Opinion
LUCAS, C. J.
—Classified employees of the state’s community colleges are entitled to the paid holidays enumerated in Education Code section 88203, [336]*336including “every day appointed by the President, or the Governor of this state . . . for a public fast, thanksgiving or holiday . . . .” We must decide whether President George Bush “appointed” days of thanksgiving, within the meaning of the Education Code, when, at the conclusion of the Persian Gulf War, he proclaimed April 5, 6, and 7, 1991, as “National Days of Thanksgiving.” As we explain, we conclude that the President’s proclamation did not entitle community college classified employees to holiday compensation for those days. We therefore reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal.
I.
Following the end of hostilities in the Persian Gulf region, President Bush issued Presidential Proclamation No. 6257, entitled, “For National Days of Thanksgiving, April 5-7, 1991.” (Pres.Proc. No. 6257, 56 Fed.Reg. 10353 (Mar. 7, 1991), 1991 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News, p. A26 [hereafter Proclamation 6257].) In relevant part, the proclamation states: “. . . I, George Bush, President of the United States of America, do hereby proclaim April 5-7, 1991, as National Days of Thanksgiving. I ask that Americans gather in homes and places of worship to give thanks to Almighty God for the liberation of Kuwait, for the blessings of peace and liberty, for our troops, our families, and our Nation. In addition, I direct that the flag of the United States be flown on all government buildings, I urge all Americans to display the flag, and I ask that bells across the country be set ringing at 3:00 p.m. (eastern daylight savings time) on April 7, 1991, in celebration of the liberation of Kuwait and the end of hostilities in the Persian Gulf.” (Id. at p. All.)
Respondent California School Employees Association (hereafter CSEA) is the exclusive representative of a bargaining unit of classified personnel employed by appellant Governing Board of the Marin Community College District (hereafter the District). CSEA sent the District a letter dated April 4, 1991, calling on the District to recognize April 5, 6, and 7, 1991, as paid holidays for the classified employees represented by CSEA, and to compensate the employees accordingly. The District denied CSEA’s demand by letter dated April 5, 1991.
After the District’s refusal to comply with CSEA’s demand for holiday compensation, CSEA successfully petitioned in the Marin County Superior Court for a writ of mandate. The court ordered the District to recognize the [337]*337thanksgiving days designated in Proclamation 6257 as paid holidays pursuant to Education Code section 88203,1 and to compensate classified employees accordingly.2
The Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment, reasoning that, for purposes of the holiday statute, the President’s “proclaiming” days of thanksgiving was the functional equivalent of his “appointing” them. The court thus concluded that the issuance of Proclamation 6257, designating April 5, 6, and 7 as “National Days of Thanksgiving,” resulted in paid holidays for the college’s classified employees.
We granted review of this issue.3 As will appear, we disagree with the Court of Appeal’s analysis.
II.
Section 88203 entitles classified employees4 of the community colleges5 to holiday compensation on nine specified annual holidays. Section 79020 provides that the community colleges shall close on the same nine designated holidays, with the addition of “Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. Day.” (§ 79020, subd. (a).) Although the President has no authority to declare a paid holiday for the state’s public school employees, or to order the closure [338]*338of the state’s public schools, the Legislature has mandated that legal significance shall attach to the designation of certain special, nonrecurring days by the federal executive. Thus, in addition to the recurring paid holidays, sections 88203 and 79020 also provide for holiday compensation and college closure, respectively, on any days “appointed” by the President (or the Governor) for a public fast, thanksgiving or holiday. (§§ 88203, 79020, subds. (c) & (d).) To decide whether, by issuing Proclamation 6257, the President “appointed” days of thanksgiving entitling classified employees to paid holidays, we must first determine the nature of the presidential action necessary to trigger the applicable statutory provisions.
In examining sections 88203 and 79020 for this purpose, we are guided by the well-established principle that o.ur function is to “ascertain the intent of the lawmakers so as to effectuate the purpose of the law.” (People v. Pieters (1991) 52 Cal.3d 894, 898 [276 Cal.Rptr. 918, 802 P.2d 420], citing People v. Craft (1986) 41 Cal.3d 554, 559 [224 Cal.Rptr. 626, 715 P.2d 585].) We determine such intent by first focusing on the words used by the Legislature, giving them their ordinary meaning. (Mercer v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1991) 53 Cal.3d 753, 763 [280 Cal.Rptr. 745, 809 P.2d 404].) This is because “it is the language of the statute itself that has successfully braved the legislative gauntlet.” (Halbert’s Lumber, Inc. v. Lucky Stores, Inc. (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1233, 1238 [8 Cal.Rptr.2d 298].)
The term “appointed” in sections 88203 and 79020 is not defined in the Education Code, and there are no California cases construing it. As it is used in the statutes here, the term “appoint” is commonly understood as meaning “to fix by a decree, order, command, resolve, decision, or mutual agreement; . . . to fix the time and place of.” (Webster’s New Intemat. Dict. (3d ed. 1981) p. 105.)
The District argues that, as used in the statutes at issue here, the term “appoint” is uncertain and therefore in need of judicial constmction to determine its meaning. This is so, according to the District, because the statutes give legal significance not only to “every day appointed by the President for a public fast, thanksgiving or holiday” but also to “that Thursday in November proclaimed by the President as ‘Thanksgiving Day.’ ” (§ 88203, italics added.) In the District’s view, the Legislature intended a meaningful distinction between the type of presidential action necessary to trigger an entitlement to holiday compensation for Thanksgiving Day, i.e., the issuance of a presidential proclamation, and that required for a presidentially appointed day of thanksgiving.
We discern no ambiguity in the Legislature’s use of the word “appoint.” Like the term “proclaim,” the ordinary meaning of which is “to declare [339]*339solemnly, officially or formally” (see Webster’s New Internal. Diet., supra, at p. 1808), the use of the word “appoint” emphasizes the solemnity and formality of the presidential action necessary to create a holiday.
Under the plain language of section 88203, a presidential decree designating a certain day or days as “day[s]” of “thanksgiving” would trigger an entitlement to a paid holiday for community college employees. A review of the presidential proclamations issued over the past 50 years reveals that relatively few have actually designated thanksgiving days. Of these proclamations, the overwhelming majority were ceremoniously issued by the President in connection with the annual Thanksgiving Day holiday, a holiday fixed as the fourth Thursday in November by congressional directive on December 26, 1941. (See Stokes & Pfeffer, Church and State in the United States (rev. 1st ed. 1964) at p. 503.) There have been four presidential proclamations naming “day[s]” of “thanksgiving” that bore no relation to the annual Thanksgiving Day holiday, including the proclamation at issue here.6
Likewise, a literal interpretation of the statute would give no entitlement to holiday pay for those days designated by the President as something other than a day of thanksgiving. Thus, a “National Day of Prayer” proclaimed in Presidential Proclamation No. 6409 in which President Bush “urge[d] . . . Americans to . . . pray ... in thanksgiving” (Pres.Proc. No. 6409, 57 Fed.Reg. 8395 (Mar. 5, 1992), 1992 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News, p. A18) would not result in a paid holiday, falling outside the literal language of section 88203 because it designated a “day of prayer” rather than a “day of thanksgiving.” (See also “D-Day Remembrance Day,” Pres.Proc. No. 6697, 59 Fed.Reg. 28463 (May 30, 1994), 1994 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News, p. A68 [a “ ‘grateful Nation remembers’ ”].)
The statute, literally interpreted, provides holiday pay entitlement only when the President happens to choose the word “thanksgiving” rather than one of the other words sometimes used to express the same presidential [340]*340directive, such as prayer or remembrance. It is doubtful, however, that the Legislature intended the operation of section 88203 to turn on such fine semantic distinctions.
Focusing solely on the President’s exact choice of words might be appropriate if the Legislature had believed the President knew, and intended, that the precise words he chose would have particular legal consequences in California. There is, however, no basis for such a view. Indeed, a review of the holiday statutes of other states shows a wide variety of terms used to give state legal significance to the President’s designation of holidays. (See, e.g., Hawaii Rev. Stat. § 8-1 [any day designated by proclamation by the President as holiday]; Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 124.19 [any day appointed and recommended by the President]; Okla. Stat. tit. 25, § 82.2 [such other days as may be designated by the President]; Ore. Rev. Stat. § 187.020 [every day appointed by the President as day of mourning, rejoicing or other special observance].)
Because there is no reason to believe that the President is aware of the legal consequences that attach to his use of certain words under the various state statutes, there appears to be no correlation between the particular words the President uses and his intention to designate a day of nationwide significance. Consequently, a literal interpretation of the statute produces the absurd result that a paid holiday is recognized not because of the President’s designation of a day of nationwide significance, but rather, through a semantic lottery of sorts in which the determinative factor is that the winning words (in this case, “day” of “thanksgiving”) appear in the President’s proclamation.
Ordinarily, if the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, there is no need for judicial construction. (In re Lance W. (1985) 37 Cal.3d 873, 886 [210 Cal.Rptr. 631, 694 P.2d 744].) Nonetheless, a court may determine whether the literal meaning of a statute comports with its purpose. (Lungren v. Deukmejian (1988) 45 Cal.3d 727, 735 [248 Cal.Rptr. 115, 755 P.2d 299].) We need not follow the plain meaning of a statute when to do so would “frustrate[] the manifest purposes of the legislation as a whole or [lead] to absurd results.” (People v. Belleci (1979) 24 Cal.3d 879, 884 [157 Cal.Rptr. 503, 598 P.2d 473]; accord, Wells Fargo Bank v. Superior Court (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1082, 1098 [282 Cal.Rptr. 841, 811 P.2d 1025]; see also People v. Broussard (1993) 5 Cal.4th 1067, 1071 [22 Cal.Rptr.2d 278, 856 P.2d 1134]; Younger v. Superior Court (1978) 21 Cal.3d 102, 113 [145 Cal.Rptr. 674, 577 P.2d 1014].) As we shall explain, the legislative purpose underlying sections 88203 and 79020 is effectuated not by a literal interpretation of the statutory language, but rather, by construing the statutory language in order to avoid capricious results unintended by the Legislature.
[341]*341Section 88203’s provision for holiday compensation on days appointed by the President for public fast, thanksgiving or holiday has existed unchanged since the 1963 enactment of its predecessor, section 13656. (Stats. 1963, ch. 96, § 1, p. 728.) Section 79020’s related mandate that public schools be closed on executive-appointed thanksgiving days originally appeared in the year 1911, when that provision became part of both former Political Code section 10 (now Gov. Code, § 6700) and Civil Code former section 7. (Stats. 1911, ch. 321, § 1, pp. 520-521; Stats. 1911, ch. 320, § 1, p. 521.) Borrowing from the existing list of holidays in former Political Code section 10, the Legislature in 1911 decreed that schools shall close “on every day appointed by the president of the United States or the governor of this state for a public fast, thanksgiving or holiday.” (Ibid.) The provision for the presidential appointment of holidays was part of both former Political Code section 10 and Civil Code section 7 as originally enacted in 1872, and derives verbatim from the Field Code. (See historical derivation, Deering’s Ann. Civ. Code (1990 ed.) § 7, p. 14.) The relevant portion of the Field’s Draft itself (Field’s Draft N.Y. Civ. Code, § 2017) contains no commentary pertaining to the presidential appointment of holidays.
Although the legislative history does not suggest any express legislative purpose behind the provision for holiday compensation and school closure on presidentially appointed days of public fast, thanksgiving, or holiday, the probable purpose of the provisions at issue here is to provide a mechanism whereby those connected with the state’s community colleges could join the rest of the nation in observing special, nonrecurring days contemplated by the President as national holidays. As previously noted, sections 88203 and 79020 entitle classified employees to holiday compensation and provide for school closure, respectively, on certain designated annual holidays, and any additional nonrecurring days “appointed” by the President or the Governor.
Under the statutory interpretation urged by CSEA and accepted by the Court of Appeal in its opinion, the issuance of a presidential proclamation designating days of thanksgiving automatically triggers school closure and an entitlement to holiday compensation. As discussed previously, we reject a literal interpretation of the statutes because focusing exclusively on the President’s fortuitous choice of words would lead to capricious results that the Legislature could not have intended. Because the “language of a statute should not be given a literal meaning if doing so would result in absurd consequences which the Legislature did not intend” (People v. Barksdale (1972) 8 Cal.3d 320, 334 [105 Cal.Rptr. 1, 503 P.2d 257]), our task becomes to determine a more reasonable interpretation consistent with the apparent intent of the framers and effectuating the statute’s purpose. (Cf. Provigo Corp. v. Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals Bd. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 561, 567 [342]*342[28 Cal.Rptr.2d 638, 869 P.2d 1163]; Younger v. Superior Court, supra, 21 Cal.3d at pp. 113-114.)
We noted earlier the probable narrow purpose of the provisions at issue here as providing a mechanism whereby those connected with the state’s community colleges could join the rest of the nation in observing those special, nonrecurring days contemplated by the President as national holidays. To effectuate this purpose, we hold that in order for the “appointment” of a holiday to occur, the President must not merely proclaim that a certain period of time be given over to thanksgiving, public fast, or holiday, but rather, must disclose an intent that such days be treated as a special national holiday. We believe that such a construction avoids the capriciousness of a statutory interpretation under which entitlement to a paid holiday is triggered by the President’s fortuitous choice of one set of words over another. (Cf. Provigo Corp. v. Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals Bd., supra, 1 Cal.4th at p. 567 [literal language of constitutional provision construed to avoid absurdity].)
III.
To determine whether the “appointment” of a holiday has occurred within the meaning of the Education Code, and more specifically, whether the President’s proclamation contemplated a special national holiday, we must first inquire whether the President has declared a corresponding federal holiday. This threshold requirement will clearly distinguish at the outset those presidential proclamations of a purely ceremonial character from those that were intended to designate a national holiday. It also avoids the anomalous situation created in this case, in which a presidential proclamation designating “National Days of Thanksgiving” is asserted to be the source of a paid holiday for California’s classified employees but which did not declare or result in a holiday for federal employees.
Interpreting the statutes as requiring the declaration of a corresponding federal holiday is fully consistent with our previous construction of the language in Government Code section 6700, subdivision (n), designating as holidays in the state “[e]very day appointed by the President or Governor for a public fast, thanksgiving or holiday.” In Laubisch v. Roberdo (1954) 43 Cal.2d 702, 710 [277 P.2d 9], we considered whether certain days were “holidays” appointed by the President for purposes of Code of Civil Procedure section 12a, which extends the time to bring an action to foreclose a mechanic’s lien. (43 Cal.2d at p. 709.) Noting that the purpose of section 12a was “to give persons required by law to perform an act within a certain period an extension of time equal to the number of intervening holidays which deprived them of access to public offices or institutions for the [343]*343transaction of business” (43 Cal.2d at p. 710), our construction of the word “holiday” in that case necessarily contemplated a day on which government offices would be closed.
Even if the requirement of a corresponding federal holiday is satisfied, however, the issue whether the President’s proclamation contemplated a national holiday is not necessarily resolved. The intent to designate a national holiday must also be apparent in the language of the proclamation, executive order, or other official announcement itself. (Cf. Capitol City Lodge No. 74, FOP v. City of Huntington (1988) 180 W.Va. 159 [375 S.E.2d 791, 794] [governor’s intention to recommend day of thanksgiving reflected by language of memorandum in its entirety].) In particular, we must examine the words and the tone of the President’s entire announcement, and the manner in which the President directs or recommends that the designated day be observed. It is appropriate to consider the language of the President’s proclamation or similar announcement, because from such an official decree the Legislature intended legal significance to arise. (See Laubisch v. Roberdo, supra, 43 Cal.2d at p. 710 [examination of presidential proclamation and executive orders]; Vidal v. Backs (1933) 218 Cal. 99, 101, 105 [21 P.2d 952, 86 A.L.R. 1134] [presidential proclamation]; see also Schmidt v. Christ (1973) 75 Misc.2d 947 [348 N.Y.S.2d. 473] [same].)
In determining whether the President contemplated a special national holiday, courts should compare the language of other presidential proclamations and orders with that of the proclamation in question. Such comparisons should provide a benchmark against which to gauge a proclamation’s potential for holiday status under the statutes.
Of course, a determination that the President did not contemplate a national holiday does not necessarily foreclose an entitlement to holiday compensation or school closure if the Governor exercises statutory authority to appoint a holiday. (See Mandel v. Hodges (1976) 54 Cal.App.3d 596, 607 [127 Cal.Rptr. 244, 90 A.L.R.3d 728] [Legislature vested Governor with statutory power to declare given day “ ‘appointed ... for a public . . . holiday,’ ” making the day a holiday under various provisions of the Government Code].) The point is illustrated by our disposition in Laubisch v. Roberdo, supra, 43 Cal.2d 702. In that case, we determined that state holidays did not arise from President Truman’s designation of August 15 and 16, 1945, as “V-J Day,” because those days were not “ ‘set apart’ ” as holidays within the meaning of Government Code section 6700, subdivision (n). (43 Cal.2d at p. 710.) Nonetheless, we found a holiday was created when California’s Acting Governor Houser proclaimed August 15,1945, “ ‘to be a legal holiday in the State of California . . . (Ibid:, see also Stanislaus Lumber Co. v. Pike (1942) 51 Cal.App.2d 54, 56 [124 P.2d 190] [Governor’s [344]*344proclamation designating July 3 as state holiday created holiday within meaning of former Political Code section 10 (predecessor to Gov. Code, § 6700, subd. (n))].)
IV.
Applying the standard set forth above for determining whether a holiday has been “appointed” within the meaning of sections 88203 and 79020, we conclude that an entitlement to holiday compensation did not arise as a result of President Bush’s proclaiming April 5, 6, and 7, 1991, as national days of thanksgiving. President Bush did not declare a federal holiday in connection with the national days of thanksgiving. Federal employees did not receive a paid holiday, and federal courts and offices remained open on April 5, 1991. (See Roderick, Surprise! It’s a Paid Day Off for Lucky Few, L.A. Times (Apr. 5, 1991) p. 3, col. 1.) Because we have determined that the creation of a corresponding federal holiday is a prerequisite to finding that the President contemplated a national holiday, and because this requirement was not satisfied, the appointment of a holiday did not occur within the meaning of the statutes. We note additionally that the Governor did not exercise statutory authority to declare a holiday. In California, state offices were open, state employees reported to work as usual and no additional holiday compensation was awarded. (Ibid.’, see also Johnson, Yesterday’s Gulf Thanksgiving Holiday Confused a Lot of People, S.F. Chronicle (Apr. 6, 1991) p. A5.)
Even if the President had declared a federal holiday, however, neither the language nor the tone of Proclamation 6257, taken as a whole, indicates that the President contemplated April 5 to 7, 1991, as anything more than a national ceremonial commemoration. The proclamation is essentially a prayer, acknowledging the end of the armed conflict in the Persian Gulf in sweeping, religious terms. It speaks in broad, general language of “unitfing] in thanksgiving to Almighty God” and “prayfing] for God’s help and guidance on the way that lies ahead.” (Pres. Proc. 6257, 56 Fed.Reg. 10353, supra, 1991 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News, at p. A26.) To observe the designated days of thanksgiving, the President asks that “Americans gather in homes and places of worship to give thanks . . .” and “that bells across the country be set ringing” at a specific hour. (Id., at p. A27.) He also directs that the nation’s flag be flown from all government buildings. It is difficult to view such requests as anything more than the traditional commemoration of a noteworthy national event.
Moreover, in his proclamation, the President specifically asks that Americans gather in homes and places of worship on April 5-7, 1991, a Friday, Saturday, and Sunday. These are so-called sabbath days for the major [345]*345Western religions, days when most Americans who worship on a weekly basis would normally do so. The President’s request thus appears to contemplate that Americans will incorporate the days of thanksgiving into their usual spiritual practices, and tends to confirm the ceremonial nature of his call for observance.
A comparison with the proclamation issued by President Richard Nixon concerning the Apollo moon landing in 1969 is instructive.7 (Pres.Proc. No. 3919, 34 Fed.Reg. 12079 (July 18, 1969), 1969 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News, p. 2817.) After designating Monday, July 21, 1969, to be a “National Day of Participation,” the President “invited[d] the Governors of the States ... to issue similar proclamations.” (Id. at p. 2818.) In addition to directing that the flag of the United States be displayed on all public buildings, he expressly ordered all federal agencies closed, with the exception of those relating to national security, and excused employees from duty on that day. Accounting for the fact that many states do not give legal effect to the appointment of holidays by the President, he “urge[d] the Governors of the States, the mayors of cities, the heads of school systems, and other public officials to take similar action.” (Ibid.) Private employers were also encouraged to “make appropriate arrangements so that as many of our citizens as possible will be able to share in the significant events of that day.” (Ibid.)
An examination of two other presidential proclamations, specifically, Presidential Proclamation No. 5936 for a “National Day of Prayer and Thanksgiving, 1989” (Pres.Proc. No. 5936, 54 Fed.Reg. 3575, supra, 1989 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News at p. A3) and Presidential Proclamation No. 6409 for a “National Day of Prayer, 1992” (Pres.Proc. No. 6409, 57 Fed.Reg. 8395, supra, 1992 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News at p. A18), offers a comparison from the other end of the spectrum. These are but two recent examples of the many proclamations calling for a day of prayer that have been issued annually by the President since 1952. (See id. at p. A19.) In neither situation was a federal holiday declared. Moreover, the language of these two proclamations is nearly identical to that of Proclamation 6257 in which President Bush called upon citizens to “gather in homes and places of worship to give thanks to Almighty God.” (Proc. 6257, supra, 56 Fed.Reg. 10353, 1991 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News at p. All.) The strictly ceremonial nature of these and other national day of prayer proclamations is evident, and to our knowledge none of them has resulted in an entitlement to [346]*346holiday compensation or school closure pursuant to section 88203 or 79020, or has been given effect under any other holiday statute. Their similarity in language to the proclamation at issue here is further indication that Proclamation 6257 should be accorded similar status.
CSEA draws our attention to the fact that, responding to a request of the Administrative Office of the Courts, the Attorney General concluded in an opinion letter that Proclamation 6257 constituted the appointment of a day of thanksgiving pursuant to California’s general holiday statute, Government Code section 6700, subdivision (n). Thereafter, the Chief Justice of California declared April 5, 1991, as a judicial holiday, closing all California trial courts for the transaction of judicial business on that day. Judicial employees were required to report to work on that day, however, and were not entitled to holiday compensation. We have reviewed the foregoing opinion and are not convinced by its analysis. Although the closure of the courts is not irrelevant to our inquiry, neither is it controlling.
At the time Proclamation 6257 was issued, its legal significance was far from clear and much confusion resulted. According to CSEA, in a survey of 282 California public school employers conducted by CSEA, many employers recognized the days of thanksgiving designated by Proclamation 6257, at least in part, and provided employees with compensating time off. Others refused to do so. The fact that the state courts were closed in response to Proclamation 6257 is more a reflection of the confusion that surrounded the President’s decree than support for CSEA’s position herein.
V.
For all the reasons set forth above, we conclude that for the presidential appointment of a holiday to occur, within the meaning of sections 88203 and 79020, it must be shown that the President’s proclamation contemplated a national holiday. As a threshold matter, the President must declare a corresponding federal holiday. Beyond this requirement, the language and tone of the proclamation must demonstrate the President’s intent to designate a national holiday.
In conjunction with his proclamation of “National Days of Thanksgiving,” President Bush did not declare a corresponding federal holiday. Thus, under the Education Code, no holiday was “appointed.” Furthermore, there is no indication in the language of the proclamation itself that the “National Days of Thanksgiving” were intended as anything more than a ceremonial commemoration. We conclude that the issuance of Proclamation 6257 did not result in the appointment of holidays and that, therefore, employees of the [347]*347community colleges are not entitled to holiday compensation for having worked on those days.8
The judgment of the Court of Appeal is reversed and the case remanded to that court with directions to vacate the writ of mandate in CSEA’s favor.
Arabian, J., Baxter, J., George, J., and Werdegar, J., concurred.