Calvert v. PANHANDLE EASTERN PIPE LINE COMPANY

371 S.W.2d 601, 19 Oil & Gas Rep. 742, 1963 Tex. App. LEXIS 1716
CourtCourt of Appeals of Texas
DecidedOctober 23, 1963
Docket11118, 11119
StatusPublished

This text of 371 S.W.2d 601 (Calvert v. PANHANDLE EASTERN PIPE LINE COMPANY) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Calvert v. PANHANDLE EASTERN PIPE LINE COMPANY, 371 S.W.2d 601, 19 Oil & Gas Rep. 742, 1963 Tex. App. LEXIS 1716 (Tex. Ct. App. 1963).

Opinion

PHILLIPS, Justice.

These cases were filed and briefed separately, however they were submitted and argued together, present the same questions, consequently we will determine the issues in one opinion.

This is an appeal by the Comptroller of Public Accounts, the Attorney General and the Treasurer of the State of Texas from a judgment of the District Court declaring the Dedicated Reserve Tax Act, Article 3.11 of Title 122A, Vernon’s Ann.Rev.Civ.St. to be unconstitutional and void for the reasons that the tax levied by the Act is prohibited by the Commerce Clause of the Constitution of the United *602 States 1 and is discriminatory in violation of the provisions of Article I, Sections 3, 16 and 19, Article VIII, Sections 1 and 2, of the Constitution of the State of Texas, Vernon’s Ann.St., and of the due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. The judgments ordered a refund to appellees (plaintiffs below) of all taxes paid and to be paid by them under protest. 2

We sustain the judgment of the Trial Court in the proposition that the tax levied is prohibited by the Commerce Clause of the Constitution of the United States, consequently we will not discuss the second part of the Trial Court’s holding that the tax is discriminatory.

Under Section (1), subsection II of the Act before us 3 there is an attempt to classify the appellees herein as producers: *603 " * * * to recognize and clarify fully by statute the relation between various persons engaged in the occupation of producing natural gas so that the taxpayer in *604 each instance may be identified clearly, and so that all persons so engaged in the occupation of production will bear equitably the taxes imposed in connection with the severance of gas from Texas soil.” And further: “Pursuant to this policy it is recognized that contractual relations [hips] exist in such natural gas production occupation between several definable groups, all engaged integrally in such occupation of severance of natural gas from the soil and all having such a direct and beneficial interest in the production of gas that for the purpose of taxation they may be classified as producers of gas. It is the policy of the State of Texas to recognize that all such persons, integrally engaged in the occupation of severance of natural gas from the soil-producers, severance producers and dedicated reserve producers, have a taxable interest in production of gas in Texas.”

There is no dispute in that each of the appellees before this Court come under the provisions of the Act in question as a “dedicated reserve producer” or “severance beneficiary” as set out in (b) and (c) of Section (2).

There are stipulations to the effect that all of the gas purchased by appellees, except for relatively minor quantities sold in Texas or used as fuel for appellee’s compressor stations, has a destination outside the State of Texas through every stage of the production, gathering, processing, sale to appellees, and transmission and sale in markets other than in Texas. All of such gas moves in a continuous stream from the producing wells to markets in other states, without break, in a steady flow, ending, as-contemplated from the beginning, at points-outside the borders of Texas.

Appellees perform only two activities in Texas in connection with such gas; by purchase they take the gas under the varying circumstances summarized above;, and they transport such gas out of Texas-in interstate commerce.

For purpose of illustration we come again to the factual situation of appellee-Michigan Wisconsin Pipe Line Company..

Michigan Wisconsin owns a pipeline that runs approximately one-half mile from the outlet of a gasoline plant owned and operated by Phillips Petroleum Company in Hansford County, Texas, to a point on the-Texas-Oklahoma border where such line leaves Texas. Michigan Wisconsin purchases residue gas from Phillips at the-outlet of such plant. Michigan Wisconsin-, transports such residue gas through such, pipeline out of Texas in interstate commerce. There are stipulations to the effect that this company produces no gas in Texas or elsewhere. It gathers no gas in Texas. All the gas which it obtains in Texas, is residue gas, which is the gas remaining-from natural gas as produced at the wells-after certain liquefiable hydrocarbons have been removed from it. Such residue gas is-delivered to Michigan Wisconsin by Phillips Petroleum Company at the outlet of a. gasoline plant owned by Phillips in Hans- *605 ford County, Texas. Concurrently with such delivery, such gas flows immediately into the facilities of Michigan Wisconsin for transportation by it to markets outside Texas.

For the purposes of this opinion it will not be necessary to further deliniate the variations in obtaining gas used by the remaining appellees herein since Section (7) of the Act before us declares its provisions nonseverable and that if any portion thereof is declared invalid as to any severance beneficiary, it shall be invalid as to the producer and all other severance beneficiaries.

In Michigan-Wisconsin Pipe Line Company v. Calvert, 347 U.S. 157, 74 S.Ct. 396, 98 L.Ed. 583, the Supreme Court of the United States in declaring the Texas “Gas Gathering Tax” unconstitutional described the identical purchase of gas by Michigan Wisconsin that is set out above. In this case the Court stated that the problem was not whether the State could tax the actual gathering of all gas whether transmitted in interstate commerce or not but whether the State had delayed the incidence of the tax beyond the step where production and processing had ceased and transmission in interstate commerce had begun. The Court held that the incidence of the tax was the “taking” of gas from Phillips’ gasoline plant; that this event had occurred after the gas had been produced, gathered and processed by others than Michigan Wisconsin; that the “taking” into Michigan Wisconsin’s pipeline was solely for interstate transmission and the gas at that time was not only actually committed to but was moving in interstate commerce. The Court, in striking down this tax as a burden on interstate commerce further observed that it would permit a “multiple burden” upon that commerce in that if the fiction urged to uphold the tax was validated, other states through which the gas passed could indulge in a similar venture, the net effect of which would be substantially to resurrect the customs barriers which the Commerce Clause was designed to eliminate.

In Calvert v. Transcontinental Gas Pipeline Corporation, Tex.Civ.App., 341 S.W.2d 679, writ refused, this Court speaking-through Justice Hughes struck down a “Severance Beneficiary Tax.” Again the identical fact situation of the Michigan-Wisconin Phillips gas purchase was described, as there Michigan Wisconsin was a “severance beneficiary” just as here.

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Bluebook (online)
371 S.W.2d 601, 19 Oil & Gas Rep. 742, 1963 Tex. App. LEXIS 1716, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/calvert-v-panhandle-eastern-pipe-line-company-texapp-1963.