Calderon v. Community Presentation Corporation

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedNovember 7, 2022
Docket1:22-cv-07806
StatusUnknown

This text of Calderon v. Community Presentation Corporation (Calderon v. Community Presentation Corporation) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Calderon v. Community Presentation Corporation, (S.D.N.Y. 2022).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK ANA E. CALDERON, Plaintiff, 22-CV-7806 (LTS) -against- ORDER TO AMEND COMMUNITY PRESERVATION CORPORATION, Defendant. LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, Chief United States District Judge: Plaintiff, who is appearing pro se, brings this action under the Americans with Disabilities (“ADA”) Act and the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), alleging that Defendant Community Preservation Corporation (“CPC”) discriminated against her in her employment. She also asserts state law claims, including breach of contract, wrongful termination, and “personal injury.” By order dated September 13, 2022, the Court granted Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), that is, without prepayment of fees. For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint within 60 days of the date of this order. STANDARD OF REVIEW The Court must dismiss an IFP complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998). The Court must also dismiss a complaint when the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction of the claims raised. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). But the “special solicitude” in pro se cases, id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits – to state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the

pleader is entitled to relief. Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires a complaint to include enough facts to state a claim for relief “that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible if the plaintiff pleads enough factual detail to allow the Court to draw the inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. In reviewing the complaint, the Court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). But it does not have to accept as true “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,” which are essentially just legal conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded

factual allegations, the Court must determine whether those facts make it plausible – not merely possible – that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id. BACKGROUND The following facts are drawn from the complaint. In February 2022, I was discriminated by CPC’s employees after disclosing [to] them my protected disability. They failed to accommodate my needs. But instead decided to lay me off. Both the HR manager and the CEO discriminated [against] me. I described the symptoms of my illness, I provided Dr’s letter, but still was discriminated and rejected, ending in my dismissal of the offer. And leaving me unemployed. (ECF 1, at 5.) Plaintiff alleges, “I was very happy to be part of the company, however, my boss did not want to train me as done in previous situations.” (Id. at 6.) She contends that “[t]he HR manager wrote a false statement about my dismissal stating that I did not want to take a computer course.” (Id.) She seeks $8,000,000 in damages. DISCUSSION A. Fair Labor Standards Act Plaintiff alleges that CPC violated the FLSA, which seeks to eliminate “labor conditions detrimental to the maintenance of the minimum standard of living necessary for health,

efficiency, and general well-being of workers.” 29 U.S.C. § 202(a). It does so, in part, by setting substantive wage, hour, and overtime standards. Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 563 U.S. 1, 11 (2011). The statute requires all employers to pay each of their employees “not less than” the prevailing minimum wage. 29 U.S.C. § 206(a)(1). There is no administrative-exhaustion requirement for claims brought under the FLSA. See Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc. 450 U.S. 728, 740 (1981). The limitation period in which to bring a claim under FLSA is generally two years, but if the violation is willful, it is three years. 29 U.S.C. § 255(a). A claim under the FLSA accrues “when the employer fails to pay the required compensation for any workweek at the regular pay day for the period in which the workweek ends.” 29 C.F.R. § 790.21(b).

The facts alleged in the complaint do not suggest that CPC violated the FSLA with respect to Plaintiff’s employment. In fact, Plaintiff does not mention her wages or allege CPC’s failure to pay her the required compensation. Plaintiff therefore fails to state a claim under the FLSA. As set forth below, however, the Court grants Plaintiff leave to amend her FLSA claim. B. Americans with Disabilities Act Plaintiff asserts that CPC violated the ADA by failing to accommodate her disability. As described below, Plaintiff does not state a claim under the ADA. “The ADA prohibits discrimination against a ‘qualified individual on the basis of disability’ in the ‘terms, conditions, and privileges of employment.’” Kinneary v. City of New York, 601 F.3d 151, 155 (2d Cir. 2010) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a)). A person is disabled under the ADA if the person has “a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A). Discrimination under the ADA includes “a

failure to make reasonable modifications.” 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii).

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Related

Kinneary v. City of New York
601 F.3d 151 (Second Circuit, 2010)
Coppedge v. United States
369 U.S. 438 (Supreme Court, 1962)
Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight System, Inc.
450 U.S. 728 (Supreme Court, 1981)
Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.
455 U.S. 385 (Supreme Court, 1982)
National Railroad Passenger Corporation v. Morgan
536 U.S. 101 (Supreme Court, 2002)
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Salahuddin v. Cuomo
861 F.2d 40 (Second Circuit, 1988)
Hill v. Curcione
657 F.3d 116 (Second Circuit, 2011)
Laurance A. Tewksbury v. Ottaway Newspapers
192 F.3d 322 (Second Circuit, 1999)
Chin v. Port Authority of New York & New Jersey
685 F.3d 135 (Second Circuit, 2012)
Harris v. Mills
572 F.3d 66 (Second Circuit, 2009)
Dooley v. JetBlue Airways Corp.
636 F. App'x 16 (Second Circuit, 2015)
Cuoco v. Moritsugu
222 F.3d 99 (Second Circuit, 2000)
Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp.
179 L. Ed. 2d 379 (Supreme Court, 2011)

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Calderon v. Community Presentation Corporation, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/calderon-v-community-presentation-corporation-nysd-2022.