injunction restraining the defendant bank from prosecuting its application for approval of such an office in Traverse City, and restraining the Comptroller of the Currency from issuing a certificate evidencing approval of the office.
The application for a preliminary injunction was denied on March 10, 1961, by then Chief Judge Raymond W. Starr.
Early in the proceedings, defendant Empire filed a motion to dismiss the actions.
Before the Court ruled on defendant Empire’s motion to dismiss, the plaintiff filed a motion in National Bank and Trust Company of Traverse City v. The Empire National Bank to add the Comptroller of the Currency as a party defendant. After extensive briefing, oral arguments, and a hearing, the Court, on July 10, 1963, in its opinion filed on July 12, 1963, ordered that the Comptroller be joined as a party defendant.
The Comptroller subsequently filed a motion for a judgment on the pleadings. Defendant Empire’s motion to dismiss in Traverse City State Bank v. The Empire National Bank and the Comptroller’s motion for judgment on the pleadings in National Bank and Trust Company of Traverse City v. The Empire National Bank, were treated as one in the briefs of the parties and at oral argument, at the direction of the court, and these motions by agreement were treated as motions for Summary Judgment.
After deliberate consideration of the very excellent briefs and arguments in the case, this Court concludes there is no genuine dispute as to any material issue of fact, and that the respective motions-of the Comptroller and the defendant bank must be granted. Findings of fact and conclusions of law in support of this-judgment are hereafter set forth.
Plaintiff National Bank and Trust Company of Traverse City is a national, banking association having its principal: office in the City of Traverse City, Michigan. Plaintiff Traverse City State Bank is a Michigan banking corporation, having its principal office in the City of Traverse City, Michigan.
Defendant, The Empire National Bank, is a national banking association, having its principal office in the City of Traverse City, Michigan. Defendant James J. Saxon is the Comptroller of the Currency of the United States.
Before February 15, 1961, the defendant, The Empix-e National Bank, was a Michigan banking corporation with the name “Empire State Bank” and with its principal office in the Village of Empire, Michigan.
On July 14, 1958, the defendant bank* then a Michigan banking corporation,, filed an application with the Commissioner of the State Banking Department of Michigan for permission to move its main office from the Village of Empire
■to a point just north of Traverse City, ■and a month later it applied to the State Banking Commissioner for permission to •establish a branch office in Empire.
The State Banking Commissioner did not pass on either application, but he did issue a certificate of authority permitting the defendant bank to establish a branch office at the location where it desired to move its principal office. The -defendant bank thereafter established this branch office on August 17, 1959.
On August 24, 1959, the Traverse City :State Bank and the First Peoples State Bank (now National Bank and Trust ■Company of Traverse City, plaintiff in this suit) brought suit under Section 23.739 of the Michigan Statutes Annotated,
in the Circuit Court for the County of Ingham. This statute provides for judicial review of any decision by the State Banking Commissioner.
In a decree filed June 29, 1960, the Circuit Court for the County of Ingham overruled the Commissioner by holding that there was no “necessity” for the new branch. Section 23.762 of the Michigan Statutes Annotated provides that a new branch office shall not be approved unless there is “necessity for the establishment of such branch.”
Before February 15, 1961, defendant Empire State Bank filed an application for approval of the Comptroller of the
Currency to be converted into a national banking association. Defendant also sought to have its chosen name, The Empire National Bank, approved by the Comptroller. 12 U.S.C.A. § 35.
On February 15, 1961, the conversion from Empire State Bank to The Empire National Bank was approved by the then Comptroller of the Currency, Ray M. Gidney.
On February 16, 1961, defendant Empire National Bank made application to the Comptroller of the Currency pursuant to 12 U.S.C.A. § 30, for approval of the Comptroller to change the location of its main office from Empire, Michigan, to Traverse City, Michigan, which is within a distance of thirty miles from Empire, Michigan.
At the same time, defendant bank made application to operate its then main office in the Village of Empire as a branch, pursuant to 12 U.S.C.A. § 36.
Application was also made for approval of a change in the name of defendant from The Empire National Bank to Empire National Bank of Traverse City.
On June 27, 1961, Comptroller Gidney issued a certificate approving the change in defendant bank’s name, and approving a change in the location of the main office to Traverse City. The Comptroller also issued a certificate authorizing the continuance of defendant bank’s operation in Empire as a branch. Defendant bank has been operating its main office in Traverse City since that time.
On February 21 and 24, 1961, these plaintiffs instituted the present action, seeking the relief set out above.
In granting the request for change of location of defendant bank, the Comptroller was necessarily acting pursuant to Title 12 U.S.C.A. § 30:
“Any national banking association, with the approval of the Comptroller of the Currency, may change its name or change the location of the main office of such association within the limits of the city, town, or village in which it is situated.
Any national banking association,, with the approval of the Comptroller of the Currency, may change the location of the main office of such association to any other location outside the limits of the city, town, or village in which it is located, but not more than thirty miles distant,
by the vote of shareholders owning two-thirds of the stock of such association. A duly authenticated notice of the vote and of the new name or location selected shall be sent to the Comptroller of the Currency; but no change of name or location shall be valid until the Comptroller shall have issued his certificate of approval of the same.” (Emphasis supplied.)
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
FOX, District Judge.
These two cases were filed in February of 1961. Plaintiffs, in their complaints, pray for a declaration that the establishment and operation by the defendant Empire National Bank, of a banking office within or near Traverse City, Michigan, whether by change of location of its principal office, or otherwise, is unlawful. Plaintiffs also prayed for an injunction restraining the defendant bank from prosecuting its application for approval of such an office in Traverse City, and restraining the Comptroller of the Currency from issuing a certificate evidencing approval of the office.
The application for a preliminary injunction was denied on March 10, 1961, by then Chief Judge Raymond W. Starr.
Early in the proceedings, defendant Empire filed a motion to dismiss the actions.
Before the Court ruled on defendant Empire’s motion to dismiss, the plaintiff filed a motion in National Bank and Trust Company of Traverse City v. The Empire National Bank to add the Comptroller of the Currency as a party defendant. After extensive briefing, oral arguments, and a hearing, the Court, on July 10, 1963, in its opinion filed on July 12, 1963, ordered that the Comptroller be joined as a party defendant.
The Comptroller subsequently filed a motion for a judgment on the pleadings. Defendant Empire’s motion to dismiss in Traverse City State Bank v. The Empire National Bank and the Comptroller’s motion for judgment on the pleadings in National Bank and Trust Company of Traverse City v. The Empire National Bank, were treated as one in the briefs of the parties and at oral argument, at the direction of the court, and these motions by agreement were treated as motions for Summary Judgment.
After deliberate consideration of the very excellent briefs and arguments in the case, this Court concludes there is no genuine dispute as to any material issue of fact, and that the respective motions-of the Comptroller and the defendant bank must be granted. Findings of fact and conclusions of law in support of this-judgment are hereafter set forth.
Plaintiff National Bank and Trust Company of Traverse City is a national, banking association having its principal: office in the City of Traverse City, Michigan. Plaintiff Traverse City State Bank is a Michigan banking corporation, having its principal office in the City of Traverse City, Michigan.
Defendant, The Empire National Bank, is a national banking association, having its principal office in the City of Traverse City, Michigan. Defendant James J. Saxon is the Comptroller of the Currency of the United States.
Before February 15, 1961, the defendant, The Empix-e National Bank, was a Michigan banking corporation with the name “Empire State Bank” and with its principal office in the Village of Empire, Michigan.
On July 14, 1958, the defendant bank* then a Michigan banking corporation,, filed an application with the Commissioner of the State Banking Department of Michigan for permission to move its main office from the Village of Empire
■to a point just north of Traverse City, ■and a month later it applied to the State Banking Commissioner for permission to •establish a branch office in Empire.
The State Banking Commissioner did not pass on either application, but he did issue a certificate of authority permitting the defendant bank to establish a branch office at the location where it desired to move its principal office. The -defendant bank thereafter established this branch office on August 17, 1959.
On August 24, 1959, the Traverse City :State Bank and the First Peoples State Bank (now National Bank and Trust ■Company of Traverse City, plaintiff in this suit) brought suit under Section 23.739 of the Michigan Statutes Annotated,
in the Circuit Court for the County of Ingham. This statute provides for judicial review of any decision by the State Banking Commissioner.
In a decree filed June 29, 1960, the Circuit Court for the County of Ingham overruled the Commissioner by holding that there was no “necessity” for the new branch. Section 23.762 of the Michigan Statutes Annotated provides that a new branch office shall not be approved unless there is “necessity for the establishment of such branch.”
Before February 15, 1961, defendant Empire State Bank filed an application for approval of the Comptroller of the
Currency to be converted into a national banking association. Defendant also sought to have its chosen name, The Empire National Bank, approved by the Comptroller. 12 U.S.C.A. § 35.
On February 15, 1961, the conversion from Empire State Bank to The Empire National Bank was approved by the then Comptroller of the Currency, Ray M. Gidney.
On February 16, 1961, defendant Empire National Bank made application to the Comptroller of the Currency pursuant to 12 U.S.C.A. § 30, for approval of the Comptroller to change the location of its main office from Empire, Michigan, to Traverse City, Michigan, which is within a distance of thirty miles from Empire, Michigan.
At the same time, defendant bank made application to operate its then main office in the Village of Empire as a branch, pursuant to 12 U.S.C.A. § 36.
Application was also made for approval of a change in the name of defendant from The Empire National Bank to Empire National Bank of Traverse City.
On June 27, 1961, Comptroller Gidney issued a certificate approving the change in defendant bank’s name, and approving a change in the location of the main office to Traverse City. The Comptroller also issued a certificate authorizing the continuance of defendant bank’s operation in Empire as a branch. Defendant bank has been operating its main office in Traverse City since that time.
On February 21 and 24, 1961, these plaintiffs instituted the present action, seeking the relief set out above.
In granting the request for change of location of defendant bank, the Comptroller was necessarily acting pursuant to Title 12 U.S.C.A. § 30:
“Any national banking association, with the approval of the Comptroller of the Currency, may change its name or change the location of the main office of such association within the limits of the city, town, or village in which it is situated.
Any national banking association,, with the approval of the Comptroller of the Currency, may change the location of the main office of such association to any other location outside the limits of the city, town, or village in which it is located, but not more than thirty miles distant,
by the vote of shareholders owning two-thirds of the stock of such association. A duly authenticated notice of the vote and of the new name or location selected shall be sent to the Comptroller of the Currency; but no change of name or location shall be valid until the Comptroller shall have issued his certificate of approval of the same.” (Emphasis supplied.)
On February 15, 1961, defendant became a national bank, subject to the federal laws, rules and regulations, and to the administrative control of the Comptroller of the Currency. On that date the Comptroller of the Currency certified defendant had complied with all statutory requirements of the National Banking Act essential to convert into a national banking association. From that time forward defendant bank “and all its stockholders, officers, and employees * * * [had] the same powers and privileges, and * * * [were] subject to the same duties, lia
bilities, and regulations, in all respects, * * * [which had] been prescribed by the Federal Reserve Act and the National Banking Act
for associations originally organized as national banking associations.”
12 U.S.C.A. § 35. (Emphasis supplied.)
An analysis of the briefs of the parties and the record in this case demonstrates that the primary, essential challenge by the plaintiffs is that the move of The Empire National Bank to Traverse City in this suit is foreclosed and illegal because it is contrary to the decision of the Circuit Court for Ingham County discussed above, which held that there was no necessity for a new banking facility in Traverse City.
Plaintiffs claim the decision of the Ingham County Circuit Court is res judicata in the instant case, or that defendant bank and the Comptroller are equitably estopped by that decision.
The state circuit court’s decision interpreted the state law applicable to a state bank, and the exercise of discretion by the State Banking Commissioner under the state branch banking law. When defendant bank was fully converted from a state banking association to a national banking association, it ceased to be subject to state banking laws and the state banking commissioner insofar as they relate to the administration of the defendant as a banking association.
Plaintiffs cite Michigan Statutes Annotated 23.866, Comp.Laws Supp.1956, § 487.113 in support of their contention, which reads in part as follows: “ * * * and the national banking association shall be deemed to be a continuation of the entity and of the identity of the state bank.”
This statute cannot be interpreted so as to supersede or interfere with the administrative control or powers of the Comptroller of the Currency over national banks as provided in the National Banking Acts. Clearly, the intent and purport of Michigan Statutes Annotated 23.866 is to impose upon the converted national bank the continuing duty to discharge all of its obligations in its fiduciary and banking capacity to the public generally, and specifically to its customers, depositors and those with whom it has entered into contractual relationships or any relationships enforceable under the law.
It is the plaintiffs’ claim that 12 U.S. C.A. § 30 casts a burden upon the Comptroller to make a finding of “necessity” before he can grant approval of a relocation of defendant bank’s main office, and that if this is the case, the Comptroller of the Currency is bound by the determination of the Circuit Court for Ingham County.
Title 12 U.S.C.A. § 30 does not oblige the Comptroller to first find “necessity” before he approves relocation of a national banking association’s main office. The statute is silent on the finding of “necessity” as a condition precedent to his approval of a national bank’s main office move.
The language of the statute makes the move dependent only upon “approval” by the Comptroller and a vote of two-thirds of the shareholders of the national bank.
The state court’s decision in the Ingham County Circuit Court case which interprets a state statute regulating a state banking association cannot control the federal statutory discretion given to the Comptroller of the Currency in his administration and regulation of national banking associations; excepting, however, only insofar as Congress has by express permission provided in the National Banking Act.
Plaintiffs also have argued that the Comptroller’s regulations in force at all times pertinent to this action demand a finding of “necessity.” C.F.R. Title 12, Chap. 1, Part 4 (January 1, 1963).
Plaintiffs predicate their conclusion upon the fact that 12 C.F.R. 4.7 directs that applications for a relocation of a national banking association’s main office shall be processed in the same manner as an application for a change in the capital structure of a national banking association.
Then, plaintiffs show the regulations for changes in capital require that ap
plications for changes in capital be processed in the same manner as applications for new charters. 12 C.F.B.. 4.6. Finally, applications for new charters involve an investigation into the “convenience and needs of the community.”
While these regulations set up the procedure for applications relating to a relocation of a national banking association’s main office, change in capital, and new charters, they do not affect the substantive requirements which govern a change in location of the bank’s main office. Those are controlled by statute, 12 U.S.C.A. § 30.
The essence of plaintiffs’ claim is that the Comptroller is not to act arbitrarily or capriciously. However, this does not mean that the Comptroller, in his expertize, may not differ from the conclusions of the Circuit Court for the County of Ingham.
Parenthetically, it may be noted that the Comptroller and the State Banking Commissioner seem to agree insofar as the State Banking Commissioner approved a move of the defendant bank into the Traverse City area.
In this court’s judgment, Title 12 U.S.C.A. § 30 vests the Comptroller with broad discretion to approve relocation of national banking associations limited only by the provisions of Section 30. His actions, nevertheless, must not be arbitrary nor capricious. Community National Bank of Pontiac v. Gidney, 192 F.Supp. 514 (E.D.Mich.1961) affirmed Community National Bank of Pontiac v. Saxon, 310 F.2d 224 (CCA 6, 1962).
The District Court in Community National Bank of Pontiac v. Gidney, had before it the question of judicial review of the Comptroller’s administrative action. One of the ultimate issues was whether or not the Comptroller abused his discretion in authorizing a branch bank.
The court in the Pontiac case was of the opinion that the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.A. § 1009, controlled judicial review of the Comptroller, and it further found that there was no review where “agency action is by law committed to agency discretion.” 5 U.S.C.A. § 1009.
The court then stated:
“ * * * this court is of the opinion that Congress intended that the Comptroller have an exclusive and unreviewable power of discretion in determining whether or not to approve the establishment of branch banks pursuant to 12 U.S.C.A. § 36(c). The court, therefore, is further of the opinion that the discretion provided for in 12 U.S.C.A. § 36(c) comes within the second exception to Section 10 of the Administrative Procedure Act and that this court is without jurisdiction to review the action of the Comptroller in the present case.” Page 519 of 192 F.Supp.
The same case came before the Circuit Court of Appeals
sub
mom. Community National Bank of Pontiac v. Saxon, 310 F.2d 224 (CCA 6, 1962). After pointing out that the action was based upon the provisions of 12 U.S.C.A. § 36(c), the branch banking statute, which is not the statute involved in the present case, the Circuit Court noted the District Court had modified its initial ruling as follows:
“ * * * the (district) Court holds that the issue of whether or not the area in question is a village under Michigan law cannot be determined by this (district) court de novo; and that the precise question then is whether the action necessarily taken by the Comptroller was arbitrary or capricious.” At page 225 of 310 F.2d.
The Circuit Court states the District Court then held that the acts of the Comptroller were not arbitrary or capricious, 310 F.2d at page 226. The Circuit Court affirmed.
The Circuit Court stated:
“We are of the opinion that the scope of review of the District Court
is limited by the terms of the Administrative Procedure Act and that its finding that the decision of the Comptroller was not arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law, is amply supported by the evidence.” At page 227 of 310 F.2d.
We take this statement by the 'Court of Appeals to mean that the scope •of inquiry by this district court in the present action is whether or not the Comptroller acted arbitrarily, capriciously, or abused his discretion.
While the Pontiac cases involved the branch banking statute, the court’s ruling is pertinent, since it treats definitively of the discretion of the Comptroller.
This court finds on the facts .presented by the pleadings and record in this case that the Comptroller did not .act arbitrarily, capriciously, or abusively, but he acted in accordance with law.
There is a substantial difference between the national banking act relating to the relocation of main offices and the ■state law relating to the relocation of .state bank main offices. Compare 12 U.S.C.A. § 30 with M.S.A. 23.767, Comp. Laws 1948, § 487.39.
For example, the state law provides that a state bank’s main office can be moved anywhere within the state, with the State Banking Commissioner’s approval. The defendant bank gave up this right when it converted into a national bank. It was apparently the intent of Congress
not
to limit the relocation of main offices of national banking associations by reference to state banking laws, since there is no such limitation. 12 U.S.C.A. § 30.
If we were to hold, as plaintiffs urge us to do, we would write into Section 30 of the National Banking Act that which Congress decided not to include in the Act. This court would thus be legislating and usurping the powers of Congress.
On the other hand, Congress has specifically provided under Section 36, the national branch banking statute, as follows:
“
-» -x- *
“(c) A national banking association may, with the approval of the Comptroller of the Currency, establish and operate new branches: * *' *; and (2) at any point within the State in which said association is situated,
if such establish
ment and operation are at the time authorized to State banks by the statute law
of the State in question by language specifically granting such authority affirmatively and not merely by implication or recognition, and subject to the restrictions as to location imposed by the law of the State on State banks.” (Emphasis supplied.)
The specific difference is a compelling reason for us to refuse to interpret the national banking association’s main office relocation statute as containing the same limitation as the branch banking statute.
The Comptroller undoubtedly is faced with problems in a decision concerning the relocation of a main office which do not appear in the establishment of a branch bank; and in this area, “[t]he Comptroller must necessarily utilize his great expert knowledge and consider questions of policy, as well as of fact, with respect to the interest of the public” ; Community National Bank of Pontiac v. Gidney, supra, 192 F.Supp. page 518. Absent any limitations in the relocation statute, the Comptroller is the expert named by Congress to make the decision.
Plaintiffs also point to the language of the Court in Camden Trust Company v. Gidney, 112 U.S.App.D.C. 197, 301 F.2d 521 (1962) where it stated in
dictum
that the Comptroller in that case had properly turned down an application for relocation of a main office. This court does not feel dictum is entitled to much weight in view of the different facts involved in the Camden case.
From an affidavit filed in this case by the Comptroller, it appears that relocation of the main office in the Camden case would have left a
branch bank,
the original main office, in a location where another bank had a branch; this clearly would have violated 12 U.S.C.A. § 36(e), and in itself justified the dictum of the court; but there is no such result in this case.
The resulting branch bank in Empire has not been challenged.
The very recent case of Whitney National Bank v. Bank of New Orleans and Trust Company, 323 F.2d 290 (Cir. D.C. 1963) is clearly distinguishable on its facts; in addition, it too involves the branch banking statute, 12 U.S.C.A. § 36(e), and not the relocation statute, 12 U.S.C.A. § 30.
A motion for summary judgment should not be granted unless there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and unless the proponent is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.
This court finds no genuine dispute as to any material fact. The statute controlling the relocation of the main office of a national bank calls for the approval of the Comptroller, 12 U.S.C.A. § 30. The Comptroller of the Currency did approve the request for relocation of the defendant
national bank’s
main office from Empire to Traverse City, which is within the thirty mile limitation of Section 30.
Since Section 30 does not require a finding of necessity, the Ingham County State of Michigan Circuit Court’s findings are irrelevant. The Comptroller had acted according to law, and, therefore, the Comptroller and the defendant
national bank
are entitled to have their motions granted.
The Comptroller and the defendant national bank shall draft a proposed judgment for the court’s consideration in accordance with this opinion.