HUGHES, Justice.
Transcontinental Gas Pipeline Corporation, Natural Gas Pipeline Company of America, Northern Natural Gas Company, Permian Basin Pipeline Company, Panhandle Eastern Pipeline Company and Michigan-Wisconsin Pipeline Company sued Robert S. Calvert, Will Wilson and Jesse James, Comptroller of Public Accountants, Attorney General, and Treasurer, respectively, of the State of Texas, to recover taxes paid, under proper protest, pursuant to the requirements of Chapter 22, Title 122-A, Arts. 22.01 to 22.09, inclusive, V.A.T.S. Tax.-Gen. These statutes were enacted in 1959, 56th Leg., 3rd C.S. p. 187, ch. 1, and are designated
[680]*680Severance Beneficiary Tax. The material provisions of tírese statutes, sometimes referred to herein as the Act, are set out below.1
[681]*681In a nonjury trial, judgment was rendered for recovery .of taxes sued for, the
Trial Court holding that the taxing statutes were unconstitutional and void, being [682]*682in violation of the ‘ Commerce Clause of .the United States Constitution.2 We quote from its judgment:
“(a) That Chapter 22 (Articles 22.-01-22.09, inclusive) of Title 122A, * * * as such Chapter 22 is interpreted by defendants or as in any manner interpreted, is invalid as to gas purchased, received and transported in Texas by plaintiffs, and each of them, for interstate transmission, in that the same is contrary to Clause 3 of Section 8 of Article I (the Commerce Clause) of the Constitution of the United States.
“(b) That, pursuant to the provisions of Article 22.09 of said Chapter 22 that ‘if this Chapter is declared invalid by a final judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction as to any severance beneficiary, it shall be invalid from the beginning as to the producer and all other severance beneficiaries,’ and to the provision of Article 22.01 (4) of Chapter 22 that ‘if the tax hereby levied is held invalid as to any class of severance beneficiaries, other than governmental entities or organizations held to be exempt from taxation, then it shall not be valid as to other sever-anee beneficiaries or producers,’ Chapter 22 and the tax levied therein are invalid as to all ‘producers’ and ‘severance beneficiaries,’ as said terms are defined in said Chapter.
“That the relief granted in Paragraph I above makes unnecessary any adjudication of the other grounds of unconstitutionality or other invalidity asserted against Chapter 22 by plaintiffs.”
We agree with this judgment, and will confine ourselves to the limits prescribed by it.
In order to understand the point of our decision, reference must be made to the construction appellants place on these statutes and their commendably frank concessions in this regard.
Basically, their overall interpretation of these statutes is that the tax is levied upon the incident of production or severance of gas in place in Texas, and that those persons who exercise the privilege of obtaining the production of dedicated gas pursuant to dedication contracts with producers have a sufficient interest in the production of such gas as to justify the imposition of the tax upon them.3
[683]*683In the disposition we make of this case, it is not necessary that we determine the incidence of the tax, i. e. whether it is the production or severance of the gas from dedicated lands as appellants contend.
Nor is it necessary that we determine that all of the “severance beneficiaries” defined by the statutes have an insufficient interest in the gas produced to justify imposition of the tax upon them in order to invalidate the tax. It is enough for this purpose that any such severance beneficiary lacks this interest. Art. 22.09, infra, footnote 1.
This brings us to the concession made by appellants. They say, and must say in order to sustain their position that all severance beneficiaries have a taxable interest in the gas produced, that the contract referred to in Art. 22.02(4) means a contract with the producer and cannot refer to a contract with a person other than the producer. We quote from their brief:
“The Act states, in effect, that the contract must confer upon ‘one person’ (the severance beneficiary) the prior right to take title to gas produced from particular lands, leases or reservoirs in Texas. * * * A person who has a prior right to take title to gas that is set apart, pledged and dedicated in place has the paramount and exclusive right to take title to the gas when it is produced under the dedication contract. Obviously, the only person who can confer this ‘prior right’ is the person having such right to convey, who must be the gas lessee, or producer. Therefore, it is apparent that producers are the ‘other persons’ referred to in Article 22.02(4), and that they, being the only persons who could possibly be ‘obligated’ by the type of contract described, are the second parties to such contracts. * * * it may be conceded that persons ‘taking title’ from persons operating processing or treating plants who have no direct contractual relationship with the producers do not have an ‘immediate and direct’ interest in production as comprehended by the authorities discussed, infra. Therefore, under appellees’ interpretation as applied to interstate transportation of gas, the actual operating incidence of the tax would not be the production but would be the ‘taking’ of gas into interstate commerce after production and processing.”
It is our opinion that the plain wording of Sec. (4), Art. 22.02 is subject to no other construction than that it authorizes and fixes liability for the tax imposed by the Act upon downstream purchasers of gas under successive contracts, relating to the same gas, of the nature specified by the Act. For convenience we recopy such Sec. (4):
"(4) ‘Severance Beneficiary’ shall mean any person for whose use and benefit gas is withdrawn from the land or waters of this State. Where a contract in writing confers upon one person the prior right to take title to gas produced from particular lands, leases or reservoirs in this State and other persons are obligated to maintain and operate wells, gathering or dehydration facilities or to process or treat such gas so as to make delivery thereof as required by such contract, it shall be conclusively pr'esumed (i) that by such contract gas in place under lands or leases or within such reservoirs has been pledged, dedicated and set apart to satisfy such contract and (ii) that any gas which is delivered and accepted under such contract has been withdrawn from the lands and waters of this State for the use and benefit of the person taking title to such gas by virtue of such contract. If there be more than one such contract covering the same gas, the tax hereby levied shall be the liability of the person who ultimately takes title to the gas in this State by virtue of such contracts. In ill other instances, it shall be conclu[684]*684sively presumed that gas when withdrawn from the lands and waters of this State is withdrawn for the use and benefit of the person taking it from the land or waters in this State and having the original possessory right thereto as and when the same is produced.”
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HUGHES, Justice.
Transcontinental Gas Pipeline Corporation, Natural Gas Pipeline Company of America, Northern Natural Gas Company, Permian Basin Pipeline Company, Panhandle Eastern Pipeline Company and Michigan-Wisconsin Pipeline Company sued Robert S. Calvert, Will Wilson and Jesse James, Comptroller of Public Accountants, Attorney General, and Treasurer, respectively, of the State of Texas, to recover taxes paid, under proper protest, pursuant to the requirements of Chapter 22, Title 122-A, Arts. 22.01 to 22.09, inclusive, V.A.T.S. Tax.-Gen. These statutes were enacted in 1959, 56th Leg., 3rd C.S. p. 187, ch. 1, and are designated
[680]*680Severance Beneficiary Tax. The material provisions of tírese statutes, sometimes referred to herein as the Act, are set out below.1
[681]*681In a nonjury trial, judgment was rendered for recovery .of taxes sued for, the
Trial Court holding that the taxing statutes were unconstitutional and void, being [682]*682in violation of the ‘ Commerce Clause of .the United States Constitution.2 We quote from its judgment:
“(a) That Chapter 22 (Articles 22.-01-22.09, inclusive) of Title 122A, * * * as such Chapter 22 is interpreted by defendants or as in any manner interpreted, is invalid as to gas purchased, received and transported in Texas by plaintiffs, and each of them, for interstate transmission, in that the same is contrary to Clause 3 of Section 8 of Article I (the Commerce Clause) of the Constitution of the United States.
“(b) That, pursuant to the provisions of Article 22.09 of said Chapter 22 that ‘if this Chapter is declared invalid by a final judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction as to any severance beneficiary, it shall be invalid from the beginning as to the producer and all other severance beneficiaries,’ and to the provision of Article 22.01 (4) of Chapter 22 that ‘if the tax hereby levied is held invalid as to any class of severance beneficiaries, other than governmental entities or organizations held to be exempt from taxation, then it shall not be valid as to other sever-anee beneficiaries or producers,’ Chapter 22 and the tax levied therein are invalid as to all ‘producers’ and ‘severance beneficiaries,’ as said terms are defined in said Chapter.
“That the relief granted in Paragraph I above makes unnecessary any adjudication of the other grounds of unconstitutionality or other invalidity asserted against Chapter 22 by plaintiffs.”
We agree with this judgment, and will confine ourselves to the limits prescribed by it.
In order to understand the point of our decision, reference must be made to the construction appellants place on these statutes and their commendably frank concessions in this regard.
Basically, their overall interpretation of these statutes is that the tax is levied upon the incident of production or severance of gas in place in Texas, and that those persons who exercise the privilege of obtaining the production of dedicated gas pursuant to dedication contracts with producers have a sufficient interest in the production of such gas as to justify the imposition of the tax upon them.3
[683]*683In the disposition we make of this case, it is not necessary that we determine the incidence of the tax, i. e. whether it is the production or severance of the gas from dedicated lands as appellants contend.
Nor is it necessary that we determine that all of the “severance beneficiaries” defined by the statutes have an insufficient interest in the gas produced to justify imposition of the tax upon them in order to invalidate the tax. It is enough for this purpose that any such severance beneficiary lacks this interest. Art. 22.09, infra, footnote 1.
This brings us to the concession made by appellants. They say, and must say in order to sustain their position that all severance beneficiaries have a taxable interest in the gas produced, that the contract referred to in Art. 22.02(4) means a contract with the producer and cannot refer to a contract with a person other than the producer. We quote from their brief:
“The Act states, in effect, that the contract must confer upon ‘one person’ (the severance beneficiary) the prior right to take title to gas produced from particular lands, leases or reservoirs in Texas. * * * A person who has a prior right to take title to gas that is set apart, pledged and dedicated in place has the paramount and exclusive right to take title to the gas when it is produced under the dedication contract. Obviously, the only person who can confer this ‘prior right’ is the person having such right to convey, who must be the gas lessee, or producer. Therefore, it is apparent that producers are the ‘other persons’ referred to in Article 22.02(4), and that they, being the only persons who could possibly be ‘obligated’ by the type of contract described, are the second parties to such contracts. * * * it may be conceded that persons ‘taking title’ from persons operating processing or treating plants who have no direct contractual relationship with the producers do not have an ‘immediate and direct’ interest in production as comprehended by the authorities discussed, infra. Therefore, under appellees’ interpretation as applied to interstate transportation of gas, the actual operating incidence of the tax would not be the production but would be the ‘taking’ of gas into interstate commerce after production and processing.”
It is our opinion that the plain wording of Sec. (4), Art. 22.02 is subject to no other construction than that it authorizes and fixes liability for the tax imposed by the Act upon downstream purchasers of gas under successive contracts, relating to the same gas, of the nature specified by the Act. For convenience we recopy such Sec. (4):
"(4) ‘Severance Beneficiary’ shall mean any person for whose use and benefit gas is withdrawn from the land or waters of this State. Where a contract in writing confers upon one person the prior right to take title to gas produced from particular lands, leases or reservoirs in this State and other persons are obligated to maintain and operate wells, gathering or dehydration facilities or to process or treat such gas so as to make delivery thereof as required by such contract, it shall be conclusively pr'esumed (i) that by such contract gas in place under lands or leases or within such reservoirs has been pledged, dedicated and set apart to satisfy such contract and (ii) that any gas which is delivered and accepted under such contract has been withdrawn from the lands and waters of this State for the use and benefit of the person taking title to such gas by virtue of such contract. If there be more than one such contract covering the same gas, the tax hereby levied shall be the liability of the person who ultimately takes title to the gas in this State by virtue of such contracts. In ill other instances, it shall be conclu[684]*684sively presumed that gas when withdrawn from the lands and waters of this State is withdrawn for the use and benefit of the person taking it from the land or waters in this State and having the original possessory right thereto as and when the same is produced.”
One of such downstream purchasers of the same gas the title to which had previously been taken by a purchaser under.a contract of statutory nature with the producer is appellee Michigan-Wisconsin Pipeline Company.
This company produces no gas in Texas or elsewhere. It gathers no gas in Texas. All the gas which it obtains in Texas is residue gas, which is the gas remaining from natural gas as produced at the wells after certain liquefiable hydrocarbons have been removed from it.
Such residue gas is delivered to Michigan-Wisconsin by Phillips Petroleum Company at the outlet of a gasoline plant owned by Phillips in Hansford County, Texas. Concurrently with such delivery, such gas flows immediately into the facilities of Michigan-Wisconsin for transportation by it to markets outside Texas.
The gas sold and delivered by Phillips to Michigan-Wisconsin, under written contracts, is residue from natural gas produced or purchased by Phillips. Some of this gas comes from acreage committed or dedicated to its supply; some comes from uncommitted or undedicated acreage.
The contract between Phillips and Michigan-Wisconsin is one in which Phillips is obligated to process or treat such gas so as to make delivery thereof as required by such contract.
It is clear to us that Michigan-Wisconsin is a “Severance Beneficiary” as defined by Sec. (4), Art. 22.02, supra.
Michigan-Wisconsin is certainly a person for whose use and benefit gas is withdrawn from the land or waters of this State.
It buys and transports such gas for consumption in other states. It could not be denied that this is a beneficial use of gas.
Michigan-Wisconsin has the prior right conferred upon it by written contract with Phillips to take title to gas produced from particular lands and Phillips, under such contract, is obligated to treat such gas so as to make delivery as required by the contract.
Being a Severance Beneficiary, as defined by the Act, Michigan-Wisconsin is, under these statutes, liable for the tax imposed by them. Such liability however, as conceded by appellants, renders the taxing statutes invalid in their entirety.
We will notice the arguments advanced by appellants in opposition to the construction we have placed on Sec. (4), Art. 22.02.
As shown by the quotation from appellants’ brief, supra, they say that only a producer can confer the “prior right” to take title to dedicated gas because he, the producer, is the only person having a prior right to such gas to convey.
If the Legislature had intended for this section to have this meaning, it would have been very simple for the Legislature to have so provided. Such construction would require us to ignore the language of this section as well as other provisions of the Act.
If a producer dedicated all of his gas produced from certain lands under a contract coming within the terms of Sec. (4), then, if appellants’ construction of this section be accepted, the person taking title to such gas under such contract would be a severance beneficiary and liable for the tax even though he had made a similar contract (such as Phillips made with Michigan-Wisconsin) with another person pertaining to the same gas. This construction is in the very teeth of the language of this section which provides that “If there be more than [685]*685one such contract covering the same gas, the tax hereby levied shall be the liability of the person who ultimately takes title to the gas in this State by virtue of such contracts.”
We find appellants frankly stating:
“Though the contract in which a producer dedicates gas reserves to a purchaser represents the most common situation in the industry, it must be said, in fairness, that the industry apparently does not regard a producer as an indispensable party to a dedication contract. A contract in which a plant operator ‘dedicates’ to the performance of a contract with a ‘downstream’ purchaser gas which is dedicated to him hy a producer is also apparently referred to as a ‘dedication’ contract. Though such contracts are probably more aptly described as ‘dedicated contracts,’ or ‘contracts dedicating contracts,’ it is not appellants’ purpose to lead this Court to believe that ‘dedication contract’ is a term of art in the industry referring only to contracts between producers and purchasers.”
Appellants explain the multiple contract ■provisions of section (4) by stating:
“It is commonplace in the natural gas industry for a producer to dedicate percentages of specified gas reserves to two or more purchasers, or ‘severance beneficiaries.’ In such cases, there are two or more ‘such contracts’ ‘covering’ the same gas. Also, in certain instances, two or more lessees will have undivided interests in the same gas leases, and will dedicate their respective portions of the gas in place by •separate dedication contracts. Again, there are two or more ‘such contracts’ ‘covering’ the same gas. The contracts ‘cover’ the same gas in the same sense that two or more deeds creating undivided interests in property ‘cover’ the same property.”
An undivided interest in property is a specified portion of the whole. Such interests may be equal but they are not the “same” in the sense that the owner of one interest can convey or contract with reference to the interest of another owner. The only manner in which the “same” interest may be conveyed is by succession, one person succeeding to the title of another. The instances posed by appellants are not of this character. They are collateral conveyances of separate, not the same, interests or gas. Neither grantee “takes title to the gas” by “virtue” of the other’s contract.
To reach the construction for which appellants contend, we would have to discard as superfluous the word “ultimately” and disregard the employment of the plural “contracts” in the quoted sentence from section (4). Under their view there would be, except as to collateral contracts covering gas from the same lands or reservoir, but one contract, a contract between the producer and the severance beneficiary. Title would be taken directly, not ultimately, from the producer by virtue of a single contract and not by virtue of such “contracts.”
Finally, such construction so sought by appellants would not take into account the frequent use of the term “first purchaser” in the Act.
If the purchaser from the producer is the only purchaser within the scope of the Act, then the use of the term “first purchaser” is inept, and the word “first” is a useless appendage.
We, as we should and must, give meaning and effect to the words “first purchaser.” We believe that they evidence recognition by the Legislature that gas pipelines frequently do not purchase directly from producers. The 4th Annual Inst, on Oil and Gas Law and Taxation, p. 155, makes this statement:
“The seller ordinarily will be either the plant operator who has purchased [686]*686the gas to extract liquid hydrocarbons or the lessee, * * * ”4
In Calvert v. Tennessee Gas Transmission Company, Tex.Civ., 341 S.W.2d 677, the Trial Court found and concluded, in part, as follows:
“A large part of the gas which plaintiff buys on delivery to its interstate lines in Texas as an incident to its occupation and business of transporting gas through its interstate lines to its ■ outside markets consists of ‘tailgate purchase’ of ‘residue’ gas after plant processing with deliveries at the discharge side of gasoline plants for the purpose of immediate interstate transmission in a steady and continuous flow, * * *”
In its brief in that case Tennessee says:
“ * * * it so happens, as proved and found in our case, that T. G. T. Co. buys approximately 50% of the gas which it purchases under ‘dedication’ contracts from plant processors at ‘tailgates’ or from ‘gatherers.’ ”
The knowledge which we have of the judicial, legislative and political history of this Act compels a construction of it consistent with its plainly expressed and avowed purpose, to tax the last purchaser of gas in this State under dedication contracts. This is usually a pipeline. To construe the Act as appellants desire would saddle a substantial portion of this tax upon the processor or first purchaser and not upon the pipeline, contrary to its language and contrary to its historical purpose.
The judgment of the Trial Court is affirmed.
Affirmed.